

STATES OF MEMORY



*The Polis, Panhellenism,
and the Persian War*

DAVID C. YATES

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For Jennifer and Lily

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Jackson, Mississippi

August 2018

Abbreviations

Ancient works and authors have been abbreviated as in *Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopedia of the Ancient World*. Modern journals of the classical world have been abbreviated as in *L'année philologique*. The following modern works have also been abbreviated:

HKDiels and W. Kranz. 1951–52. *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3 Vols.⁶ Berlin.

FD~~uilles~~ de Delphes. Paris.

FGH~~isch~~by et al. 1923–. *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*. Leiden.

IG73–. *Inscriptiones Graecae*. Berlin.

LSJ. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, et al. 1996. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Oxford.

RIIMeiggs and D. Lewis. 1969. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century b.c.* Oxford.

RCKassel and C. Austin. 1983–. *Poetae Comici Graeci*. Berlin.

PMGPage. 1962. *Poetae Melici Graeci*. Oxford.

RQJ. Rhodes and R. Osborne. 2003. *Greek Historical Inscriptions, 404–323 bc*. Oxford.

West²West. 1998. *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati*.² Oxford.

Suppplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.

SyllDittenberger. 1960. *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 4 Vols.³ Hildesheim.

Note on Sources

It has been my practice to use translations whenever possible and to modify or provide my own only when necessary. Translations are credited throughout with the last name of the translator, which corresponds to the list provided here. Modifications are noted where relevant. If unaccompanied by a name, the translation is my own.

Adams	C. D. Adams. 1919. <i>The Speeches of Aeschines</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Bury	R. G. Bury. 1929. <i>Plato IX: Timaeus, Critias, Cleitophon, Menexenus, Epistles</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Campbell	D. A. Campbell. 1991. <i>Greek Lyric III: Stesichorus, Ibycus, Simonides, and Others</i> . Cambridge, MA. D. A. Campbell. 1993. <i>Greek Lyric V: The New School of Poetry and Anonymous Songs and Hymns</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Cooper	I. Worthington, C. R. Cooper, and E. M. Harris. 2001. <i>Dinarchus, Hyperides, and Lycurgus</i> . Austin.
DeWitt and DeWitt	N. W. DeWitt and N. J. DeWitt. 1949. <i>Demosthenes VII: Funeral Speech, Erotic Essay (LX, LXI), Exordia and Letters</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Emlyn-Jones and Preddy	C. Emlyn-Jones and W. Preddy. 2013. <i>Plato V: Republic I, Books 1–5</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Geer	R. M. Geer. 1947. <i>Diodorus of Sicily IX: The Library of History, Books XVIII–XIX.65</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Hammond	M. Hammond. 2009. <i>Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War</i> , with an Introduction and Notes by P. J. Rhodes. Oxford.
Harris	I. Worthington, C. R. Cooper, and E. M. Harris. 2001. <i>Dinarchus</i> ,


Henderson	<i>Hyperides, and Lycurgus</i>. Austin. J. Henderson. 1998–2002. <i>Aristophanes</i>, 4 Vols. Cambridge, MA.
Jones	W. H. S. Jones. 1918–35. <i>Pausanias, Description of Greece</i>, 4 Vols. Cambridge, MA.
Lamb	W. R. M. Lamb. 1930. <i>Lysias</i>. Cambridge, MA.
Maidment	K. J. Maidment. 1941. <i>Minor Attic Orators I: Antiphon, Andocides</i>. Cambridge, MA.
Mensch	P. Mensch. 2010. <i>The Landmark Arrian: The Campaigns of Alexander</i>, Edited by J. Romm and R. B. Strassler with an Introduction by P. Cartledge. New York.
Natoli	A. F. Natoli. 2004. <i>The Letter of Speusippus to Philip II: Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary</i>. Stuttgart.
Oldfather	C. H. Oldfather. 1946. <i>Diodorus of Sicily IV: The Library of History, Books IX–XII.40</i>. Cambridge, MA.
Papillon	T. L. Papillon. 2004. <i>Isocrates II</i>. Austin.
Paton	W. R. Paton. 1916. <i>The Greek Anthology I, Books I–VI</i>. Cambridge, MA. W. R. Paton. 1925. <i>Polybius IV: The Histories, Books IX–XV</i>. Cambridge, MA.
Pearson	L. Pearson and F. H. Sandbach. 1965. <i>Plutarch: Moralia XI</i>. Cambridge, MA.
Perrin	B. Perrin. 1914. <i>Plutarch, Lives II: Themistocles and Camillus, Aristides and Cato Major, Cimon and Lucullus</i>. Cambridge, MA. B. Perrin. 1916. <i>Plutarch, Lives IV: Alcibiades and Coriolanus, Lysander and Sulla</i>. Cambridge, MA. B. Perrin. 1919. <i>Plutarch, Lives, VII: Demosthenes and Cicero, Alexander</i>

	<i>and Caesar</i> . Cambridge, MA.
	B. Perrin. 1921. <i>Plutarch Lives, X: Agis and Cleomenes, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, Philopoemen and Flamininus</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Purvis	A. L. Purvis. 2007. <i>The Landmark Herodotus, The Histories</i> , Edited by R. B. Strassler with an Introduction by R. Thomas. New York.
Race	W. H. Race. 1997. <i>Pindar</i> , 2 Vols. Cambridge, MA.
Rolfe	J. C. Rolfe. 1946. <i>Quintus Curtius: History of Alexander I, Books 1–5</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Sommerstein	A. H. Sommerstein. 2008. <i>Aeschylus I: Persians, Seven against Thebes, Suppliants, Prometheus Bound</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Tredennick	H. Tredennick and E. S. Forster. 1960. <i>Aristotle II: Posterior Analytics, Topica</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Usher	S. Usher. 1985. <i>Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Critical Essays II</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Vince	J. H. Vince. 1930. <i>Demosthenes I: Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Speeches, Speech against Leptines, I–XVII, XX</i> . Cambridge, MA.
Waterfield	R. Waterfield. 1998. <i>Plutarch: Greek Lives</i> , with Introduction and Notes by P. A. Stadter. Oxford.
Welles	C. B. Welles. 1963. <i>Diodorus of Sicily VIII: Library of History, Books XVI.66–XVII</i> . Cambridge, MA.
West	M. L. West. 1999. <i>Greek Lyric Poetry</i> . Oxford.
Yardley	J. C. Yardley. 2017. <i>Livy: History of Rome IX, Books 31–34</i> , Introduced by D. Hoyos. Cambridge, MA.

Maps




map 1 Greece and the Aegean



- | | |
|---|---|
| 103: The Southeast Entrance | 303: Treasury of Brasidas and the Acarnanians (?) |
| 104: Base of the Coreyean Bull | 313: Athenian Portico |
| 105: Base of the Arcadians | 407: Base of the Serpent Column |
| 106: Base of Philipomen | 408: Base of the Crotonians |
| 108: Unidentified Portico | 410b: Base of the Salaminis Apollo |
| 109: Agostolani Monument | 417: Altar of Apollo |
| 110: Marathon Statue Group | 420: Euryanion Monument |
| 112: Base of the Seven against Thebes and Epigoni | 422: Temple of Apollo |
| 223-225: Athenian Treasury and Statue Group | 518: Daimonaid Monuments |

map 2 Delphi

(Plate 5 in J.- F. Bommaleau. 1991. *Guide de Delphes: Le site*. Paris)



map 3 The Greco-Persian World

Introduction

The Collective Memories of the Persian War

Introduction

In 340/39 bce the orator Aeschines was dispatched to serve as the Athenian representative to the Delphic Amphictyony, an international body that oversaw the sanctuary at Delphi. Even for the fourth century the political situation was exceptionally volatile. Athens was at war with Philip II of Macedonia, but for now hostilities were limited to the north. A direct attack on Athens was unlikely. Philip had crossed into central Greece some six years earlier to support the Thebans in their fight against the Phocians, but now Philip had no such excuse, and his relations with the Thebans were not such that he felt confident to return uninvited. Yet Thebes was certainly no friend to Athens. In spite of their earlier cooperation against Sparta, relations between the two had cooled considerably since the battle of Leuctra had made Thebes the most powerful polis in Greece almost a generation earlier. The Athenians had quickly sided with Sparta and had more recently supported the Phocians in their unsuccessful war against Thebes. When Aeschines arrived at the meeting of the Amphictyony, the situation was explosive, and the match that set it off was a dispute over how the Persian War ought to be remembered.¹

A little over thirty years before, the temple of Apollo at Delphi, long ago built by the Alcmeonid clan of Athens, had been destroyed in an earthquake. By 340/39 sufficient progress had been made on the new temple for the Athenians to decorate its architraves with golden shields. The shields were intended to commemorate Athenian participation in the Persian War. Aeschines provides the dedicatory inscription, which read: “The Athenians, from the Persians and Thebans when they were fighting against the Greeks” (Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ Μήδων καὶ Θηβαίων, ὅτε τάναντία τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐμάχοντο: 3.116). Given the strained relations between Athens and Thebes at the time, the shields proclaimed a particularly divisive recollection of the war.² The Thebans were infuriated and had their allies, the Amphissians, propose a significant fine on the Athenians in the Amphictyonic Council both for dedicating the shields prior to the consecration of the temple and for inscribing them as they did. In response, Aeschines attacked the impiety of the Amphissians with

such ferocity that the ire of the council was actually turned against the accusers. A sacred war was declared against the Amphissians, which gave Philip the excuse he needed to enter central Greece. Athens gathered what allies it could (Thebes included) and marched to defeat at Chaeronea in the next year.³

At the heart of the altercation over the golden shields stood two very different versions of the Persian-War past. The Thebans had submitted to Xerxes in the wake of Thermopylae, but later presented their collaboration with Persia (or Medism) as the result of compulsion. When the Persian War was mentioned at Thebes, emphasis seems to have been placed on the abortive expedition to Tempe in Thessaly and the defensive action at Thermopylae, where the Thebans claimed to have served the Greek cause with distinction. Their collaboration with Persia was generally and understandably ignored.⁴ The situation at Athens was quite different. The Athenians stood at the forefront of the fight against Xerxes and often claimed that the overall victory could be attributed to their efforts alone. Persian-War memorials dotted Athens and Attica. At Delphi the golden shields were just one of at least four magnificent Athenian monuments to the war with Persia. When the Thebans were mentioned, their Medism was condemned in no uncertain terms.⁵ It is notable, however, that the facts of the case were hardly in dispute. The Thebans never claimed that they did not ultimately Medize. What was at issue here was how those facts should be framed, interpreted, and presented—and where.

There was undoubtedly a panhellenic dimension to this incident. The temple of Apollo at Delphi was one of the most visited and visible structures in the Greek world. The shields' unmistakable message of Athenian heroism and Theban betrayal was meant for panhellenic consumption. When the Thebans took offense, they responded through a panhellenic body, the Delphic Amphictyony. Although the delegates did not ultimately come to a decision about the shields, no one doubted the competence of this international body to judge the propriety of the dedication and its inscription. But despite the panhellenic setting, neither the Athenians nor the Thebans were advancing anything that could be called a commonly accepted Greek memory of the war. Theban attempts to mollify charges of Medism were variously accepted or rejected, depending on one's attitude toward the Thebans at the time. Athenian heroics were a staple in the Athenian tradition, but seldom appear in the traditions of the other Greek poleis in the classical period. Yet, it is not simply the case that the Athenian shields were parochial in outlook. The inscription was designed to offend. The absence of any other Medizers and the fact that the Thebans and Persians were placed in explicit opposition to

“the Greeks” leaves the distinct (and false) impression that the Thebans alone betrayed an otherwise united Greece. Far from representing a panhellenic version of the past, the Athenian shields emphasized and aggravated the deep fissures within the Greek world.

Above all, this episode underscores the stakes involved in the recollection and commemoration of the Persian War. Roughly a century and a half after Xerxes’s invasion, the political map of Greece had changed considerably. Beaten by the Thebans at Leuctra and broken by repeated invasions, Sparta was a shadow of its former self. The Peloponnese, once a bulwark of Spartan power, was now a hive of fractious poleis and shifting alliances. Athens had regained hegemony over much of the Aegean in the decades after the Peloponnesian War, only to lose it again during the Social War. It remained a force to be reckoned with, but it would never return to the heights of power reached after the Persian War. Thebes had bested Sparta at Leuctra, but a subsequent vacuum of leadership at home and a ruinous war with the Phocians had cost them dearly. A weakened Thebes continued to vie with Athens for primacy, even as new and more dangerous threats were emerging on the fringes of the Greek world. When Aeschines addressed the Amphictyony in 340/39, one such threat, Philip of Macedonia, was poised to enter central Greece on any pretext, and yet even then the memory of the Persian War was thought important enough to upset the delicate balance.

At first glance, the contentious fight over the golden shields at Delphi might appear to be an exception within the Persian-War tradition. The Thebans and Athenians fought against each other in the Persian War, after all, and despite a few decades of cooperation in the fourth century, their relationship had been largely hostile. Naturally they would have had different and indeed conflicting memories of the Persian War. But in the present study I intend to demonstrate that such differences were in fact typical of the Persian-War tradition in the classical period. I argue (1) that the Greeks recalled the Persian War as members of their respective poleis, not collectively as Greeks, (2) that the resulting differences were extensive and fiercely contested, and (3) that a mutually accepted recollection of the war did not emerge until Philip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great shattered the conceptual domination of the polis at the battle of Chaeronea. These conclusions suggest that any cohesion in the classical tradition of the Persian War implied by our surviving historical accounts (most notably Herodotus) or postulated by moderns is illusory. Like Athens and Thebes, each city-state used the common facts of the war to create a largely idiosyncratic story about its past.⁶

The idea that the individual poleis of the classical period had

different conceptions of the Persian War and that those conceptions were often in competition with each other is neither new nor particularly controversial.⁷ Yet the extent of these differences and the intensity with which the Greeks competed over them has never been adequately explored. This is in no small part because Persian-War memory has by and large been studied only in segments. Most modern treatments focus on a single battle or source.⁸ As a result, although individual aspects of Persian-War memory have received attention, the whole remains largely understudied. Even Jung's learned examination of Marathon and Plataea as *lieux de mémoire* has similar limitations.⁹ These two battles were frequently commemorated and did (among most Athenians at least) bookend the war,¹⁰ but a representative picture of the full tradition eludes us without a consideration of Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, and Mycale—to say nothing of more “peripheral” battles like Lade, Himera, Eurymedon, or Cyprian Salamis.¹¹ Moreover, the monuments and narratives surrounding any one battle, even a battle as apparently separable as Marathon, can only be completely understood in relation to the others. Indeed, some of the most magnificent Marathon monuments were erected almost a generation after the fact and so in full awareness of the subsequent commemoration of Xerxes's failed invasion.

In the absence of a detailed study of the entire Persian-War tradition, Herodotus's *Histories* and the extensive evidence from Athens have cast a long shadow. This is not at all surprising. Herodotus is one of our earliest and certainly our fullest source for the Persian War. The wealthy polis of Athens supplies the largest number of surviving Persian-War commemorations, which have consequently received greater scholarly attention.¹² The effects are widespread. Trends apparent only in Athens are often thought to have had purchase throughout the Greek world, or conversely, broad trends are supposed to have had a distinctly Athenian character.¹³ Such conclusions can impart a false sense of unity to the overall tradition and overstate the extent to which Athens influenced it. Herodotus gives us ample reason to doubt both propositions. In Book 7 he famously anticipates a broadly negative reaction to his conclusion that the Athenians had proven to be the saviors of Greece (7.139), a common Athenian claim in the fifth and fourth centuries. Despite an alleged Athenian bias, Herodotus was capable of seeing the Persian War from multiple perspectives and often cites significant regional differences without hesitation.¹⁴ At first glance, then, the *Histories* would seem to provide a satisfying scaffold on which to assemble our surviving evidence.¹⁵ But for all the times that Herodotus underscores variations within the Persian-War tradition, he nevertheless organizes them within a single overarching narrative.¹⁶ We mistake literature

for reality if we assume that this narrative unity had any existence outside of Herodotus's *Histories*.

My contention that the Persian-War tradition lacked any significant cohesion in the classical period is rather more controversial. The Persian War involved a number of the most powerful poleis in the Greek world, fighting together against a foreign invader. Naturally, the Greek victory is thought to have fostered a growing sense of panhellenism.¹⁷ The term *panhellenism* is of modern coinage, and its application to the ancient world is somewhat confused to say the least.¹⁸ It can refer broadly to an awareness of shared Greek culture and identity, which emerged slowly within the Greek-speaking world and was then sharpened by contact with the so-called barbarians. It can also refer to a program advocating political unity among ethnic Greeks (or rather a significant portion of them), usually in reaction to a real or perceived external threat, often the Persian Empire. This second meaning assumes the existence of the first, but does not necessarily imply a common or altruistic drive for unity. Claims to hegemony and empire often lurked behind the ideals of political panhellenism. The direct influence of cultural and political panhellenism on the commemoration of the Persian War is often alluded to, but Michael Jung has presented the most detailed case for it.¹⁹ He concludes that panhellenism and Persian-War memory were linked from the start, that the Spartans attempted to use this connection to advance their own hegemonic interests, and that their efforts were immediately frustrated by the larger collective of allies, who insisted upon a more representative commemoration of their joint victory.²⁰ Jung's contention that the Greeks were capable of thinking of the Persian War in panhellenic terms is in itself unobjectionable, and his conclusion about Sparta's hegemonic ambitions (true or not) fit quite well with our second definition of panhellenism. But his further claim that the Greek allies defended and propagated a common panhellenic memory of the war in response is much more difficult to accept. This is no small point for Jung, who argues that the collective rejection of Sparta's usurpation of the Persian-War tradition inspired a memory of the war that transcended the polis—a *polisübergreifend* memory, or what I term *transcendent panhellenism* in the following.²¹ This panhellenic memory of the war was, according to Jung, actively sponsored by the Hellenic League and maintained by rituals performed at Plataea.²² From these power centers, transcendent panhellenism competed with the claims of the various poleis down to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, when the parochial finally superseded the panhellenic.²³ This line of argument has some important implications for the overall cohesion of the Persian-War tradition in the classical period since it would suggest

that a shared panhellenic conception of the war played a decisive role in the initial formulation of the tradition and continued to influence it for decades to come.

I suggest a very different relationship between panhellenism and the Persian-War tradition. I maintain that the collective bonds tying the Hellenic League together were simply insufficient to prompt any significant number of individuals within it to remember the war as Greeks. Instead, our best evidence indicates that the Greeks remembered the war as members of their respective city-states. This focus on the achievements of the state did not emerge after a long struggle with a competing, panhellenic memory, but rather dominated the Persian-War tradition from the start. In short, a panhellenic version of events did not compete and eventually fail (as Jung argues);²⁴ it failed immediately and so offered no viable alternative to seeing the war from the parochial perspective of the polis. This is not to deny that there was a sense among the Greeks that their city-states belonged to a larger community of Greeks, or that this community could be invoked on occasion to forward local interests. The Persian War was fought on a manifestly panhellenic scale, and countless Persian-War commemorations make mention of “the Greeks.” But these commemorations almost invariably cite the larger community of Greeks as a passive backdrop against which the heroics of the individual polis are paraded. This is panhellenism to be sure, but not the kind Jung and others argue for in the years after the Persian War.

Support for the notion that the Greeks thought of the war in terms of a panhellenic collective comes largely (but by no means exclusively) from our later sources. When these sources are assumed to reflect earlier trends, the case for a panhellenic commemoration of the war in the classical period can seem quite persuasive, but as I show in the following, such assumptions are often unfounded. When our evidence is returned to its proper chronological context, it becomes clear that the Greeks did not begin to commemorate the war as Greeks with any frequency until the hellenistic period. This shift has gone largely unnoticed.²⁵ Its cause, I argue, can be traced to Philip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great. Although often overlooked in studies of Persian-War memory,²⁶ their impact was significant and twofold. At the most basic level, Philip and Alexander initiated a massive propaganda campaign intended to turn the tradition from a patchwork of conflicting claims into a panhellenic narrative that could be used to unify all Greece against the Persians. At a deeper level, the rise of Macedonia marked a major shift in the basic assumptions that underlay Greek political life. Philip’s victory at Chaeronea had not merely unseated one hegemon for another; it dealt a fatal blow to the regime of competing city-states that maintained the

classical tradition of the war. The new powers in the Greek world had little use for the exclusive and divisive claims of the classical poleis. They too wanted access to the grand tradition of the Persian War and the legitimacy it conferred. As a result, the transcendent panhellenism that underlay Philip and Alexander's self-interested propaganda campaign soon came to inform Persian-War memories that were circulated throughout the hellenistic world.

When Aeschines rose to defend the Athenian memory of the Persian War that appeared on the golden shields, he had no idea that he was setting in motion a series of events that would ultimately undermine the political assumptions upon which that commemoration and indeed almost all classical commemorations of the Persian War sat. In this work I explore in detail the classical tradition that informed the heated debate over the golden shields and the changed tradition that followed. Although my focus falls squarely on the classical period down to the Lamian War (480–322 bce), the final chapter is reserved for a brief discussion of commemorative trends in the hellenistic period down to the end of the third century bce. The immediate object of this study is to provide a more accurate understanding of the commemorative dynamics that shaped Greek recollections of the Persian War, but the implications extend much further. The Persian War was one of the most remembered events in Greek history. A thorough examination of its commemoration sheds new light on Greek memorial culture in the classical period generally, underscores the importance of the parochial in Greek thought, and adds to ongoing debates about the development of panhellenism. But before we turn to the commemorations themselves, it is important to review some fundamental aspects of memory theory and the particular methodological challenges of applying that theory to the ancient world.

Theorizing Memory in Ancient Greece

The treatment of memory theory has been quite uneven in previous studies of the Persian-War tradition.²⁷ Reluctance to address the subject is understandable. Almost two decades ago Kerwin Klein could say of memory that “the appearances of the word are so numerous, and its apparent meanings so legion, that it would take the work of a lifetime to begin disentangling them.”²⁸ With the stream of memory studies flowing unabated from then to now, the prospects of providing a full synthesis of the state of scholarship are even more daunting today.²⁹ Consequently, I offer here only a few observations that will serve to clarify my own use of existing memory theory. I consider five

key concepts: the definition of collective memory, the relationship between power and memory, the nature of memorial communities, memory as narrative, and finally, the transmission of memory over time.

Collective Memory

In the early twentieth century Maurice Halbwachs employed the term *collective memory* as a way to understand the impact of society on individual memory. He argued that there was a social aspect to all memory.³⁰ When individuals recall the past and attempt to give it meaning in the present, they rely on vast stores of terms, images, associations, and values. These necessary concomitants of memory do not and cannot properly belong to the individual alone. Rather, they are shared in common with larger or smaller groups and are often supported by habits, customs, and social institutions particular to those groups. Thus the memories held by the members of a family, town, office, profession, or polity will overlap to the extent that we may say that a collective memory exists among them.

Despite broad agreement about what collective memory is, serious objections have been raised about Halbwachs's precise formulation of it. Halbwachs often speaks as if a collective memory exists independent of the individuals who compose the collective.³¹ The implication of such a conclusion would be at once implausible and disquieting. The simple fact is that collectives do not remember. Only an individual may recall or forget something about the past. To assert the contrary strikes many as a return to such happily abandoned notions as the spirit or nature of a race or nation. Yet Halbwachs himself was fully aware that only individuals remember.³² He adds only that they do so within a social context. Furthermore, Halbwachs's insistence that individuals recall the past within numerous frames of memory militates against the notion that any one of those collectives could fully or even adequately define the individuals who constitute it.³³ Still, it is important here to underscore some conclusions that Halbwachs himself did not emphasize. Collective memories have no existence beyond the individuals who remember them.³⁴ Collectives, as well as their perceived identities and memories, are rather social constructs and exist only to the extent that they are believed to exist.³⁵ It is in part because Halbwachs did not draw sufficient attention to the role of the individual that new terms have been proposed to replace *collective memory*.³⁶ But it remains an acceptable and useful term so long as the preceding caveats are understood. For the simple sake of avoiding the repetition of a single *terminus technicus*, I use *collective*, *social*, and *cultural memory*, *recollection*, and

Power

Regardless of what we call collective memory, the influence of power relationships upon it is undeniable and frequently cited.³⁸ But what do we mean when we say that memory responds to power? The most obvious way to conceive of this relationship is to say that those in power will frequently manipulate memories about the past to their own advantage, and while there is truth in the old adage that “history is written by the winners,” this observation is too sweeping to be of much use for our present purposes. Roger Bastide offers a productive way to think about the problem that foregrounds the individual.³⁹ Collective memory, he argues, is a network of exchange, in which each individual contributes his or her own memories with the help of *cultural devices* like language, myths, rituals, texts, and monuments.⁴⁰ The result is no mere assemblage of individual memory. The whole is greater than the sum of its constituent parts, since it “involves the integration of various different personal pasts into a single common past that all members of a particular community come to remember collectively.”⁴¹ But as Foucault warns us, exchanges within such networks will not be equal.⁴² Social differentiation naturally gives to the memories of some an authority denied to the memories of others. We see this basic principle at work throughout the Persian-War tradition. Powerful political figures like Themistocles, Cimon, and Alexander the Great were in a unique position to influence broader perceptions of the war. So too were prominent artists and intellectuals like Simonides, Aeschylus, Polygnotus, Herodotus, and Ephorus. Empowered groups within the polis (such as hoplites, free citizens, and males) were likewise well placed to focus commemoration on their efforts alone. Internationally, the victorious allies had a far better chance to frame the recollection of the war than did the defeated Medizers. Certainly Aeschines had no difficulty deflecting accusations leveled against the Athenians by the Thebans and Amphissians.

At the same time, however, an understanding of collective memory as a network suggests some distinct limits on the influence of powerful individuals or groups. Foucault argues that power is not ultimately the exclusive preserve of those we generally term powerful.⁴³ Power is not a point or possession that can be held or monopolized; it is rather the name given to the complex network of unequal relationships that both he and Bastide see running through any society. Considered from this perspective, collective memory cannot be reduced to the willful manipulation of those at the top. Of course, social elites do indeed

have an outsized influence on how the past is recalled, but to be effective, elite memories must be accepted by the numerous, historically insignificant, shareholders of power.⁴⁴ Self-interest is manifestly at play, but we must account for the self-interest of a much broader segment of society. Elite commemorations of the past can be appropriated by others, reinterpreted over time, or fail outright if they do not account for the expectations of those being asked to do the remembering.⁴⁵ Even when the past is presented in a broadly acceptable way, Foucault suggests that acceptance will never be total.⁴⁶ We do not ultimately share a collective mind, and for every widely accepted memory, there will invariably be *counter memories*, or alternate versions of the past held by disempowered groups within society.⁴⁷ As we shall see, even an individual as powerful as Alexander the Great maintained only imperfect control over the full network of power and thus imperfect control over broad perceptions of the Persian-War past.

Memorial Communities

The term *memorial community* is borrowed from Peter Burke, who uses it to designate communities holding conflicting interpretations of the past within a given society.⁴⁸ For my present purposes, I do not wish to use the term so restrictively. I use it to designate not a type of collective, but rather all collectives that share memories of the past. In this broader sense, memorial communities exist everywhere humans interact.⁴⁹ Some, like the family or village, are quite small and are maintained by almost daily face-to-face interactions.⁵⁰ Others are too large to sustain such interpersonal connections and exist only because their members believe they exist. Benedict Anderson has dubbed such collectives *imagined communities*,⁵¹ and it is with these communities that we are principally concerned here.⁵² In one sense, the term rightly emphasizes the defining role of the individual, but we should not allow the somewhat whimsical associations we tend to have for the word “imagined” or “imagination” to suggest that the individual retains full autonomy within the collective. To the extent that a memorial community possesses internal cohesion, it will exert influence over the kinds of memories that individuals within them are likely to form and share. It predisposes them to see the world in a particular way, through the lens of these shared memories, and to act accordingly.⁵³ When this fails to occur, the “imagined” community ceases to exist in any meaningful sense of the word.

Shared memories in imagined communities do not emerge casually, as they might in a face-to-face community. Because of the distances involved, these memories must be propagated and then maintained

through cultural devices.⁵⁴ Consequently, one-time participation in an event, even one as significant as the Persian invasion, would not in itself generate a shared memory of that event for those who experience it or subsequently remember it.⁵⁵ The point is critical for our present purposes. As noted earlier, it has been tempting to assume that for a time the Greeks recalled and commemorated the Persian War as Greeks. But at the heart of the present study is the proposition that the panhellenic memorial community lacked the capacity to produce or sustain a shared memory of the Persian War and that instead the more cohesive and influential state communities very nearly monopolized public recollections of that war throughout the classical period. This was not because remembering the Persian War as a citizen was the only option open to the Greeks. When Aeschines addressed the Amphictyony in 340/39, he was in fact a member of countless memorial communities, both imagined and face-to-face.⁵⁶ He was a member of a family, a deme, and a tribe, each with its own distinct collective memories. He was an orator, a politician, and a partisan of a particular political faction at Athens. He was also an Athenian, an Ionian, and finally every bit as much a Greek as the Amphiſſians he berated. But when he rose to address this panhellenic body, he rose as an Athenian to defend a distinctly Athenian memory of the war. In so doing, he reproduced and reaffirmed the priorities of the golden shields and countless other classical commemorations of the Persian War.

Narrative

The degree to which collective memory does or does not reflect the influence of the polis can only be determined through an examination of the narratives explicitly or implicitly associated with its commemorations. I use the term *commemoration* loosely here and throughout to refer to any speech, text, action, or artifact that produces or evokes a narrative of the past.⁵⁷ These narratives stand at the center of a communicative process that binds a memorial community together and produces what we call collective memory.⁵⁸ It is, indeed, only as narrative that memory can be transmitted from one person to another, from one generation to another. Our surviving narratives of the Persian War can be as small as a few words in an inscription or as large as Herodotus's historical account. But whatever its size, a narrative can never be large enough or detailed enough to tell the whole story of the past. Hayden White has argued that the past is manifestly too complex for that.⁵⁹ Like a map, a narrative of the past becomes comprehensible only by leaving certain details out. The process by which information is included or excluded is never

innocent or random, and almost invariably responds to the priorities of those doing the commemorating and subsequent remembering.⁶⁰ In this way a string of facts is made meaningful to those sharing the story.

There are several different kinds of narratives that will concern us here. There are the stories that a monument, ritual, or literary work tells about itself through text, image, topography, or performative action. Following Yael Zerubavel, I term these narratives *commemorative narratives*.⁶¹ The golden shields themselves made clear that they commemorated an Athenian victory over the Persians and Thebans in the dedicatory inscription, underscored the extent of that victory through the objects dedicated (numerous golden shields), and emphasized its significance with a prominent location (the architraves of the temple of Apollo at Delphi). Such narratives do not exist in a vacuum, however. Commemorative narratives are meaningful because they call to mind larger stories about the events they explicitly commemorate. In addition to the specific story they told about themselves, the golden shields were also intended to recall a much wider array of memories—a larger story about the battle of Plataea, the Persian War, and Greek history in general. It is only at this level that the grave consequences of the dedication begin to make sense.

These larger narratives are often called *master narratives*, but the term itself is somewhat ambiguous. Master narratives stand in some relationship of mastery to other narratives, but the nature of that mastery is not always spelled out. At one end of the spectrum, master narratives can denote stories of the past told by groups seeking to master other groups, whose stories about the past can be dubbed *counter narratives*.⁶² At the other end of the spectrum, master narratives are understood as super narratives; that is, large narratives composed of manifold smaller narratives and thus holding a position of mastery over its component parts. While some scholars favor one definition over the other, many make use of a combination of the two.⁶³ Both definitions of master narrative are quite useful for disentangling the various surviving stories of the Persian War, but only to the extent that they can first be disentangled from each other. I propose to term narratives through which the empowered of a given community attempt to impose their stories upon others *dominant narratives*.⁶⁴ Narratives that oppose them remain *counter narratives*. Stripped of any implication of mastery sought by a particular group, the term *master narrative* becomes the name for any narrative that tells a story of a significant segment of the past and incorporates smaller commemorative narratives. We should not, however, imagine that these master narratives existed in a fixed form, deposited like so many official measures in a kind of mnemonic archive. Some of our sources

may attempt to give voice to the larger story of the Persian War, but as Cubitt reminds us, “for most people and for most purposes, having a sense of such a past is a vaguer and more impressionistic experience . . . less a matter of having the past precisely plotted than of possessing a few relatively central symbolic references . . . around which broader associations of meaning can be flexibly organized.”⁶⁵ Master narratives are not infinitely tensile; these broader stories of the past exerted significant influence over how individual episodes were commemorated, but they are not simply big commemorative narratives. They are materially different. Commemorative narratives exist. They can be seen and read. Master narratives are evoked. They are implicit and are constructed in dialogue with the various commemorations an individual interacts with most often.

It is perhaps the allusive nature of master narratives that has most obscured their importance in Persian-War memory. When scholars have identified differences in the tradition, they have by and large done so at the concrete level of commemorative narratives, and so differences about specific points have dominated the discussion. Far less attention has been paid to the larger master narratives that framed these smaller narratives. Consequently, there has been an assumption that disputes over the details of the Persian War occurred within a commonly accepted master narrative, and that assumption is wholly understandable. The facts of the Persian War, or its *chronicle*, to use Hayden White’s terminology, remained a store of material available to all.⁶⁶ The Greeks also shared a common culture that predisposed them to recall the past in the light of certain broadly held *cultural paradigms*.⁶⁷ Indeed, paradigms like patriarchy, militarism, and especially parochialism would all have a manifest impact on the classical tradition of the war throughout Greece. But between the explicit claims of the commemorative narratives and the common tools of culture and historical fact stand the master narratives. It has been tempting to fall back on Herodotus or modern historical reconstructions to supply this master narrative, but almost by definition such synthetic accounts would not have held currency anywhere in classical Greece.⁶⁸ I argue that the Greek poleis did not simply insist upon different details within an accepted frame of meaning; they created idiosyncratic master narratives into which those details fit. The disputes in our extant commemorative narratives were, therefore, merely part of much deeper differences that extended to such basic questions as when the war occurred, where it occurred, and what it all meant. Both commemorative and master narratives were still informed by elemental similarities of fact and culture, but in the classical period those common elements were consistently marshalled to emphasize differences between the dedicating parties.

Tradition

When Aeschines defended the golden shields before the Amphictyony, neither he nor his opponents remembered the Persian War. Strictly speaking, memory does not survive past the first generation. When we say that Aeschines, Demosthenes, or Philip of Macedonia remembered the Persian War, we are speaking metaphorically. What each thought he knew about the war was derived from a tradition in which contemporary memories were transmitted orally or externalized in commemorations.⁶⁹ But the recollection of tradition is not a passive process of retrieval from a kind of mental or cultural storehouse. Each generation understands the past within the context of its own present.⁷⁰ Aeschines and his fellow Athenians did not (and were not likely to) recall the battle of Plataea in the same way it was recalled in the years immediately after the battle. In the 470s the Thebans posed no serious threat to Athens and so were hardly worth the exhortation we find on the golden shields. The situation in the mid-fourth century was, as we saw earlier, entirely different, and it is that contemporary reality that the shields were responding to. Tradition is therefore a dynamic process.⁷¹ Each new act of remembrance opens the possibility for the past to be recollected in a different way, one that better explains or befits present circumstances. This is not to say that collective memory is wholly at the mercy of present whims. The real experiences of a community strongly influence how the past is commemorated initially, and the subsequent force of preexisting tradition adds a powerful conservative tendency.⁷²

This tension between the tug of innovation and pull of conservatism results in a slow, but constant evolution of collective memory, even in a relatively stable society.⁷³ The principle is amply shown in Athens, where numerous studies have demonstrated subtle changes in how the battle of Marathon was perceived over the course of the classical period.⁷⁴ Sufficient evidence is lacking in other localities, but it is reasonable to assume a similar pattern. From the outside and centuries later, these changes can seem quite obvious, but from the inside they generally go unnoticed.⁷⁵ Changes are slow, subtle, and build on preexisting notions of the past. This constant and nearly imperceptible evolution of tradition breaks down, however, when the power relationships and cultural paradigms on which collective memories rely are seriously disturbed.⁷⁶ Eric Hobsbawm has coined the term *invented tradition* to describe the commemorations of the past that emerge in such moments of crisis.⁷⁷ These traditions are not the result of the slow constant change of memory, but are rather conscious attempts to link a radically altered present to the past. Although Hobsbawm himself is thinking largely of the particular forces that

altered tradition in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the term has obvious purchase in the ancient world as well.⁷⁸ After all, radical change was not a product of modernity alone. I argue in the following that the rise of Macedonia and the consequent decline of the regime of competing poleis that had dominated Greece in the classical period represented a paradigm shift that in turn created a host of invented traditions throughout and beyond mainland Greece.

Bound with the issue of tradition is Pierre Nora's popular phrase *lieu de mémoire*.⁷⁹ It has been used widely in reference to the ancient world,⁸⁰ but it is important to note that for Nora a *lieu de mémoire* can only exist in the postmodern context. It appears when an acceleration of history and a professionalization of historiography strain the relationship between a memorial community and its collective memories, resulting in a sense of incredulity on the part of the former to the latter. Interactions with *lieux de mémoire* "seem like exercises in nostalgia, sad and lifeless . . . rituals for a ritual-less society; fleeting incursions of the sacred into a disenchanted world."⁸¹ Even if we sever the connection with postmodernity,⁸² *lieu de mémoire* loses all meaning as a *terminus technicus* without an overwhelming sense of incredulity from the community whose collective memory it is intended to recall.⁸³ It is simply French for a site of memory (what I term a *commemoration* in the preceding) and holds no meaning beyond what the English phrase denotes.⁸⁴ While it is certainly possible that Persian-War commemorations became proper *lieux de mémoire* in antiquity, I argue here that even well into the hellenistic period they remained fully embedded within the contemporary *milieu de mémoire*, Nora's term for a community's integrated sites of memory before incredulity isolates them into *lieux de mémoire*.⁸⁵

This survey of memory theory has been intentionally brief. Several aspects of the five concepts addressed here have been omitted or treated only in passing. This is not an accident. Discussions of memory theory in historical case studies are all too often isolated in the introduction—treated in detail at the beginning, but then largely forgotten throughout the rest of the work. I pursue here a different model. What appears in the preceding is not intended as an encapsulation of the memory theory that stands behind the present case study, but a primer for concepts that appear throughout the book. Each of these points will be expanded upon later as the ancient evidence demands. This integrative approach permits a more dynamic relationship between memory theory and the case study of the Persian War and will, I hope, contribute to our understanding of both. Indeed, the decentralized nature of political power in classical Greece makes it an ideal environment for studying how the past is manipulated, contested, and invented—both then and now.

The Evidence

Conclusions about the Greek memory of the Persian War can only be as accurate as our evidence, and our evidence is notably lacking when compared to studies of modern commemoration. Halbwachs sets out the challenge quite clearly: “should I wish to restore the remembrance of a certain event in its entirety, I would have to bring together all the partial and distorted reproductions concerning it that are held by all group members.”⁸⁶ The task, as Halbwachs well knew, is impossible, but modern studies are in a much better position to approximate the ideal. In her examination of Israeli national tradition, Yael Zerubavel rightly notes that “a wide range of formal and informal commemorations fuels the vitality of collective memory. Holiday celebrations, festivals, monuments, memorials, songs, stories, plays, and educational texts continue to compete with scholarly appraisals of the past in constructing collective memory.”⁸⁷ Other treatments of modern collective memory rely on an equally impressive array of information.⁸⁸ The entire body of evidence we have for the commemoration of the Persian War in antiquity can muster nothing like what we see in these examples. Only a fraction of the Persian-War commemorations produced in the centuries after the war is attested. What we have is impressive by ancient standards, but cannot be assumed to be a representative sample of the whole.⁸⁹ Only certain types of commemorations were likely to survive or be recorded, and they are not evenly distributed across the Greek world in time or space. We can reconstruct the historical facts of the war with some confidence, but disentangling those facts from the subsequent commemoration of the war is another matter. Before we begin our examination of the ancient Greek memory of the Persian War, we must first establish the kinds of conclusions that our source material can support.

The commemorations of the Persian War in antiquity come down to us in three basic forms: the extant monuments, literary texts that recall the war, and finally, the commemorations described in those texts. Our most immediate and in many ways our most valuable evidence is the monuments themselves. An impressive number of Persian-War monuments was constructed throughout antiquity, and many have been securely identified. These monuments obviously prove most illuminating when they survive in sufficiently good condition to bear thorough examination. The Serpent Column, now in Istanbul, and the Athenian treasury at Delphi stand out. Such monuments provide direct access to contemporary commemorative narratives. Unfortunately, the number of Persian-War monuments that fit this criterion is quite small. Most are in a state of considerable

disrepair. The extant base of the statue of Zeus at Olympia or the foundation of the Stoa Poikile in Athens can provide intriguing clues, but must be heavily supplemented with our surviving literary evidence to speak directly to the commemorative narratives they were originally intended to publicize.

These literary sources provide the bulk of the evidence we have for the memory of the Persian War.⁹⁰ We can think of the text itself as a kind of artifact of collective memory. When Herodotus wrote, he did so as a member of contemporary memorial communities and for audiences whose collective memories he shared or was at least familiar with.⁹¹ The same could be said of any of our ancient authors, but we cannot assume that the community whose memories an author reflected at any given point was that of a significant number of people, much less an entire state. They may reflect the recollections of much smaller groups within the state or those holding counter memories of the war. Much depends on genre and the predispositions of the author.⁹² While a Thucydides or Plato may preserve narratives that ran counter to popular opinion in Athens, we can assume that this was rather less likely when the work was produced on commission or for the general public. Bernd Steinbock has demonstrated that Athenian orators constructed their arguments in light of their audience's commemorative expectations.⁹³ The success of Simonides's poems depended in part on telling the Corinthians, Athenians, and others what they wanted to hear.⁹⁴ Pindar attests to this tendency directly when he says, "I shall earn from Salamis the Athenians' gratitude as my reward, and at Sparta I shall tell of the battle before Cithaeron [i.e. Plataea]" (*Pyth.* 1.75–77, tr. Race). Herodotus's position was not entirely different, according to the later biographical tradition. He presented his research throughout Greece and was thought to have received handsome rewards from audiences pleased with his presentation.⁹⁵ Regardless of whether we believe such stories in detail, Herodotus would not have been insensitive to the expectations of his listeners.

Both the extant monuments and our surviving texts serve as potential primary sources for the collective memories of the communities in which (or for which) they were produced. But by far the largest number of attested Persian-War commemorations comes at second hand.⁹⁶ Our literary accounts are full of references to a wide variety of rituals, stories, and monuments. Herodotus frequently attributes this or that version of events to members of one polis or another. Thucydides has his Athenian and Plataean speakers refer to the Persian War in their own words. Plutarch and Pausanias include numerous descriptions of commemorations from across the Greek world. We cannot take these reports at face value, however. Several

later sources attest monuments and rituals that they firmly believed could be dated to the years immediately after the Persian War, but which were almost certainly later additions. As noted earlier, memory is not static. Rituals evolve, views change, and monuments are restored, renewed, and sometimes fabricated, often without attracting any particular attention. Plutarch, Pausanias, and others surely believed that they were seeing Persian-War-era monuments or unaltered elements of long-standing rituals, but we cannot afford to make the same assumption.⁹⁷ Some of these uncertainties can be eliminated when we turn to near contemporary sources, particularly Herodotus and Thucydides, but even here we must proceed with caution. Contemporary biases were, if anything, stronger than those that animated later writers.⁹⁸ Thucydides may very well reflect contemporary Plataean perspectives on the Persian War, but we must never lose sight of the fact that he had his own reasons for presenting the material as he did.

This type of evidence imposes some obvious interpretive limitations. There is a strong bias toward production as opposed to reception.⁹⁹ We can say that a monument was erected or a particular version of events propagated, but seldom can we trace how a given community reacted to it. There are exceptions. We know how the Thebans responded to the golden shields. We know that the epigram Pausanias the regent placed upon the Serpent Column after Plataea also elicited a negative reaction. But these exceptions only serve to prove the rule—reception is a blind spot. Much of our evidence also tends to reflect what we might call official or public memory, which itself tends to reflect dominant narratives. Monuments and poems commissioned by the various city-states are rather obvious examples, but our surviving historians and antiquarians were also likely to over-represent this type of commemoration. Herodotus, Plutarch, Pausanias and others were attracted by noteworthy elements of the Persian-War tradition: views held by large swaths of people, sumptuously funded monuments, and conspicuous rituals. Some evidence survives for the collective memories held by smaller communities, but most of what we have represents (or rather purports to represent) the memories maintained by larger memorial communities: poleis, kingdoms, and leagues. We must also acknowledge that our reliance on literary sources means that most of what we know has been transmitted to us by an elite intelligentsia.¹⁰⁰ This is a limitation to be sure, but it does provide some perspective on our surviving public commemorations. As noted earlier, elite memories do not inevitably constitute the dominant narrative within their memorial communities, and several of our authors seem to advocate counter narratives of the war. In sum, our evidence tends to represent the supply side of dominant and/or elite

narratives. As we know from countless memory studies, this does not in any way reflect the inherent complexity of collective remembering.¹⁰¹ We must concede at the outset that only a partial picture of the Persian-War tradition is recoverable, one that privileges the most powerful members of the largest memorial communities.

This imperfect view of Persian-War memory is further curtailed by the uneven distribution of our evidence. Certain localities at certain times generated numerous commemorations; others left no trace of any mnemonic activity. Thucydides anticipated the problem when he opined that later generations would judge Athens many times more powerful than Sparta because the remains of Athens would be so much more impressive (Thuc. 1.10). True to his conjecture, Athenian evidence dominates, while only a handful of commemorations emerge from Sparta—to say nothing of other states like Megara, Corinth, and Tegea. Our evidence is dissipated still further when we place it in its proper chronological sequence. In the case of Megara, for example, we have two poems from the *Theognidea* (757-64 and 773-82) and an attestation of a battlefield grave at Plataea (Hdt. 9.85) that do seem to represent perceptions of the Persian War at the time of the war, but Megara's other surviving commemorations were likely dedicated over the next century and are not attested until the imperial period.¹⁰² When our surviving evidence is mapped both spatially and temporally, we are left with isolated examples scattered across the Greek world and throughout antiquity. We could combine our available evidence to yield a kind of summary sketch of the Persian-War tradition, but as I hope to show in the following, this would present at best a severely distorted picture. Indeed, at the root of any such attempt would stand two unjustifiable assumptions: that there was a single master narrative of the Persian War that held currency throughout the Greek world, and that this narrative remained largely static over the course of eight centuries.

If an accurate picture of the Persian-War tradition can only be gained by examining the evidence in its proper spatial and temporal context, we must consider whether one or two commemorative narratives are sufficient to shed light on the collective remembrance of a particular memorial community at a particular time. Obviously not with the detail and nuance we would prefer, but I maintain that our scattered examples do provide a reasonable basis for analyzing the social memories of the Persian War. Many of the commemorations we know about were commissioned and maintained by large collectives, often at considerable expense. Although this reliance on public memory entails obvious limitations, it also increases the likelihood that our surviving commemorations were at least intended to represent broadly shared views of the past.¹⁰³ Again, public

commemoration is not simply a matter of elite propaganda imposed upon the larger community from the top; rather, it is the result of countless contestations and negotiations within society. Autocratic regimes will attempt to impose greater control with mixed success, but among the many oligarchic and democratic regimes across Greece, publicly funded commemorations would have been the products of open debate, compromise, and reasoned estimations about likely public reaction.¹⁰⁴ The impact of this last factor is not restricted to political actors. As noted earlier, authors presenting their work to the broader public would have consciously or subconsciously made similar calculations. None of these factors guarantees that every commemoration intended for popular consumption was a perfect encapsulation of social memory.¹⁰⁵ Commemorations can go wrong; expectations can be misread. Even if we could be confident that a given commemoration did accurately reflect the contemporary mood, that single example could not hope to speak to the inherent variations within a large memorial community and would consequently leave us blind to possible counter narratives.¹⁰⁶ Here again, we cannot pretend that an analysis of ancient memory will yield the kind of rich detail so common in modern studies. But the connection between public expectation and public commemoration gives us good reason to conclude that our few examples can shed valuable light onto the collective memories of the Persian War throughout ancient Greece.¹⁰⁷

The likely impact of commemoration on subsequent recollection gives us further reason to trust our evidence for Persian-War memory. Monuments, stories, and rituals do not just reflect memories held at the time they were erected, told, or instituted; they can also play a formative role for future generations, particularly when they enjoy marked social prominence.¹⁰⁸ As we saw in the preceding, the past is not simply recalled at the whim of the present; it also responds to the weight of preexisting tradition.¹⁰⁹ Our surviving evidence includes a number of conspicuously placed and frequently cited commemorations. Monuments like the Serpent Column and the Marathon painting in the Stoa Poikile continued to dominate their surrounding environments for generations to come.¹¹⁰ Plutarch could still quote powerful and memorable lines from Simonides and Pindar centuries later.¹¹¹ Here again, we cannot press the point too far. Not all commemorations have an impact commensurate with their prominence,¹¹² and even when they do, there is no guarantee that they will continue to be interpreted as intended.¹¹³ Reception must remain a blind spot. Nevertheless, the prominence of a given monument or the popularity of a particular work raises the probability that its commemorative narrative continued to shape collective memories of the Persian-War past.¹¹⁴

Finally, we must face the fact that we cannot entirely separate the history of the Persian War from its memory. This goes beyond the vexed question of the difference between history and memory.¹¹⁵ For the Persian-War tradition, it is a simpler, more practical concern. The sources that we use to understand the events of the Persian War are the same as those we must use to elucidate its commemoration.¹¹⁶ This book is, of course, a study of memory, and what the Greeks thought about their past matters more for our present purposes than what actually happened.¹¹⁷ As a result, I will often treat surviving or attested commemorations without discussing the real events that stand behind them. But historical reality still matters, not only because it can shed light on the evolution of subsequent tradition, but also because it is necessary from time to time to establish the facts surrounding a given commemoration.¹¹⁸ The first chapter is in large part devoted to disentangling our three sources for the political fallout over the self-serving epigram Pausanias the regent placed on the monument dedicated by the victorious Greeks after the battle of Plataea. Each is a valid example of memory, but it is critically important to discover which one has correctly related what happened in fact. Unfortunately, there are no hard and fast rules to determine which commemorations accurately reflect the events they commemorate or to what extent. Contemporary sources have easier access to better information, but, as noted earlier, they can also be driven by deeper biases. Accounts that are historically plausible are more persuasive than outlandish ones, but even the most patent fabrication can be (and often is) given the appearance of verisimilitude. We can scour our best sources for obvious bias and implausibility, but there is no guarantee that what remains is historically accurate and not simply a sanitized commemorative narrative. Ultimately, each case must be judged on its own merits.

The reconstruction of the Persian-War tradition we can derive from our existing sources will never be complete.¹¹⁹ We are, in effect, left with a few scattered examples that privilege the production of dominant or elite narratives. Were we attempting to plumb the depths of small group recollections or counter narratives, we might very well find these limitations insurmountable. But the present study is primarily concerned with just the kinds of public commemorations we do have. My object is to examine how the Greeks remembered the Persian War when they did so publicly, and how those broad predispositions changed over time. Obviously we would prefer to examine multiple converging and conflicting commemorative narratives from across the Greek world and over an extended period of time, and there is no doubt that such an examination would yield a much more nuanced picture than can be provided here. But that level

of detail is beyond recovery. Our alternatives are to proceed cautiously with what we have or to simply ignore it, relying rather on Herodotus and what can be gleaned from Athens. This book is an attempt to pursue the former approach.

Outline

Now that I have reviewed some essential aspects of collective memory and considered its application to the ancient world, I conclude by outlining briefly how the book is organized. Despite the relative paucity of evidence from the perspective of modern memory studies, the Persian War was nevertheless one of the most commemorated and talked-about events of the ancient world. A full examination of all the evidence would go well beyond what could realistically be treated in a single monograph. Only select examples are discussed here, but I believe that the selection is sufficiently representative to prove that the Greeks did not recall the war as Greeks, but rather as members of their respective city-states, that the resulting differences were extensive and fiercely contested throughout the classical period, and finally, that a single master narrative of the war achieved dominance within Greece only after the rise of Philip and Alexander the Great.

[Chapters 1 and 2](#) demonstrate that the Greek memory of the Persian War was centered on the polis throughout the classical period. [Chapter 1](#) approaches the question by way of a detailed examination of a single monument, the Serpent Column. This dedication, the largest and most spectacular erected by the victors, became an instant source of controversy. I argue that the dispute over this commemoration was fueled by tensions between an elite, transcendent panhellenism represented by Pausanias the regent and the narrower, civic priorities of the individual poleis. The removal of Pausanias's epigram thus constituted an immediate and conscious rejection of a memory of the war that transcended the polis in favor of one that was centered on it. [Chapter 2](#) ("Panhellenism") continues this line of argument by demonstrating that very few Persian-War monuments from the classical period ever transcended the conceptual boundaries of the separate states. I conclude that, although the Greeks never sought to suppress the panhellenic scope of the conflict, they consistently opted either to define the victory in terms of states or to focus on the achievements of a single state.

I next turn to the differences that emerged between the parochial narratives of the Persian War in the classical period. [Chapter 3](#) ("Contestation") examines the intensity with which commemorative disputes over the Persian War were pursued through the example of

Delphi, where several states propounded different and often contrary assertions about the war. The stakes in these disputes could be quite high. Claims to the Persian War were advertised with sumptuous monuments. Those who failed to persuade could face political isolation or even invasion. [Chapters 4](#) and [5](#) consider the extent of the differences that emerged between parochial memories and demonstrate that the kinds of contestations examined in [Chapter 3](#) were not taking place within a generally accepted master narrative of the Persian War. [Chapter 4](#) (“Time and Space”) focuses on the basic framing questions of when the war occurred and where. Despite drawing on the same chronicle of events, the Greeks developed various answers to these two questions. [Chapter 5](#) (“Meaning”) continues and deepens this examination of master narratives by considering whether the Greeks assigned the same basic meaning to the war. I conclude that different preexisting social memories, actual wartime experiences, and present interests predisposed the Greeks to remember the Persian War in largely idiosyncratic ways.

[Chapters 1–5](#) make the case that the Persian War never achieved significant commemorative cohesion throughout the classical period. [Chapters 6](#) and [7](#) take up my third point and examine the factors that caused this classical tradition to change in the late fourth century. [Chapter 6](#) (“A New Persian War”) treats Philip and Alexander’s efforts to invent a Persian-War tradition to which all Greeks could stake a claim, regardless of their actual wartime service. The final chapter ([Chapter 7](#), “After Alexander”) offers a brief look ahead to the afterlife of this invented tradition, demonstrating that the self-interested propaganda of the Macedonian kings soon became the dominant narrative of the Persian War in the early hellenistic period. The city-states that had actually participated in the war did maintain their local traditions, but those traditions now evolved within a larger hellenistic world that eagerly adopted the new panhellenic tradition, whose broader lines allowed easier access to this valuable piece of commemorative property.

Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the case for a divided memory of the Persian War during the classical period and the late emergence of a competing panhellenic version. I then consider some of the implications of these findings for our understanding of the Persian War, the ancient sources for it (particularly Herodotus), and the larger questions of panhellenism, parochialism, and memorial culture in classical Greece.

¹ I use the singular, Persian War (as opposed to the more common “Persian Wars”), throughout as a general term to refer to the series of conflicts between the Greeks and Persians from the reign of Cyrus in the mid-sixth century to the end of

the Delian League's active operations against the Persians in the mid-fifth century. For a justification of this decision, see [Chapter 4](#), pp. 138–39.

¹⁰ This is the assertion of Plato's Athenian interlocutor in the *Laws* 707c (with [Jung 2006](#): 13), but see [Chapter 4](#) for more on the various periodizations of the war.

¹¹ It should be noted that [Jung 2006](#): 22–24 fully acknowledges these limitations.

¹² See [Flashar 1996](#), [Hölkeskamp 2001](#), [Gehrke 2003](#) (= 2007), [Jung 2006](#), [Ruffing 2006](#), [Buraselis and Meidani 2010](#), [Buraselis and Koulakiotis 2013](#), and [Carey and Edwards 2013](#). To this list can be added earlier studies by [Loraux 1986](#), [Castriota 1992](#), [Green 1996b](#), and [T. Harrison 2002a](#), each of which devotes significant attention to the presentation of Athenian identity as well as the uses to which the Persian War was put in support of it.

¹³ See, for example, [E. Hall 1989](#): 2, [R. Thomas 1989](#): 223, [Castriota 1992](#): 65 and 90, [T. Harrison 2002a](#): 4, and [J. Hall 2002](#): 182–89 and 205.

¹⁴ See, for example, [Vannicelli 2007](#).

¹⁵ The tendency of scholars to rely on Herodotus's Persian-War account has been noted by [Marincola 2007](#): 105–106 generally and by [Schreiner 2008](#): 412 specifically in reference to [Jung 2006](#). For examples of this trend in history and memory, see [Starr 1962](#): 322, [T. Harrison 2000](#): 62, and [Vannicelli 2007](#): 316.

¹⁶ For more on the relationship between history and memory, see pp. 26–27.

¹⁷ See, for example, [Dobesch 1968](#): 6–7, [Perlman 1976](#): 19, [E. Hall 1989](#): 2 and 8–10, [J. Assmann 1992](#): 299 (= 2011: 273), [Flower 2000b](#): 65–66, [T. Harrison 2002a](#): 3, [Cartledge 2002](#): 54, [J. Hall 2002](#): 175, [L. Mitchell 2007](#): 77–78, and [M. Scott 2010](#): 263. For some earlier assessments of the Persian War's impact on Greek unity, see the discussion in [Walbank 1951](#): 41–43.

¹⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the modern term *panhellenism* and its influence in the ancient world, see [Dobesch 1968](#): 1–28, [Perlman 1976](#), [Oliva 1991](#), [Brandt 1992](#), [Green 1996b](#), [Flower 2000b](#), [Cartledge 2002](#): 53–60, [J. Hall 2002](#), [L. Mitchell 2007](#), and [M. Scott 2010](#): 260–64.

¹⁹ [Jung 2006](#): 225–97; for other references to the influence of panhellenic organizations or ideals on individual commemorations or the overall tradition, see [Gauer 1968](#): 93, [Loraux 1986](#): 58, [Tronson 1991](#): 103–104, [Hornblower 1992a](#): 176, [Boedeker 1995](#): 220–25 and 2001b: 150–53, [Bearzot 1997](#), [Steinhart 1997](#): 53–59, [Flower 2000b](#), [Aloni 2001](#): 101, [Rutherford 2001](#): 40–41, [Cartledge 2002](#): 54 and 2013: 123–24, [Raaflaub 2004](#): 115–16, [R. Friedman 2006](#): 174–76, [L. Mitchell 2007](#): 79, and [Beck 2010](#): 61–68.

² For more on this dedication, see [Chapter 5](#), p. 178, and [Chapter 7](#), p. 257 n.29.

²⁰ [Jung 2006](#): 241–59.

²¹ See [Jung 2006](#): 259, 270, and 295.

²² [Jung 2006](#): 259–81.

²³ [Jung 2006](#): 280 and 295–97.

²⁴ Jung often speaks of a field of tension (*Spannungsfeld*) between panhellenic and parochial claims on the memory of the war down to the mid-fifth century; see 2006: 241, 242, 247, 248, 255, and 295.

²⁵ But see [Marincola 2007](#), 2010, and [Yates 2015](#).

²⁶ Note, for example, the absence of any significant treatment of Philip or Alexander in [Jung 2006](#) or [Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes 2007](#), but see [Kremmydas 2013](#) in [Carey and Edwards 2013](#) for an exception to the rule.

³ For more on the sequence of events that led to the Fourth Sacred War, see [Ellis 1976](#): 186–90, [Londev 1990](#), and [Hammond 1994](#): 139–42.

⁴ See [Chapter 6](#), pp. 230–32 for more on the Theban memory of the Persian War.

⁵ For more on the Athenian commemoration of the Persian War, see [Chapter 5](#); for more on the Persian-War monuments erected at Delphi, see [Chapter 3](#).

⁶ *Polis* is a much debated term, which in antiquity could refer to an urban

settlement, that settlement along with its surrounding territory, a political community, or often all three together. For more on the nature and definition of the polis, see M. Hansen 1997, 2000, 2004, and 2006, J. Hall 2007 and 2013, van der Vliet 2007, Gehrke 2009, and Strauss 2013. It is, however, only the third definition that concerns us here (see also note 52). Consequently, I use the words *polis*, *city-state*, *state*, and *polity* throughout with no meaningful distinction intended, to refer to any type of nominally autonomous political community.

⁷ The point was made long ago by Starr 1962: 328–30, citing Herodotus, and has become axiomatic in the study of Persian-War memory; see W. West 1970, Hölscher 1998b: 84–103, Jung 2006: 225–97, Marincola 2007, Vannicelli 2007, Beck 2010, Higbie 2010, Cartledge 2013: 122–57, Yates 2013, and Morgan 2015: 150–54.

⁸ Marathon has been the subject of numerous studies. Three recent edited volumes focus in part on the memory of that battle (Buraselis and Meidani 2010, Buraselis and Koulakiotis 2013, and Carey and Edwards 2013). They join earlier articles by Flashar 1996, Hölkeskamp 2001, Gehrke 2003 (= 2007), and Zahrnt 2010 on the same subject. The commemoration of Thermopylae has been examined by Flower 1998, Cherf 2001, Albertz 2006, Vannicelli 2007, M. Meier 2010, and Matthew and Trundle 2013; Salamis by Ruffing 2006; and Plataea by Beck 2010: 61–68. Jung's 2006 treatment of Marathon and Plataea is considered in some detail later. Individual sources or groups of sources have also received attention. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the trend. Gauer 1968 assembles all the surviving and attested dedications. W. West 1970 and Higbie 2010 consider the surviving Persian-War epigrams. Spawforth 1994, Alcock 2002: 74–86, and Russo 2013 review Roman uses of the Persian War. Boedeker 1995, 2001a, and 2001b devote significant attention to Simonides. T. Harrison 2000 examines Aeschylus's *Persae*. Marincola considers fourth-century historiography and oratory (2007) as well as Plutarch (2010). Rowe 2007 focuses on Plato. Cartledge 2013 provides a thorough treatment of the so-called Oath of Plataea. Yates 2013 reviews the evidence for the temple of Athena Areia at Plataea. Studies that treat some aspect of Herodotus's presentation of the Persian War are too numerous to mention here, but see Chapter 2, pp. 81–88 for a selection.

⁹ Jung 2006.

²⁷ Several recent treatments make little to no mention of memory theory (see Albertz 2006, Bridges, Hall, and Rhodes 2007, Buraselis and Meidani 2010, Buraselis and Koulakiotis 2013, and Carey and Edwards 2013). Flashar 1996 and Hölkeskamp 2001 situate their discussions of Marathon in the works of Jan Assmann. Jung 2006 relies on Nora's concept of *lieux de mémoire*. Gehrke 2001 and 2007 cites a rather larger sampling of memory theory, including Nora, J. Assmann, Hobsbawm, and Anderson.

²⁸ Klein 2000: 129.

²⁹ For diachronic treatments of memory scholarship, see Hutton 1993, Olick and Robbins 1998, and Misztal 2003, as well as Beck and Wiemer 2010: 10–17 and Galinsky 2016 with particular reference to the ancient world. For some original reformulations of memory theory, see J. Assmann 1992 (= 2011), Fentress and Wickham 1992, Winter and Sivan 1999, and Grethlein 2010: 1–11.

³⁰ Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950) and 1992 (= 1925); see also J. Assmann 1992: 34–48 (= 2011: 21–33), Fentress and Wickham 1992: 1–40, Winter and Sivan 1999, Misztal 2003: 9–15, E. Zerubavel 2003: 1–10, and Cubitt 2007: 118–25.

³¹ See Bastide 1978: 244, R. Thomas 1989: 197–98, Winter and Sivan 1999: 9, Alcock 2002: 15, Cubitt 2007: 13–14 and 158–65, Gallia 2012: 3–4, and Steinbock 2013b: 8–9.

³² See Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950): 48 and 1992 (= 1925): 40 and 54; see also Hutton 1988: 314, J. Assmann 1992: 47 (= 2011: 32–33), Olick and Robbins 1998:

111, [Misztal 2003](#): 54, and [Olick 2010](#): 156–57.

³³ [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 44–49, 76–78, and 124–27, and 1992 (= 1925): 52–53 and 81; see also [E. Hall 1989](#): 6–7, [Nora 1996](#): 3, [Alcock 2002](#): 15, and [Olick 2003](#): 6.

³⁴ We will not explore here the neurological factors that influence memory production in the minds of these remembering individuals, but see [Stock, Gajsar, and Güntürkün 2016](#) for a summary of some of those factors.

³⁵ [Anderson 1983](#): 5–7, [J. Gillis 1994](#): 3–5, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 18.

³⁶ [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): ix, for example, suggest social memory. [Winter and Sivan 1999](#): 9 settle on collective remembrance. [Cubitt 2007](#): 13–16 attempts to draw a distinction between social memory and collective memory. Other examples could be multiplied. For a defense of the term *collective memory*, see [Olick 2010](#).

³⁷ For a similar conclusion, see [Beck and Weimer 2010](#): 16–17 and [Arrington 2015](#): 14.

³⁸ See [Hutton 1988](#): 314, [J. Assmann 1992](#): 70–73 (= 2011: 53–56), [Bodnar 1992](#): 15 and 1994: 76, [Le Goff 1992](#): 54, [J. Gillis 1994](#): 4, [Savage 1994](#): 135–41, [Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000](#): 12, [Schwartz 2000](#): 13–17, [Alcock 2002](#): 17–18, [Misztal 2003](#): 12, [Cubitt 2007](#): 131 and 176–77, [Winter 2010](#): 62–65, [S. Price 2012](#): 16, and [Hölkeskamp 2014](#): 69.

³⁹ [Bastide 1970](#) and 1978: 240–59; for a similar emphasis on the individual, see [Vansina 1985](#): 152–54, [Wachtel 1986](#): 214–17, [R. Thomas 1989](#): 197–98, [Winter and Sivan 1999](#): 27–29, [Winter 2006](#): 4–5, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 130–31 and 165–67.

⁴⁰ [Bastide 1970](#): 81 and 1978: 247–48 is thinking predominantly of physical objects and topographical features, but see [Cubitt 2007](#): 141–54 for a much broader understanding of the concept as well as the term *cultural device*; see also [Connerton 1989](#), [J. Assmann 1992](#) (= 2011), [Schudson 1995](#), [Misztal 2003](#): 16–17, and with a particular focus on the ancient world, [Alcock 2002](#): 23–32, [Beck and Weimer 2010](#), and [Gallia 2012](#): 1–11.

⁴¹ The quotation is from [E. Zerubavel 1996](#): 294, but see [Bastide 1970](#): 96 as well as [Winter and Sivan 1999](#): 6, [Schwartz 2000](#): 8–9, [Misztal 2003](#): 11, and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 12 for similar observations.

⁴² [Foucault 1978](#): 92–98 and 2000; see also [Vansina 1985](#): 150 and 154 and [Otto and Pendersen 2006](#): 37.

⁴³ [Foucault 1978](#): 92–102 and 2000.

⁴⁴ See also [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 87 and 127–37, [Y. Zerubavel 1994](#), [Dietler 1998](#), [Winter and Sivan 1999](#), [Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000](#): 33, [Alcock 2002](#): 18, [Misztal 2003](#): 60–74, [Lebow 2006](#), [Cubitt 2007](#): 231, [Winter 2010](#), [Gallia 2012](#): 6–7, and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 16.

⁴⁵ [Halbwachs 1992](#) (= 1925): 86 speaks to this point when he says of new traditions that “society must persuade its members that they already carry these beliefs within themselves at least partially, or even that they will recover beliefs which had been rejected some time ago.”

⁴⁶ See [Foucault 1977](#): 148–64, 1978: 95–96, 1980: 78–92, and 2000: 346–48, who is concerned with power and knowledge generally, but his conclusions apply to the more limited field of collective memory as well (see [Misztal 2003](#): 64–66).

⁴⁷ For more on counter memory, see [Davis and Starn 1989](#), [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 67–84, [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#): 10–11, [Alcock 2002](#): 16–17, [Misztal 2003](#): 61–67, [Olick 2003](#): 8, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 222–31.

⁴⁸ [Burke 1989](#): 107; for this and similar terminology used in reference to collective memory, see [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 47–64, [Olick and Robbins 1998](#): 122–23, [Misztal 2003](#): 15–19, and [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 4. It should be noted that although very few memorial communities are expressly formed for the purposes of remembering the past, memory remains critical to the proper functioning of any

stable community (see [Cubitt 2007](#): 132–33).

⁴⁹ [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 76–78 and [Connerton 1989](#): 1.

⁵⁰ For a detailed discussion of small group dynamics, see [Fine 1982](#).

⁵¹ [Anderson 1983](#): 1–7 coins the term *imagined community* to help explain the modern phenomenon of nationalism, but even he concedes that the basic concept applies more broadly: “in fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined” (1983: 6).

⁵² Many poleis were quite small and may have sustained face-to-face interactions among members (M. [Hansen 2006](#): 89–90), but the poleis whose commemorations we examine in the following tended to be larger and composed of a dominant urban settlement with several surrounding villages and perhaps one or more dependent urban settlements.

⁵³ [J. Assmann 1992](#): 130–33 (= 2011: 111–14); for a study of these (negotiable) constraints imposed by social memory on the individual in the modern context, see [Olick and Levy 1997](#).

⁵⁴ [J. Assmann 1992](#): 87–129 and 144–51 (= 2011: 70–110 and 124–31), [J. Gillis 1994](#): 7–9, [Olick and Robbins 1998](#): 124–26, [Cubitt 2007](#): 141–54, [Gehrke 2010](#): 16, and [Winter 2010](#): 65–67.

⁵⁵ See [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 32 and 113 and [Connerton 1989](#): 20.

⁵⁶ [Steinbock 2013b](#): 70–84 provides a detailed analysis of the kinds of memorial communities at play within Athenian society.

⁵⁷ [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): x suggest a similarly broad definition.

⁵⁸ [Connerton 1989](#): 38, [J. Assmann 1992](#): 36–37 (= 2011: 23) and [2006](#): 3, [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 47–51, [Schudson 1995](#): 355, [Miszta 2003](#): 11–12, [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 11–14, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 90–111.

⁵⁹ [H. White 1978](#); see also [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 73–74, [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#): 6, [Nora 1996](#): 9, [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 11–36, [Cubitt 2007](#): 186, and [A. Assmann 2010](#).

⁶⁰ [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 4–5.

⁶¹ [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#): 6; see also [Cubitt 2007](#): 203–204.

⁶² For more on counter narratives, see [notes 46](#) and [47](#).

⁶³ On this problem generally, see [Klein 1995](#).

⁶⁴ For a similar usage of this term, see [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#): 10, [Olick 1999](#): 381, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 222–31.

⁶⁵ [Cubitt 2007](#): 203.

⁶⁶ [H. White 1978](#): 44–46.

⁶⁷ What I call *cultural paradigms* are perhaps more often referred to as *metanarratives* (see, for example, [Megill 2007](#): 167), but I do not make use of that term here.

⁶⁸ [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 84 says of history that “the totality of past events can be put together in a single record only by separating them from the memory of the groups who preserved them. . . . This procedure no longer entails restoring them to lifelike reality, but requires relocating them within the frameworks with which history organizes events.” See also [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 101–105, [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 152–54, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 39–49. Far too much has been made of the difference between history and memory (see [note 115](#)), but what Halbwachs says here of history generally can still be said of synthetic histories that explicitly seek to craft a single historical narrative from multiple parochial commemorations.

⁶⁹ For more on externalization, see [Cubitt 2007](#): 121.

⁷⁰ [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 50–87 and 1992 (= 1925): 39–40 and 119, [Bastide 1970](#): 94, [Handler and Linnekin 1984](#), [Vansina 1985](#): 147–48, [Wachtel 1986](#): 210–11, [Connerton 1989](#): 2–4, [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 40, 58–59, and 87–88, [J. Assmann 1992](#): 40–42 (= 2011: 26–28), [Schudson 1995](#): 351–55, [Y. Zerubavel](#)

1995: 5–6, Nora 1996: 3, Wertsch 2002: 7, Misztal 2003: 56–67, Winter 2006: 3–4, and Cubitt 2007: 16–17 and 75–90.

⁷¹ For a similar use of the term *tradition*, see Misztal 2003: 91–98.

⁷² Halbwachs 1992 (= 1925): 86, 160, and 188–89, Bastide 1978: 250–53, Appadurai 1981, Schwartz 1982: 396 and 2000: 17–20, Lowenthal 1985: 326, Burke 1989: 100–105, Connerton 1989: 2–3, Schudson 1989, Fentress and Wickham 1992: 51 and 127–31, Y. Zerubavel 1995: 5, Olick and Levy 1997, Dietler 1998: 85, Olick 1999, Pohl 2000: 27–28, Misztal 2003: 67–74, E. Zerubavel 2003: 37–40, Cubitt 2007: 27–28, 78, and 201–203, Gallia 2012: 6–7, and Steinbock 2013b: 18–19.

⁷³ Shils 1981: 13–14, Vansina 1985: 160–61, and Cubitt 2007: 179–81; see also Handler and Linnekin 1984 and Schudson 1995. This slow evolution of memory also finds support in neurological studies of the human brain (see Stock, Gajsar, and Güntürkün 2016: 385–89).

⁷⁴ See Flashar 1996, Hölkeskamp 2001, Gehrke 2003 (= 2007), Jung 2006: 72–169, Sfyroeras 2013, and Zahrnt 2013.

⁷⁵ Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950): 78–87 and 1992 (= 1925): 51, Fentress and Wickham 1992: 200, Alcock 2002: 16, Gehrke 2010: 17, and Steinbock 2013b: 14–15. For the importance of space in creating the illusion of permanence in social memory, see Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950): 128–57 and Connerton 1989: 37. Modern experiments on individual recollection have come to the same conclusions (see Stock, Gajsar, and Güntürkün 2016: 386–88).

⁷⁶ Bastide 1970 and 1978: 240–59, Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950): 86–87 and 1992 (= 1925): 160, Hutton 1988: 314, Connerton 1989: 6–13, J. Gillis 1994: 7–9, Y. Zerubavel 1994, Foot 1999, Alcock 2002: 31–32, and E. Zerubavel 2003: 39–40.

⁷⁷ Hobsbawm 1983a.

⁷⁸ Hobsbawm 1983a: 4 acknowledges that traditions were likely invented throughout history. An application of this basic principle to the ancient world can be seen in J. Assmann 1992: 78–83 (= 2011: 62–66), J. Shear 2011: 11, and Galinsky 2016: 15.

⁷⁹ Nora 1996; see also Davis and Starn 1989: 3.

⁸⁰ See Jung 2011 and Gangloff 2013 with a good overview of the major treatments to that point.

⁸¹ Nora 1996: 6–7; see also Cubitt 2007: 47–48 and 244–45.

⁸² As in the case of invented traditions, it is not necessary to limit *lieu de mémoire* to the modern period. Viewing the phenomenon from the perspective of Foucauldian power relationships helps. As power relationships evolve, a commemoration remains current and meaningful if it too evolves and so remains a part of what Nora called the *milieu de mémoire*, the integrated social memory of a community before incredulity sets in (see note 85). If it fails to do so, it will be forgotten; but if that commemoration were monumentalized or canonized to an extent that it could not be ignored, it could be said to exist within the altered relationships of power as a *lieu de mémoire*—an island of meaning commanding respect, but at the same time incredulity from a power structure in which it no longer fits. Nora comes very close to this more relative definition when addressing events that occur in and around the French Revolution, whose commemorations seemed for a time to oscillate between *milieux de mémoire* and *lieux de mémoire*. See, for example, his discussion of Bastille Day (1996: 7) and the abortive revolutionary calendar (1996: 15).

⁸³ Nora himself expressed concern that this might happen if the term were applied too broadly (1996: 14–15). See also Olick and Robbins 1998: 121–22 and Erll 2010: 10.

⁸⁴ For the various translations of this phrase, see den Boer 2010: 22–23.

⁸⁵ Nora devotes surprisingly little attention to the term *milieu de mémoire*. It is a setting “in which memory is a real part of everyday experience” (1996: 1), “an

integrated memory, all-powerful, sweeping, un-self-conscious, and inherently present-minded—a memory without a past that eternally recycles a heritage, relegating ancestral yesterdays to the undifferentiated time of heroes, inceptions, and myth” (1996: 2). Like a *lieu de mémoire*, a *milieu de mémoire* can be anything—site, image, text (1996: 3). Nora’s notion of memory before the acceleration of history can often appear unduly simplistic (1996: 8), reduced to the spontaneous and unreflective effort to resurrect the past (1996: 12; see also [J. Gillis 1994](#): 5–6 and [Misztal 2003](#): 27–37). For a fine description of how a *milieu de mémoire* would have functioned in the ancient world, see [Hölkeskamp 2007](#) and [2014](#) on the city of Rome. Despite his use of Nora’s terminology, Hölkeskamp does not use *milieu de mémoire* and *lieu de mémoire* as opposites, but rather sees the latter as a component of the former (see 2007: 491–92).

¹⁰⁰ See [Alcock 2002](#): 23 in general; [S. R. Todd 1990](#): 168 makes the same point in reference to the surviving Attic orators specifically. This trend is not restricted to the ancient world, however (see [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 127–37).

¹⁰¹ For the limitations of public memory, see [Cubitt 2007](#): 219 and 234; for the limitations of dominant narratives, see [Connerton 1989](#): 18, [Misztal 2003](#): 61–67, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 224. For the importance of smaller memorial communities whose recollections are not necessarily reflected in public commemoration, see [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 76–78 and [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 8–9.

¹⁰² We know of a statue of Artemis dedicated in the city to commemorate the defeat of a Persian raid on the Megarid (Paus. 1.40.2–3), a rock shot with arrows near Pagae that was associated with that attack (1.44.4), and a cenotaph within the city (1.43.3 and “Simon.” 16P [= *IG VII.53*]). Another statue of Artemis at Pagae was also likely connected to the Persian raid, but that is a modern conjecture (Paus. 1.44.4). For more on the Megarian commemoration of the Persian War, see [Yates 2018](#) and [Chapter 5](#), pp. 183–89.

¹⁰³ [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 43, [Schwartz 1982](#): 378–79 and 2000: 21–22, [Bodnar 1992](#): 13–20 and 1994, [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 13, [Schudson 1995](#): 359–60, [Misztal 2003](#): 67–74, [Olick and Levy 1997](#): 928, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 132–40.

¹⁰⁴ For a detailed examination of this phenomenon in the modern world, see [Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991](#), [Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000](#): 16–32, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 222–231.

¹⁰⁵ For the slippage between official commemoration and public sentiment, see [Bodnar 1992](#): 13–20, [Cressy 1994](#), [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 67–84, [Olick 1999](#), and [Winter and Sivan 1999](#): 6–39.

¹⁰⁶ In the case of the Athenian commemoration of Marathon, where our evidence is quite good, these counter narratives come into clear view ([Sfyrroeras 2013](#)).

¹⁰⁷ For the use of public memory as evidence for collective memory in the ancient world, see, for example, [Loraux 1986](#): 171, [R. Thomas 1989](#): 200–208, [Gehrke 2001](#): 286–97, [Hölscher 2003](#): 15–16, and [Steinbock 2013a](#): 75–78 and 2013b: 13.

¹⁰⁸ [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 4–7, [Savage 1994](#): 143, [Schudson 1995](#): 358–59, [Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000](#): 32–39, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 178 and 192–97; see also [Hölkeskamp 2007](#), [Steinbock 2013b](#): 85–86, [Galinski 2014](#): 3, [Hughes 2014](#): 111–14, and [Arrington 2015](#): 1–18 with specific reference to the ancient world.

¹⁰⁹ See pp. 17–18.

¹¹⁰ [Wiseman 2014](#): 44–48 questions the capacity of such monuments to sustain popular memory, but see [Hölkeskamp 2014](#) for a persuasive rebuttal.

¹¹¹ [Scodel 2008](#): 118, drawing generally on Jan Assmann’s work, notes the importance of canonical texts in the transmission of memory in the ancient world. [Wiseman 2014](#) suggests that much information about the Roman past that appears in extant prose and poetry was transmitted to large segments of society orally and so had a significant impact beyond elite circles.

112 Wagner-Pacifi and Schwartz 1991: 402–403 and Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 91.

113 Wagner-Pacifi and Schwartz's study of the Vietnam Memorial is a perfect case in point. Although the design of the monument was clearly intended to avoid patently patriotic or nationalist themes, popular use of the monument tended to emphasize those very themes, most notably through the placement of tiny American flags at the site (1991: 404–407). For the same phenomenon, see Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000: 10–11, Winter 2010: 62–65, and in the context of the ancient world, Hughes 2014: 109–111.

114 For this basic assumption, see Hölscher 2003: 13 and Steinbock 2013a: 79–81.

115 For a thorough discussion of the relationship between history and memory, see Hutton 1993; see also Fentress and Wickham 1992: 144–62, Misztal 2003: 99–108, and Cubitt 2007: 26–62. Erll 2010: 6–7, however, has rightly concluded that the issue is a “dead end.” History and memory are manifestly not opposites, and historiography has long reflected and shaped dominant narratives. This is true of the modern period, but is perhaps even more so of ancient historiography (see Gowing 2005: 11–15, Gallia 2012: 4, S. Price 2012: 15, Galinsky 2016: 2–5, and Rüpke 2016: 90–93).

116 For further discussion of the difficulties of deriving historical information from commemorations generally, see Fentress and Wickham 1992: 75–86.

117 See Fentress and Wickham 1992: xi–xii and Jung 2011: 9–10 for a similar prioritization.

118 As Hobsbawm 1983a: 12 rightly notes, “the study of invented traditions” (and I would add, all collective memory) “cannot be separated from the wider study of the history of society, nor can it expect to advance much beyond the mere discovery of such practices unless it is integrated into a much wider study.” See also Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 145–58, Confino 1997: 1388, Olick 1999: 386, Alcock 2002: 30, Gallia 2012: 8, and Steinbock 2013b: 45. Knapp 1989 has mounted a thorough attack on the importance of the actual past for collective memory, but his arguments are rather more philosophical in outlook and are in any case concerned with the modern trend of historical revisionism.

119 See Alcock 2002: 34 for a similar conclusion about social memory generally.

86 Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950): 52; see also E. Zerubavel 2003: 6.

87 Y. Zerubavel 1995: 5.

88 See, for example, Appadurai 1981, Wagner-Pacifi and Schwartz 1991, Bodnar 1994, Irwin-Zarecka 1994, Schudson 1995, Y. Zerubavel 1995, Olick 1999, Winter and Sivan 1999, and Schwartz 2000.

89 For a similar conclusion, see Gowing 2005: 9 on the memory of the Roman Republic.

90 For the use of literature as a source of collective memory, see Fentress and Wickham 1992: 144–72 and Cubitt 2007: 48–49.

91 For authors and artists as members of memorial communities and indeed contributors to it, see Y. Zerubavel 1995: 5, Innes 2000: 5, Pohl 2000: 24, and Schwartz 2000: 21–22.

92 For the importance of genre in memory studies, see Fentress and Wickham 1992: 153–62.

93 Steinbock 2013a: 74 and 2013b: 94–96; see also K. Clarke 2008: 245–303.

94 Petrovic 2010; for a similar line of argument, see A. Brown 2013: 104.

95 Evans 1982: 7–8 and 1991: 99–100.

96 For the challenges posed by such secondhand information for the reconstruction of medieval commemorations, see Innes 2000: 7.

97 Alcock 2002: 28–32.

98 Flashar 1996: 65 and Marincola 2007.

99 The problem is particularly acute in the study of ancient memory (see Alcock

2002: 30, Hughes 2014: 109–111, and Arrington 2015: 17). Even in reference to modern psychology, Fentress and Wickham 1992: 32 note that “it is much easier to observe and record memory ‘coming out’ than ‘going in.’”

The Serpent Column

Introduction

Our first task is to demonstrate that the Greeks did not recall the Persian War as Greeks, but rather as members of their home states. This is certainly how the golden shields that Aeschines defended so vigorously in 340/39 recalled the war,¹ but we must consider the extent to which this way of commemorating the Persian War shaped the overall tradition and for how long. It might at first glance be tempting to lean heavily on theory here. Collective memories require memorial communities to sustain them. When those communities are imagined, considerable effort and expense are required to instill and maintain in their scattered members a shared sense of the past.² We might consider whether the Hellenic League or the great panhellenic centers were even capable of sustaining shared notions of the Persian-War past over and against the claims of the various poleis. Such an examination of the larger structures of power within the Greek world would, however, take us far from the memory of the war itself and could, in any case, only show that a panhellenic recollection that transcended the state was unlikely. Surer results will emerge if we begin from the commemorations themselves and show that the memory of the Persian War did not in fact transcend the state. I begin here with a close examination of a single case study, the Serpent Column. This monument, one of the earliest, most magnificent, and most controversial Persian-War commemorations we know, offers an ideal vantage point on the social tensions that ensured the domination of the state within the classical tradition of the Persian War.

The Serpent Column was erected at Delphi in 477 across from the temple of Apollo, whose golden shields tested Aeschines's rhetorical skills some 140 years later.³ The column had been voted as a tithe to Apollo after the battle of Plataea two years before (Hdt. 9.81.1) and was at the time the premier monument to the victory over Persia. The Hellenic-League allies erected three other monuments during the war,

all of which were bronze statues of the gods honored.⁴ But in this case, the Greeks decided to erect a massive column in the form of three coiled serpents on whose heads sat a golden tripod.⁵ All together, the Serpent Column dwarfed the nearby statue of Apollo, dedicated for the victory at Salamis, as well as the statues of Zeus at Olympia and Poseidon at Isthmia, both dedicated after Plataea.⁶ The unique form, the addition of a significant component in gold, and its sheer size marked the Serpent Column as something special from the outset.⁷ The man charged with overseeing its construction was the supreme commander of the Greeks at Plataea and regent of Sparta, Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus.⁸ Pausanias saw in the monument a chance at self-aggrandizement, which he had no intention of passing up. He had an elegiac couplet inscribed on it that attributed the dedication and victory to none other than himself.⁹ The reaction was swift and negative. The inscription was erased and in its place a list of thirty-one allied states with a brief heading was added to the lower coils of the column.

Collective memories are never more visible than when they are explicitly contested.¹⁰ Within a few years of the last major engagement in mainland Greece, the most conspicuous commemoration of the Greek victory over Persia was literally rewritten. Our sources leave us with two questions: who removed the inscription, and why? The answers to these questions have had a significant impact on how scholars have interpreted the Persian-War tradition in the classical period. Michael Jung echoes scholarly consensus on the debacle. Pausanias's inscription represented both the personal vanity of the regent as well as Sparta's hegemonic claims on the memory of the Persian War. The reaction came from the other members of the Hellenic League, who refused to kowtow before Sparta's pretensions. Sparta was ultimately forced to remove the inscription and replace it with a fair acknowledgment of the joint effort of the allies who had together won the war. Sparta was listed first in recognition of its status as hegemon, but the tone of the list was by and large panhellenic.¹¹ Jung interprets the revised Serpent Column as both a product and expression of a panhellenic memorial community committed to a recollection of the war that transcended the separate interests of the various participating states. Such an interpretation adds strong support to his larger conclusion that a unified framing narrative initially dominated the classical tradition of the Persian War.¹²

Jung sees in the monument a fight between two interest groups: the state of Sparta represented by its regent on the one hand, and the member states of the league acting in their corporate interests on the other.¹³ I argue that this reconstruction does not map well onto our

best evidence for the incident. In the following, I re-evaluate the sources for the removal of Pausanias's inscription and conclude that the tensions that animated this commemorative *cause célèbre* were not between Pausanias's advocacy of Spartan exceptionalism and the collectivist tendencies of the remaining allies, but rather between an elite panhellenism represented by Pausanias and the narrower, civic priorities of the individual states (Sparta first among them). The reinscription of the Serpent Column would not then mark the victory of transcendent panhellenism, but rather its flat defeat at the hands of a more state-centered recollection of the war. Such a reinterpretation has broad implications. At the most basic level, it places this key piece of evidence at odds with Jung's larger conclusions about the emergence of a panhellenic memory of the war that transcended the interests of the separate member states. But my interpretation of the Serpent-Column affair suggests something more. The monument does not simply fail to support the notion of a dominant panhellenic narrative; it hints at a strong aversion to any recollection of the war that undermined the city-state as the principal memorial community through which the Persian War was commemorated in the years that followed.

The Evidence

The scandal that broke over Pausanias's inscription was one of the most remembered events in the history of the Persian-War tradition. Three extended accounts survive among several shorter renditions. Thucydides is the oldest (1.132.2–3), followed in the fourth century by Apollodorus, who cites the episode in his court speech *Against Neaera* ([Dem]. 59.96–98).¹⁴ Several centuries later, Plutarch adduced the Serpent Column's list in his essay on Herodotean bias (*Mor.* 873c–e). Despite (or rather because of) all these accounts, the identity and motivation of the party that had Pausanias's inscription removed and replaced with the list of allies remain in doubt.¹⁵ Thucydides maintains that it was the Spartans who took offense, had the epigram removed, and decided what form the new inscription would have. Apollodorus asserts that these actions were taken by the Delphic Amphictyony in the face of Spartan opposition. Plutarch produces an account that seems to draw from both traditions. Much depends on disentangling our contradictory sources.¹⁶

Thucydides describes the political fallout surrounding the Serpent Column toward the end of Book I as part of his digression on the fall of Pausanias (1.128–135). After his second recall from the Aegean, the Spartans became very apprehensive of their regent. They began to

reconsider his prior bad acts in a new light. Thucydides reserves Pausanias's inscription at Delphi for special comment:

[The Spartans] reviewed previous examples of his deviation from the established norms of behavior, especially his treatment of the tripod which the Greeks had dedicated at Delphi as the first-fruits of their victory over the Persians. He had taken it on his own initiative (ἰδίᾳ) to have it inscribed with the following couplet:

“When the leader of the Greeks destroyed the army of the Persians,

He, Pausanias, dedicated this monument to Apollo.”¹⁷

The Spartans had at the time immediately (εὐθύς) erased the couplet from the tripod and inscribed it instead with the names of all the cities which had taken part in the Persian defeat and the dedication of the monument. (1.132.2–3, tr. Hammond modified)

Here Pausanias oversteps his authority by arrogating to himself the privilege of placing a self-serving inscription on the tripod dedicated by the Greeks. The Spartan government responds immediately to rectify his transgression. They have the epigram erased and replaced with the list of allied states. The authority of the Spartan state in Thucydides's version is hard to miss. Not only do Thucydides's Spartans have the power to remove an inscription from a league dedication, but they can also replace it with an inscription of their own devising without any apparent input from the allies.¹⁸ The new inscription was of course a list of the allies with a brief heading, but Thucydides presents the decision as Sparta's and not the result of consultation with the allies themselves. Thucydides leaves little room for ambiguity. Pausanias's infraction and its solution were from first to last a Spartan matter.

The digression on Pausanias (along with the one on Themistocles that immediately follows it) contains a number of departures from Thucydidean convention.¹⁹ Most disturbing of all is an uncharacteristic tendency to inaccuracy and credulity on Thucydides's part. Some have concluded that both digressions were based on an earlier written source, whose sloppy account Thucydides naively accepted and reproduced within his history; others have suggested that they were perhaps products of Thucydides's youth.²⁰ Might then his version of the Serpent-Column affair be fruit of the poison tree? As it happens, the agency of Sparta in the removal of Pausanias's inscription can be deduced from outside the digression. In Book 3 the forlorn Plataeans attempt to influence their Spartan judges by recalling their glorious Persian-War service (3.53–59). In the course of the speech the Plataeans cite as proof the fact that the Spartans had inscribed their name upon the Serpent Column: “it will seem a monstrous act if Spartans sack Plataea; if, when your fathers recognized the valor of our city by inscribing its name on the tripod at Delphi, you then obliterate it and its entire population from the whole

Greek world, to please the Thebans” (3.57.2, tr. Hammond). The assertion is, of course, located within a speech, and the Plataeans have more than enough reason to embellish the truth, but their appeal would border on the preposterous if Thucydides believed that the list of allies had been added against the wishes of the Spartans. Whatever we conclude about the digression on Pausanias, Spartan agency seems to reflect Thucydides’s considered and consistent understanding of that event.

Our second source for the original dedication at Delphi, Apollodorus’s *Against Neaera*, tells quite a different story about the political fallout from Pausanias’s epigram. Apollodorus wishes to impress on his listeners the great difficulty of earning Athenian citizenship by recounting all that had been done by the Plataeans, who were nevertheless granted citizenship only after individual scrutiny. In the course of his demonstration Apollodorus treats Pausanias and his inscription:

And then Pausanias, the king of the Spartans, tried to insult you, not content that the Spartans had been honored with leadership by the Greeks. Your city, which had in reality led the Greeks in the fight for freedom, did not oppose the Spartans in ambition, to avoid the envy of the allies. For these reasons Pausanias, the king of the Spartans, was indignant and inscribed a couplet on the tripod at Delphi that the Greeks who had joined the fight at Plataea and Salamis made in common from the barbarian spoils and dedicated to Apollo as a commemoration of their courage. The couplet read:

“When the leader of the Greeks destroyed the army of the Persians,
He, Pausanias, dedicated this monument to Apollo.”

He did this, as if the deed and dedication had been his own and not the common property of the allies. The Greeks became enraged, and the Plataeans were selected to bring a charge on behalf of the allies against the Spartans before the Amphictyony for 1,000 talents. They compelled them (ἠνάγκασαν αὐτούς) to erase the couplet and inscribe the names of the states that had taken part in the deed. ([Dem.] 59.96–98)

Here Pausanias is essentially working on behalf of Sparta. He intends to insult Athens because he was not content with Sparta’s share of the credit and so had his epigram placed on the Serpent Column. Apollodorus does not make clear whether Pausanias was acting on direct orders from Sparta, but his account certainly assumes that they were pleased with the results. When the allies of the Hellenic League object, their anger is directed at Sparta, not Pausanias.²¹ For their part, the Spartans refuse to act until they are faced with a 1,000-talent fine imposed by the Delphic Amphictyony. Only then are the Spartans forced to erase the elegy and inscribe in its place a list of the cities that represented the war as a common achievement.

Although many have attempted to square the differences between the Thucydidean and Apollodoran versions,²² they remain

irreconcilable. The crux of the argument for compatibility is that in the excursus on Pausanias, Thucydides is concerned exclusively with the regent's character and so naturally ignores the larger political implications, which Apollodorus provides. This argument faces two problems. The first is that Thucydides does not ignore the international ramifications of Pausanias's behavior in the excursus. In fact, he mentions Pausanias's interaction with the allies three times before addressing the Serpent Column (1.128.5, 1.130.1, and 1.130.2). The last alludes to allied complaints about Pausanias's arrogance, which set in motion the chain of events that led the Spartans to re-evaluate his earlier attempt to claim the Serpent Column as his own.²³ Mentioning an allied dimension in this context would have hardly been out of place.²⁴ Second (and more critically), the difference between the two cannot be simplified to mere omission. There is a substantive contradiction with regard to the attitude of the Spartan state. In Apollodorus's account a trial and the threat of a fine are necessary to get the Spartans to take any action, which in turn leaves the impression that they approved of Pausanias's inscription.²⁵ In Thucydides, however, they disapprove to the extent that the matter is handled immediately (εὐθύς) and without any apparent prompting.²⁶ If Apollodorus's version is correct, Thucydides does not omit, he misleads.

The third major source for the Pausanias affair is Plutarch in his *On the Malignty of Herodotus*. He uses several pieces of evidence to disprove Herodotus's contention that only a small number of allies actually fought at Plataea. One is an account of Pausanias's inscription:

Furthermore, Pausanias, who already had thoughts of tyranny in his mind, so they say, put up this inscription at Delphi:

"When the leader of the Greeks destroyed the army of the Persians,
He, Pausanias, dedicated this monument to Apollo."

Thus he shared, after a fashion, his glory with the Greeks by declaring himself their commander. When the Greeks refused to accept this wording and brought charges (ἐγκαλοῦντων), the Spartans sent to Delphi and erased this couplet from the tripod, inscribing instead the names of all the cities, as was proper. But can we believe that the Greeks would resent not being included in the inscription if their absence from the battle was on their conscience, or that the Spartans would strike out the name of their leader and commander and substitute the names of men who shirked and ignored the contest? (*Mor.* 873c-d, tr. Pearson modified)

Plutarch has often been adduced to support Apollodorus's version,²⁷ and with good reason. Both are clear that complaints over the inscription had an allied component. But this is where the similarities end. Plutarch's account makes no mention of the Amphictyony, a fine, or indeed any compulsion. Allied charges are presumably brought against Pausanias, not Sparta, which in turn shows no hesitation and

authors the list of allies as a solution to the problem.²⁸ Indeed, Sparta's willingness is central to Plutarch's overall understanding of the event. He maintains that they would never have removed Pausanias's epigram and replaced it with the names of allies who had betrayed them in battle. If Plutarch thought that Sparta had been compelled (as Apollodorus maintains), his larger argument becomes nonsense.²⁹ If we could be sure that Plutarch was bringing independent information to the table, we could at the very least say that his account does not lend support to Apollodorus's contention that the allies forced the Spartans to remove the inscription. But it remains difficult to make such an assumption.³⁰ We are in the end left with only Thucydides and Apollodorus.

It is not often that we compare Thucydides to a fourth-century orator and find Thucydides wanting. It is even more surprising given that there are some obvious marks against the orator. Apollodorus's digression on Plataean history contains a number of patent errors, not the least of which is his misidentification of Pausanias as Sparta's king in the passage cited in the preceding.³¹ There is also the exorbitant fine of 1,000 talents, which even Apollodorus's most ardent defenders find improbable.³² Finally, objections could be raised against the incredible power exercised by the Amphictyony.³³ But Jung is certainly not alone in preferring Apollodorus to Thucydides. Despite all of Apollodorus's shortcomings, acceptance of his version of the Serpent-Column affair has won broad scholarly support.³⁴ Preference for Apollodorus is obviously not a product of his overall reputation or the merits of his account, but rather the perceived deficiencies of Thucydides's rendition. Sparta's negative reaction to Pausanias's epigram appears inexplicably under-motivated—or so it has been claimed.³⁵ Objections to Thucydides's version do not, however, hold up to close scrutiny.

Our surest clues will emerge from the monument itself; that is, Pausanias's epigram, which is identical in all three extended treatments,³⁶ and the inscription that still appears on the lower coils of the Serpent Column, now located in Istanbul.³⁷ Both lend strong support to Thucydides's version. I begin with the epigram, provided here in isolation:

When the leader of the Greeks destroyed the army of the Persians,
He, Pausanias, dedicated this monument to Apollo.

Ἑλλήνων ἀρχηγὸς ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσε Μήδων,
Παυσανίας Φοῖβῳ μνῆμ' ἀνέθηκε τόδε.

The accepted interpretation maintains that Pausanias intended his inscription to redound to the greater glory of Sparta, but Sparta is nowhere to be found. Despite the fact that Pausanias was regent and

commanded at Plataea only as a representative of Sparta, he is defined here as neither citizen nor official of that state.³⁸ Rather, Pausanias is careful to specify his connection to “the Greeks,” a contemporary shorthand for the Hellenic League.³⁹ Consequently, all participating states, including the hegemon, are reduced to a homogeneous collective. If Pausanias intended his epigram to advocate Spartan hegemony, as Apollodorus implies and moderns claim, he was (for once!) coy to the point of opacity. Read in isolation, the epigram suggests that his aim was rather to advertise his unmediated connection to, and leadership of, the larger community of allies.

The emphasis that Pausanias’s elegy placed on the panhellenic collective and himself to the detriment of his home state suggests a plausible motivation for Thucydides’s version of events. It is not at all uncommon to see a polis react negatively to the presumptions of an outsized aristocrat, or regent in this case.⁴⁰ But we can only explain Sparta’s actions in this way if Pausanias’s epigram offended Spartan sensibilities. Jung, following the earlier work of Werner Gauer, argues that it did not.⁴¹ Gauer maintains that dedications in Sparta often yielded primacy to kings, regents, and even generals. In support, he cites three Spartan officials who appear prominently on fifth-century dedications: the same Pausanias on a bronze cauldron erected at Byzantium,⁴² Brasidas on the treasury of the Acanthians at Delphi,⁴³ and Lysander in the Aegospotami monument, also at Delphi.⁴⁴ None of these examples is satisfactory, however. Another dedication by Pausanias hardly sheds much light on broader Spartan customs since it is just as likely that he also violated them in that case.⁴⁵ Indeed, our one source for the inscription cites it specifically as another example of the regent’s arrogance.⁴⁶ The treasury that sported the name of Brasidas so prominently was an Acanthian monument and moreover celebrated a man who was both dead and formally heroized.⁴⁷ The Aegospotami monument alone provides a valid parallel. Yet here we are dealing with a monument built some eighty years after the Serpent Column and likely constructed under the supervision of a man who was just as egotistical and liable to controversy as Pausanias himself (Plut. *Lys.* 18.1).⁴⁸ A more apposite example of contemporary Spartan memorial customs appears in an early classical dedication found at Olympia:⁴⁹

Lord Zeus the Olympian, son of Cronus, accept a beautiful statue
With a heart favorable to the Spartans. (ML 22)⁵⁰

There is also the subsequent Peloponnesian-League monument celebrating the victory at Tanagra in 458/7:

The temple has a golden shield; from Tanagra

The Spartans and their allies dedicated it,
A gift taken from the Argives, Athenians, and Ionians,
The tithe offered for victory in war. (Paus. 5.10.4, tr. Jones modified)⁵¹

In neither case is a king (much less a regent) singled out for praise.

Our literary sources give us even more reason for viewing Pausanias's epigram as an aberration. Thucydides himself is quite clear when he introduces the episode that this was an instance of a "deviation from the established norms of behavior" (1.132.2, tr. Hammond).⁵² Later he concludes that the Spartans viewed the incident as a "violation" (ᾀδίκημα) at the time (1.132.3). Whatever the historicity of the digression on Pausanias, it is hard to imagine that a young Thucydides or his source could have been mistaken on this point. In this connection, we might note a later observation by Pausanias, the travel writer, who states that

[t]he Spartans seem to me to be of all men the least moved by poetry and the praise of poets. For with the exception of the epigram upon Cynisca, of uncertain authorship, and the still earlier one upon Pausanias that Simonides wrote on the tripod dedicated at Delphi, there is no poetic composition to commemorate the doings of the royal houses of the Spartans. (Paus. 3.8.2, tr. Jones modified)

Pausanias is surely overstating the case. King Theopompus is mentioned in a fragmentary poem by Tyrtaeus (5.1W²), Leonidas appears in a famous poem on Thermopylae, attributed to Simonides (531.7–9P), and the Plataea Elegy reserves signal praise for Pausanias the regent (11.33–34W²). Yet it is not unlikely that the travel writer accurately noticed a dearth of material emphasizing the accomplishments of Sparta's leaders.⁵³ Combined with our surviving inscriptional evidence, these passages suggest that the epigram Pausanias added to the Serpent Column was far from typical at Sparta and that it could easily have evoked the reaction Thucydides suggests.

Let us now turn to the list of allies that replaced Pausanias's inscription. Apollodorus presents it as a backlash against Spartan attempts to monopolize the monument, and its tone is surely panhellenic in scope. The heading features no single state.⁵⁴ Rather, it proclaims only that "these fought the war" (το[ί]δε τὸν πόλεμον [ἐ]πολ[έ]μεον: ML 27.1–3).⁵⁵ The deictic pronoun directs the viewer's attention to the list of thirty-one allies below, which begins with the league hegemon, Sparta, and then Athens, followed by the rest of the allies.⁵⁶ The dialect, once thought to be Laconian, has since been identified as Phocian.⁵⁷ It is clear that this was no mere monument to the ambitions of a single state. Even if Sparta appears first, the impact of so many allied states draws attention to the extent of the alliance and not (or rather not only) to the state that led it.⁵⁸ None of this, however, speaks against Thucydides, who does not

maintain that the monument was subsequently redefined as a Spartan one. Despite having apparent control over the final form, the Spartans act consistently to define the Serpent Column in panhellenic terms. Their stated objection to Pausanias is that he had laid personal claim to a monument “which the Greeks had dedicated at Delphi as the first-fruits of their victory over the Persians” (1.132.2, tr. Hammond). Their solution is a list of the allies who “had taken part in the Persian defeat and the dedication of the monument” (1.132.3, tr. Hammond). To be fair, the list of allies presents no inherent contradictions to Apollodorus’s version either, but it does speak against Jung’s interpretation of it. Indeed, if the Serpent Column were reinscribed to transcend the individual city-states in memory (as Jung concludes), the heading and list that appear there could not have undercut that message more. Although Pausanias had defined the larger community over which he held command as the Greeks, it is notable that this term, with all of its rich panhellenic associations, is omitted from the new heading. The allies who turned back the Persians are no longer Greeks, as they had been in Pausanias’s epigram; they are now Spartans, Athenians, Corinthians, and so forth. The list is certainly panhellenic in scope, but its panhellenism does not transcend the individual states. Rather, it is defined by them.

The list of allies has further implications that also serve to undercut any sense of transcendent panhellenism. The messy business of pronouncing which Greek states had supported the cause becomes a central concern.⁵⁹ This list includes almost all of the states that contributed contingents to the battles of Plataea and Salamis,⁶⁰ but it goes too far to imply that this was an unobjectionable presentation of the allies who fought the war.⁶¹ A quick look at the list reveals some interesting omissions: the Ionians who defected at Mycale, the late and reluctant Medizers, and even lukewarm allies who failed to reach Plataea or Salamis in time.⁶² The effect is divisive. The list denies states that do not appear there any share of the credit by declaring that these (and implicitly only these) fought the war. Excluded parties do not seem to have accepted condemnation quietly. As we shall see in [Chapter 3](#), several spent vast sums erecting Persian-War monuments of their own within meters of the Serpent Column itself.⁶³ Pausanias’s epigram had set a strikingly different tone. “The Greeks” is a relatively loose term. At its narrowest, it indicates the members of the Hellenic League,⁶⁴ but makes no distinction between consistent members, early members who were later forced to defect, or states that joined only toward the end of the war. At its most expansive, however, the term transcends the political boundaries of the Hellenic League and implicitly credits the victory to all self-identifying Greeks. There is, of course, still something panhellenic about a monument that includes

the names of so many states, but at the same time, the prominence enjoyed by those states calls into question whether the motive behind the new inscription was, as Jung argues, to create a plane of memory that transcended them.

Pausanias's elegy and the inscription that replaced it do speak to a tension between a panhellenic and a state-centered paradigm for recalling the Persian War, but Jung, following Apollodorus, misunderstands how those tensions played out. It is Pausanias who attempts to define the war in terms of a panhellenic collective, and it is the response that reasserts the agency of the city-states. In the end, Thucydides's account makes better sense of the monument. This is not to say that the allies played no role. Plutarch may very well be right when he says that the allies were also enraged at Pausanias's presumption. At least, it stands to reason that the member states of the Hellenic League would have had as much cause as Sparta to resent Pausanias's attempt to efface their individual accomplishments. But even if the allies did play a role, the ultimate solution was not a monument dedicated to the victory of a large, homogeneous collective. By opting for a list of select poleis, the Spartans placed the political divisions of the Greek world at the heart of the premier commemoration of the victory over Persia.

The Context

Our primary sources for the political debacle surrounding the inscription on the Serpent Column can answer who ordered the original epigram removed—the Spartans—but we must dig deeper to explain why the incident evoked such a negative reaction and particularly why the list of allies was thought an effective response to the problem. Pausanias had indeed overstepped his proper authority and violated Spartan customs, but there was patently more at stake here than a mere breach of protocol or even the outsized ambitions of a lone aristocrat. By proclaiming himself leader of the Greeks, Pausanias was interweaving his ambitions with a recollection of the Persian War that omitted the polis, both his own and those of his allies. In the following I argue that the “why” of the Serpent-Column affair lies not merely in the personal effrontery of the regent, but rather at its intersection with a panhellenism that sought to transcend the polis.

There are a couple of different ways we could proceed. We could mine our sources on Pausanias and other elites at the time to show a broader postwar trend. We could also reconsider the evidence for the Hellenic League and demonstrate that the organization offered

unparalleled opportunities for elites to exert power outside the traditional bounds of the polis. Such historical approaches gain by including a broad sweep of evidence, but the danger is that the reconstruction might appear more imposed than found. Not every international connection codes the whole as an elitist enterprise that would in turn inspire fears at home.⁶⁵ Consequently, I structure this portion of my investigation around a reading of two episodes in Herodotus where, I argue, the fifth-century historian explores the awkward fit between the panhellenic ambitions of the league's commanders and the much narrower priorities of their home states.⁶⁶ The first is a verbal altercation between Themistocles, fresh from his victory at Salamis, and Timodemus, an otherwise unknown Athenian.⁶⁷ In the second, Herodotus describes a brief exchange between Lampon, a prominent aristocrat from Aegina, and Pausanias after his victory at Plataea. Neither episode has a particularly strong claim to historical veracity,⁶⁸ but it is precisely because they are likely inventions of either Herodotus or perhaps popular imagination that they have value for our present purposes. These are not merely mines from which to collect raw materials for a modern interpretation, but thoughtful reflections by a near contemporary on the tensions at play as two heroes of the Greek victory faced the reality of returning to the civic constraints of the polis just after their greatest moments of triumph.

I begin with Themistocles. In his last significant treatment of the Athenian general, Herodotus allows the otherwise unknown Timodemus to chastise the victor of Salamis for the exceptional honors he had been awarded by the Spartans.

When Themistocles had left the Spartans and arrived back at Athens, an Athenian named Timodemus of the deme Aphidna, who was an enemy of Themistocles but otherwise not a prominent man, rebuked him out of insane jealousy about his trip to Sparta, asserting that he had won honors from the Spartans because of Athens and not because of himself. Timodemus continued to say this without cease until Themistocles retorted, "The fact is that if I were from Belbina, I would not have been honored this way by the Spartans, but neither would you, my friend, even though you are an Athenian." (Hdt. 8.125, tr. Purvis modified)

On the surface, Themistocles outwits a hapless rube.⁶⁹ Timodemus is a non-entity and a personal enemy whose excessive jealousy compels him to bait the great general because of his trip to Sparta.⁷⁰ Thoughts have naturally flown to Homer's Thersites (*Il.* 2.211–77).⁷¹ Nevertheless, this is not a one-dimensional anecdote intended merely to prompt Themistocles, *qua* Odysseus, to silence the upstart Timodemus with a memorable *bon mot*. The attack on Themistocles is not without merit. Themistocles is rightly reminded that he had not won the battle alone, but had served simply as a representative of the

polis, to which any credit for the victory properly belonged.⁷² Witty riposte aside, even Themistocles must acknowledge the justice of this pointed recollection of the Persian War. If he were not an Athenian, he would not have won his honors from Sparta. Timodemus is ideally placed to deliver this thoroughly civic objection to Themistocles's pretensions. Despite his high-profile opposition to a leading statesman, Herodotus does not allow us to draw the reasonable inference that Timodemus was a member of the Athenian political elite. Rather, he is careful to note that Timodemus was "otherwise not a prominent man" (ἄλλως δὲ οὐ τῶν ἐπιφανέων ἀνδρῶν).⁷³ Thersites may come to mind, but this is not Homer. This is democratic Athens, and there a criticism from the middle carries more weight.⁷⁴ Even Timodemus's name, which Asheri renders "one who honors the people," underscores the serious tensions that set Themistocles up for his quip: tensions between the great general's panhellenic ambitions and Timodemus's narrower, civic sensibilities.⁷⁵

Herodotus's presentation of Themistocles immediately before his altercation with Timodemus gives us even more reason to read this exchange in the light of broader concerns about Themistocles's growing influence outside Athens. His trip to Sparta is merely the last in a string of abuses Herodotus relates between the victory at Salamis (8.108) and the Timodemus episode (8.125).⁷⁶ All feature Themistocles exceeding the constraints imposed by his home polis. This is, of course, not the only point Herodotus hopes to make here. The Athenian general remains throughout the archetypal rogue and trickster whose unprincipled conduct anticipates criticisms of the future Athenian Empire.⁷⁷ But in each case, Themistocles tricks, cheats, and generally misbehaves by leveraging the panhellenic prestige and influence he had gained within the Hellenic League. In so doing, Herodotus adds historical depth not just to the class fears that stand behind Timodemus's rebuke, but to his parochial fears as well.

As soon as the Greeks at Salamis realized that the Persian fleet had departed, they set sail, determined to engage the retreating Persians. When they reached Andros and had still not caught sight of the enemy fleet, the generals deliberated. Themistocles advised them to sail immediately to break down the bridges over the Hellespont (8.108.2), but Eurybiades opposed the idea on the grounds that trapping the Persians in Europe would only make them desperate and more dangerous. The Peloponnesian generals agreed (8.108.2–4). Themistocles realized his opinion would not prevail, but then decided to advocate Eurybiades's opinion to the Athenians.⁷⁸ Herodotus clarifies that this change of heart was not sincere: "now the reason Themistocles said this was in order to secure a reserve of credit with the King, so that in case he were to suffer some calamity at the hands

of the Athenians, he would have a refuge to run to” (8.109.5, tr. Purvis).⁷⁹ The historicity of the entire episode is questionable,⁸⁰ but it is notable that even at this point Herodotus’s Themistocles contemplates future troubles with his fellow citizens and considers a way to circumvent their will.⁸¹ He immediately dispatches word to Xerxes (8.110). His trusted messenger, Sicinnus, proclaims that he had been sent by “the commander of the Athenians and the best and wisest man of all the allies” (8.110.3, tr. Purvis). The introduction is not mere bombast.⁸² Themistocles’s perceived influence within the league is the crux of this particular act of deception. In his message he claims that he “held back the Greeks from pursuing your fleet and breaking apart the bridges at the Hellespont” (8.110.3, tr. Purvis modified). Themistocles does not take credit for stopping the Athenians under false pretenses (which is what Herodotus says he does), but rather fabricates a second lie, largely independent from his first, in which he claims credit for the decision advocated by Eurybiades.⁸³ The embellishment is understandable. Xerxes could hardly have been expected to lavish appreciation on Themistocles for halting the unrealistic zeal of the Athenian contingent alone.⁸⁴ By playing on his reputation within the league, Themistocles inflates his own importance to Xerxes and can ultimately guarantee himself a position of power beyond the bounds of his home state. Herodotus is careful to remind his readers that this was not done out of an excess of caution; Themistocles would in time slip the civic bonds imposed by his fellow citizens by fleeing to the Persian court (8.109.5).

Herodotus’s Themistocles continues to use his position within the league for private gain. After it was decided not to sail against the Hellespont, he convinces the Greeks to besiege the Andrians (8.111.1).⁸⁵ He almost certainly cited their support for the Persian cause,⁸⁶ but this is not the motivation Herodotus attributes to Themistocles. The Andrians are attacked because they refused to pay him a bribe (8.111.2). Others are similarly threatened and yield (8.112). Themistocles’s power within the Hellenic League is cited specifically:

He [Themistocles] collected large sums of money from the Carystians and the Parians, who had heard both that Andros was being besieged because it had Medized, and that Themistocles was the most highly reputed of all the commanders; so they sent the money out of fear. (8.112.2, tr. Purvis)

Themistocles is not here eliciting tribute for Athens, nor is he exacting the punishment demanded by the oaths of the Hellenic League taken the year before. Indeed, Herodotus states explicitly that the money was collected without the knowledge of the other generals (8.112.3). Rather, these are private payments.⁸⁷ His position of power both

within and beyond his home state allowed him to act, in effect, as an independent agent.

The last of Themistocles's transgressions was the trip to Sparta that Herodotus presents as the immediate cause of Timodemus's attack. At the end of the campaign season, the generals gathered at Isthmia to honor the man who had proven himself the most valuable of the Greeks during the war (8.123.1).⁸⁸ Each general voted for himself first, but a majority voted Themistocles second (8.123.2). No victor was named. Nevertheless, Themistocles's reputation stood at a high point throughout all Greece (8.124.1). Despite his international fame, Themistocles eagerly sought the official recognition he felt he had been denied. He traveled to Sparta, where he was given an olive crown, along with Eurybiades, and was honored with a state escort to the borders of Laconia (8.124.2–3).⁸⁹ Herodotus gives added emphasis to his zeal by noting that Themistocles departed for Sparta immediately after the failed vote on the Isthmus (αὐτίκα μετὰ ταῦτα: 8.124.2).⁹⁰ The victorious general did not return to Athens (as Herodotus's phrasing suggests he should have done), but rather went directly to Sparta. It is important here to note that Themistocles never received exceptional honors at home.⁹¹ When he traveled to Sparta, he was not just prowling for additional honors; he was circumventing the constraints of his home polis.⁹²

Herodotus may undercut Timodemus personally and give Themistocles the last word, but the substance and timing of the episode suggest that Herodotus did indeed intend it to reflect grave concerns about the unprecedented power the panhellenic effort had bestowed on Themistocles and perhaps others.⁹³ Class tensions loom large here to be sure, but we should not overlook the parochial dimension to this episode. Its importance to Herodotus falls into particularly sharp relief if we compare his version of the exchange to another that appears in Plato.

In reply to the man from Seriphos who became abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to his own merits but to his city, Themistocles said that he would not himself have become famous if he were a Seriphian, and nor would the other if he were an Athenian. (*Rep.* 329e–330a, tr. Emlyn-Jones and Preddy)

Cicero (*Cato* 8) and Plutarch (*Them.* 18.3) relate essentially the same version. Here Herodotus's middling Athenian is removed, along with his significant name, and is replaced by an unnamed man from Seriphos. None of our sources mentions Themistocles's trip to Sparta or his desire for international acclaim, which prompts the entire episode in Herodotus. Indeed, the altercation in Plato is presumably between two members of the international elite. Themistocles still intends to show that Athens alone is not a sufficient explanation for

his success, but in Herodotus the place that would have obscured Themistocles's natural talents is Belbina, a small island off the coast of Attica and in no way connected to Timodemus personally. In Plato, the man is from the island Themistocles cites and implicitly mocks, which elevates the private altercation between aristocrats into a patriotic contest between their states—the great Athens (with its equally great general) against the insignificant Seriphos.⁹⁴ Themistocles remains the clever, albeit obnoxious, aristocrat, but the tension between elite panhellenism and civic parochialism that had animated the episode in Herodotus is gone. At the very least, we can say that Herodotus saw in this exchange something others did not care to. But if Plato's version is the older (as many maintain),⁹⁵ we could go even further and conclude that Herodotus has gone out of his way to insert this tension into an anecdote that did not originally have it.

Herodotus returns to the tensions between the panhellenic aspirations of the league's elite leaders and their fellow citizens in Book 9 with another, likely fictitious, exchange—this time involving Pausanias. As the battle of Plataea draws to a close, Pausanias is offered some disturbing advice by Lampon, an Aeginetan aristocrat and perhaps Pausanias's guest friend.⁹⁶ Herodotus provides a speech in direct address:

Son of Cleombrotus, you have accomplished a feat that is extraordinary in both its magnitude and its nobility; a god granted that you should be the one to protect Greece and gain the greatest glory of all the Greeks known to us. But now you should carry out what still remains to be done so that you will have an even greater reputation and so that in the future every barbarian will beware of initiating reckless acts against the Greeks. For after Leonidas died at Thermopylae, Mardonius and Xerxes cut off his head and suspended it from a stake; and if you now pay back Mardonius by treating him in the same fashion, you will win praise first from all the Spartans, and then from the rest of the Greeks, since by impaling Mardonius, you will have vengeance for what happened to your uncle Leonidas. (9.78, tr. Purvis modified)

Pausanias replies immediately, again in direct address:

My friend from Aegina, I commend and appreciate that you mean well and are trying to look out for my future interests, but this idea of yours falls short of good judgment. After you have raised me up on high, together with exalting my homeland and my achievement, you cast me down to nothing by encouraging me to abuse a corpse, claiming that if I did so, I would have a better reputation. But this is a deed more appropriate to barbarians than to Greeks, though we resent them for it all the same. In any case, because of this, I could hardly please the Aeginetans or anyone else who approves of such deeds as this. It is quite enough for me to please the Spartans by committing no sacrilege and by speaking with respect for what is lawful and sacred. As for Leonidas, whom you urge me to avenge, I tell you that he and the others who met their ends at Thermopylae have already achieved great vengeance by the countless souls of those who lie here dead. As for you, do not ever again approach me with such a suggestion or try to advise me, and be thankful to

Lampon seeks to ingratiate himself to Pausanias by suggesting that Mardonius's head be cut off and impaled, to avenge similar treatment meted out to Leonidas.⁹⁷ On the surface, Herodotus affords Pausanias the opportunity to reject barbaric cruelty.⁹⁸ But there is more than barbarism at play in Lampon's suggestion. His assumptions and arguments (though not the substance of his advice) reflect another striking combination of elitism and transcendent panhellenism.

Lampon defines Pausanias and his interests in terms of kinship. He opens by addressing Pausanias with his patronymic ("son of Cleombrotus": 9.78.2). This form of address generally marks respect,⁹⁹ but more relevant for our purposes is the simple fact that it identifies Pausanias as a member of a prominent aristocratic (indeed royal) family. Despite the prominence of Lampon's family, it is notable that Pausanias does not reciprocate, choosing rather to identify him by his polis ("My friend from Aegina": 9.79.1).¹⁰⁰ When Lampon comes to his main point, Pausanias is again figured within his family. The Leonidas who must be avenged is noted specifically and emphatically as Pausanias's uncle (πατρὼν τὸν σὸν Λεωνίδην), not—as would be equally appropriate—the king of Sparta (9.78.3).¹⁰¹ Vengeance is here not a matter of civic pride, but a personal matter for a relative of the slain man. Pausanias refuses to counter Lampon's suggestion on these terms, but rather challenges the assumptions that underlie it, explaining that "he and the others who met their ends at Thermopylae have already achieved great vengeance" (9.79.2). It is not just that Leonidas has already been avenged by the results of the battle of Plataea.¹⁰² Rather, the question of vengeance is not properly about Leonidas alone, but about all those who fell at Thermopylae.

Lampon matches his elitist emphasis on kinship with a broadly panhellenic perspective. Lampon does not present Plataea as a Spartan victory, as Pindar (*Pyth.* 1.75–80) and Aeschylus (*Pers.* 817) will do, but rather as Pausanias's alone: "a god granted that you should be the one to protect Greece and gain the greatest glory of all the Greeks known to us" (9.78.2).¹⁰³ The Spartan citizenry is only mentioned once as merely one of the groups that will praise Pausanias for his act of vengeance: "you will win praise first from all the Spartans, and then from the rest of the Greeks" (9.78.3).¹⁰⁴ In fact, Lampon leaves very little room for Sparta in his effusive praise of Pausanias. His present victory and future acclaim are panhellenic in scale. Herodotus does not want the fact to go unnoticed. Pausanias responds: "after you have raised me up on high, together with exalting my homeland (τὴν πατρίην) and my achievement, you cast me down to nothing by encouraging me to abuse a corpse" (9.79.1). No such praise of Pausanias's homeland appears in Lampon's speech,¹⁰⁵ which

emphasizes its absence all the more. Pausanias, in marked contrast, uses his home state as the ultimate point of reference. Lampon has promised Pausanias praise from the Spartans and the other Greeks if he did as advised. Pausanias observes that the act is itself repugnant to Greek morals and so would hardly win him any praise worth having (9.79.2). He then adds: “it is quite enough for me to please the Spartans by committing no sacrilege and by speaking with respect for what is lawful and sacred” (ἀποχρᾶ δέ μοι Σπαρτιήτησι ἀρεσκόμενον ὅσια μὲν ποιέειν, ὅσια δὲ καὶ λέγειν: 9.79.2). Reference to Sparta is strictly unnecessary here. Lampon’s suggestion is soundly rejected on the (panhellenic) grounds that it is un-Greek. But by affirming his sole desire to please the Spartans, Pausanias implicitly rejects the importance that Lampon has placed on international acclaim.¹⁰⁶ It is not merely that vengeance on Mardonius would fail to improve his standing abroad; Pausanias calls into question the value of any reputation sought outside the city-state.

With Lampon and Pausanias, Herodotus presents two very different recollections of the Persian War. Lampon assumes a landscape populated by elites whose achievements are measured on a panhellenic scale; Pausanias objects and vehemently restores what Lampon ignores, the citizen polis. As in the case of Themistocles and Timodemus, Herodotus is exposing the tensions not only between elite and civic paradigms for recalling the war, but between panhellenic and parochial ones as well.¹⁰⁷ It is, of course, singularly ironic that in this case Herodotus places the civic/parochial reading into the mouth of Pausanias. Lampon’s appeal to Pausanias’s elitist and panhellenic aspirations match his subsequent reputation quite well. At Byzantium, Pausanias will adopt the barbaric customs he eschews here (cruelty first among them).¹⁰⁸ On the Serpent Column, he will present himself as standing alone in a panhellenic world, while the Spartans are left to accept equal and anonymous subordination to their regent along with the rest of Greece. After his recall and trial, he will violate even more blatantly the customs he pledges himself to here.¹⁰⁹ The incongruity allows two possible interpretations: Herodotus never accepted the charges later leveled against Pausanias and crafted his dialogue with Lampon in part to exculpate the regent, or Herodotus acknowledged Pausanias’s later failings and used his moment of greatest success to highlight his subsequent change of character and fortune.¹¹⁰ In either case, Herodotus locates Pausanias at the fault line between elite panhellenism and civic parochialism just as the Persian threat to mainland Greece was drawing to a close.

I suggest that the Serpent-Column affair straddled this same fault line. Pausanias’s claim to be the leader of the Greeks presented his fellow Spartans (and the other allies as well) with the same toxic

intersection of elitism and panhellenism that (in Herodotus) drove Themistocles after Salamis and Lampon after Plataea. The Spartan decision to replace his epigram with a list of poleis mirrors the reactions of Timodemus and Pausanias's Herodotean doppelganger, each of whom insists on the centrality of the polis to any proper recollection of the Persian War. This final point is worth underscoring. The Spartans did not just remove Pausanias's name from the Serpent Column. They could have replaced his self-serving epigram with a simple assertion that the Greeks (collectively) won the war and dedicated the monument. They did not. Rather, they took the additional step of dividing the victorious Greeks by state, a decision that (as I have shown earlier) added an unnecessary layer of political complication and contestation—unnecessary that is, if the claim that the Persian War had been won by a homogeneous collective of Greeks was an unobjectionable assertion in itself. But the removal of this collective terminology suggests that here too Pausanias's epigram had proven problematic.

Sparta's preference for a list of allies over a collective term for the alliance as a whole can best be understood as a product of latent fears brought to the surface by Pausanias's crassly self-serving epigram. In truth, there was nothing inaccurate or even misleading about the claim that the Greeks had fought the war, won it, and dedicated the Serpent Column. Indeed, this is exactly how Thucydides describes the monument.¹¹¹ But such a recollection of the war was perhaps all the more problematic precisely because it was true. Faced with the reality of invasion, the separate poleis, even the most powerful ones, had implicitly conceded that none could resist alone. In so doing, they acknowledged at some level the inherent weakness of the individual polis. A broad coalition was needed. That coalition did not long outlast the victory at Plataea, but its decisive importance to the victory still had the potential to undercut patriotic retellings of the war throughout the various participating states, as well as the political capital those states hoped to gain from such retellings both within and beyond their borders.¹¹² Even Pausanias's claim to be the leader of this larger group had some truth to it. The kind of international cooperation that sustained the Hellenic League was not an equal-opportunity enterprise. If the city-states required a broad alliance, they had to turn to those citizens with the most extensive international connections, the elites.¹¹³ These elites set early league policy through the common council at Isthmia and continued to act through the war councils in the field down to 478/7.¹¹⁴ But when the immediate threat had passed, these men were expected to submit themselves again to the constraints of their home states.¹¹⁵ Pausanias's epigram did not just signal that he had no intention of

doing so, it also set before the Greek world a disturbing counter memory of the Persian War that could serve to justify his decision to think and act beyond the constraints of his home polis. Much as Herodotus's Lampon suggests and his Themistocles assumes, the Persian War recalled by the Serpent Column's epigram was not won by the citizens of the separate poleis, but by the great man at the head of a grand panhellenic army unencumbered by parochial divisions and limitations. Pausanias had struck a nerve. It would not have taken much for contemporaries to infer from his epigram that the Serpent Column was in effect commemorating the irrelevance of the citizen polis. This is, after all, how Herodotus has both Timodemus and his Pausanias understand similarly panhellenic recollections of the war. Removing the name of Pausanias from the monument was not enough. The transcendent panhellenism that underwrote his ambitions had to go as well.

In point of fact, such elite posturing never presented any real threat to the polis or its domination of the Persian-War tradition. If Pausanias had hoped to win for himself a position of power outside the bounds of his home state, he badly misread the political environment. Both before and after the war, the polis was for most Greeks the center around which orbited a host of political activities, religious festivals, poetic competitions, and commemorations that easily made it "the master of memory and forgetfulness," in Le Goff's famous turn of phrase.¹¹⁶ Elites like Pausanias could think outside the polis, but most of their fellow citizens could not and generally looked upon those who did with some suspicion.¹¹⁷ That said, the Persian War had been an exceptional event that left a distinct impression on the lives and memories of those who experienced it. Yet the panhellenic unity it compelled was not sustained. The Hellenic League had already ceased to function by the time the Serpent Column was completed.¹¹⁸ One-time comrades returned to their home states, to take up again the parochial biases and prejudices that had divided them before the war. Consequently, their shared experiences did not become shared memories. What Paul Connerton says of World War I is particular apposite here:

It is possible to imagine that the members of two quite different groups may participate in the same event, even so catastrophic and all-engulfing an event as a great war, but still these two groups may be to such a degree incommensurable that their subsequent memories of that event, the memories they pass on to their children, can scarcely be said to refer to the "same" event.¹¹⁹

In this, Connerton is echoing Halbwachs, who drew a similar conclusion in the context of more quotidian experiences.¹²⁰ In the absence of sustained exposure to cultural devices designed to instill a

shared recollection of the past, a single event will very likely fracture into as many memories as there are distinct memorial communities that can exploit it over time.¹²¹ Jung has suggested that there were indeed such devices, particularly at the site of Plataea, but as we shall see in the next chapter, it is doubtful that the Persian-War rituals associated with that site exerted the kind of influence he suggests.¹²² Pausanias had appealed to a community of Greeks that did not exist in the way his epigram presupposed. The Greeks saw themselves as citizen of their respective poleis and expected their past achievements to be commemorated in the same way.¹²³

Despite his miscalculation, Pausanias's ambitions and the panhellenic prestige that supported them were nevertheless perceived as a very serious threat at the time. His arrogant style of command in the Aegean had forced his recall to Sparta where he was tried for misconduct at roughly the same time as the Serpent Column was revised (Thuc. 1.95.3). According to Thucydides, there was already talk of Medism (1.95.5).¹²⁴ The Spartans refused him any further commands (1.95.6 and 1.128.3), but on his own authority (ἰδίᾳ) he subsequently commandeered a trireme from another state, Hermione, took control of a third, Byzantium, and after his expulsion, settled in a fourth, Colonae. From there he was thought to have continued his alleged collusion with the Persians to bring Greece under their control (1.128–31). Themistocles's later career inspired similar fears. His personal claims on the victory over Persia made him an easy target for ostracism (Plut. *Them.* 22). When accusations of Medism were later brought by the Spartans, they were given sufficient credence to justify his recall to stand trial, but Themistocles then used his international connections to escape to the Persian court, where he too promised to hand Greece over to the Great King (Thuc. 1.135–38). In each case, these elites leveraged their panhellenic fame and standing, both of which were products of the Persian War and its commemoration, to move beyond the constraints of their home states and ultimately to threaten their very existence. We may doubt that either Pausanias or Themistocles could have made good on their frankly outlandish promises, but the mere fact that such allegations were widely believed suggests that there were at the time real concerns that runaway elites could actually undo the successes for which they claimed exclusive credit.

In such an environment, the importance of asserting the claims of the state over the Serpent Column (and by extension the memory of the Persian War generally) begins to come into focus. Pausanias's epigram presented the Spartans with a complex problem, however. Both Pausanias and his equally striking assertion of transcendent panhellenism had to be removed, but the Serpent Column was not a

state monument. Even Thucydides makes the point explicitly. This was a panhellenic monument commissioned and paid for by the alliance as a whole. The fact of unity had to be recognized and yet rendered innocuous. The Spartan solution was elegant. The list of allies called to mind an alliance that had been nothing more or less than the citizens of a select number of separate city-states. This Hellenic League had, in other words, never been more than the sum of its parts. At the same time as the revised Serpent Column insisted upon the boundaries that separated the citizens of the member states, it erased those between elites and non-elites. There was no room for a Pausanias or Themistocles. Victory, as Herodotus's Timodemus reminds us and his Pausanias affirms, was achieved by the citizens of the participating poleis, not the great leaders of an international league.

Conclusion

As noted earlier, collective memories become particularly apparent when the monuments that reflect them are contested.¹²⁵ This is certainly true of the Serpent Column, but only to the extent that we can accurately reconstruct the nature of the dispute that broke when the content of Pausanias's epigram became known. Jung sees it as the defeat of a parochial (specifically Spartan) vision of the war at the hands of the other Greek allies who remembered the war rather in terms that transcended the claims of any individual state. This would suggest that the extraordinary threat posed by Persia and its eventual defeat had so strengthened a panhellenic memorial community that it could express its own commemoration of the war over and against the more entrenched state communities in the years after the battle of Plataea. The larger social and political realities that shaped memory production in those years would have made such an outcome unlikely, and I hope I have shown here that the Serpent Column speaks against it as well. The epigram that was originally inscribed on it reflected rather a provocative combination of Pausanias's personal ambition and a panhellenic recollection of the war that relegated the city-states to insignificance. The list that replaced it rejected both claims by prompting viewers to recall the war as the exclusive achievement of the separate participating poleis. The resulting commemoration, though still panhellenic in scope, did not transcend the state, but was rather defined by it.

The Serpent-Column affair continued to attract attention over the centuries and remains our best documented disagreement about how the Persian War ought to be commemorated, but the outcome of the struggle between Pausanias and his fellow citizens was never really in

doubt (even if contemporaries may not have seen it that way). The polis was too well established. Regardless of what Pausanias inscribed on the Serpent Column, the dominance of the polis within the lives of those who actually and then metaphorically remembered the Persian War would have guaranteed it a central place within the tradition for so long as that dominance held. The Serpent-Column affair did not, therefore, decide the course of a Persian-War tradition poised between two viable alternatives (one defined by the state and the other transcending it). Nor did Pausanias's crass manipulation of the latter fuel a backlash that catapulted the former to unexpected dominance throughout the coming decades. The Serpent Column is important for our understanding of the overall Persian-War tradition not because it was decisive, but rather because it is telling. The controversy that erupted over its commemorative narrative lays bare for us the assumptions and expectations that would come to shape the memory of the Persian War throughout the classical period, as we shall see in the next chapter.

¹ For more on the golden shields, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 1–3.

² For more on imagined communities, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 12–14.

³ The likely date for the completion of the Serpent Column was estimated by [Gauer 1968](#): 93. For a discussion of earlier and later possibilities with bibliography, see [Jung 2006](#): 248 n.78. The accepted location of the monument was challenged by [Laroche 1989](#), who maintains that it was actually located just to the south. This thesis has won broad support (see [Bommelaer 1991](#): 165–66 and [Jung 2006](#): 244 n.67 with further bibliography).

⁴ The Hellenic League voted to erect a statue of Apollo at Delphi after Salamis (Hdt. 8.121.2). After Plataea they voted to erect a bronze Zeus and Poseidon at Olympia and Isthmia, respectively, along with the Serpent Column at Delphi (Hdt. 9.81.1). The Greeks also dedicated various items of war booty. For more on these other dedications of the Hellenic League, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 64–68.

⁵ The exact relationship between the tripod and the bronze column is a subject of debate. While some hold that the three heads of the serpents held the feet of a modestly sized tripod, others maintain that the column itself merely lent support to the bowl of a much larger tripod, whose legs reached the base of the monument. [Gauer 1968](#): 75–90 provides a detailed review of the issues, but comes to no firm conclusions. For a good summary of the debate to date, see [Jung 2006](#): 244 n.69 and [Stephenson 2016](#): 25–27, who, like Gauer, also come to no firm conclusions. For our purposes, the exact reconstruction of the monument is less important than the manifest fact that the Serpent Column was exceptional among the other Hellenic-League dedications.

⁶ The heights of the other dedications are provided by Herodotus in cubits (see 8.121.1 and 9.81.1). The Salamis Apollo was the tallest at 12 cubits (roughly 5.5 meters), followed by Zeus at 10 (roughly 4.5), and then Poseidon at 7 (roughly 3.2). The height of the Serpent Column with its tripod can only be approximated, but 9 meters is a conservative possibility (see [Bommelaer 1991](#): 165 and [Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012](#): 43). [Steinhart 1997](#): 35 suggests a total height of 12 meters. We are, of course, dealing with ancient estimations on the one side and modern suppositions on the other, but even if we account for some error one way or

the other, the Serpent Column would have towered over the nearby Salamis Apollo.

⁷ See also [Jacquemin 2001](#): 102, [Jung 2006](#): 242–46, and [M. Scott 2010](#): 85.

⁸ All of our extant sources (see p. 33) strongly imply that Pausanias began with authority over the monument's final form. Indeed, his self-serving epigram is already inscribed before any complaint is made, which suggests that he did not act in committee and felt no need to submit a draft for approval. The basic form and location of the monument were, of course, voted by the allies after Plataea, but it seems that Pausanias then oversaw the execution of that decision. Xenophon's control over the tithe voted after the return of the 10,000 (*Anab* 5.3.4–13) supplies a possible parallel for Pausanias's extraordinary personal influence over the dedication; see also [W. West 1969](#): 14.

⁹ Presumably the inscription appeared on the pedestal ([Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 60 and [Page 1981](#): 216), but Thucydides twice states that it appeared on the tripod itself (1.132.2–3). So too does Apollodorus ([*Dem.*] 59.97). Although [Petrovic 2007](#): 268 accepts this attestation at face value (see also [Stephenson 2016](#): 2 and 81), there is reason to suspect Thucydides's precision in this case. Elsewhere he states that the list of allies also appeared “on the tripod” (3.57.2), even though it was clearly inscribed on the shaft of the column. Herodotus makes the same mistake when he explains why the Tenians were added “to the tripod” (8.82.1). It seems likely that Thucydides (and Herodotus) referred to the entire monument simply as “the tripod,” and so his comments provide no basis for placing the inscription anywhere but the likeliest location, the pedestal.

¹⁰ [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 67–84.

¹¹ [Jung 2006](#): 241–55; see [note 34](#) for earlier bibliography.

¹² [Jung 2006](#): 225–97; see also [Beck 2010](#): 61–68.

¹³ [Jung 2006](#): 254–55.

¹⁴ For the identification of Apollodorus as the author of Demosthenes 59 and the likely date of the speech, see [Macurdy 1942](#): 257–59 and [Trevett 1990](#): 407.

¹⁵ There is no doubt about who actually removed the inscription (see [Gauer 1968](#): 93). All of our extant sources agree that the Spartans executed the removal of the inscription and added the list (*pace* [Jung 2006](#): 250 n.81 and [Steinhart 1997](#): 53–59). Rather the question is who ordered Pausanias's epigram to be removed and dictated the nature of its replacement.

¹⁶ The remaining post-classical sources are largely indecisive and add little to our three substantial accounts. Nepos's brief treatment is derived from Thucydides. The Spartans take offense, remove the inscription, and replace it with a list of allies (*Paus.* 1.3–4). Aristodemus too attributes the list of allies to the Spartans, but his support must be taken with a grain of salt, since he does not connect the list with the Serpent Column, but rather a disc found at Sparta after Pausanias's death (*FGrHist* 104 F1.9); he treats Pausanias's original epigram elsewhere (F 1.4.1). Brief references also appear in Pausanias the travel-writer (3.8.2), Aelius Aristides (46.175), and the *Suda* (s.v. Pausanias). None of these sources bears directly on the question of who replaced the epigram with the list of allies. The *Palatine Anthology* includes the original epigram, but nothing else (6.197).

¹⁷ For the Greek of the epigram and a more detailed discussion of its contents, see pp. 39–40.

¹⁸ The relative authority of Sparta within the Hellenic League is an issue of some debate, but there is more than enough evidence in Herodotus and Thucydides to suggest that such independent action on behalf of the league as a whole was not out of character for the hegemon (see [Yates 2015](#) with earlier bibliography).

¹⁹ See [Westlake 1977](#) with earlier bibliography on p. 95 n.4; see also the earlier work of [Konishi 1970](#), [Lazenby 1975](#), and [Podlecki 1976](#): 297–98, as well as the subsequent contributions of [Schumacher 1987](#), [Evans 1988](#): 1–4, [Carawan 1989](#),

Hornblower 1991: 211–12, Blösel 2012, and Munson 2012: 251–52.

²⁰ For the former possibility, see Westlake 1977 and Blösel 2012: 226–28; for the latter, see Munson 2012: 255.

²¹ Bonner and Smith 1943: 2–3 find this fact noteworthy, but never explain this curiously misdirected prosecution.

²² See Bonner and Smith 1943: 2, Gauer 1968: 93, Hornblower 1991: 218–19 and 1992a: 176, Kapparis 1999: 378–79, Nafissi 2004a: 72–73, and Jung 2006: 246–47 nn.72 and 75; Trevett 1990: 409 states quite openly that the two are incompatible, but then provides several arguments that explain how they are not necessarily contradictory. Even Sánchez 2001: 104, who criticizes Apollodorus’s accuracy here, maintains that the differences between the two can be boiled down to mere omission.

²³ In the first, Pausanias returns some of Xerxes’s captured kinsmen to Persia without the knowledge of the allies (1.128.5); in the second, Thucydides refers in passing to the high esteem in which the Greeks held Pausanias before his misdeeds at Byzantium (1.130.1).

²⁴ Despite Hornblower’s preference for Apollodorus, he rightly notes that “the omission [of the Amphictyony] is actually less “natural,” in this ample and Herodotean stretch of narrative, than are the comparable omissions of the Amphictyony in the *Pentekontaetia*” (1991: 218; see also Hornblower 1992a: 176). For his explanation, see note 33.

²⁵ Trevett 1990: 409.

²⁶ Fornara 1967a: 291–94 has argued that the erasure of Pausanias’s inscription occurred far later than is usually thought, in 468 after the regent’s second recall. His interpretation turns on Thucydides’s use of μὲν οὖν immediately after the elegy is cited. Fornara takes these particles to mark the end of the digression that relates Pausanias’s past action and thus to resume the main temporal line of the story situated after the second recall, but see K. Meister 1971: 21, Trevett 1990: 411, Kapparis 1999: 378, and Nafissi 2004a: 72 n.65 against this reading.

²⁷ See Trevett 1990: 410, Hornblower 1991: 219, Kienast 1995: 132 n.105, and Kapparis 1999: 378.

²⁸ See Steinhart 1997: 53, Sánchez 2001: 103–104, and Nafissi 2004a: 72 for a similar assessment of Plutarch’s version. Bowen 1992: 146 goes even further, suggesting that the Spartans here erase the inscription “not simply to meet the demands of the allies but because they too were offended.”

²⁹ The weakness of Plutarch’s historical argumentation here (noted by Bowen 1992: 146) is not at issue, but rather only the assumptions that inform it, however weak.

³⁰ Plutarch cites an array of sources in his essay on Herodotean bias (see Bowen 1992: 7–9), but we have no way of knowing which supplied this version of events. It may represent a contemporary tradition, perhaps even taken from a fifth-century source, but it may as easily represent a later embellishment.

³¹ That Pausanias was in fact only a regent, see Hdt. 9.10.1–2 and Thuc. 1.132.1. Five other notable errors in Apollodorus’s digression on Plataea also stand out: (1) the assertion that the Plataeans were the only Boeotians to resist Xerxes (95), but see Hdt 7.132.1, 8.50.2, and 9.30 for the conspicuous participation of Thespieae; (2) the presence of half of the Plataeans at Thermopylae (95), but see Hdt. 7.202 for their absence; (3) their participation at Salamis (95), against Hdt. 8.44.1; (4) the attribution of a perpetual hatred for Plataea to Sparta and the house of Archidamus down to the Peloponnesian War (98) in spite of Archidamus’s claim that Plataea need only have declared neutrality to avoid destruction in Thucydides (2.72); and finally (5) the claim that Archidamus was directly involved in the Theban attack on Plataea (98–99), which is otherwise unattested. For more, see Trevett 1990: 408–

409 and Kapparis 1999: 375–80.

³² Bonner and Smith 1943: 2, Trevett 1990: 410, and Jung 2006: 246 n.72. Kapparis 1999: 379 takes a more generous view, noting that the Spartans were likely never compelled to pay the sum since they did comply in the end. Sordi 1957: 62 suggests that the Athenians ultimately stood behind the prosecution.

³³ Hornblower 1992a and 2007 has argued that the Amphictyony was consistently ignored by Thucydides throughout his history, citing this episode as an example. He is doubtless correct to draw attention to this important institution. But Thucydides's predisposition to avoid mentioning the Amphictyony does not in itself prove that it played a role here, merely that Thucydides's silence alone is not probative. As I have argued, it is rather the contradiction between the two accounts that proves most telling. But even if the Amphictyony were very much more powerful than Thucydides suggests, immediate political considerations would make its role in Apollodorus just as unlikely. Most of the members of the Amphictyony had Medized and may have faced punitive action at this time by none other than the Spartan king Leotychidas (Hdt. 6.72; see also Chapter 3 p. 105 n.21). It remains inherently unlikely that an organization whose members were so thoroughly compromised in recent years would have been sought to arbitrate such a dispute, or that this body would have dared to punish so harshly a state whose command over the combined armies of the Hellenic League was only now being relinquished. While Sánchez 2001: 91 rightly warns against explaining all the Amphictyony's actions in these years in light of its Medism, we should not ignore that salient fact either. Ultimately, the role played by the Amphictyony here is (*pace* Hornblower) much more evocative of the fourth century than the early fifth (see also Fornara 1967a: 293 and Sánchez 2001: 104). For a sympathetic, but ultimately critical review of Hornblower's arguments, see Lefèvre 2002: 436–41. For a different conclusion about the power of the Amphictyony in the fifth century, see Bowden 2003.

³⁴ Jung 2006: 241–55; see also Bonner and Smith 1943: 2, Zeilhofer 1959: 39–41, Gauer 1968: 93, Wolski 1969/70: 39, K. Meister 1971, Trevett 1990: 409–11, Hornblower 1991: 218 and 1992a: 176, Kienast 1995: 132–33, Steinhart 1997: 53–59, Förtsch 2001: 53–54, Lefèvre 2002: 437, Nafissi 2004a: 72–73, Kowerski 2005: 188 n.99, Beck 2010: 64, Higbie 2010: 184, and Petrovic 2010: 203. This view of events is by no means universally held (see Fornara 1967: 293–94, Page 1981: 216, Molyneux 1992: 198, Sánchez 2001: 103–104, and Flower and Marincola 2002: 12). Bertrand 1992: 45, Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012: 44, and Stephenson 2016: 86–87 provide Thucydides's version without supporting arguments against Apollodorus.

³⁵ Bonner and Smith 1943: 2, Gauer 1968: 92–93, and Jung 2006: 247–48 make the point explicitly; Stephenson 2016: 87, who ultimately follows Thucydides, is also troubled by a perceived lack of motivation on Sparta's part.

³⁶ The couplet is, in fact, identical in all of the extant sources that quote it (see p. 33) except the *Palatine Anthology*, where the Doric dialect is used and the third person singular verbs (ᾠλεσε and ἀνέθηκε) are rendered in the first person (ᾠλεσα and ἀνέθηκα). Page 1981: 216–17 deduces that Doric was likely used on the original, even though he concedes that the *Anthology* provides insufficient proof to that effect (see also Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 60). Jung 2006: 246 n.73 concludes that the version in the *Anthology* was the product of a late philological exercise. In the end, however, we have no good evidence for the precise form of the inscription since even our earliest source, Thucydides, could not have seen it inscribed. What Thucydides provides must be the product of an oral tradition or at best an early transcription. It would be hypercritical to cast doubt on the basic accuracy of the epigram, which the incident's fame surely guaranteed, but contemporaries may have had little interest in preserving the original dialect. For more on the transmission of

the epigram to Thucydides, see [Page 1981](#): 216–17 and [Petrovic 2007](#): 270–72.

³⁷ [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 57–60; for more on the surviving column, see [Gauer 1968](#): 75–92, [Steinhart 1997](#), and [Stephenson 2016](#): 2–17. For the transportation of the Column to Constantinople and its afterlife there, see [Gauer 1995](#), [Stichel 1997](#), and [Stephenson 2016](#): 97–126.

³⁸ See also [Stephenson 2016](#): 85.

³⁹ For a discussion of the use of “the Greeks” (οἱ Ἕλληνες) as a by-word for the Hellenic League in Herodotus, see [Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950](#): 96–98, [Brunt 1953/54](#): 145–46, [Yates 2015](#): 2–3 n.10, and [Vannicelli 2017](#): 477–78. [Harrell 2002](#): 459 draws attention to the additional problems associated with the title ἀρχηγός (see also [Nafissi 2004a](#): 73).

⁴⁰ We should not forget that Pausanias took command of Spartan and allied forces at Plataea on behalf of his young cousin, Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas (Hdt. 9.10.2; [Bertrand 1992](#): 45), and even then he did not command alone, but rather shared command with another cousin, Euryanax (9.10.3). For more on the tension between aristocrats and their fellow citizens, see pp. 45–60.

⁴¹ [Jung 2006](#): 248 n.76 and [Gauer 1968](#): 93; see also [Förtsch 2001](#): 53–54 and [Stephenson 2016](#): 87–88. It should be noted, however, that Förtsch expresses some concern that such a custom would violate “Sparta’s egalitarian principles.” [Welwei 2007](#): 47–48 downplays the importance of the incident generally, but he also assumes that the epigram had been inscribed and removed before Pausanias was dispatched to command the league fleet in the spring of 478. As already noted (p. 30), it is rather more likely that the monument was not completed and inscribed until the next year and so at roughly the same time as Pausanias was removed from command.

⁴² Herodotus notes the presence of a bronze cauldron, dedicated by Pausanias at the mouth of the Pontus, but only in passing (4.81.3). Our source for the inscription is Athenaeus (12.536b), who here cites the third-century local historian, Nymphis of Heracleia (= *FGrHist* 432 F9 and “Simon.” 39P). The epigram reads: “This memorial of valor was dedicated to lord Poseidon at the Black Sea by Pausanias, commander of spacious Greece, a Spartan by birth, son of Cleombrotus, of the ancient family of Heracles” (tr. Campbell).

⁴³ For more on the treasury of the Acanthians at Delphi, see [Bommelaer 1991](#): 160–62 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 104–105. Plutarch provides the inscription: “Brasidas and the Acanthians from the Athenians” (*Lys.* 1.1).

⁴⁴ For more on the monument generally, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 129–31.

⁴⁵ [Nafissi 2004a](#): 73 and [Petrovic 2007](#): 269 also raise the possibility that the monument may have been a private dedication rather than another public monument appropriated by the regent.

⁴⁶ Nymphis believed that the cauldron was an earlier dedication and that Pausanias added the inscription in a vain attempt to claim the monument as his own, “forgetting himself because of his wantonness and arrogance” (*FGrHist* 432 F9 = *Ath.* 12.536b). For more on the arrogant tone of the inscription, see [Page 1981](#): 254–55, who argues that in some respects it exceeds even the Serpent Column’s epigram.

⁴⁷ For more on the heroization of Brasidas, see [Hoffmann 2000](#).

⁴⁸ For Lysander’s role in the construction of this monument, see [Pouilloux and Roux 1963](#): 55–60, [Bommelaer 1981](#): 14–16 and 22 and 1991: 108–110, [Bearzot 2004](#): 143–46, [M. Scott 2010](#): 105–107, and [Förtsch 2001](#): 60–61.

⁴⁹ [Ferrario 2014](#): 255 notes the contrast between Pausanias’s epigram and the dedication at Olympia, but with no discussion of the prior debate.

⁵⁰ See also *Paus.* 5.24.3 for an ancient transcription. Pausanias connects this monument to the Second Messenian War, but this has been ruled out on

epigraphical and stylistic grounds. We are almost certainly dealing with a monument dedicated in the late sixth or early fifth century (see [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 47 and [Förtsch 2001](#): 51). See also [Förtsch 2001](#): 52 for a Spartan dedication from the late archaic period with a similar focus on the collective.

⁵¹ For more on the inscription, see [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 78–79, [Förtsch 2001](#): 55–56, and [Osborne and Rhodes 2017](#): 70–73.

⁵² [Jung 2006](#): 247 n.75 takes this passage to indicate that no major conflict between Sparta and Pausanias resulted, but it must certainly suggest that at the very least his epigram was not thought to represent normal Spartan commemorative practice.

⁵³ In this connection, it is worth noting that at Olympia, Pausanias observes a statue of Archidamus III of Sparta (r. 360/59–338) and goes on to remark that “before Archidamus no king, so far as I could learn, had his statue set up by the Spartans, at least outside the boundaries of the country” (6.4.9, tr. Jones modified). Here Pausanias is commenting on a different medium of commemoration, but his observation lends credence to the possibility that the Spartans generally eschewed such personal honors as Pausanias the regent arrogated to himself in his inscription.

⁵⁴ [Beck 2010](#): 65. Diodorus relates a version of events in which the Serpent Column had a different couplet: “The saviors of spacious Greece dedicated this tripod, having rescued their cities from hateful slavery” (Diod. 11.33.2, tr. Campbell). He makes no mention of Pausanias’s epigram and rather treats the one he cites as the only and original heading for the monument. Despite the contradictions between Diodorus and the rest of the tradition, some have taken his version as evidence for a more poetic replacement to Pausanias’s epigram (see [Gauer 1968](#): 93, [Eckstein 1969](#): 26, [Förtsch 2001](#): 54, [Neer 2007](#): 239, and [Stephenson 2016](#): 81). [K. Meister 1971](#) has, however, thoroughly exploded this possibility (see also [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 60 and [Kapparis 1999](#): 377), and I do not wish to rehearse his reasons here. I would like to address continuing qualms about ignoring a source that would have presumably been in a position to see such an epigram ([Gomme 1945](#): 434, [Page 1981](#): 216, and [Trevett 1990](#): 409 n.11). Diodorus states that the epigram appeared on the tripod, not the column. We have already seen that Herodotus and Thucydides refer to the whole monument by the name of the tripod alone (see [note 9](#)), but we need not assume the same for Diodorus. If he believed that this epigram appeared on the now lost tripod (as [Neer 2007](#): 239 and [Stephenson 2016](#): 81 suppose), then naturally he would not have seen the inscription, nor would he be making such a claim. Rather he would here be following a literary source (for more, see [Chapter 2](#), p. 98 n.173).

⁵⁵ An alternate reading was supplied by [R. Meister 1957](#) (τὸ[ν Μέδον] πόλεμον [ἐ]πολ[έ]μεον) and still has defenders ([Steinhart 1997](#): 60–61), but scholarly consensus stands behind the earlier reading (see, for example, [Gauer 1968](#): 94 n.421, [K. Meister 1971](#): 21, [Jung 2006](#): 249 n.79, and [Stephenson 2016](#): 10). Although I provide the earlier reading here, neither supplement greatly impacts my interpretation of the inscription.

⁵⁶ Sparta and Athens hold place of pride as first and second, respectively, but the logic behind the sequence of the other states remains unclear. It has been argued that it represents the internal structure of the Hellenic League (see [Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950](#): 96–100) or is informed by the Delphic Amphictyony ([Steinhart 1997](#): 66–69). Neither theory has gained much support. For arguments against Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, see [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 59, [Brunt 1953/54](#): 146–48, and [Jung 2006](#): 251–52; against Steinhart, see [Jung 2006](#): 252–53. [Gauer 1968](#): 94–95 has argued more conservatively for a mix of geography and perceived importance informed throughout by a Spartan perspective. With the exception of Sparta, however, the precise sequence of allies has no bearing on my

argument here.

⁵⁷ Gauer 1968: 94 and Förtsch 2001: 54 argue for Laconian, but Steinhart 1997: 53–59, following Jeffery 1990: 102, demonstrates that the dialect is in fact Phocian (see also Nafissi 2004a: 72, Jung 2006: 249–50, and Stephenson 2016: 13–14). Steinhart connects the question of dialect with the different versions of the story presented by Apollodorus and Thucydides, arguing that a Phocian dialect suggests Amphictyonic intervention and so supports Apollodorus's version. While the presence of Laconian would speak for an explicitly Spartan perspective, the use of Phocian (the local dialect) is less decisive. As I argue in the following, Thucydides does not suggest that the Spartans sought to impose a manifestly Spartan perspective on the monument. Even if we read the choice of Phocian as significant, it is equally likely that the Spartans ordered it to be so, just as they requested the list of allies.

⁵⁸ Jung 2006: 250–54 and Beck 2010: 65; see also Kienast 1995: 133.

⁵⁹ A list also opens space for petty quarrels about primacy, but only to the extent that the sequence of states corresponds to perceived achievement, and this assumption is by no means a safe one (see note 56).

⁶⁰ Gauer 1968: 94, Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 59, Steinhart 1997: 61–63, and Jung 2006: 254. Three allied states that did serve at Salamis or Plataea are absent: Seriphos (Hdt. 8.46.4) and Croton (8.47) from Salamis and Pale in Cephallenia from Plataea (9.28.5). For more on Croton's absence, see Chapter 6, pp. 220–22.

⁶¹ Jung 2006: 254 comes perilously close to suggesting that any level of participation earned states a place on the list (see also Bertrand 1992: 45, Kapparis 1999: 377, and Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012: 43). Other commentators say almost nothing about the conflicts that must have emerged from the specific choice to limit the list to those who participated in two specific battles; see, for example, Gauer 1968: 94, Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 59, and Steinhart 1997: 61–63.

⁶² For the Ionian states that defected before and after Mycale, see Hdt 9.103–104. For the subsequent entry of Samos, Chios, Lesbos, and an undisclosed number of “the other islanders” into the Hellenic League, see 9.106.4. For the states that fought at Artemisium or Thermopylae, but failed to participate at Salamis and Plataea, see for example the Thebans and Phocians at Thermopylae (7.202–203) and the Locrians at both (7.203.1 and 8.1.2). For the lukewarm allies, see the Corcyreans, who had promised support but did not reach Salamis in time (7.168), or the Mantineans, who had served at Thermopylae (7.202) and helped to construct the wall across the Isthmus (8.72), but failed to reach Plataea in time (9.77).

⁶³ For indications of contestation and negotiation in the composition of the list itself, see Chapter 3, p. 106 n.27.

⁶⁴ See note 39.

⁶⁵ We should not assume a strict binary in which use of elitist self-presentation always or inevitably constituted a rejection of the polis (Morris 1996: 27 and 2000: 160).

⁶⁶ This is not to suggest that support for joint action against Xerxes's invasion was advocated exclusively by the aristocracy or that Pausanias (and others) had a panhellenic political program in mind of the sort we find in Isocrates. I use “panhellenic” here to indicate merely that the horizons of aristocratic ambition could (and often did) extend beyond the bounds of their home poleis.

⁶⁷ Herodotus famously introduces Themistocles as a “new man” (Hdt. 7.143.1; see also Plut. *Them.* 1.1–2), and so he is hardly a representative of the old aristocracy; but neither was he a common Athenian. He boasted close political ties across Greece, and his conspicuous self-display at panhellenic shrines became the stuff of legend. Plutarch refers to a sumptuous feast provided at the Olympic Games (5.3). A contemporary poet, Timocreon, berates Themistocles for a similarly rich (but botched) feast at the Isthmian Games (727.10–12P; see also Stehle 1994 and

McMullin 2001). We might also adduce an anecdote in which Themistocles had wanted to dedicate spoils within the temple of Apollo at Delphi, only to be turned away by the Pythia (Paus. 10.14.6). To the extent that the international ambitions of the elite could inspire fear in the polis, Themistocles was as much an elite as any member of the great families at Athens.

⁶⁸ See Blösel 2004: 329–31 for a critique of the Timodemus episode; see Macan 1908b: 761 and Asheri 1998: 73–74 for Lampon.

⁶⁹ See, for example, Hart 1982: 150, Jordan 1988: 556–57, and Blösel 2004: 329–31.

⁷⁰ For more on these honors, see pp. 50–51. Labarbe 1958 attempts to prove that Herodotus intended his audience to understand that Timodemus was a Lacedaemonian *perioikos*, but his arguments strain the clear implication of the text (Asheri et al. 2003: 327).

⁷¹ See Mazzarino 1965: 188, Blösel 2004: 330, and A. Bowie 2007: 215.

⁷² The objection becomes a commonplace. Demosthenes contrasts a contemporary tendency to attribute victories to generals with an older custom that held Salamis and Marathon the victories of the polis, not Themistocles and Miltiades (23.198). Aeschines makes the same point (see note 93). Clitus seems to have had such arguments in mind when he famously rebuked Alexander the Great (Arr. *Anab.* 4.8.5 and Plut. *Alex.* 50.11). Later, Plutarch attributes a similar objection to Sophanes, who after Marathon moved to deny Miltiades the honor of a garland, stating, “Miltiades . . . when you have fought and conquered the Persians by yourself, then you can also expect to be honored by yourself” (*Cim.* 8.1, tr. Waterfield).

⁷³ Mazzarino 1965: 188.

⁷⁴ Asheri et al. 2003: 326.

⁷⁵ Asheri et al. 2003: 326; see also Flory 1987: 180 n.8. Blösel 2004: 330 n.59 raises the possibility that the name is intended to hint at a conflict between individual and collective, but never explores the possibility, focusing rather on domestic rivalries.

⁷⁶ See also Ferrario 2014: 98–101.

⁷⁷ See, for example, Fornara 1971b: 70–74, Dewald 1985: 53–55, Evans 1991: 78–80, and Blösel 2001 and 2004: 255–335.

⁷⁸ Herodotus says that Themistocles “turned (μεταβαλὼν) to the Athenians” (8.109.1). The participle μεταβαλὼν can indicate a change in location, but is often understood to imply some change of strategy as well (see Masaracchia 1977: 211 and Asheri et al. 2003: 307).

⁷⁹ In the next chapter (8.110.1) Herodotus will sum up Themistocles’s actions here with the verb διαβάλλειν (“to deceive,” according to Powell 1966 s.v.). Fornara 1971b: 71 n.17, Blösel 2004: 263–64, and Baragwanath 2008: 310 n.44, however, assume that διαβάλλειν should be taken to mean “hiding his intentions” since Themistocles here does not give the Athenians poor or misleading advice, but perfectly sound advice for his own ulterior motives. The word διαβάλλειν also appears prominently when the Athenians are “deceived” by Aristagoras in Book 5 (96.1, 97.1, and 97.2); see Pelling 2007: 183–85 and Hornblower 2013: 276 for a discussion of its range of meaning on that occasion and generally.

⁸⁰ See Macan 1908b: 525–26, How and Wells 1928b: 272, Milton 1983, Asheri et al. 2003: 306–309, and Blösel 2004: 255–84 and 2012: 229–30.

⁸¹ Blösel 2004: 260–65 and 2012: 230–32 sees the episode as a major shift in Herodotus’s presentation of Themistocles, who had hitherto used illicit means only to advance the interests of his home state.

⁸² As Macan 1908b: 533 suggests.

⁸³ The disjunction is often missed (see Fornara 1971b: 70–72, Hart 1982: 149, and Moles 2002: 47). Blösel 2004: 260, however, rightly notes that the speech

before the Athenians is strictly unnecessary to the later deception of Xerxes.

⁸⁴ As [Cawkwell 1970](#): 42 notes, “it would have been dangerous folly for the Athenians to go on their own.”

⁸⁵ Herodotus does not say explicitly that Themistocles advocated the attack, but then adds “for the Andrians were the first of the islanders from whom Themistocles had demanded money and who had refused to pay him” (8.111.2, tr. Purvis). The implication is clear.

⁸⁶ When Themistocles later threatens other islanders, they recognized that Medism was a factor in the attack on Andros (8.112.2). For the role Medism played in the actual attack on these islands, see [Podlecki 1975](#): 71, [Balcer 1995](#): 268, and [Blösel 2004](#): 293. [Cawkwell 1970](#): 41 suggests that these may have been payments for the upkeep of the fleet imposed on those not actively engaged in the defense of Greece (see also [Asheri et al. 2003](#): 310).

⁸⁷ In point of historical fact, it is almost impossible that Themistocles would have been able to make such threats without the Athenians and/or the generals of the league knowing it (see [Macan 1908b](#): 534–37 and 1908c: 329–31, [How and Wells 1928b](#): 272, [Masaracchia 1977](#): 214, [Hart 1982](#): 149, [Waters 1985](#): 143, [Evans 1991](#): 78, and A. [Bowie 2007](#): 202). But this is not relevant for our present purposes. Herodotus says explicitly that the other generals did not know. The question here is whether Herodotus presents this as an Athenian or purely Themistoclean undertaking. Athens plays no role in the demands made on the other islanders, but appears prominently in the Andros episode, where Herodotus has Themistocles famously justify extortion by noting “the Athenians had come with two great gods, Persuasion and Necessity” (8.111.2, tr. Purvis). In their response, the Andrians twice connect the power of these “gods” to Athens (8.111.2–3). Herodotus certainly suggests direct Athenian involvement, but explicitly attributes the demands and greed to Themistocles alone. [Hart 1982](#): 149 concludes that there is some muddling here, and [Blösel 2001](#): 190 may very well be right to see in this an attempt to foreshadow Athenian imperialism (see also 2004: 285–98). In any case, I would argue that Herodotus’s reference to Themistocles’s personal greed (Θεμιστοκλέης . . . πλεονεκτέων: 8.112.1) is sufficient to suggest that Herodotus wants us to see him acting beyond his mandate, at least to some extent ([Stadter 2006](#): 248).

⁸⁸ Herodotus is almost certainly thinking of the war up to that point and not just the battle of Salamis ([Asheri et al. 2003](#): 324 and [Blösel 2004](#): 321).

⁸⁹ For more on the nature of the honors the Spartans bestowed on Themistocles, see [Jordan 1988](#).

⁹⁰ [Masaracchia 1977](#): 219 suggests that the phrase adds a specifically anti-Themistoclean feel to the passage. See [Blösel 2004](#): 327 against the historicity of Themistocles’s trip to Sparta at this time.

⁹¹ [Baragwanath 2008](#): 175 and [Ferrario 2014](#): 213–14.

⁹² Diodorus presents the matter in a much more serious light (11.27.3). Upon his return to Athens, Themistocles is there stripped of command precisely because he had accepted such high honors from the Spartans. As always with the later tradition, however, it is hard to know whether Diodorus has good information for this, or his source merely elaborated on Herodotus’s anecdote.

⁹³ We might see evidence of broader tensions in an anecdote related by Aeschines. He claims that, after a successful attack on the Persians, the Athenians granted their generals the privilege of erecting three Herms in the Stoa of the Herms “on condition that they should not inscribe their own names upon them, in order that the inscription might not seem to be in honor of the generals, but of the people” (3.183, tr. Adams). The historicity of the episode is in doubt (see [Wade-Gery 1933](#): 74–75, [Jacoby 1961](#): 509, [Hobden 2007](#): 496, and [Zaccarini 2017b](#): 67), but we need not rely on Aeschines’s interpretation. The orator also cites the three

inscriptions (“Simon.” 40P), and the commanders do indeed play a muted role. Only one mentions them, but not by name (Page 1981: 259 and Meyer 2005: 296). Rather, they remain anonymous and appear only as the recipients of rewards bestowed by the Athenians (40c1–2). The Athenian hero, Menestheus, is also mentioned (40a1), but the point of comparison is the Athenian *demos* (Zaccarini 2017a and 2017b: 66–67), not the generals (as Meyer 2005: 295–96, Hölscher 2010: 141, and Shapiro 2012: 168–69 suggest). Against the backdrop of Themistocles’s exclusive claims to the victory over Persia in the years immediately before the erection of this monument, these inscriptions hint at a broader reaction against individual self-aggrandizement even if we do not give credence to Aeschines’s rendition.

⁹⁴ For the broader, interstate implications of the episode in Plato, see Immerwahr 1966: 286 n.140 and Blösel 2004: 329–31.

⁹⁵ See Blösel 2004: 329–30 with earlier bibliography.

⁹⁶ Pausanias calls him a *xenos* (9.79.1), but the context does not allow us to distinguish between its possible meanings: guest-friend, friend, or stranger (Dickey 1996: 146). For the prominence of Lampon’s family, see Flower and Marincola 2002: 244, Asheri 1998: 74, and Asheri et al. 2006: 280.

⁹⁷ The episode is also noted in passing by Pausanias, the travel writer (3.4.10).

⁹⁸ See Solmsen 1944: 252–53, Hart 1982: 153, Asheri 1998: 73, Desmond 2004: 25–26, Asheri et al. 2006: 280–81, Pelling 2006: 115, and Morgan 2015: 143.

⁹⁹ Dickey 1996: 52–56.

¹⁰⁰ For more on this type of address, see Dickey 1996: 146–49.

¹⁰¹ It should be noted that when the Spartans, at the prompting of the Delphic Oracle, demand satisfaction from Xerxes for the murder of Leonidas, they call him simply “the king” (8.114.2). Nafissi 2004a: 63 suggests that this is another example of Herodotus framing the murder as a personal and family matter since the messengers do state that the demand comes from “the Lacedaemonians and the Heraclids from Sparta” (8.114.1, tr. Purvis). While it is certainly possible that Herodotus has the royal family in mind here (Asheri 1998: 67–68 and Asheri et al. 2003: 314–15), he might also be making a distinction between the Lacedaemonians and Spartiates (A. Bowie 2007: 207). However that may be, the use of Leonidas’s title places this matter squarely into the realm of public vengeance.

¹⁰² As Solmsen 1944: 252–53, Romilly 1971: 333, Lateiner 1989: 46, Flower and Marincola 2002: 245, and Nafissi 2004a: 62–66 conclude.

¹⁰³ Like Pindar and Aeschylus, Herodotus elsewhere declares that the Spartans surpassed the other Greeks in valor (9.71.1), but earlier attributes the victory to Pausanias personally (9.64.1); for more, see Asheri et al. 2006: 259.

¹⁰⁴ Flower and Marincola 2002: 246 attribute the mention of the Greeks here to Herodotus’s overall panhellenistic slant, but it also fits the requirements of the secondary narrator quite well.

¹⁰⁵ The incongruity is noted by Macan 1908a: 760 without explanation, but missed by Flower and Marincola 2002: 246, Nafissi 2004a: 63, and Asheri et al. 2006: 281.

¹⁰⁶ The contrast between Spartan and barbarian here has long been observed (see note 98), but the additional contrast between parochial and panhellenic has been missed.

¹⁰⁷ Asheri 1998: 74 also draws attention to a broader tension here, but he supposes a contrast between Pausanias’s representation of the Spartan aristocratic ethic and Lampon’s more mercantile mentality.

¹⁰⁸ See also Stadter 2006: 246–47.

¹⁰⁹ See p. 59.

¹¹⁰ For intentional irony, see Fornara 1971b: 63–66, Gould 1989: 117–18, T.

Harrison 2002b: 567, Nafissi 2004b: 148–58, Pelling 2006: 114–16, and Stadter 2006: 246; against, see Strasburger 1955: 20–21, Evans 1988 and 1991: 80–86, Lateiner 1989: 212, and Flower and Marincola 2002: 11–14.

¹¹¹ Thucydides introduces his discussion of Pausanias's epigram by stating that "[The Spartans] reviewed previous examples of his deviation from the established norms of behavior, especially his treatment of the tripod which the Greeks had dedicated at Delphi as the first-fruits of their victory over the Persians" (ὁν ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἀπὸ τῶν Μήδων ἀκροθίνιον: 1.132.2, tr. Hammond).

¹¹² For a discussion of the point at which the Hellenic League ceased to function, see Yates 2015: 10–18 with earlier bibliography.

¹¹³ For more on the aristocratic nature of international connections, see Herman 1987 in particular.

¹¹⁴ For more on the administration of the Hellenic League, see Yates 2015. I add here that such broader concerns over the elitist bent of the international league may help to explain the relatively short life span of the Hellenic-League council and the league itself as an active political organization.

¹¹⁵ Wolski 1971 and 1973 explores the impact of the Persian War on existing political tensions within the Greek world, particularly as regards later accusations of Medism.

¹¹⁶ Le Goff 1992: 54. For more on the influence exerted by polis-wide commemorations on the memories of its citizens, see R. Thomas 1989: 196–237, Osborne 1994, Hölscher 1998b and 1998c, Ober 2008: 194–99, Gehrke 2010: 20, Hedrick 2013, Schmitt Pantel 2013, and Steinbock 2013b: 49–69. Athens looms large here, but similar rituals (though perhaps not as many) were also taking place in poleis across Greece. We should not, however, forget that the imagined community of the polis was itself composed of numerous smaller memorial communities (some imagined, others face-to-face) that together militated against any uniform recollection of the past, as Steinbock 2013b: 70–84 notes explicitly (see also the Introduction, p. 10).

¹¹⁷ The tensions caused by the international ambitions of aristocrats like Pausanias and the more parochial perspective of the majority of their fellow citizens have been well explored; see, for example, Nagy 1979: 7, Herman 1987, Stein-Hölkesskamp 1989: 104–122, Morgan 1990: 191–234 and 1993, Morris 1996: 35–36 and 2000: 127–30 and 185, Kurke 1999: 17, Neer 2001: 281–87 and 2007, and Rose 2012: 98–104. See also Ferrario 2014 for a survey of the evolution of the "great man" as a concept in Greece. Morris 1996 and 2000: 109–91 has argued for a much larger constellation of contrary perspectives in archaic society, which he dubs elitist and middling ideologies. His conclusions have proven quite influential (see, for example, Kurke 1997: 110–11, 1999: 19–23, and 2007: 147–48, Miller 1997: 188, Neer 2001: 281–87 and 2007: 228–30, Crielaard 2002: 277, J. Hall 2002: 119, 2007: 45–49, and 2009: 612–14, Nicholson 2005: 15–16, and Rose 2009: 474 and 2012: 206–211). This broader dichotomy has, however, also earned a fair amount of criticism for being overly schematic (see, for example, Hammer 2004, L. Mitchell 2007: 59–60, and Corner 2011; see also Rose and Hall cited in the preceding).

¹¹⁸ See note 112.

¹¹⁹ Connerton 1989: 20.

¹²⁰ Halbwachs 1980 (= 1950): 32 and 113; *contra* Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 47–64, whose focus on trauma leads to the conclusion that communities can continue to exist long after members have divided into other constituent groups, but see Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 51 for the impact of preexisting divisions on perceptions of shared trauma.

¹²¹ See the Introduction, pp. 13–14.

¹²² See Chapter 2, pp. 72–81.

¹²³ For more on the divided nature of Greek political, social, and religious life, see, for example, [Finley 1954](#), [Sourvinou-Inwood 1990](#), [Brandt 1992](#), [Neer 2001](#), [L. Mitchell 2007](#): 39–104, and [M. Scott 2010](#): 250–73.

¹²⁴ See [Fornara 1966](#): 261–67 and [V. Parker 2005](#): 9 (with early bibliography) against such an early date for Pausanias’s collusion with the Persians.

¹²⁵ See p. 32.

Panhellenism

Introduction

The two versions of the Serpent Column represent two distinct ways of remembering the Persian War. Pausanias saw the war as existing on a panhellenic plane, populated by elites whose achievements propelled them beyond the bounds of their home states. The list that replaced it defined the victory over Persia exclusively in the terms of the polis. In the present chapter, I examine the relationship between panhellenic and state-centered readings of the war within the broader Persian-War tradition. For this, we must change tack. In the case of Pausanias, our evidence permits us to produce a detailed narrative of a specific moment of contestation. This cannot be reproduced for the vast majority of monuments. Even the attempt would rely so much on supposition that it could hardly prove persuasive. We must rather look to the results: the monuments and narratives themselves. From these, I conclude that the same basic political realities that frustrated Pausanias's efforts also produced a broader Persian-War tradition that was dominated by the idea of the polis throughout the classical period.

It is well accepted that individual states commissioned monuments and inspired narratives that focused exclusively on their own achievements.¹ A single illustrative case will prove sufficient here.² When the Corinthians erected a monument to commemorate their war dead at Salamis, they added an inscription that focused on their home state alone.

Stranger, once we lived in the well-watered city of Corinth, but now Salamis, the island of Ajax, holds us; here we destroyed Phoenician ships and Persians and Medes and saved holy Greece. ("Simon." 11P, tr. Campbell)³

In point of fact the battle had been fought by an international fleet, roughly half of which was supplied by the Athenians. This fleet acted under the command of a Spartan admiral and later recognized the

particular valor of the Aeginetans.⁴ Despite these facts, however, the Corinthian epigram does not just claim a share of the credit for the overall victory. Indeed, when read in isolation, the epigram very much implies that the Corinthians fought alone and that it was because of the actions of this polis that Greece was preserved.⁵ The larger collective appears, of course, but it stands passive and inert, a mere beneficiary of Corinthian valor. We could survey the surviving Persian-War monuments statistically or analyze in detail a selection of Simonides's other epigrams to corroborate this conclusion.⁶ But I hope to demonstrate something more. I am not suggesting that the Greeks produced state monuments and panhellenic monuments and that the former were in time more influential than the latter. I argue that even when the Greeks turned their attention more explicitly to the larger war effort, the commemorations they produced were still dominated by the cultural paradigm of the polis. Transcendent panhellenism does not compete and after several decades fail, as Jung argues.⁷ It fails immediately and never offers a viable alternative to seeing the war from the point of view of the separate states, at least not until Philip invented his new Persian-War tradition after Chaeronea.⁸ I can demonstrate the point most effectively if I leave aside those monuments that clearly focus on the polis and turn rather to those expressions of Persian-War memory that scholars most closely associate with panhellenism.

In the following I address these panhellenic commemorations in six sections. I begin with the other monuments commissioned by the Hellenic League, particularly the Salamis Apollo and the statue of Zeus at Olympia. I then turn to Simonides's roughly contemporary elegy about the battle of Plataea, followed by an examination of a pair of Plataean rituals associated with the same battle. Next, I consider Herodotus's grand narrative of the Persian War, likely finished in the 420s, and then Isocrates's famous panhellenist tract, the *Panegyricus*, written about forty years later. I conclude with a set of works that touch on the role of Macedonia in the Persian War, which were by and large written before the battle of Chaeronea and thus before the invention of the new tradition. With one exception (the Salamis Apollo), these commemorations either define the larger effort in terms of states (as does the list on the Serpent Column) or go even further by viewing it from the exclusive perspective of a single state (as do the surviving state epigrams).

The Monuments of the Hellenic League

The Serpent Column was not the only commemoration ordered by the

victorious Greek allies. In fact, they commemorated a total of seven known monuments on two occasions at five sites.⁹ After the battle of Salamis, the Greeks dedicated three Phoenician triremes: one at the Isthmus, another at Sunium, and a third on Salamis (Hdt. 8.121.1). They also had a bronze statue of Apollo with the prow of a ship in its hand erected at Delphi (8.121.2).¹⁰ After the battle of Plataea, the Greeks erected three statues at three of the major panhellenic sites: the Serpent Column at Delphi, a bronze statue of Zeus at Olympia, and a bronze statue of Poseidon at Isthmia (9.81.1). The triremes and the statue of Poseidon offer few clues. Herodotus is our only source, and he is sparing with details. Of the triremes, he notes only where they were placed, that the one at Salamis was dedicated to Ajax, and that only the one at Isthmia survived to his own time.¹¹ In the case of the Poseidon statue, Herodotus reports its size, form, and location, but nothing else.¹² No accompanying inscription survives.¹³ If we want to consider the debate that surrounded the Serpent Column within its immediate commemorative context, we must rely on those monuments whose presentations of panhellenism can be scrutinized. That leaves the Salamis Apollo and the statue of Zeus at Olympia.

Our literary sources tell us little more about the Salamis Apollo than they do about the Poseidon at Isthmia. Herodotus provides the fact of its dedication, its form, and its height. He also notes its relative position within the site at Delphi, which was just north of the Serpent Column (8.121.2).¹⁴ But in this case, we need not rely solely on the literary tradition. In recent years the base of this statue has been identified and with it an inscription.¹⁵ Unfortunately, the inscription is damaged and all traces of the party that dedicated the monument are lost. What remains reads, “[. . .] dedicated it to Apollo” ([. . .] τὸπῶλλον | ἀνέθεν). Jacquemin and Laroche have posited *HEΛΛΑΝΕΣ*, “Greeks,” as the missing subject.¹⁶ The archaeological work that has led to the identification of this base with the Salamis Apollo is detailed and persuasive, but the dangers of arguing from a bracketed word are proverbial.¹⁷ Indeed, the inscription has been associated with two other monuments before, and on each occasion appropriate subjects were conjectured.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the restoration is winning broad acceptance.¹⁹ Since I am attempting to argue that state-centered expressions dominated the memory of the war during the classical period, I will adopt the interpretation least favorable to my own case and proceed on the assumption that the restoration is correct. As such, the Salamis Apollo would stand as the most striking expression of transcendent panhellenism prior to the battle of Chaeronea. All participating combatants are encompassed within a simple collective term. It is this homogeneous collective, and no mere assemblage of states, that dedicates the monument and implicitly won

the battle. Even the epigram that Pausanias originally placed on the Serpent Column does not approach this level of transcendence since Greek agency there is still qualified by Pausanias's personal leadership. But the Salamis Apollo obliterates Eurybiades, Themistocles, and Adeimantus equally, along with the participating states. Here, the Greeks stand alone and indivisible.

More could be gleaned from the Salamis Apollo if the precise chronological relationship between it and the Serpent Column could be established with confidence. It is tempting to posit a simple evolutionary model.²⁰ Awash in the glow of their unexpected victory at Salamis, the Greeks, in a show of uncharacteristic unity, treat the achievement as the common property of all.²¹ But in the subsequent Serpent Column, Pausanias attempts to take advantage of that sense of unity, which prompts the states to reassert their mastery over the Persian-War past on that monument. The trouble is that the Salamis Apollo was likely not completed significantly before the Serpent Column. True, the Salamis Apollo was commissioned a year earlier, but at the time Delphi was not secure from Persian attack. It had escaped in 480 by nothing short of divine intervention (Hdt. 8.35–39) and remained vulnerable until the victory at Plataea.²² It seems unlikely that the Greeks would have begun work on the monument before the site was secure,²³ which suggests that the two monuments would have been under construction at roughly the same time. Instead of a strictly evolutionary model, we might rather see them as expressing slightly different, but nevertheless contemporary visions of panhellenism.

We add to the complexity of this reconstruction when we consider the statue of Zeus at Olympia. Again, Herodotus notes the form, height, and basic location of the monument. Its accompanying inscription is recorded by Pausanias (5.23.1–2). He states that the names of the participating states were inscribed on the right side of the base. The list is similar, but not identical to the one that ultimately appeared on the Serpent Column.²⁴ For our purposes these differences in the details are less important than the overall similarity in tone. We should not, of course, press the point too far. Pausanias makes no mentions of a heading, which, if it existed at all, need not have been similar to the one that appeared on the Serpent Column. Nevertheless, the presence of a list that departs from the Delphic list only in details suggests that they were both intended to reflect the same basic commemoration of panhellenism as a state-centered phenomenon.²⁵ Here again, the exact chronological relationship is uncertain. The Zeus at Olympia was commissioned at the same time as the Serpent Column and so presumably was completed at roughly the same time as Pausanias's epigram was found objectionable. But does that imply that

the Zeus at Olympia was the first monument to bear a list, which was subsequently reproduced on the Serpent Column with minor corrections? It is a reasonable assumption, but impossible to prove.²⁶ We might be talking about a matter of months, and our evidence simply does not allow us to see at that level of detail. Moreover, we must remember that we have the list from Olympia only at second hand and thus have no way to confirm whether it was an original part of the monument's design or was added subsequently.

If we knew when the other Hellenic-League monuments were completed and particularly who oversaw their construction, we might craft an arresting account of powerful personalities jockeying for position through a monumental medium.²⁷ But it is ultimately better to abandon any attempt to tell such a story and focus rather on the monuments as contemporary expressions of different commemorative strategies. The Salamis Apollo certainly allows us to say that transcendent panhellenism was not restricted to Pausanias and Themistocles, since neither is likely to have overseen construction.²⁸ But the Olympia Zeus reminds us that the league's leadership was not unanimous in its attachment to a panhellenism that transcended the state.²⁹ Indeed, the contrast between the Salamis Apollo and the Olympia Zeus parallels the tensions that played out in the Serpent-Column affair, with one notable exception. The bold expression of transcendent panhellenism in the Salamis Apollo was not erased. The reason is not hard to guess. Pausanias had crassly harnessed panhellenism to advance his own personal ambitions. He had made manifest the threat latent in a recollection of the war that transcended the state. The Salamis Apollo, if we accept Jacquemin and Laroche's conclusions, was far less obvious and so did not attract controversy, at least so far as we know. Nevertheless, we do not find another extant example of such transcendent panhellenism before the end of the classical period. I maintain that this was no accident.

Plataea Elegy

At roughly the same time as the league monuments were being completed, Simonides composed an extended poem on the events of Plataea.³⁰ While most of Simonides's surviving work on the Persian War betrays a clear focus on the individual states, the Plataea Elegy presents a far more panhellenic version of events. But did that panhellenism transcend the individual states, or was it rather defined by them? The question is difficult to answer with confidence. The poem itself is highly fragmentary. Many readings rely on extensive conjecture and remain debatable. Moreover, the patron and context of

performance are uncertain. Suggestions abound.³¹ Pausanias the regent, the city-state of Sparta, or a panhellenic body (either the Hellenic League or Delphic Amphictyony) may have commissioned the work for performance at Sparta, Delphi, Corinth, Plataea, or perhaps on the Hellespont. And these are only the most popular permutations. Obviously, we must proceed with caution, but I believe that the surviving fragments suggest that the poem's panhellenism was presented from the viewpoint of the states and so ultimately matched the perspective of the revised Serpent Column.

The panhellenic tone of the Plataea Elegy has been noted often and rightly so. The work likely opened with a hymn to Achilles, whose death begins our fragment 11W². Initial reference to the ultimate panhellenic work, the *Iliad*, undoubtedly set the tone for the whole.³² After the introductory hymn (fr. 11.1–20) and an invocation of the Muse (20–28), Simonides turns to the events immediately prior to the battle of Plataea (29–45). There his focus moves from Sparta, where the expedition first sets out (29–34), to Corinth (35–36), Megara (37), and possibly Athens (39–42).³³ The initial impression—that Simonides sought to present a wider perspective than the surviving state epigrams—is reinforced by two later fragments that are cited by Plutarch and draw particular attention to the heroics of the Corinthians in the battle (fr. 15 and 16).³⁴ Another fragment, thought to contain a prophecy by the Spartan seer Teisamenus, even refers to the favoring of an alliance (fr. 14.8), which could be interpreted as a reference to the Hellenic League.³⁵ Although much of the poem is lost, Plutarch, who was undoubtedly familiar with the entire work, gives us reason to think that the rest of the poem also reflected a broader perspective. After citing the two fragments about Corinth noted earlier, he assures his readers that “these lines are not meant to be sung by a chorus in Corinth nor are they from an ode in honor of the city; they come from an elegiac poem which simply tells the story of those events” (ἄλλως δὲ τὰς πράξεις ἐκείνας ἐν ἐλεγείᾳ γράφων ἱστόρηκεν: *Mor.* 872e, tr. Pearson). Boedeker concludes that Plutarch thought the elegy was not biased in favor of any one city.³⁶

Despite the panhellenic scope of the Plataea Elegy, the fragments suggest that the individual states played the defining role. It is important to note that the Muse is not called upon to protect the memory of the Greeks generally or even those who fought at Plataea, but of the Spartans alone.³⁷ Simonides also begins his historical narrative with the Spartans, who leave “[from the Eu]rotas and from [Sparta’s] town” (11.29, tr. West). They remain the focus of the action from line 29 to 41, where they are accompanied by the quintessential Spartan heroes, the Dioscuri and Menelaus (11.30–31).³⁸ Pausanias, the leader of the expedition, garners two lines himself (11.33–34).

Afterward, Corinth and Megara are mentioned, but both appear only as place names. The Spartans remain the subject of the poem as we follow the march of the army north.³⁹ The allies do not join the expedition until line 37, where they are noted merely as “the others” (ὡ[λλοι] in a subordinate clause.⁴⁰ Whether the Spartans continue to dominate the action as the allied army reaches Attica, is joined by the Athenians, and then takes up positions at Plataea is a subject of debate.⁴¹ Regardless, the Spartans certainly do assume a commanding position within the opening historical narrative. If the hymn to Achilles is meant to stir panhellenic sentiment, the poet quickly harnesses it to the greater glory of a single state.⁴²

The poem is not, of course, exclusively interested in the actions of Sparta. Aside from the place names mentioned at the beginning of the historical narrative, the Corinthians are later singled out for particular praise. While noting the place held by the Corinthians in battle,⁴³ Simonides adds that they were “well versed in every martial excellence” (fr. 15) and that their action “magnifies their fathers’ far-famed glory with their own” (fr. 16, tr. West). At the very least, these fragments indicate that Corinth too was praised, but the context of fragments 15 and 16 hints at much more. We have no other indication that Corinth held a place of honor in the battle line or that the Corinthians achieved anything notable in the battle itself.⁴⁴ If Simonides mentions the Corinthians here, it stands to reason that he described the entire line and mentioned most, if not all, of the other states that contributed troops by name.⁴⁵ Such a conclusion suggests that the complete Plataea Elegy would have been an impressive witness to the panhellenic scope of the alliance against Xerxes. But it is equally clear that Simonides’s panhellenism does not go beyond a recounting of the exploits of the individual states. Indeed, the overall impression is evocative of the revised Serpent Column. Sparta takes place of pride, followed by the other member states of the league who participated in the battle.⁴⁶ At no point, however, does a collective of Greeks act beyond the conceptual limitations of the polis.

We cannot, of course, pretend that what survives is representative of the whole, but neither can we assume anything about the complete work that is not indicated in its fragments or *testimonia*.⁴⁷ Plutarch may assure us that the poem was not biased in favor of any single state, but his claim cannot be used to exclude a broader, but equally state-centered, viewpoint. There is also the intriguing possibility that the poem was commissioned by none other than Pausanias himself.⁴⁸ If we could be certain of that, we might learn much by considering the different strategies of memory the regent employed to advance his own ambitions, here embedding his accomplishments in a more state-centered view, but in the Serpent Column eliding the participating

states altogether.⁴⁹ Ultimately we cannot know Pausanias's role. As noted earlier, undue speculation about the personalities involved is best avoided in the present context. Regardless of who stood behind the work, its surviving portions reflect an understanding of panhellenism that is defined by the participating states.

The Plataea Rituals

Often mentioned in the same breath with Simonides's Plataea Elegy are a pair of rituals celebrated at Plataea: the Freedom Games (or Eleutheria), centered on the cult of Zeus Eleutherios (the Liberator), and the funerary honors paid to those who fell in the battle of Plataea on the side of Greek freedom. Our hellenistic and imperial sources describe a rich and elaborate pair of rituals whose expressions of panhellenism seem very much to transcend the individual states. Sacrifices to Zeus Eleutherios were carried out every year during a meeting of the common council of the Hellenic League (Plut. *Arist.* 19.7 and 21.1). Every fourth year these sacrifices were accompanied by the Freedom Games (Plut. *Arist.* 21.1 and Paus. 9.2.6), which were also overseen by the council.⁵⁰ The inscription that appeared on the altar of Zeus Eleutherios evinces a similarly panhellenic perspective ("Simon." 15P). There, the names of the individual states are omitted as the Greeks act collectively on their own behalf and erect an altar that is "common to free Greece" (ἐλευθέρα Ἑλλάδι κοινόν).⁵¹ The monument's implicit audience is thus invited to remember the war as Greeks in much the same way as they would be by the Salamis Apollo. The annual sacrifice for the fallen was a more Plataean affair,⁵² marked with a procession that included the chief magistrate of Plataea (Plut. *Arist.* 21.2–5), but here too there was a strong panhellenic element as the ritual was performed before an international audience (*Mor.* 872f). Moreover, this was a single sacrifice for all the fallen, who were now united as one collective in the ritual (*Arist.* 21.4–5).⁵³ Given the strongly panhellenic character of the Plataea rituals, it is little wonder that those who see transcendent panhellenism in the Plataea Elegy have favored one of the two as a likely setting for the first performance of the poem.⁵⁴

If we could trust that the rituals later witnessed by our hellenistic and imperial sources remained static since the fifth century, we would have ample reason to conclude that the tenets of transcendent panhellenism continued to exert significant influence over commemorative practice long after Pausanias's epigram was struck from the Serpent Column. But few now would accept all that our later sources say about the fifth-century rituals at Plataea, even if

individual elements have found their defenders.⁵⁵ Rituals change; when upheaval and dislocation are added, the process of change naturally accelerates.⁵⁶ In the years between the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the earliest attestations of the later tradition in the early hellenistic period, Plataea was destroyed twice, once in 426 and again in 373. On both occasions the site remained unoccupied for about a generation, thirty-nine years in the first case (426–387/6) and thirty-five in the second (373–38).⁵⁷ Upon its final restoration, Plataea became a showpiece for Macedonian propaganda, and, as I argue in [Chapter 6](#), it is at this point that the elements of the tradition familiar from our hellenistic and imperial sources were likely invented.⁵⁸ Of course, it must remain possible that those elements unattested in the fifth century are genuine nonetheless, but such extensive breaks in the continuous tradition at Plataea makes invention rather more likely.⁵⁹ In the following I consider the rituals individually to determine what elements can be confirmed for the fifth century and the extent to which they support the notion that the rituals at Plataea may have been designed to transcend the individual city-states in memory.

Let us begin with the cult of Zeus Eleutherios. Thucydides is our only classical source.⁶⁰ He mentions Zeus Eleutherios in the context of the negotiations between the Spartans and Plataeans before the siege of Plataea in 429. At the approach of the Spartan army, the Plataeans send a delegation to King Archidamus reminding him of an oath the Hellenic-League allies took to defend the inviolability of Plataea:

When the Spartan Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, had liberated Greece from the Persians with the help of those Greeks who were prepared to share the danger of that battle fought in our territory, he made sacrifice in the agora of Plataea to Zeus Eleutherios, and with all the allies assembled there he offered a guarantee to the people of Plataea that they would retain possession of their land and city and live there in independence; no one should ever attack them without justification or seek to enslave them; if any attack were made, the allies there present were to defend them in force. (Thuc. 2.71.2, tr. Hammond modified)

The Plataeans make no mention of an annual ritual. The sacrifice is rather a simple, single event and nothing like the elaborate performances of later centuries.⁶¹ If Thucydides is aware of such a ritual, he permits his speakers an inexplicably foolish omission since the presence of a continuous tradition would have greatly strengthened their case.⁶² We might also note that Thucydides places the sacrifice in the Plataean agora (ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ), while the later altar with its stirring panhellenic inscription was located outside of town.⁶³ Not only does Thucydides fail to provide support for the later elaborations associated with the cult of Zeus Eleutherios, he speaks against them. Pausanias's original sacrifice is the only firm

basis from which to make an argument.⁶⁴ This conspicuous act of piety, followed by a public oath, was surely intended to be remembered, and what the Plataeans remembered of it is characteristic of the Pausanias who would soon inscribe his accomplishments on the Serpent Column.⁶⁵ The sacrifice and oath were panhellenic in scope,⁶⁶ and their implication for state sovereignty, wide-reaching. Pausanias had personally guaranteed the independence of a sovereign state under the auspices of an international league of states. And this was the narrow reading. King Archidamus had a much broader view, implying that Pausanias's guarantee extended to all member states, not just Plataea (2.72.1).⁶⁷ In either case, Pausanias was greatly expanding the power of the Hellenic League by imposing a perpetual obligation to defend one (or all?) of its members.⁶⁸ His very public acts at Plataea suggest he wanted these new obligations to become a fixture in the collective memory of the Greeks generally.

Jung has argued that this one-time sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios on behalf of the other Greeks was sufficient to create for all participants a binding interpretation of Plataea as a panhellenic victory.⁶⁹ The sacrifice and oath at Plataea were, of course, remembered, but not quite in the way Pausanias seems to have intended. The circumstance is common enough. Substantial effort is expended promoting a particular interpretation of the past, but the memory outlives the power structure whose interests it was designed to advance. As a result, the commemoration is reinterpreted to suit present (and in this case, parochial) needs.⁷⁰ The exchange between Archidamus and the Plataeans on this occasion points to a memory whose original expression of transcendent panhellenism has been thoroughly subordinated to Plataean and Spartan interests. If Archidamus is correct, the Plataeans have presented a half truth that writes the rest of Greece out of the story. If we follow the Plataeans, however, Archidamus is attempting to mitigate his transgression of the oath by citing a fabricated agreement that he asserts the Plataeans have already violated. In all likelihood, both parties were, to some extent, adducing distorted memories of the past.⁷¹ We need not, however, assume crass manipulation. As noted in the previous chapter, one-time participation is insufficient to generate a collective memory of an event.⁷² The Greeks who assembled in the Plataean agora may have been sympathetic to Pausanias's expression of transcendent panhellenism at the time, but Pausanias's ambitions and the league that underwrote them did not last.⁷³ The individual states soon placed their own stamp on the event. The Plataeans certainly remembered the sacrifice. The Spartans did too. But Thucydides gives us no reason to conclude that its recollection created a binding interpretation of the

war that transcended the interests of the separate states.

In the case of the honors paid to the fallen, we have strong evidence that the later elaborations were based on an authentic fifth-century ritual. Thucydides mentions annual obsequies for the fallen in a later Plataean speech, this one delivered before a Spartan tribunal after the surrender of the town. He has his Plataeans sum up their actions for the fallen:

Look round at the graves of your fathers, killed by the Persians and buried in our land. Each year we used to honor them at public expense with gifts of clothing and all other customary offerings; we brought them the first fruits of all that our land produces in season; we did this as their supporters in a friendly land, as allies of those who were once our comrades in arms. (3.58.4, tr. Hammond modified)

The Plataeans speak of honors only for the Spartan dead, but they almost certainly honored the others as well and have here tailored their comments to suit a Spartan audience.⁷⁴ The Plataeans assume that the Spartans will be familiar with the ritual, but Thucydides does not give us a sense of how popular or important the services were outside of Plataea. For that we must turn to Herodotus, who comments on the tombs themselves:

The graves of all these [i.e. the Spartans, Athenians, Tegeans, Megarians, and Phliasians] were full of bodies, but according to what I have heard about all the other graves that are seen at Plataea, each of the peoples who felt disgraced by their absence from the battle piled up empty mounds for the sake of posterity, and even the so-called grave of the Aeginetans there, so I have been told, was heaped up ten years later at the request of the Aeginetans by Cleades son of Autodicus, a Plataean and their *proxenos*. (9.85.3, tr. Purvis)

Herodotus is not explicit, but the mere fact that any state felt the need to erect a cenotaph at Plataea “for the sake of posterity” (τῶν ἐπιγιννομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων) is suggestive.⁷⁵ It is, indeed, hard to see why these states would have staged such a ruse or how Herodotus could have realistically attributed this motive to them if the battle site had little visibility outside Plataea. I am hesitant to support Plutarch’s assertion that the annual ritual was, as a rule, carried out before an international audience, but the site at least, if not the ritual as well, must have had purchase beyond the borders of Plataea.⁷⁶

Despite the panhellenic scope and international visibility of the obsequies for the fallen, there is no indication that the site or the rituals were intended to (or did in fact) transcend the individual states.⁷⁷ The site was built around the same state-centered assumptions that informed the Serpent Column’s list. Each state had its own separate tomb, perhaps with separate funerary honors.⁷⁸ Panhellenism is recognized,⁷⁹ but only as the sum total of the individual states that took part. Moreover, the site quickly attracted

contestation, as Herodotus attests. Of course, his account of false tombs and severely limited participation has been criticized since antiquity,⁸⁰ but historical accuracy is not at issue here. Herodotus almost certainly did not invent the version he tells.⁸¹ Rather, he reflects contemporary animosities that have been mapped onto a site of memory whose organization had long placed the deep divisions inherent in the Greek alliance on center stage. The fact comes into clearer focus when we contrast what Herodotus saw with the reorganized site of the hellenistic and imperial periods. Pausanias observed that “roughly at the entrance into Plataea are the graves of those who fought against the Persians. Of the Greeks generally there is a common tomb (μνημα κοινόν), but the Spartans and Athenians who fell have separate graves” (9.2.5, tr. Jones modified). The distinct roles of Athens and Sparta still warrant individual recognition, but the remaining members of the alliance have melted into a homogeneous whole, buried and, as Plutarch confirms, honored together.⁸² The attempts of succeeding generations to transcend the parochial claims of the individual states demonstrate quite neatly the extent to which the early rituals failed to do so.⁸³

It is also important to stress the extent to which the obsequies were under Plataean management and designed to serve the ends of that state.⁸⁴ Even in the later tradition, they remain a largely Plataean affair.⁸⁵ Our near-contemporary sources are more explicit. Thucydides’s Plataeans are clear that the obsequies were initiated and maintained solely by the state of Plataea.⁸⁶ And they seem to have put their monopoly to good use. Control of the physical site meant that the Plataeans were in a position to grant favors to states wishing to advertise their Persian-War *bona fides*. Herodotus cites the Aeginetans by name. They sought permission to build their tomb from the Plataeans and later constructed it through their Plataean *proxenos*. For Herodotus, this is proof that the Aeginetans played no role in the battle. We need not follow Herodotus’s controversial conclusions about the battle to accept as fact that several of the tombs at Plataea were cenotaphs constructed after the fact.⁸⁷ If we can trust Herodotus to this extent, then we can safely say that the Plataeans likely granted several such favors in the years after the battle. Management of the obsequies on behalf of the Spartans and presumably others provided the Plataeans with further opportunities to place their former allies under obligation. On trial for their lives, the Plataeans are careful to remind the Spartans of the services they rendered and the consequent remuneration due to them (3.58.4–5). In the end these favors did the Plataeans little good, but the attempt itself hints at the real political benefits the Plataeans hoped to extract from the panhellenic sentiment associated with their town.

The overall character of the fifth-century ritual honoring the fallen at Plataea is beyond recovery, but we may gain a glimpse of it when the ritual is placed once again into the rhetorical context of the Plataean speech in Thucydides. Numerous references to the Persian War precede the emotional appeal to the tombs of the fallen Spartans. The Plataeans hold center stage throughout as “the benefactors of Greece” (οἱ εὐεργέται τῆς Ἑλλάδος: 3.57.1).⁸⁸ They tout their Persian-War service, underscoring that they were the only Boeotians who helped defend the freedom of Greece (3.54.3).⁸⁹ They did so out of proportion to their strength, even serving with the fleet at Artemisium despite having no previous experience at sea (3.54.4). After addressing their present Athenian alliance and recounting the recent Theban sneak-attack, they return to the theme of the Persian War, reminding the Spartans that they were among the few during Xerxes’s invasion to choose principle over self-interest (3.56.5) and that they were highly honored for it (3.56.6). After contrasting their glorious service to Greece with their present plight,⁹⁰ the Plataeans cite the tombs of the Spartans (3.58.4), which will now stand in the territory of their killers, bereft of the obsequies they once received at the hands of their Plataean comrades (3.58.5).⁹¹ In their final appeal for mercy, the Plataeans beg the Spartans not to surrender men who were the most zealous for the Greek cause over to their hated enemies, the Thebans (3.59.4). It is immediately clear that the larger Greek community plays an essential role in the Plataean speech, but as in the preceding Corinthian epigram, it remains passive. The Greeks are served, saved, and benefited, but at no point do the Plataeans allow the Greeks to act.⁹² Indeed, when in passing the Plataeans refer to the freedom won in their land, it is tellingly a freedom won for the Greeks, not by them (πρὸς δὲ καὶ γῆν ἐν ᾗ ἡλευθερώθησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες δουλώσετε: 3.58.5). If the obsequies conveyed anything like the tone Thucydides attributes to the Plataean speech, then we can conclude that panhellenism was surely an important theme, but subordinated nevertheless to the greater glory of Plataea.

Herodotus

Herodotus presents a unique challenge to this survey since the size and complexity of his account of the Persian War could justify its own chapter. The *Histories* contain sweeping expressions of panhellenism that easily transcend the interests of the individual states. At the same time, however, those states (particularly Athens and Sparta) dominate the narrative of the war. Herodotus’s Hellenic League is not merely defined by states, but is several times almost brought to ruin by the

tensions between them. Treating every relevant passage would take us too far afield and could in any case hardly prove decisive. The question is not how frequently Herodotus characterizes the Greek alliance in one way or the other, but rather how these passages interact to produce a specifically Herodotean memory of the allied war effort. I therefore focus on two of the most striking statements of transcendent panhellenism in the work: the aspirations of the Hellenic-League councilors to unify Greece (7.145) and the famed expression of ethnic loyalty placed in the mouths of the Athenians (8.144). I argue that in both cases Herodotus juxtaposes the high ideals of his characters with the harsh, divisive realities of the Greek world.⁹³ The effect goes beyond what we see in the Serpent Column or Plataea Elegy. Those commemorations merely understood the alliance against Xerxes as a collection of independent states. Herodotus, on the other hand, explores in detail the inherent tensions within the divided alliance and never more so than when his characters attempt to transcend them. The change in emphasis is unsurprising. Herodotus likely wrote the bulk of his *Histories* in the years immediately before and then during the Archidamian War.⁹⁴ Herodotus knows that support for the common cause will soon erode as hostilities mount between Athens and Sparta. The divided nature of the Greek effort, which had been a simple fact a generation before, became for Herodotus the seeds of a future war between the two states that had done the most to unify Greece and lead it to victory over Xerxes.

When Herodotus first introduces the Hellenic League in Book 7, he prominently and programmatically names it “the Greeks who wanted what was best for Greece” (7.145.1, tr. Purvis modified). Herodotus uses similar phrases throughout the work, but more generally refers to the league simply as “the Greeks.”⁹⁵ The term has obvious panhellenic resonance and is evocative of the terminology used in the Serpent-Column epigram and perhaps the Salamis Apollo. This larger Greek collective is no passive backdrop, as it had been in the obsequies for the fallen at Plataea. Herodotus frequently portrays “the Greeks” as agents, although generally in contrast to the barbarians.⁹⁶ At their first meeting, the councilors of the league take a broad view of Greek resistance. Herodotus, commenting on their decision to dispatch ambassadors throughout Greece, claims that “they did this in the hope that if they put their heads together and worked toward a common goal, Greece could then somehow unite into one” (εἴ πως ἔν τε γένοιτο τὸ Ἑλληνικόν: 7.145.2, tr. Purvis modified).⁹⁷ This is no subtle nod to the tenets of transcendent panhellenism. Indeed, it stands in marked contrast to the tone of the revised Serpent Column, which seems almost designed to deny that such efforts were

successful.⁹⁸ But as we shall see, Herodotus likely intended his readers to come to the same conclusion.

The high aspirations of the league's councilors are undercut by the narrative that surrounds it. A few chapters before introducing the Hellenic League, Herodotus expands on the unique contribution of Athens to the overall victory. His basic thesis is that the migration or Medism of the Athenians would have resulted in complete defeat (7.139). The characterization of the alliance in this digression is hardly flattering. Herodotus implies that if Athens had withdrawn, none of the remaining naval allies would have attempted resistance (7.139.2). The Peloponnesians would have been attacked one by one and forced to Medize. Sparta alone would have attempted to resist, but perhaps not. Seeing the mass Medism of the rest of Greece, Herodotus surmises that they might have come to an arrangement with Persia as well (7.139.3–4).⁹⁹ Without Athens, salvation is impossible, and even doomed heroics seem unlikely. Rather, all is compulsion, calculation, and failure. Herodotus concludes with what could almost be a paraphrase of an Athenian epigram: “So anyone who said the Athenians proved the saviors of Greece would not have strayed from the truth” (νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἂν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τάληθός; 7.139.5, tr. Purvis modified). Many accept Herodotus's counterfactual reconstruction as largely accurate, and they may very well be right,¹⁰⁰ but we cannot then read Herodotus's conclusions as an unproblematic and generally accepted recollection of the war. Contemporaries certainly did not accept the premise. Herodotus himself prefaces this digression by noting that “I am compelled to declare an opinion that will cause offense to many people” (7.139.1, tr. Purvis). True or not, praise for Athens could not be seen objectively in the toxic political environment of the 420s, and Herodotus knew it.¹⁰¹ Indeed, by prefacing his arguments as he does, Herodotus almost invites his readers to view the grand aspirations of unity that he is soon to relate from the perspective of its eventual failure. The sum effect of the digression is, therefore, quite striking. Even before allowing the Greeks to unify against Persian aggression, Herodotus credits salvation to a single state, relegates the contribution of the others to insignificance, and even hints at the internecine hostilities that would come to dominate the recollection of the Persian War in his own day.¹⁰²

Herodotus further undercuts the rhetoric of the Hellenic League in his subsequent narrative. Although the league councilors undertake a number of bold steps to counter the Persian threat at their first meeting, most of them fail within a few pages.¹⁰³ Spies are sent to Sardis (7.145.2), but are captured in the very next chapter (7.146).

Ambassadors are dispatched to Argos, Sicily, Corcyra, and Crete (7.145.2), but then Herodotus proceeds to describe in some detail how each failed to gain new allies for the league (7.148–171).¹⁰⁴ In the end, only the cessation of hostilities between the allies had the desired effect (7.145.1), but even here Herodotus emphasizes continued friction.¹⁰⁵ Discord is a major theme of every battle account except the rather brief narrative of Mycale.¹⁰⁶ At Thermopylae the Peloponnesian allies want to depart almost immediately (7.207), and when the pass is turned, they are finally dismissed because of their lack of zeal (7.220). The Thebans must be kept as hostages (7.222) and defect at the first opportunity (7.233). Only the Thespians fight to the end along with the Spartans (7.222). At Artemisium, Themistocles must bribe Eurybiades and Adeimantus to remain (8.5), and even after that, the fleet is still planning to flee when news of the defeat at Thermopylae makes their position wholly untenable.¹⁰⁷ At Salamis the rift between those who live within and beyond the Peloponnese explodes into the open (8.59–64). Themistocles threatens withdrawal from the league (8.62.2) and hints darkly at an attack upon his fellow Greeks (8.61.2)¹⁰⁸ before Eurybiades opts to remain (8.63). During his narrative of the engagement, Herodotus impugns the Corinthian contingent in detail, before exculpating them briefly (8.94). At Plataea, Herodotus maintains (likely against popular opinion) that only the Athenians, Tegeans, and Spartans actually fought in the final engagement, while the vast majority of the allies betrayed the cause by knowingly withdrawing from the battlefield (9.52).¹⁰⁹ In each of these battles, Herodotus emphasizes that it was not the league as a whole that saved the day, but rather a defined and relatively limited number of loyal states.¹¹⁰ That Greek unity broke down as frequently and spectacularly as Herodotus maintains has been questioned since antiquity,¹¹¹ but even if his account greatly distorts historical reality, it remains telling for our present purposes. The historian wants to present a Persian-War story that underscores the tensions between the Greek allies.

These same tensions also stand behind the famous assertion of panhellenic unity attributed to the Athenians in Book 8. Mardonius hopes to win Athens to the Persian side and dispatches Alexander of Macedonia as his representative (8.136). The Athenians themselves hope to leverage the offer to force the Spartans to send an army north of the Isthmus (8.141.2). Alexander makes his offer (8.140); the Spartans counter (8.142). The Athenians have the last word and assert that they would never side with the Persians (8.143–44). Among their reasons they cite ethnic loyalty:

Moreover, there is the question of Greek culture, shared kinship and language, common shrines and sacrifices to the gods, and a similar way of life—it would not

be right for the Athenians to become traitors to these things. (8.144.2)

When read in isolation, Herodotus seems to place transcendent panhellenism at the heart of the struggle against Persia. Athens resists the temptation of a favorable alliance with Xerxes and rather risks all because of shared kinship, language, religion, and custom: in short, those aspects of life that transcended the political divisions of the Greek world. Here again, however, panhellenic aspirations are explicitly juxtaposed to the divisive realities of the Greek alliance.¹¹² Indeed, the only reason the Athenians need to assert that they would never betray Greece in the first place is that the Spartans have rushed to Athens on the assumption that they were on the verge of doing just that (8.141.1).¹¹³ As the Athenians remind the Spartans in their speech, such fears were not unjustified (8.144.1).¹¹⁴ When the defensive line at Thermopylae failed earlier that year, Herodotus tells us that the Athenians had expected a Peloponnesian army to meet the Persians in Boeotia and so save Athens from devastation, but no such force materialized. Rather, the Peloponnesians looked to their own safety by constructing a wall across the Isthmus of Corinth (8.40.2). A general withdrawal of the fleet to the Isthmus before the battle of Salamis was only stopped by deception on Themistocles's part (8.75–83). In the historical narrative leading up to the speech, Herodotus underscores that Athenian reliance on the panhellenic sentiments of their fellow allies (Sparta in particular) had nearly cost them everything.

The Athenians occupy the moral high ground, and Herodotus surely intends us to regard their attachment to the common cause with admiration.¹¹⁵ Nevertheless, it is not their chief consideration. It is seldom noted that the Athenians themselves present common culture as a secondary concern.¹¹⁶ Let us consider the preceding quotation in its larger context:

Even if we were willing to act in this way [i.e. Medizing], there are many serious considerations which would prevent us from doing so. First and foremost of these (πρῶτα μὲν καὶ μέγιστα) is that the images and buildings of the gods have been burned and demolished, so that we are bound by necessity to exact the greatest revenge on the man who performed these deeds, rather than to make agreements with him. Moreover, there is the question of Greek culture (αὐτίς δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν), shared kinship and language, common shrines and sacrifices to the gods, and a similar way of life—it would not be right for the Athenians to become traitors to these things. (8.144.2, tr. Purvis modified)

Their first priority by far (πρῶτα μὲν καὶ μέγιστα) is gaining vengeance for the destruction of the Athenian temples. It is, of course, possible to see in this passage a reference to the broader Persian policy of temple destruction and consequently another panhellenic

justification for continuing the fight.¹¹⁷ But the sharp contrast drawn here between these temples and the panhellenic considerations that comprise the second reason (αὐτίς δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν) speaks against such a reading.¹¹⁸ This is not to say that Herodotus intends to undercut Athenian claims. There is no hint in the account of Alexander's embassy that he wants his readers to feel anything but admiration for Athens's continued loyalty to the common cause. It is, in fact, all the more revealing for our purposes that even when Herodotus wishes to praise the panhellenic sentiments of his characters, there is no question of such loyalties transcending the interests of the home state. For Herodotus, it is not an insult to say that the Athenians put the concerns of their state ahead of the collective; it is simply a fact of life.

Immediately after the Athenian speech, Herodotus again exposes the tensions that stand behind the rhetoric of unity. Within four chapters, hopes of timely Spartan aid are dashed, and the Athenians are again forced to retreat to Salamis (9.3).¹¹⁹ Ambassadors are dispatched with instructions to inform the Spartans that "if they did not help defend the Athenians, then the Athenians would find some way to save themselves without such assistance" (9.6, tr. Purvis modified). The vague threat could include mass migration,¹²⁰ but the ambassadors themselves are rather more explicit. When they arrive in Sparta, they reaffirm their attachment to the Greek cause, adding now, however, that "we shall not make an agreement [with Xerxes] if we have a choice" (οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσομεν ἐκόντες εἶναι: 9.7α.2, tr. Purvis modified). Gone is any mention of honorable migration. Moreover, the final qualification raises the possibility that the Athenians may soon find themselves unable to avoid making such an agreement.¹²¹ After more delay on the part of the Spartans, the Athenian ambassadors leave innuendo behind and state the case bluntly:¹²²

Spartans, you may remain here, celebrating the Hyacinthia and amusing yourselves while betraying your allies. The Athenians, since they have been wronged by you and are destitute of allies, will give up and make peace with the Persian in whatever way they can. (καταλύσονται τῷ Πέρσῃ οὕτως ὅπως ἂν δύνωνται: 9.11.1, tr. Purvis modified)

The ambassadors here certainly exceed their original instructions from Athens, but this should not be read as the outburst of a frustrated secondary narrator or a mere negotiating tactic.¹²³ A few chapters earlier, Herodotus reveals that he too understood the stakes of this debate as nothing less than open Athenian Medism, when he questions why the Spartans, "who took such great pains to prevent the Athenians from Medizing when Alexander of Macedonia came to Athens now seemed not to care whether they did so or not" (9.8.2, tr.

Purvis). The Athenians do boldly maintain their loyalty to Greece and ultimately follow through, to their very great credit, but within the larger narrative Herodotus invites his contemporary audience to question the constraints that such panhellenic rhetoric really placed upon the Athenians or the other state actors, either then or in the present.¹²⁴

Isocrates's *Panegyricus*

Few figures in classical Greece are as closely associated with panhellenism as Isocrates.¹²⁵ The great sophist composed multiple orations tempting this state or that leading figure into uniting Greece for a grand panhellenic expedition against the Persians.¹²⁶ His most extensive treatment of the Persian War in support of this larger mission occurs in the *Panegyricus*, likely published in 380 bce.¹²⁷ Here, he attempts to persuade Athens and Sparta to set aside their differences and take up a dual hegemony (4.17). The setting of the speech suits his bold vision of unity and cooperation. The *Panegyricus* claims not to be written for an exclusively (or perhaps even predominantly) Athenian audience. Although doubtless never delivered,¹²⁸ the very title of the speech presupposes a nominally panhellenic context.¹²⁹ Despite Isocrates's broader aspirations, the arguments and examples adduced are distinctly biased in favor of his own home state of Athens. It is Isocrates's contention that he can only persuade the Spartans to join his panhellenic venture by demonstrating in some detail that they have no right to lead it (4.18). So, for 113 chapters, over half of the speech (4.19–132), Isocrates proves that the privilege of hegemony belongs by right to Athens alone. Prominent within this larger argument is the example of the Persian War.

Isocrates arranges his narrative of the war as a series of contests between Athens and Sparta, a noble ἀγών to save Greece (4.85).¹³⁰ He begins with Marathon (4.86–87). This was no casual decision. As we shall see in [Chapter 4](#), the temporal boundaries of the war were quite fluid. Marathon was by no means the accepted beginning of the war. Even at Athens, other possibilities were contemplated.¹³¹ But Marathon did have the virtue of being a predominantly Athenian victory, and so was an ideal place for Isocrates to begin a comparison of the two leading states in the war. He takes care crafting his narrative of the battle. While it cannot be seriously maintained that Herodotus presents a wholly accurate account,¹³² the contrast between his version and that of Isocrates proves illustrative nonetheless. According to Herodotus, the Athenians at Marathon face

retribution for their actions in the Ionian Revolt (6.94.1) and seek aid from the Spartans (Hdt. 6.106.2), who continue to view the war as a largely Athenian problem.¹³³ All this is omitted by Isocrates. The Persian threat appears without cause and for the first time here at Marathon. The Spartans understand immediately that the stakes of the battle are for all Greece and so eagerly rush to take part, but ultimately fail to arrive in time, leaving the Athenians to fight the Persians single-handedly. The late arrival of the Spartans is confirmed by Herodotus (6.120), but the historian nevertheless includes the service of the Plataeans (6.108.1). Isocrates, however, is not interested in even this small example of interstate cooperation. For the orator, this remains an exclusively Athenian victory.¹³⁴

Thermopylae and Artemisium provide Isocrates his next opportunity to compare the heroics of the two leading states. The case for Athens here was harder to make. Herodotus presents Thermopylae as the glorious defeat of the 300 Spartans, who sacrificed themselves for the survival of Greece. Other allies had been present initially (7.202–203); two remained until the final day (7.222). But even by Herodotus's time the myth of Thermopylae was fast becoming a story about Sparta alone.¹³⁵ At first glance, Artemisium hardly provides much balance. The Athenians contributed the largest contingent of ships, but were in the end merely part of a much larger fleet under the overall command of a Spartan admiral, Eurybiades (8.1–2). Isocrates, however, turns to other sources for a more patriotic retelling of these events. The Spartans still dominate Thermopylae, but Isocrates notes a larger, 1,000-man contingent and is careful to add that they were accompanied by a small cadre of allies (4.90).¹³⁶ There is no explicit note that these allies ever left, and the implication must be that the full allied force fought there to the end. The Athenians, on the other hand, face the barbarians alone with a mere 60 ships (4.90). Gone is the massive Athenian fleet of 180 triremes, gone are the 144 allied ships that were also present, and gone is the Spartan supreme commander.¹³⁷ The overall effect is to cast the glorious few Athenians into much the same role as the 300 Spartans held in the more popular Thermopylae legend.¹³⁸ The results of the battles have been similarly recast. Only propriety stops Isocrates from calling Thermopylae a defeat: “surely it would be impious to say that they were defeated” (4.92, tr. Papillon)—an accurate, albeit somewhat ungenerous, conclusion.¹³⁹ Artemisium, however, shines as an unqualified victory: “our ships, on the other hand, conquered the advanced fleet” (4.92, tr. Papillon). Herodotus is more conservative. The Greeks enjoy some success (8.11 and 8.16), but at substantial cost and decide to abandon their position before any word of Thermopylae reaches them.¹⁴⁰ Here again, Isocrates seems to turn to more favorable Athenian sources.¹⁴¹

The battle of Salamis provides the final point of comparison. The Peloponnesian states are demoralized and selfishly construct a wall across the Isthmus (4.93). Athens is now bereft of allies (4.93) and plans to fight alone (4.95). The difference with Herodotus is noteworthy. The clear implication from Isocrates is that there are no allied ships at Salamis when the Athenians decide to abandon their homes and risk all at sea.¹⁴² Herodotus very much implies that such a situation would have provoked the Athenians to Medism,¹⁴³ but not so in Isocrates. It is not until the Athenians are on the verge of joining battle that the Peloponnesian fleet appears at all, apparently assembled now for the first time. Their motives are ignoble.¹⁴⁴ They are compelled by shame and self-interest to share in the danger (4.97). Naturally, Isocrates concludes by asserting that the overall Greek victory depended on Athenian heroics at Salamis (4.98). At this point, we might expect him to compare this battle with the subsequent victory at Plataea, which was popularly (but not exclusively) credited to Sparta.¹⁴⁵ Herodotus, despite his overall thesis that Salamis had been the decisive engagement, still recognized Plataea as the finest victory known (9.64.1). But Isocrates is not interested in a balanced narrative of the war. The battle of Plataea is omitted entirely; so too is Mycale.¹⁴⁶ Isocrates chooses rather to end his account in 480 with the battle of Salamis (4.99), which is now not just the decisive victory of the war, but the final victory as well.¹⁴⁷

Much of what Isocrates adduces finds parallels in the intensely Athenocentric genre of the funerary oration, in which speakers praised the past and present exploits of Athens to a largely Athenian audience on the occasion of the state funeral for those Athenians who died fighting for their homeland.¹⁴⁸ In his omission of Plataea, however, Isocrates exceeds even the surviving examples of this explicitly state-centered genre.¹⁴⁹ Given his ambitions to transcend the dissension that plagued the Greek states, his exceptionally bitter and polemical narrative of the Persian War is remarkable.¹⁵⁰ Isocrates does, of course, have an argument to make, and his comparison of Spartan and Athenian achievements is designed to further that argument, as he reminds us in his discussion of Salamis (4.97–98).¹⁵¹ Nevertheless, his decision to structure his case for a panhellenic expedition in such a way is telling in itself. Whatever Isocrates's broader objectives, his rendition of the Persian War is not merely defined by the states, but is centered on one state. There is no reason to suspect irony or undue naiveté on Isocrates's part.¹⁵² His focus on Athens, his (seemingly crass) manipulation of the received tradition, and the bitter polemic edge apparent throughout represent merely an extreme case of the subordination of panhellenism to a state-centered paradigm. Isocrates was either incapable or simply disinclined to see the Persian War from

any viewpoint other than that of his own home state.¹⁵³ Nor was this attitude restricted to the *Panegyricus*. When some decades later Isocrates touched on the Persian War in the *Philippus*, he would again evince the same focus on the wartime achievements of Athens despite changed circumstances¹⁵⁴—but more on that later.

The Rise of Macedonia

The invasion of Persia, planned by Philip of Macedonia and executed by his son Alexander the Great, was a self-consciously panhellenic enterprise. The Persian War of old loomed large. The entire undertaking was presented as an ethnic war of revenge against the barbarians for the impieties committed by Xerxes during his invasion of Greece. Chapters 6 and 7 will consider the impact of the Persian War on Macedonian propaganda, as well as the consequent impact of Macedonian propaganda on the later Persian-War tradition. But for our present purposes, I am less interested in the transcendent panhellenism that undoubtedly came to define the Macedonian treatment of the Persian War after Chaeronea than in some earlier, ultimately abortive attempts to apply a state-centered model to Macedonia. Macedonia is unique among the examples cited in this chapter since unlike Athens, Sparta, Corinth, or Plataea, Macedonia was not a polis. It was rather an *ethnos* ruled by a monarchy. It had also Medized. It was in part this inconvenient truth that inspired the Macedonian dynasts to seek a new way to tell the story of the Persian War that largely ignored the heroics of individual states and focused rather on the collective effort of the Greeks generally. But this paradigm shift in the Persian-War tradition was not a foregone conclusion from the beginning. When Greek intellectuals first offered their talents to Philip in defense of Macedonian hegemony, their understanding of the Persian War remained state-centered. Despite the very different realities of Macedonia and its wartime record, they attempted to apply the same paradigm there.

In 346 Isocrates published the *Philippus*, an open letter urging the Macedonian king to unify Greece against Persia.¹⁵⁵ The relevance of the Persian War as a precedent for the prospective campaign is manifest, but studiously avoided.¹⁵⁶ As we saw earlier, when Isocrates presented this same proposal in the *Panegyricus*, the Persian War warranted extensive treatment. But the letter to Philip makes only four brief references to the war. None plays an important role. Isocrates first cites the zeal with which Sparta and Athens sought the favor of the Persian king in the years after the Persian War as proof that former enemies can become reconciled (5.42). It will be eighty

chapters until he mentions the war again, this time to note that the Persians began hostilities in an attempt to conquer Greece (5.124–25). He then mentions in passing that Greece had been saved by Athens three times (5.129). Presumably the Persian invasion represents one of these occasions, but Isocrates does not say so explicitly.¹⁵⁷ The final reference is Isocrates's most detailed and illustrative. He advises Philip that benefaction is a surer route to fame than naked power. Athens and Sparta, he says, are celebrated, not for their empires, but for their exertions on behalf of Greece. Marathon and Salamis are noted specifically in the case of Athens. Sparta is credited with Thermopylae, though it is here called a defeat without qualification. Plataea is again ignored. No other allied states are mentioned (5.146–48). The Persian War is much less prominent in the *Philippus*, but remains in essence what it was in the *Panegyricus*—the victory of Athens with an honorable mention for Sparta; that is, a story about the most important participating states.

At no point does Isocrates connect the Persian War to Macedonia. This is no accident. As noted throughout the chapter, the classical tradition focused on the state even when its aims were broadly panhellenic. A story about Macedonia's role in the Persian War would place Isocrates in an extremely difficult position. Alexander I, Philip's ancestor and the king of Macedonia at the time of Xerxes's invasion, was among the most prominent Medizers in Herodotus. His father gave earth and water to Darius (Hdt. 5.18). Alexander himself gave his sister in marriage to a Persian general (5.21), served on campaign with Xerxes (8.34) and Mardonius (9.44), and also acted as special envoy to Athens on Mardonius's behalf (8.136). At the same time, however, Alexander had done much to ingratiate himself to the Greeks and seems to have turned on the Persians very soon after Plataea.¹⁵⁸ Rather than defend Alexander's dubious Persian-War record, however, Isocrates opts to avoid the subject altogether. His decision leaves some awkward silences.¹⁵⁹ When Isocrates provides a list of Philip's ancestors who would second his own recommendations to befriend the Greeks and war against the barbarians, Alexander's belated attack on the Persians is omitted (5.105–108). When he goes on to assert that Philip's family did indeed have a long-standing enmity with the barbarians, he skips the Persian War entirely and looks back instead to mythology and Heracles's attack on Troy (5.111–12). For Isocrates, Macedonia has no Persian-War story to tell, or rather its Persian-War story must center on the actions of Macedonia and so must be a story tarnished by Medism, which is better left untold in the present context.

Isocrates's omission did not go unnoticed. A few years later, Speusippus, the nephew of Plato and his successor at the Academy,

wrote his own letter to Philip.¹⁶⁰ He claims to write on behalf of one of his students, Antipater of Magnesia. Antipater needed help and deserved it because of some insightful criticisms of Isocrates's letter, which Speusippus goes on to describe (1–2). Mentioned prominently among several mythological and historical omissions are “the services rendered to Greece (τὰς εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα γενομένας εὐεργεσίας) by your ancestor Alexander” (3, tr. Natoli). Specific proof is offered, much of which can be found in some form or another in Herodotus. Alexander is credited with killing a group of ambassadors sent by Xerxes to demand earth and water. Herodotus also mentions the incident, although he dates it to the reign of Darius (5.18–21). Next, Speusippus claims that Alexander warned the Greeks that their first defensive position at Tempe was untenable, because of the treachery of the Aleuadae of Thessaly. It is as a result of this intervention that Speusippus acclaims Alexander the savior of Greece: “after Alexander informed the Greeks of the treachery of Aleuas and the Thessalians, the Greek forces pulled out and were saved as a result of Alexander's intervention” (οἱ Ἕλληνες δι' Ἀλέξανδρον ἐσώθησαν: 3, tr. Natoli). Herodotus's Alexander does offer advice on this occasion, but he appears in a less patriotic light. There is no treachery behind the Greek lines. Rather, Alexander simply advises the Greeks that Xerxes's numerical superiority made resistance futile (7.173.3). The Greeks still recognize this as an act of goodwill, but Herodotus never implies that he thereby saved the Greeks.¹⁶¹ Speusippus ends his discussion of Alexander's Persian-War service by briefly alluding to Plataea, but provides no specifics (4). Speusippus could not have been unaware that Alexander was in Xerxes's service and that there was another, less flattering, way to read his actions. Indeed, he seems to impute this very reading to Isocrates when summing up the effect of their omission: “as it is, he has passed over them in complete silence as if they were disasters that must not be mentioned” (3, tr. Natoli). Speusippus is not denying the facts of the case. He is offering a bold reinterpretation of them, supported by a basically Herodotean version with some omissions and revisions.¹⁶² The sum effect is to provide Philip with the same kinds of evidence Isocrates cited on Athens's behalf in the *Panegyricus*.

Speusippus was likely not the only one engaged in this kind of revisionism. Antipater was a budding historian offering to publish a history featuring his criticisms within the narrative (Speus. 12–13). Anaximenes of Lampsacus (*FGrHist* 72), who already enjoyed the patronage of Philip, later composed a history about his activities that included references to Alexander I and the Persian War.¹⁶³ A literary letter contained in the Demosthenic corpus, if it was indeed excerpted from Anaximenes's history,¹⁶⁴ would suggest that Alexander's Persian-

War service featured prominently. The dramatic date of the letter is 340 bce. Mounting tensions between Macedonia and Athens have compelled Philip to state his case before the Athenian people. The issue of Amphipolis comes up, and Philip reaffirms his claim on the town by citing Alexander I's Persian-War service:

For, if [Amphipolis] belongs to the original conquerors, have not we a right to hold it? It was my ancestor, Alexander, who first occupied the site, and, as first-fruits of the Persian captives taken there, set up a golden statue at Delphi. ([Dem] 12.21, tr. Vince)

Here Alexander appears in very much the same light as Speusippus suggests.¹⁶⁵ The broader context (that is, his fair-weather Medism) is tactfully omitted, which in turn allows him to be presented as a hero of the war whose actions against Persia could be verified at Delphi.¹⁶⁶ The reference, however brief, speaks to Anaximenes's efforts to rehabilitate Alexander, certainly here and perhaps more extensively in the earlier parts of his work.¹⁶⁷

Our examination of some of the early efforts to situate Macedonia's recent rise to power in the context of the Persian-War past reveals two very different strategies. Isocrates exercises a kind of willful amnesia and skips over the entirety of Macedonia's dubious Persian-War record. Speusippus and perhaps Anaximenes present a stridently revisionist account that recasts Alexander I as a hero of the struggle against Persia. What is most notable for our purposes, however, is what these strategies have in common. Neither Isocrates nor Speusippus seriously contemplates the possibility that the Persian War could be an event to which all Greeks had claim regardless of prior service, that it could in short transcend the state. Speusippus was rather at pains to suggest that Macedonia could make a historical claim every bit as strong as had Athens and Sparta in decades past. Isocrates, on the other hand, relegates the Persian War to near oblivion, recognizing implicitly that Macedonia had no right to that tradition. Ultimately, Philip was not blind to the potential of the Persian-War past to transcend the internecine hostilities of the city-states (as we shall see in [Chapter 6](#)), but in the minds of his contemporaries access to the Persian-War tradition remained, as it had been on the revised Serpent Column, the exclusive preserve of the participating states in exact proportion to their individual achievements.

Conclusion

The survey of evidence provided in the preceding touches on the most famous expressions of panhellenism in the classical period. It includes different types of commemorations—monumental, poetic, ritual, historiographical, rhetorical, and epistolary—and spans the course of the classical period, from the years immediately after the battle of Plataea to the rise of Philip of Macedonia. Only one, the Salamis Apollo, could be said to transcend the horizons of the individual states. The rest are, of course, indisputably panhellenic. Each draws significant attention to the larger scope of the war. But their expressions of panhellenism do not properly transcend the state. At most, they imagine panhellenism as an expression of the sum total of the separate states that fought in the war. This is the panhellenism of the Serpent Column. It is reproduced (or anticipated?) on the Zeus at Olympia and informs the Plataea Elegy and Herodotus's grand Persian-War narrative. Our other commemorations present a much more restrictive version, centered on the services of one state alone. Isocrates and Speusippus stand out, but elements of this view can be found in the obsequies for the fallen and Herodotus as well. Here, the Greeks serve as a mere backdrop to the heroics of the individual state. Informing both types of nominally panhellenic commemorations is a state-centered paradigm.

We should not, of course, overstate the case. The Salamis Apollo is (or rather might be) a salutary reminder that transcendent panhellenism was never completely suppressed, even if Pausanias's attempts to take advantage of it were rejected explicitly. From its prominent position at Delphi, the Apollo statue would have acted as a constant reminder of the unrealized potential of the Persian-War tradition to overwhelm the claims of the individual states. Nor should we imagine that the Salamis Apollo stood alone in an otherwise unanimously state-centered view of the war. Too many Persian-War memorials have been lost or are known only at second hand to advance such a categorical conclusion. Moreover, there are positive clues that a broader view of the war continued to be remembered. Aeschylus's *Persae* is a case in point. The play itself was produced for an Athenian state festival before a largely, but not exclusively, Athenian audience.¹⁶⁸ The overall tone fits the occasion. Athenian exceptionalism looms large as the fate and heroics of Athens take center stage.¹⁶⁹ But even here, we see an indication of something bigger.¹⁷⁰ Before the battle the Greeks shout:

Come on, sons of the Greeks, for the freedom of your homeland, for the freedom of your children, your wives, the temples of your fathers' gods, and the tombs of your ancestors! Now all is at stake. (402–405, tr. Sommerstein)

This is a striking assertion of transcendent panhellenism voiced, according to the messenger, by the Greeks as a whole.¹⁷¹ We might also consider the epigram Diodorus asserts was originally placed upon the Serpent Column (11.33.2):

The saviors of spacious Greece dedicated this tripod, having rescued their cities from hateful slavery. (“Simon.” 17bP, tr. Campbell)

That Greece is saved evokes such state-centered renditions of the war as the Plataean speech in Thucydides and the Corinthian epigram,¹⁷² and if Diodorus’s epigram were authentic, we might naturally conclude that the saviors in question are the specific allied states listed on the column, not the Greeks generally. But the epigram cannot be authentic and was likely an invention of the fourth century.¹⁷³ As such, we might better read the epigram in its literary, rather than historical, context. Diodorus, perhaps reflecting his own source, makes no mention of a restricted list of allies, and so the epigram’s unqualified reference to “the saviors of Greece” leaves the impression that a larger, homogeneous collective was at work.¹⁷⁴

Expressions of a panhellenism that transcended the interests of the separate states and so contested the dominant paradigm of the city-state remained a part of the Persian-War tradition throughout the classical period, but the surviving evidence indicates that they played a much smaller role than Jung and others have suggested. This much can be deduced from the panhellenic commemorations alone. When we add the countless state-sponsored monuments and narratives, the overall picture of state domination becomes even clearer. The commemorative center did not hold. The Greeks who defeated the Persians were proudly divided into states and throughout insisted on a memory of the Persian War that emphasized that fact. What emerged was a tangle of different, often contradictory commemorations of the Persian War. But behind these differences (which I explore in the next three chapters), stood an elemental similarity—a shared paradigm for understanding the Persian War as a state-centered phenomenon.

¹ See the [Introduction](#), p. 4.

² For more state commemorations of the Persian War, see [Chapters 3, 4, and 5](#).

³ The actual grave marker has been found on Salamis, but it contains only the first two lines. The remaining two survive through the literary tradition. That they could have originally appeared on the stone, see [Page 1981](#): 202, [Molyneux 1992](#): 192, and [Higbie 2010](#): 191, all drawing here on [Boegehold 1965](#).

⁴ This synopsis of the battle derives ultimately from Herodotus. He provides the size of the fleet and the proportion of it supplied by the Athenians (8.43–48), the identity of the overall supreme commander (8.42), and the fact that the Aeginetans won the prize of valor (8.93). Herodotus’s numeric figures may not be entirely accurate, and later Athenian authors tended to gloss over the role of Aegina, but the

basic facts he presents are not in dispute.

⁵ Higbie 2010: 192.

⁶ See especially W. West 1970 for a collection of epigrams with a similar focus on the individual polis. Kowerski 2005: 76–80 argues that the overall mood of commemoration at the time was panhellenic (see also Taplin 2006: 3–4). The epigrams Kowerski selects to demonstrate this broader point (“Simon.” 8P, 9P, 15P, 17aP and 17bP) are, with the exception of 17aP (Pausanias’s epigram on the Serpent Column), of dubious authenticity. Epigrams 8P and 9P appear in the *Palatine Anthology* (7.253 and 7.251) as epitaphs for the fallen at Thermopylae, but we know they were not. Page 1981: 197–98 (followed by Kowerski) suggests that they were in fact the epigrams on the Spartan and Athenian tombs at Plataea, as seen by Pausanias in the second century ce (9.2.5). Epigram 15P is noted by Plutarch as the inscription that appeared on the altar of Zeus Eleutherios, also at the site of Plataea (Arist. 19.6). But see pp. 75 and 79 for the manifest changes and innovations associated with that site, which must in turn cast serious doubt on the inscriptions associated with it. For doubts about 17bP (an inscription Diodorus believed appeared originally on the Serpent Column), see Chapter 1, pp. 42–43 n.54.

⁷ Jung 2006: 225–97, esp. 295–97; see also Beck 2010: 61–68.

⁸ See Chapter 6.

⁹ We should not imagine that these were the only objects dedicated by the alliance. Herodotus juxtaposes the specific spoils dedicated after Salamis with “other offerings” (8.121.1). What I treat here, however, is restricted to the dedications about which we have firm knowledge.

¹⁰ M. Scott 2010: 172 reads Pausanias as implying that there was also a statue of Zeus dedicated at Olympia for the victory at Salamis, but this presses Pausanias too far. The passage in question reads: “The Greeks who fought against the king, besides dedicating at Olympia a bronze Zeus, dedicated also an Apollo at Delphi from spoils taken in the naval actions at Artemisium and Salamis” (Ἕλληνες δὲ οἱ ἐναντία βασιλέως πολέμησαντες ἀνέθεσαν μὲν Δία ἐς Ὀλυμπίαν χαλκοῦν, ἀνέθεσαν δὲ καὶ ἐς Δελφοὺς Ἀπόλλωνα ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐπὶ τε Ἀρτεμισίῳ καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι: 10.14.5, tr. Jones). Pausanias’s point is that the monuments were dedicated by the same organization, not necessarily on the same occasion. Herodotus’s silence here is decisive. Pausanias must be referring to the Zeus dedicated after the victory at Plataea.

¹¹ For more on the triremes, see Gauer 1968: 72–73 and Miller 1997: 33; see also Asheri et al. 2003: 320–21 and A. Bowie 2007: 213.

¹² For more on the Poseidon, see Gauer 1968: 98 and Fuchs 1995.

¹³ It is often suggested that the Poseidon statue may have been accompanied by a list of allies, as we know the dedications at Delphi and Olympia were (see Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950: 95 n.2, Jacquemin 2001: 102 n.57, and Jung 2006: 256). The assumption is natural enough, though it should be remembered that a list was not part of the original design for the Serpent Column. In any case, the supposition of a list is too tentative to be treated as fact here.

¹⁴ Herodotus places the Salamis Apollo next to the golden statue of Alexander I. A more precise location can be surmised from Pausanias (10.14.5); see also Bommelaer 1991: 169–70.

¹⁵ Jacquemin and Laroche 1988.

¹⁶ Jacquemin and Laroche 1988: 245–46; see also Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012: 42.

¹⁷ There is, however, nothing inherently unlikely about Jacquemin and Laroche’s suggestion. As the authors note, Pausanias’s epigram used the “Greeks” as a byword for the Hellenic-League allies; so too did Herodotus (see Chapter 1, p. 40 n.39).

¹⁸ Although the stones were initially found near the base of the Serpent Column

and so in the area of the Salamis Apollo, they were first associated with the Corcyrean Bull (Paus. 10.9.3), which was located at the entrance of the Sacred Way, by [Homolle 1897](#): 275–76 (see also [FD III.1.2](#)). This identification was challenged by [Vatin 1981](#): 450–53 who connected it with the Plataean Bull located on the temple terrace instead (Paus. 10.15.1).

¹⁹ See [Bommelaer 1991](#): 169, [M. Scott 2010](#): 83–84, and [Stephenson 2016](#): 90.

²⁰ See, for example, [M. Scott 2010](#): 85–86.

²¹ Herodotus does not give us much confidence that such feelings of comradeship long outlasted the victory. When the Greek generals attempted to award the prize of valor, each voted for himself and consequently no prize was awarded (8.123). His account may be apocryphal, however (see [Macan 1908b](#): 550 and [Blösel 2004](#): 321–23). For Herodotus's own biases about panhellenism, see pp. 81–88.

²² Herodotus reports that Mardonius openly contemplated and rejected a move against Delphi because of an oracle, which conveniently prophesied disaster if Delphi were sacked (9.42.3). For more on the position of Delphi during Xerxes's invasion, see [Chapter 3](#), p. 117 n.97.

²³ See [Zahrnt 1993](#): 361 who also adds that the members of the Amphictyony, who had largely Medized, would have hardly approved the monument in 480 (1993: 361 n.28). [Kienast 1995](#): 131 n.93 attempts to preserve an early date by noting that Delphi was a neutral site, but Herodotus gives us no indication that the Persians saw it as such or that the Greeks would have assumed it of them.

²⁴ The Delphic list contains 31 states, whereas the Olympian list contains only 27. All states listed at Olympia also appear at Delphi, but with four additions: Thespieae, Eretria, Leucas, and Siphnos. There are also differences as to the order of allies. Tegea appears eighth in line at Olympia, but fourth behind Sparta, Athens, and Corinth at Delphi. Otherwise the sequence of the lists is identical until a little over halfway, when it begins to differ radically. For a convenient comparison of the two lists along with the allies noted in Herodotus, see [How and Wells 1928b](#): 323. [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 59 maintain that the two lists were originally identical, but that either Pausanias the travel writer or a subsequent copyist accidentally omitted the names (see also [Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950](#): 95 and [Jung 2006](#): 256). [Eckstein 1969](#): 23 adds that the missing names may have become illegible or otherwise obscured by Pausanias's time. [Herrmann 1972](#): 246 n.476 reserves judgment. None addresses the differences as to sequence; rather, all focus exclusively on the missing names. It must, however, remain possible that the lists reflect differences on the monuments themselves.

²⁵ [Jung 2006](#): 256 also concludes that similar assumptions underlay the conception and design of the Zeus at Olympia and the revised Serpent Column at Delphi, but obviously has different assumptions in mind than those posited here (see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 32–33).

²⁶ [Gauer 1968](#): 97 and [Stephenson 2016](#): 90 suppose that the Olympian list did precede the one at Delphi. Gauer finds some additional support for the primacy of the Olympian list in the fact that one of the states absent there (Siphnos) was clearly a late addition to the Serpent Column. [Eckstein 1969](#): 26 concludes that the Olympian list was added at the same time as the Serpent Column was being revised, but he provides no evidence to support that conclusion.

²⁷ [Stephenson 2016](#): 90–91 conjectures that work for the other Plataea monuments was overseen by the other leading states of the alliance, Athens and Corinth, and assumes that the Salamis Apollo was erected “by the Athenians and their allies.”

²⁸ Even in the unlikely event that the Athenians had been commissioned to oversee the monument (see [note 27](#)), they would have hardly handed that honor to Themistocles, who was already facing concerns at home about his growing power

and ambitions (see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 47–52). Pausanias is possible, since he was certainly overseeing construction of the nearby Serpent Column. But even if the exigencies of the war had delayed construction of the Salamis Apollo, the commission was probably awarded soon after the battle, and it is unlikely that the son of the sitting regent, who took no known part in the battle, would have been so honored. Eurybiades, the overall commander at Artemisium and Salamis, is a far more tempting possibility.

²⁹ It is possible that Pausanias was charged with overseeing the statue of Zeus as well, but it is equally possible that it was handed to his co-commander and little-known cousin, Euryanax (Hdt. 9.10.3). If we knew for certain that the list of allies was original to the monument and that Pausanias was commissioned to oversee it, we might explore the implications for Pausanias's self-presentation in some detail, but since neither can be relied upon, I refrain from speculation.

³⁰ For the date, see [Boedeker 1995](#): 225, [Bearzot 1997](#): 75, [Schachter 1998](#): 29, [Aloni 2001](#): 101–104, [Jung 2006](#): 226, and [Thiel 2011](#): 387–88. We should not, however, press an early date too far. The key piece of evidence cited for a date before 477 is the disgrace Pausanias endured in that year as a result of his recall (Thuc. 1.95). He was, however, still regent and remained influential in Sparta and elsewhere until his death (see [Chapter 1](#), p. 59). If this poem were commissioned by Pausanias personally or even by a sympathetic patron, we could easily find an appropriate date and occasion in the years after 477. Indeed, Themistocles was almost certainly in political trouble when his ruse at Salamis was touted in Aeschylus's *Persae* (353–432 with [Podlecki 1970](#): 58 and [E. Hall 1996](#): 135–36). Pausanias's death a few years before that of Simonides himself seems a likely *terminus ante quem*, but we might, along with [Mayer 2007](#): 385–88, consider the erection of the two statues of Pausanias after his death as a suitable occasion (Thuc. 1.134.4). This would not (*pace* Mayer) require the poem to have been performed privately at a symposium since the erection of the statues already presupposes a public celebration of Pausanias at Sparta, albeit an imposed one.

³¹ See, for example, [Boedeker 1995](#): 220–25, [Pavese 1995](#): 24, [Bearzot 1997](#), [Schachter 1998](#), [Aloni 2001](#): 102–104, [Rutherford 2001](#): 38–41, [Shaw 2001](#), [Taplin 2006](#): 5, [Thiel 2011](#), and [Morgan 2015](#): 148–49. It is, however, generally accepted that the poem was performed, not for a private symposium as M. [West 1993](#): 5 and [Mayer 2007](#): 373–84 maintain, but at a public festival (see especially [Aloni 2001](#): 88–95 and now [Thiel 2011](#): 386–87, responding to [Mayer 2007](#)).

³² [Parsons 1992](#): 32, [Aloni 2001](#): 94–95, [Boedeker 2001b](#): 161–62, [Rutherford 2001](#): 38, and [Jung 2006](#): 227–30.

³³ For the presence of Athens, see [note 41](#).

³⁴ [Plut. Mor.](#) 872d–e; [Boedeker 2001a](#): 127 and [Stehle 2001](#): 118.

³⁵ The Spartan seer Teisamenus refers to driving the Persians “[out of A]si[a]” (ἐξ Ἀ[σ]ί[η]ς ἐλάσει) and “favoring a n[ew] alliance” (καὶ νήν συμμα[χ]ίην φιλέω[v: fr. 14.7–8, tr. West]), but without more context it is impossible to know whether these comments are intended to evoke the larger collective or merely hint at what the current collection of states could or would do. M. [West 1993](#): 8–9 suggests that this new alliance might be the Delian League, but see [Aloni 2001](#): 103 n.69 and [Rutherford 2001](#): 48 against that possibility.

³⁶ [Boedeker 1995](#): 225, followed by [Obbink 2001](#): 80 and [Jung 2006](#): 235–36. See also [Aloni 2001](#): 101 and [Rutherford 2001](#): 39.

³⁷ See [Boedeker 1995](#): 219, [Pavese 1995](#): 15, [Schachter 1998](#): 27, [Aloni 2001](#): 102–103, [Rutherford 2001](#): 45, [Stehle 2001](#): 117, [Taplin 2006](#): 4, and [Grethlein 2010](#): 53. M. [West 1993](#): 7, [Bearzot 1997](#): 71–72, [Jung 2006](#): 233–35, and [Thiel 2011](#) note the general importance of Sparta for the opening of the historical portion of the poem without drawing attention to the invocation specifically.

³⁸ Pavese 1995: 15–16, Bearzot 1997: 72, and Thiel 2011: 385.

³⁹ That we here follow the march of the Spartan army, see Parsons 1992: 6, M. West 1993: 7, Schachter 1998: 27, Jung 2006: 236–37, Taplin 2006: 5, and Morgan 2015: 147; *contra* Kowerski 2005: 66–67 and 74.

⁴⁰ Aloni 2001: 102 rightly notes the rather paltry treatment of the allies here.

⁴¹ Fragment 11 ends with a mention of the city of Pandion, a possible reference to Athens (Aloni 2001: 102, Boedeker 2001a: 125, Obbink 2001: 74, and Rutherford 2001: 47; *contra* Schachter 1998: 27–28 and Jung 2006: 237). The restoration of the line is, however, very uncertain. It reads only . . . Πανδίωνος ἐξε[λάσσω]ντες. Two possible interpretations turn on how ἐξε[. . .]ντες is restored. Parsons 1992: 37 argues that we should here see the Athenians as crossing over from Salamis and joining the expedition, which might suggest a modest, but perhaps even a dramatic change of focus (see also Boedeker 2001a: 128, Parsons 2001: 61, and Luppe 2008). M. West, however, interprets the line differently, arguing that the Spartans are here driving the Persians out of Attica (see also Pavese 1995: 7 and Rutherford 2001: 47). There is even less firm ground when we consider fragment 13, which stood in the column immediately after fragment 11 and mentions the sons of Dorus and Heracles in a possible description of the Greek battle line (13.9–10). M. West 1993: 7 takes this to indicate a continued focus on the actions of the Spartans (see also Bearzot 1997: 72–73, Aloni 2001: 103, Jung 2006: 238, and Thiel 2011: 386). But see Boedeker 1995: 224 and 2001a: 129, who argues that our surviving fragment may reflect merely part of a larger description of the disposition of the army.

⁴² See also Schachter 1998: 26–28.

⁴³ See Plut. *Mor.* 872d. This reading has been proposed by Luppe 1994 and is supported by Boedeker 2001a: 129, Kowerski 2005: 87, and Grethlein 2010: 53.

⁴⁴ Herodotus, of course, maintained that the Corinthians fled to the town of Plataea in the night along with the rest of the Greek center (9.52). Although his interpretation of the final engagement has been criticized since antiquity (see note 80), we need not follow Herodotus's version in full to infer from it that the Corinthians earned no exceptional praise for their actions. Herodotus's treatment of the Corinthians at the battle of Salamis provides an instructive contrast. In this battle too there were (Athenian) rumors that the Corinthians attempted to flee, but Herodotus adds that the Corinthians and the rest of the Greeks maintained that they fought with distinction (8.94.4).

⁴⁵ Luppe 1994: 21, Aloni 2001: 101, Rutherford 2001: 48, Kowerski 2005: 87–88, and Thiel 2011: 386.

⁴⁶ Jung 2006: 238–41 provides a fairly conservative reading of the poem's panhellenism. He concludes that the panhellenic scope of the poem has been defined by the influence of the Spartans and as such represents an early stage in the tensions between Sparta and its allies that, he argues, would soon erupt in the Serpent-Column affair.

⁴⁷ Kowerski 2005 suggests that the Plataea Elegy may have been only part of a much larger poem that addressed several battles and whose perspective would have necessarily been much broader than the surviving portions might suggest (see also Grethlein 2010: 51–52). This reconstruction cannot, however, be demonstrated with sufficient confidence to bear weight here.

⁴⁸ See Lloyd-Jones 1994, Schachter 1998, Aloni 2001: 104, and Shaw 2001.

⁴⁹ For more on the striking difference in tone between Pausanias's epigram on the Serpent Column and the Plataea Elegy, see Thiel 2011: 389.

⁵⁰ The basic outlines of the rituals witnessed by Plutarch and Pausanias in the second century ce can be confirmed for the third century bce by an honorary decree found at Plataea (see Étienne and Piérart 1975). There, reference is made to sacrifices to Zeus Eleutherios and games in honor of the fallen (ln. 18–24), all

administered by an international council of the Greeks (In. 25–30). A fragment of the comic poet, Poseidippus, writing in the early third century BCE, also mentions the Eleutheria festival at Plataea in passing, but provides no further details (PCG 7 F31). For a fuller treatment of these rituals with full citations of all available sources, see [Schachter 1994](#): 125–43. For more on the evolution of the cult over time, see [Chapter 6](#), pp. 224–27 and [Chapter 7](#), pp. 263–64; for the identity of the common council specifically, see [Chapter 6](#), p. 225.

⁵¹ For the full text of the inscription and further discussion of its implications, see [Chapter 6](#), p. 227.

⁵² [Schachter 1994](#): 137.

⁵³ The individual role of the states remains a part of the service, as the chief magistrate of Plataea washes and anoints the individual tombs, but he then sacrifices a single bull for all and “summons the brave men who died for Greece” to dine as a single group, ending with this toast: “I drink to the men who died for the freedom of the Greeks” (Arist. 21.5, tr. Perrin modified). Even the washing of the graves is likely to have involved less individual recognition for the participants than it might seem at first glance. Although Herodotus implies that every participating state erected a tomb (9.85), Plutarch’s near contemporary, Pausanias, notes only three, one each for the Spartans and Athenians and then a third for all the rest (9.2.5). For more on the number and organization of the tombs, see pp. 78–79.

⁵⁴ See [Parsons 1992](#): 6, [Boedeker 1995](#): 222–23 and 2001b: 150–53, [Pavese 1995](#): 22–24, [Bearzot 1997](#), [Aloni 2001](#): 101, [Rutherford 2001](#): 40–41, and [Taplin 2006](#): 5.

⁵⁵ Much of the conversation about these rituals is tied to the so-called Covenant of Plataea, an alleged act of the Hellenic-League council after Plataea described by Plutarch in the *Aristeides* (21.1). Larsen [1933](#): 262–65, [1940](#): 177–79, and [1955](#): 48, [Raubitschek 1960](#), and [Siewert 1972](#): 89–93 defend the later tradition in full, but few have followed this course (but see [Boedeker 2001b](#): 150–53). [Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950](#): 101–105 express serious doubts, concluding that those elements not corroborated by Thucydides are likely a product of the fourth century (see also [Habicht 1961](#): 34, [Étienne and Piérart 1975](#): 63–68, [Robertson 1976](#): 16–19, [Prandi 1988](#): 62–65, [Tronson 1993](#): 121–27, [Raaflaub 2004](#): 103, [Bremmer 2006](#): 22, and [Cartledge 2013](#): 129). [Meiggs 1972](#): 507–508, [Welwei 1991](#): 56, [Baltrusch 1994](#): 46–48, and [Jung 2006](#): 259–71 argue for an authentic core to the account provided by Plutarch, but do not agree what that core might entail.

⁵⁶ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 17–19. [Connerton 1989](#): 41–71 devotes significant attention to the role of rituals in memory, and although he rightly concludes that rituals “are not subject to spontaneous variation, or at least are susceptible to variation only within strict limits,” he nevertheless concedes the importance of “conspicuous regularity” in the maintenance of such rituals (1989: 44).

⁵⁷ Plataea was besieged by the Spartans and their allies in the early years of the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 2.75–78). Its defenders surrendered in 427 and were subsequently put to death (3.52–68). The town itself was initially given to some Megarian exiles and the pro-Theban partisans among the Plataeans, but was demolished about a year later (3.68.3). Plataea was rebuilt in the wake of the King’s Peace in 387/6 (Paus. 9.1.4; see also Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10), but was again destroyed by the Thebans in 373 (Diod. 15.46.4–6 and Paus. 9.1.4–8). The final restoration of the city occurred under the patronage of Philip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great, but our sources do not agree on the exact details (see [Chapter 6](#), p. 223 n.100). For more on the destructions and restorations of Plataea before Philip, see [Amit 1973](#): 61–117, [Prandi 1988](#): 108–32, [Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013](#): 30–32, and [Yates 2013](#): 370.

⁵⁸ See [Chapter 6](#), pp. 224–27.

⁵⁹ [Currie 2005](#): 102, following [Gomme 1956](#): 358, suggests that the construction

of an inn for pilgrims by the Thebans (Thuc. 3.68.3) may indicate the continued observance of the obsequies for the fallen, but the close connection Thucydides draws between this structure and the worship of Hera suggests rather that the Thebans had the Pan-Boeotian Daedala cult in mind (Schachter 1981: 244–45). Any connection with the obsequies for the fallen is, therefore, entirely conjectural and so serves to prove the continuance of that cult only by presupposing that it did in fact continue (Schachter 1994: 129). Even if we were to make such a supposition for the period after the first destruction of the town, Isocrates very much suggests that the ritual was not maintained after its second destruction in the fourth century (14.61).

⁶⁰ Boedeker 2001b: 151 maintains that three bronze vessels may lend support to the early existence of the Eleutheria Games. Two were found in Attica and a third in Thessaloniki. They each contain an inscription in Attic script that reads, “The Athenians gave these prizes for those who died in the war” (IG I³ 523–25; see also Vanderpool 1969 and Amandry 1971: 602–25). Although Vanderpool connects them to funeral games at Athens, Amandry objects that the phrase “The Athenians gave these prizes” excludes any games held in Athens and suggests either the Eleutheria at Plataea or the Heracleia at Marathon as alternatives. Even if we accept Amandry’s objection to Vanderpool, however, the connection between these prizes and the putative Eleutheria in Plataea remains pure conjecture (Bremmer 2006: 22 n.75 and Jung 2006: 264 n.140) and thus carries little probative value in the present context. I agree with Raaflaub 2004: 103 that future finds are needed to corroborate the possible implication of these vessels.

⁶¹ Étienne and Piérart 1975: 63–68, Schachter 1994: 127–28, and Jung 2006: 270; see also Pritchett 1985: 119–20 and Beck 2010: 66–67.

⁶² Étienne and Piérart 1975: 67, Tronson 1993: 127, J. Price 2001: 111 n.52, Cartledge 2013: 128, and Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013: 28 n.100. MacLeod 1977: 235 draws particular attention to the emphasis Thucydides lays on the vain efforts of the Plataeans “to make a bridge between past and present” in their later speech before the Spartan judges in Book 3. Boedeker 2001b: 152 attempts to explain the silence of Thucydides by suggesting that the Eleutheria may have been closely associated with Athens and so understandably omitted in this context, but the only evidence that supports such a connection, the three bronze vessels mentioned in note 60, is itself extremely tenuous.

⁶³ Pausanias the travel writer places the altar of Zeus Eleutherios quite near the tombs of the fallen, which were located outside the now expanded walls of the town (9.2.5). For the ramifications of this contradiction, see Bremmer 2006: 22 and even Jung 2006: 266 n.145 and 333–34, who otherwise favors a close connection between the earlier and later rituals; for more on the walls of Plataea, see Aravantinos, Konecny, and Marchese 2003. Page 1981: 212 is sympathetic to the authenticity of the inscription (see also Molyneux 1992: 197, Erbse 1998: 227–30, Kowerski 2005: 77, and Morgan 2015: 150). None takes account of the fact that the altar itself must have been a later addition. Jung 2006: 267 (and 330) is equally sympathetic, but concludes that the evidence for its authenticity is simply too weak to press (see also Raaflaub 2004: 103 and Wallace 2011: 169 n.53 and n.62).

⁶⁴ As Jung 2006: 267 also concludes.

⁶⁵ Even the phrase the Plataeans use to set the scene is evocative of Pausanias’s inscription. Here too Pausanias wins the war alone, with the help of the Greeks: “When the Spartan Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, had liberated Greece from the Persians with the help of those Greeks who were prepared to share the danger of that battle fought in our territory” (2.71.2, tr. Hammond). It is, however, notable that Thucydides has his Plataeans identify Pausanias as a Spartan in the present context—diplomatic negotiations with the sitting king of Sparta.

⁶⁶ See Jung 2006: 267–70. It is telling that even though the Plataeans are, strictly

speaking, trying to oblige the state of Sparta to follow the precedent set by its erstwhile regent, the oath itself is not remembered as a bilateral obligation between Plataea and Sparta, but rather as a league matter in which the alliance as a whole was called to witness the restoration of Plataea and swear to defend it if attacked unjustly.

⁶⁷ Archidamus responds to the Plataean interpretation by saying, “men of Plataea, what you say is fair, as long as your actions match your words. In the terms of Pausanias’s pledge to you, enjoy your own autonomy but also help us to free the others who shared those dangers and joined in that oath to you, and are now subject to the Athenians. We have raised this great force and gone to war for their sake, to liberate them and the others” (tr. Hammond).

⁶⁸ Pausanias’s bold vision for the Hellenic League here certainly contrasts with the weakness of that organization in fact (see [Yates 2015](#)).

⁶⁹ [Jung 2006](#): 270.

⁷⁰ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 17–19.

⁷¹ [Badian 1993](#): 110–14 (= 1989: 96–101) reads the exchange rather more legalistically and assumes throughout that Thucydides has a set and easily verifiable agreement in mind that can be discerned from his account. He points out that Thucydides presents three different versions: (1) the Plataea version, guaranteeing the autonomy of Plataea (2.71.2); (2) Archidamus’s, requiring all member states to defend the freedom of any other member state whose autonomy is threatened (2.72.1); and (3) that of the Spartan judges who cite only the requirement that Plataea remain neutral (3.68.1). Badian dismisses the Plataean interpretation since the Plataeans are corrected by Archidamus, but offer no response, thus implicitly accepting the justice of his interpretation. He then rejects the version of the Spartan judges because Thucydides would have had no reliable information about their deliberations. Badian’s attempt to disentangle the mess has proven influential ([Hornblower 1991](#): 359, citing [Badian 1989](#)), but it does not hold up to scrutiny. We should not expect the first speaker in a pair of speeches to rebut the assertions of the second. The Plataeans’s failure to do so here does not validate Archidamus’s historical interpretation any more than their failure to do so in Book 3 guarantees that they conceded the facts presented by the Thebans at their subsequent trial. Badian’s decision to privilege Archidamus’s version over that of the Spartan judges also causes problems, since it suggests that Thucydides has imputed to his characters an understanding of the past he knew to be incorrect when his sources failed him. We might rather expect the opposite. I suggest that a legalistic reading provides no answers because this was ultimately not a matter of black-letter law, but memory. Indeed, no speaker refers to an inscription of the oaths. Rather, both speakers evoke Pausanias’s original speech act. For the complex relationship between speeches and between speech and narrative in Thucydides, see [Stahl 1973](#), [Macleod 1975](#), and [Rood 1998](#): 39–54.

⁷² See [Chapter 1](#), p. 58.

⁷³ For Pausanias, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 56–60; for the duration of the Hellenic League, see [Yates 2015](#): 10–18.

⁷⁴ Isocrates certainly speaks as if the tombs of all those who fell at Plataea received obsequies (14.61), and although he likely has the brief restoration of Plataea in the fourth century in mind, it is not unlikely that the same held true in the fifth century ([Boedeker 2001b](#): 150–51; see also [Bremmer 2006](#): 21–22).

⁷⁵ [Currie 2005](#): 111.

⁷⁶ [Schachter 1994](#): 127.

⁷⁷ *Contra* [Jung 2006](#): 260.

⁷⁸ This final point is pure conjecture. The Plataeans say that they honor the fallen Spartans, but almost certainly honored the rest as well (see [note 74](#)). The ease with

which the Plataeans compartmentalized the full rituals might hint at separate services, but such an inference can hardly be pressed.

⁷⁹ Jung 2006: 259 n.115 is quite right to note that the collection of so many tombs together would have brought the panhellenic scale of the conflict to mind.

⁸⁰ The substance of Herodotus's account was already subject to criticism by Plutarch (*Mor.* 872f–73d) and continues to be treated with skepticism by moderns (for example, Macan 1908b: 771–72, How and Wells 1928b: 325–26, Flower and Marincola 2002: 256, Jung 2006: 260 n.117, and Asheri et al. 2006: 293–94).

⁸¹ Twice Herodotus notes that he has learned this version from others (ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι and ἐγὼ ἀκούω: 9.85.3), but see Fehling 1989 for a critical examination of Herodotus's use of sources. There is, however, no good reason to doubt that such stories were being circulated before Herodotus wrote.

⁸² See note 53.

⁸³ For more on the change the site underwent from the classical to the imperial periods, see Schachter 1994: 142, Flower and Marincola 2002: 254, Bremmer 2006: 22, and Jung 2006: 260 n.117. Prandi 1990a: 57 suggests that this may have occurred in the second century ce between the time that Plutarch wrote the *Aristeides* and Pausanias wrote his travel guide. She argues that because Plutarch saw many tombs (“numerosi *mnemata*”) at Plataea (*Arist.* 19.5–6 and 21.5), he must have seen much the same thing as Herodotus saw, not the three tombs mentioned by Pausanias (see also Nafissi 1995: 131). It should be noted, however, that Plutarch only uses the plural (τὰ μνήματα and τὰς στήλας) and never specifies that there were many of them. The same can be said of his treatment of the tombs in *On the Malignity of Herodotus* (*Mor.* 872f). Moreover, such a late change would have likely occurred within Pausanias's lifetime and so his failure to note what would have been a very recent change is somewhat surprising. We cannot exclude a late date, of course, but it is rather more likely that the reorganization of the site occurred after the restoration of the town in 338 (see Chapter 6, pp. 224–27).

⁸⁴ Étienne and Piérart 1975: 67 and Schachter 1994: 137. Currie 2005: 110–11 and Jung 2006: 263–65 and 270 acknowledge the fact, but focus rather on the panhellenic aspects of the ritual.

⁸⁵ It is tempting to assume that Plutarch understood the obsequies for the fallen as an element of the same decree proposed by Aristeides that relieved the Plataeans of active military service (Meiggs 1972: 507 and Cartledge 2013: 128), which would therefore credit the obsequies to a vote of the Hellenic League. But the decree itself only obliged the Plataeans to sacrifice to Zeus on behalf of Greece. The extended description of the obsequies provided immediately thereafter need not be read as a direct result of Aristeides's decree: “Once these proposals [i.e., the Covenant of Plataea] were ratified, the Plataeans undertook to make funeral offerings annually for the Greeks who had fallen in battle and lay buried there” (κυρωθέντων δὲ τούτων, οἱ Πλαταιεῖς ὑπεδέξαντο τοῖς πεσοῦσι καὶ κεμένοις αὐτόθι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐναγίζειν καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν: *Plut. Arist.* 21.2, tr. Perrin modified).

⁸⁶ The Plataeans remind the Spartans that the obsequies were carried out at the expense of their state (δημοσίᾳ: 3.58.4) and later warn them that if Plataea is destroyed, “you will take the sacrifices to your fathers out of the hands of those who ordained and established them” (3.58.5, tr. Hammond).

⁸⁷ See note 80.

⁸⁸ See also 3.58.3 and 3.59.1 for the same sentiment.

⁸⁹ In claiming that they were the only Boeotians to offer help, the Plataeans completely ignore the role of the Thespians (see Gomme 1956: 339 and Macleod 1977: 229–30). The patriotic hyperbole used here is similar to a common Athenian practice of ignoring the role of Plataea in the battle of Marathon (see note 134).

⁹⁰ The Plataeans draw particular attention to the zeal (προθυμία) and marshal

excellence (ἀρετή) they displayed in the service of the Greek cause (ἐς τοὺς Ἑλληνας: 3.57.4 and 3.58.1). The Plataeans make a similar point to Archidamus in Book 2 when they claim that their city had been afforded special protections after the battle, not because they needed it, but “because of excellence and zeal” (ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα καὶ προθυμίας: 2.71.3).

⁹¹ Here again, the Plataeans have stretched the truth of their case, as the Spartans famously faced the Persians at the battle of Plataea, not the Thebans (Hdt. 9.61).

⁹² Jung surely goes too far when he suggests that Plataea could never attempt to monopolize the memory of the battle of Plataea (2006: 265). It may be true enough internationally, but in the minds of the Plataeans and, I would argue, at the site of Plataea as well, matters stood rather differently.

⁹³ For a similar reading of Herodotus generally, see [Ferrario 2014](#): 84–94 and [Zali 2015](#): 16–19.

⁹⁴ Common opinion holds that the *Histories* were completed in the early years of the Archidamian War after decades of research and oral presentation; see [J. Cobet 1977](#), [Evans 1979](#), [1982](#): 15–18, and [1991](#): 89–90, [Waters 1985](#): 6, [Gould 1989](#): 13–18, and [R. Thomas 2006](#): 61 with earlier bibliography; but see also [Fornara 1971a](#) and [1981](#) for the possibility of an even later date (c. 414).

⁹⁵ For the application of this title to the Hellenic League, see [Chapter 1](#), p. 40 n.39.

⁹⁶ For example, when Herodotus famously remarks that the Persians had many people, but few men at Thermopylae, the observation is tied to an attack on the Greeks generally, not a specific state contingent (7.210.2). Later he credits all the Greeks equally with using good order at the battle of Salamis, in contrast to the barbarians who did not (8.86). Before Plataea, he concludes that the Greeks gained confidence “from the fact that they had stood up to the attack of the cavalry and had repelled it” (9.25.1, tr. Purvis), despite the fact that Megara and Athens alone took part in the engagement (9.21–23). Similar instances could be multiplied.

⁹⁷ [Macan 1908a](#): 197 suggests that this phrase indicates the “general policy and attitude” of the allies, not merely a comment on their decision to dispatch ambassadors to the other Greek states.

⁹⁸ See [Chapter 1](#), pp. 42–45.

⁹⁹ [Macan 1908a](#): 185 rightly notes that by raising even the possibility of a Spartan surrender, Herodotus “spoils the effect of the heroic alternative just formulated.”

¹⁰⁰ See [How and Wells 1928b](#): 181, [Hignett 1963](#): 272, [Fornara 1971b](#): 45–46, [Balcer 1995](#): 248, [Green 1996a](#): 169–70, [Raaflaub 2010a](#): 231, and [C. Meier 2012](#): 278–79. [Hammond 1988](#): 588, [Cawkwell 2005](#): 96–108, and [Cartledge 2006](#): 165–66, however, express doubts.

¹⁰¹ For a detailed treatment of Herodotus’s complex relationship with Athens, see [Moles 2002](#) with further bibliography. Whatever Herodotus’s attitude toward the city, however, the historian certainly recognized that this passage would appear biased in favor of Athens, even if he had no partisan agenda in saying so.

¹⁰² For more on Herodotus’s tendency to craft his account so as to juxtapose past and present, see [Raaflaub 2010b](#): 197–203.

¹⁰³ [Ferrario 2014](#): 92–94.

¹⁰⁴ The Argive rejection comes first (7.148–152), followed by an extended account of the failed negotiations with Gelon in Sicily (7.153–167). Ambassadors to Corcyra have more luck (7.168.1), but Herodotus anticipates his timeline to tell us that the Corcyreans never supplied any aid and were in fact waiting out the results of the war (7.168.2–4). He ends with Crete, where Delphi advises them against any alliance with the Greeks (7.169–171). See also [Lazenby 1993](#): 106–108.

¹⁰⁵ Herodotus may relate another step taken at the first meeting of the league. Earlier in Book 7, he notes that the league decided to tithe those states that willingly

Medized (7.132.2). We do not, however, know when the decision was made and so whether it was prohibitive or punitive in nature. If prohibitive (as Brunt 1953/54: 136–37, [Kienast 2003](#): 47, and [Vannicelli 2017](#): 451 argue), then we could add it to our list of failed league undertakings, since the threat does not stop most of northern and central Greece from Medizing. Indeed, the fact that Herodotus only relates this action after he proleptically lists the Greek states that did Medize (7.132.1) would suggest that he is drawing emphasis to its futility. But if punitive (as [Baltrusch 1994](#): 40 n.199 concludes), it would have no such implication.

¹⁰⁶ At Mycale concerns over unity are delayed until immediately after the battle narrative, where they play a particularly prominent role in a debate about the fate of the Greek states of Ionia (9.106.2–4).

¹⁰⁷ Herodotus notes the Greek decision to flee at 8.18, while the news that Thermopylae had fallen does not reach the fleet for another three chapters (8.21). For the awkward timing of this account, see [Macan 1908b](#): 381, [Masaracchia 1977](#): 166, and A. [Bowie 2007](#): 109.

¹⁰⁸ See [Baragwanath 2008](#): 200 n.89.

¹⁰⁹ Later Pausanias the regent will also characterize the withdrawal of the allies to Plataea town as a betrayal (9.60.1).

¹¹⁰ The point is rightly made by [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 199–200 in reference to the battle of Plataea.

¹¹¹ See [Plut. Mor.](#) 865b–868a, 870a–871c, and 872b–873e; for modern criticisms, see [Macan 1908a](#): 309–10, 324, and 328, 1908b: 381 and 706, [How and Wells 1928b](#): 310, [Hignett 1963](#): 119, 205–207, and 327, [Masaracchia 1977](#): 166, [Barron 1988](#): 607, [Green 1996a](#): 262, [Cawkwell 2005](#): 92–100, and [Asheri et al. 2006](#): 244.

¹¹² The contrast between Athenian rhetoric and political reality on this occasion has often been noted: [Macan 1908b](#): 610, [Hignett 1963](#): 282, [Fornara 1971b](#): 85–86, [Hart 1982](#): 171, [Barron 1988](#): 596–97, [Green 1996a](#): 229, [van der Veen 1996](#): 103–108, [Konstan 2001](#): 32–36, [R. Thomas 2001](#): 214–15, [T. Harrison 2002b](#): 566–67, [Pelling 2006](#): 113–14, [Stadter 2006](#): 249, A. [Bowie 2007](#): 235–36, [Baragwanath 2008](#): 234–39, and [Kyle 2010](#): 51.

¹¹³ [Lazenby 1993](#): 170, [Green 1996b](#): 7, [Konstan 2001](#): 33, [R. Thomas 2001](#): 215, A. [Bowie 2007](#): 232, and [Baragwanath 2008](#): 228–30.

¹¹⁴ A. [Bowie 2007](#): 235 notes the provocative nature of the opening line of the Athenian speech.

¹¹⁵ See [Burn 1962](#): 494–95, [Pelling 2006](#): 113, [Stadter 2006](#): 247–48, and [Baragwanath 2008](#): 203 and 230.

¹¹⁶ See, however, [R. Thomas 2001](#): 215 and [J. Hall 2002](#): 190 and 2009: 604–605.

¹¹⁷ As does [Baragwanath 2008](#): 234.

¹¹⁸ See [J. Hall 2002](#): 190 and 2009: 604–605.

¹¹⁹ The Athenians had specifically requested the Spartans to send an army as soon as possible (8.144.4) and had certainly expected to see those reinforcements arrive before Mardonius (9.6), as [Baragwanath 2008](#): 231–32 notes.

¹²⁰ [Asheri et al. 2006](#): 180.

¹²¹ [Asheri et al. 2006](#): 184.

¹²² See [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 120, [Pelling 2006](#): 113, and [Baragwanath 2008](#): 235 for the growing intensity of Athenian rhetoric on this occasion.

¹²³ As [Pelling 2006](#): 113–14 and [Baragwanath 2008](#): 235–36 conclude.

¹²⁴ See [Fornara 1971b](#): 85–86, [van der Veen 1996](#): 107, [Moles 2002](#): 43, and [Raaflaub 2002](#): 167 and 2010b: 198. [Baragwanath 2008](#): 238 comes to a similar conclusion, but emphasizes that the Athenians (rhetoric aside) do ultimately choose to defend Greek freedom.

¹²⁵ See [Buchner 1958](#): 95–96, [Perlman 1969](#): 370–71 and 1976: 25–26 with

earlier bibliography, [Sakellariou 1981](#): 129–34, [Cawkwell 1982](#): 324–26 and 2005: 6, [Romilly 1992](#): 9–12, [Green 1996b](#): 6, [Flower 2000b](#): 93–95, and [L. Mitchell 2007](#): xix.

¹²⁶ [Sakellariou 1981](#): 129–32 and [Cawkwell 1982](#): 325.

¹²⁷ See [Eucken 1983](#): 141 and [Usher 1990](#): 19.

¹²⁸ [Sandys 1979](#) [= 1872]: xlii, [Ryder 1965](#): 50, and [Papillon 2004](#): 27.

¹²⁹ A *panegyrikos logos* is by definition a speech delivered at a panhellenic festival, either at one of the crown festivals (Olympia, Delphi, Isthmia, or Nemea) or one of Athens's two great festivals, the Panathenaea or Greater Dionysia (see [Sandys 1979](#) [= 1872]: xli–xlii and [Papillon 2004](#): 23). The most likely location intended is Olympia ([Eucken 1983](#): 141), but even if Isocrates had an Athenian festival in mind, he envisioned a substantial body of non-Athenians to be present (4.43–46).

¹³⁰ For the presence of explicitly agonistic language throughout the *Panegyricus*, see [Eucken 1983](#): 142–62; for its role in the description of the Persian War specifically, see [Eucken 1983](#): 155–56.

¹³¹ For Athenian periodizations of the war, see [Chapter 4](#), pp. 160–68. It should be noted here that even Isocrates opted for a different beginning to the war in his *Panathenaicus*—Xerxes's invasion, rather than Marathon (see [Chapter 4](#), p. 167 n.129).

¹³² For more on Herodotus's narrative of Marathon, see [Massaro 1978](#), [Flashar 1996](#): 67–68, [Jung 2006](#): 126–69, and [Raaflaub 2010a](#).

¹³³ In his speech before the Spartans, the messenger Philippides does not suggest that the Persian attack constituted a direct threat to Sparta. He does urge the Spartans not to allow the most ancient city in Greece to be enslaved and notes that with the loss of Eretria “Greece has become weaker by one important city,” but these arguments are designed merely to strengthen the basic request for aid against an attack directed at Athens alone: “the Athenians beg you to rush to their defense” (6.106.2, tr. Purvis modified). When the Spartans later fear Athenian defection after Salamis, they still present the early phases of the war as an exclusively Athenian matter: “the conflict was over your *archê*; but now it spreads to all Greece as well” (8.142.2). For more on this difficult passage, see [Chapter 4](#), pp. 150–52. It is important to add, however, that Herodotus did not agree with the Spartans in this regard, as he claims that the real purpose of the Marathon campaign was the enslavement of all Greece (6.94.1). For more on Isocrates's divergences from Herodotus here, see [D. Gillis 1971](#): 66 and [Usher 1990](#): 169.

¹³⁴ In omitting the Plataeans, Isocrates was part of a much broader trend ([Loraux 1986](#): 157–58 and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 127–42), but the fact that they did participate was easy to corroborate. Herodotus notes that their service was announced at every penteteric festival held at Athens (6.111.2), and the fact could not have escaped Isocrates's notice, even if he ultimately chose to follow the more patriotic version here.

¹³⁵ For more on the commemoration of Thermopylae during the classical period, see [Albertz 2006](#): 50–66 and A. [Brown 2013](#).

¹³⁶ [Usher 1990](#): 170. [Buchner 1958](#): 101–102 argues that Spartan numbers have not actually been inflated here, and while this may be true, the effect is surely to detract (however slightly) from the accomplishments of the 300 Spartans.

¹³⁷ See [Buchner 1958](#): 101, [D. Gillis 1971](#): 66 and [Usher 1990](#): 170. According to Herodotus, the Athenians initially supplied 127 ships for themselves and their Plataean allies as well as 20 for the Chalcidians (Hdt. 8.1). During the campaign the Athenians also sent 53 ships as reinforcements (8.14).

¹³⁸ That the number of Athenian ships has been intentionally reduced to make Artemisium the equal of Thermopylae was long ago noted by [Sandys 1979](#) (= 1872): 91–92.

¹³⁹ Pace Buchner 1958: 102, this is not a compliment, as a quick glance at the effusive treatment of Herodotus (7.219–38) or Diodorus (11.11) demonstrates.

¹⁴⁰ The tendency to flee is a particular trait of the Peloponnesians and especially the Corinthians in Herodotus's narrative, but in this case he attributes the decision to the Greeks generally and especially the Athenians, who had suffered particularly high losses (8.18). The extent of these losses is difficult to determine. Herodotus notes that "many Greek ships and many men were lost" after the second engagement (8.16.3, tr. Purvis) and later specifies that half of the Athenian ships had been disabled (8.18), but these figures do not seem to factor in the number of ships available at Salamis (see Burn 1962: 442–43, Hignett 1963: 210, Asheri et al. 2003: 195–96, and A. Bowie 2007: 136). For the Greek decision to retreat from Artemisium, see note 107. For the possibility that Artemisium had in reality been a Greek defeat, see Cawkwell 2005: 104–105.

¹⁴¹ In the years immediately after the battle, Pindar had pronounced Artemisium "the bright foundation of victory" (fr. 77, tr. Race). Simonides seems to have composed extended poems about it (see Rutherford 2001: 35–37). An epigram, attributed to Simonides and inscribed at a temple to Artemis near the battle site, stated that the Athenians "subdued . . . all manner of men from the land of Asia" (24P, tr. Campbell). More recently, Lysias described the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium in much the same way as Isocrates (2.30–31), which raises the possibility that this version had become a canonical element of the funerary oration.

¹⁴² See also Bridges 2015: 110 n.24.

¹⁴³ For Athenian threats to Medize without sufficient Peloponnesian support, see pp. 85–88.

¹⁴⁴ D. Gillis 1971: 67 and Konstantinopoulos 2013: 67. Buchner 1958: 107 rightly notes that Spartan apathy here presents a marked contrast to their earlier zeal at Marathon and Thermopylae.

¹⁴⁵ Herodotus, of course, credits the Spartans with the prize of valor in the battle (9.71.1–2), but see also Pind. *Pyth.* 1.77–8, Aesch. *Pers.* 816–17, and perhaps the Plataea Elegy (p. 68–72); for more on the shifting reception of the battle, see Jung 2006: 225–97.

¹⁴⁶ Buchner 1958: 104 and Usher 1990: 173.

¹⁴⁷ Eucken 1983: 156.

¹⁴⁸ For the similarities between Isocrates's treatment of these events and the *Epitaphios Logos*, see Buchner 1958: 11–13 and 96–108 and Loraux 1986: 74. Loraux 1986 remains the standard work on the genre, but see now the brief discussion by Steinbock 2013b: 49–58 with more recent bibliography.

¹⁴⁹ Plataea does appear both in Plato's *Menexenus* (241c) and Lysias's *Epitaphios Logos* (2.46–47).

¹⁵⁰ See Baynes 1955: 146, Buchner 1958: 2–10, Ryder 1965: 50, D. Gillis 1971: 56–57, Sakellariou 1981: 132, Eucken 1983: 156–57, Usher 1990: 20–21 and 154, Porciani 1996: 31, Flower 2000b: 94, and L. Mitchell 2007: 83. For the special place of Athens in Isocrates's panhellenic vision generally, see Perlman 1957 and 1969, Romilly 1992: 6, and J. Hall 2002: 207–10.

¹⁵¹ Buchner 1958: 1–15; see also Usher 1990: 19–21 and Porciani 1996.

¹⁵² As Flower 2000b: 94 rightly notes. D. Gillis 1971: 73, however, points to Isocrates's bitter attacks on Sparta as a central flaw of the speech. Pownall 2007: 19 suggests that the *Panegyricus* may have been intended to undercut such patriotic exaggerations, but she provides no supporting arguments, hinting rather that it may be the subject of a future study.

¹⁵³ See Perlman 1976: 25–29 and Green 1996b: 22 for a similar conclusion about Isocrates's broader priorities.

¹⁵⁴ In addition to the *Philippus*, Isocrates provides a treatment of the Persian War

in his *Panathenaicus*, but in this case similarities with the *Panegyricus* are less noteworthy since here too Isocrates hopes to demonstrate that Athenian claims to credit are better founded than those of Sparta (see 12.49–52 and 187–190). For a recent reading of Isocrates’s presentation of Sparta in the *Panathenaicus*, see [Gray 1994](#).

¹⁵⁵ For the date, see [Perlman 1957](#): 306 with earlier bibliography.

¹⁵⁶ *Contra* [K. Clarke 2008](#): 264, who maintains that the Persian-War theme is in fact quite prominent in the speech.

¹⁵⁷ [Laistner 1927](#): 165.

¹⁵⁸ For more on Alexander’s actions during Xerxes’s invasion, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 110–13.

¹⁵⁹ [Perlman 1957](#): 314–15 explains the omission by noting that the benefactions of Alexander I do not fit with Isocrates’s broader attempt to demonstrate Philip’s debt to the Greeks. [Natoli 2004](#): 83–84, however, rightly adds that Alexander’s Medism could not have been an insignificant factor in the decision to omit him from the work.

¹⁶⁰ See [Natoli 2004](#): 23–31 (with earlier bibliography) for a strong case in favor of the authenticity of the letter and for dating it between 343 and 341.

¹⁶¹ For more on this episode, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 111–12.

¹⁶² For more on Speusippus’s version of events, its contrast with Herodotus, and the possible sources for its non-Herodotean elements, see [Natoli 2004](#): 77–84 and 117–21 and [Squillace 2004b](#): 34–36.

¹⁶³ For a recent survey of the evidence for Anaximenes and his relationship with the Macedonian court, see [Natoli 2004](#): 59–61.

¹⁶⁴ For this possibility, see [Natoli 2004](#): 61 and [Squillace 2004b](#): 102 with earlier bibliography.

¹⁶⁵ Speusippus himself seems to refer to this episode obliquely when, to bolster Philip’s claims to Torone, he notes “the recent acquisitions of Alexander in the territory of the Edones” (7, tr. Natoli). That this Alexander is Alexander I, see [Natoli 2004](#): 135. It should be noted, however, that Speusippus makes no mention of the Persians, who play a prominent role in the letter of Philip. For more on these attempts to justify Macedonian control of Amphipolis, see [Markle 1976](#): 94–95 and [Squillace 2011a](#).

¹⁶⁶ It should be noted that earlier in the same speech the present Athenians are shown to fall well short of their ancestors’ legendary hostility against Persia, as Philip shames them for now seeking a Persian alliance against him (12.7; [Squillace 2004b](#): 37 and 101–102).

¹⁶⁷ The first book of Anaximenes’s *Philippica* seems to have dealt with matters anterior to Philip’s ascension to the throne ([Jacoby 1926](#): 107 [on *FGrHist* 72 F4] and [Natoli 2004](#): 60) and may have featured Alexander I as a kind of Lycurgan figure to whom many of the traditional features of the Macedonian army were attributed ([Brunt 1976a](#)), but see [Develin 1985](#) against this interpretation.

¹⁶⁸ We do not know if the City Dionysia was as popular outside of Athens in 472 as it was to be later that century (see [E. Hall 1996](#): 11).

¹⁶⁹ For the prominent role of Athens in the play, see *Pers.* 231–45, 284–89, 347–49, 353–56, 472–75, 716, 823–26, and 974–77 with [Lattimore 1943](#): 91–93, [Broadhead 1960](#): xix–xx, [Podlecki 1970](#): 7, [T. Harrison 2000](#): 61–65, and [Ruffing 2006](#): 8–9.

¹⁷⁰ For a brief discussion of the possible tensions in the play between Athenocentrism and a more panhellenic view, see [E. Hall 1996](#): 11–12, [T. Harrison 2000](#): 64–65, [Taplin 2006](#): 6, and [Marincola 2007](#): 117.

¹⁷¹ [Broadhead 1960](#): 124; *pace* [Podlecki 1970](#): 62 and [Green 1996a](#): 186 who see Themistocles lurking behind the quotation. See also [Garvie 2009](#): 195–96 for more

on the controversy.

¹⁷² For the Plataean speech, see pp. 80–81; for the Corinthian epigram, pp. 62–63.

¹⁷³ For arguments against authenticity, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 42–43 n.54. Since the epigram appears in Diodorus, there is a *prima facie* case that it was in circulation by the time Ephorus was writing ([K. Meister 1971](#): 23 and [Kapparis 1999](#): 377). If, as I suggest in the aforementioned footnote, Diodorus believed that the stirring epigram appeared on the golden tripod itself, we might posit a more exact context for the invention. The tripod was melted down during the Third Sacred War. A touching elegy could have been fabricated for the tragically lost symbol of Greek piety and unity in the aftermath. Ephorus would remain a possibility, but so too might Theopompus, who wrote a work entitled “On the Valuables Stripped from Delphi” (*FGrHist* 115 F247–249), perhaps in the service of Philip’s propaganda campaign against the Phocians ([Jacoby 1962](#): 389), but just as likely produced out of general moral outrage ([Flower 1994](#): 37). For the likely influence of Theopompus on Diodorus’s account of the Third Sacred War, see [Markle 1994](#).

¹⁷⁴ This seems to be how [Kowerski 2005](#): 79 reads the epigram. Similar conclusions have been drawn about Timotheus’s *Persae*, but see [Chapter 7](#), pp. 257–58 n.34.

Contestation

Introduction

The polis dominated the memory of the Persian War, and this despite the fact that a panhellenic league of states had manifestly been responsible for the victory. As we saw in [Chapter 2](#), even when the Greeks recalled the broader scope of the conflict, they either defined unity in terms of states or focused their attention on their home state alone. In the next three chapters, I consider some of the unexplored and underexplored implications of the resulting divisions within the Greek memory of the Persian War. In the present chapter, I examine, through the example of Delphi, the intensity of the debates that contradictory memories of the Persian War could spark in classical Greece. In [Chapters 4](#) and [5](#), I expand on this observation, arguing that the Greeks did not simply dispute specific claims about the war, but also organized those claims into notably different master narratives of the war as a whole. The object of these chapters is not primarily to provide further proof that the state dominated the memory of the Persian War in the classical period (though each lends support to that conclusion). Rather, I hope to show that the dominance of the polis as a cultural paradigm militated against the dominance of any single commemorative or master narrative about the war, which fostered in turn a jumble of distinct and ferociously competitive Persian-War memories that differed from each other more significantly than scholars have generally assumed.¹

Contestation is a popular subject in memory studies of the modern period, but we must tread cautiously when applying their findings to classical Greece. Disputes between different recollections of the past are usually cast in terms of dominant and counter narratives.² The concepts are derived from Foucault's broader observations on power and the archaeology of knowledge. There, dominant and counter narratives form a kind of symbiosis. Dominant narratives enjoy prominence and sanction, but are always opposed by counter

narratives held by peripheral groups within society.³ These counter narratives can overthrow and replace the dominant narrative, but are then opposed by other counter narratives in turn. Behind the application of such terminology to collective memory stands the assumption that there is a single center that can be dominated and that failure to do so naturally places other narratives in a subordinate and oppositional relationship that is recognized as such by individuals within the memorial community. This assumption has presented few problems in studies of modern memory, where the nation-state looms large and easily (but perhaps only apparently) supplies the requisite center and periphery.⁴ Obviously, there was no equivalent to the modern nation-state in classical Greece. The Greeks did believe that they were part of a larger imagined community of Greeks, but that community had no political existence. Outside the polis, there was no center for a narrative to dominate, no periphery for it to retreat to.⁵ There were, of course, panhellenic sites, but they provide poor parallels to the capitols and national memorials of modern nation-states. The governing bodies of these sites lacked the sanction or power to articulate a collective memory for the whole. The monuments that populated these sites were by and large gifted by others. When they competed, they did so as nominal equals since each likely reflected the dominant narrative of their respective states.⁶ Some were more conspicuous or opulent than others, and they could be challenged by narratives that ran counter to them. We can still speak of dominant and counter narratives, but at the panhellenic sites the gulf between them was not as wide nor the relationship as symbiotic as the terms imply in their modern context. It was perhaps because dominance lacked official sanction that parochial narratives competed so fiercely. Only the grandeur or prominence of a monument could possibly win recognition for its commemorative narrative beyond the confines of the polis.

Delphi is an ideal place in which to examine the fierce competition fought by the various poleis over the Persian-War past as well as the commemorative dynamics that underlay it.⁷ Delphi was a prominent shrine. It hosted the Pythian Games and was the seat of the most famous oracle in Greece. Visitors from across the Mediterranean traveled to the sanctuary. Despite its importance, Delphi was not subject to a nearby city-state, as were Olympia, Isthmia, and Nemea. Rather, it was jointly managed by the Delphians and the Delphic Amphictyony, but neither group exerted strict control over what could be dedicated within the sanctuary or where it could be placed. The form and placement of monuments were therefore the product of negotiation, in which the dedicator seems to have held the upper hand.⁸ Consequently, Delphi became a magnet for states as they

mounted competing claims to the glory of the Persian War.⁹ Michael Scott has recently produced a full-scale examination of the commemorative competition that occurred at Delphi, and my analysis here owes much to his work. Like Scott, I use the spatial relationships between dedications as a way to understand how these monumental expressions of collective memory competed with each other over time.¹⁰ But whereas Scott offers a survey of all the competing commemorative narratives at Delphi (and Olympia) to examine the politics of space at these sites, I use his findings as a point of departure for a more detailed analysis of Delphi's Persian-War monuments, the parochial narratives they were intended to advance, and the high stakes of the competition they entered into. My focus falls on two specific groupings of dedications: the first in dialogue with the Serpent Column and its list of allies on the temple terrace, and the second in dialogue with the Marathon statue group erected near the southeast entrance of the sanctuary. Together they demonstrate the intensity with which the Greeks contested the memory of the Persian War in the classical period.

The Temple Terrace

The first discernable axis of memorial competition at Delphi was instigated by questions of inclusion. The invasion of Xerxes had been opposed by a relatively loose alliance of Greek states with an unstable membership.¹¹ Some had joined early, only to Medize later; others defected to the alliance during the war or joined at its end; others still had been members nominally throughout the war, but had failed to contribute at key moments. The question of who had earned the right to claim a share in the defeat of Persia was far from clear as the Persians were driven from mainland Greece and then the Aegean. On the eastern end of the temple terrace the Serpent Column, revised after the removal of Pausanias's epigram, addressed this question directly.¹² The heading proclaimed that "these fought the war" (το[ῖδε τὸν] πόλεμον [ἐ]πολ[έ]μεον) and was followed by a list of thirty-one states (ML 27):

Spartans	<i>Coil</i>	2
Athenians		
Corinthians		
Tegeans		3
Sicyonians		
Aeginetans		
Megarians		4

Epidaurians	
Orchomenians	
Phliasians	5
Troezenians	
Hermionians	
Tirynthians	6
Plataeans	
Thespians	
Mycenaeans	7
Ceans	
Melians	
Tenians	
Naxians	8
Eretrians	
Chalcidians	
Styrians	9
Eleans	
Potidaeans	
Leucadians	10
Anactorians	
Cythnians	
Siphnians	
Ambracians	11
Lepreans	

The heading's claim is straightforward, but disingenuous. The list excludes a number of states that did indeed fight against the Persians during Xerxes's invasion.¹³ The logic at work behind the composition of the list is therefore not immediately obvious. We might naturally assume that it is restricted to those who fought at Plataea and so paid for the monument. But several states that fought at Salamis, but not Plataea, also appear on the column, and it seems that participation in either battle earned a state a place on the list.¹⁴ The decision to restrict the list in this particular way has provoked surprisingly little comment,¹⁵ but it is important to recognize that the revised Serpent Column does not present itself as a monument to two battles within a larger war, but to the war as a whole. By implication, any polis not named must have failed to fight, either because they had refused to do so or, worse yet, had Medized.

A charge of Medism in the years immediately after the war was a very serious matter.¹⁶ Severe penalties were contemplated. Before the war the allies swore to impose a crippling fine on all those states that freely joined the Persians (Hdt. 7.132).¹⁷ After Mycale, the Spartans proposed that their lands be seized and handed over to the Ionians,

who had by now revolted from the Persians (9.106.3).¹⁸ Neither action was carried out, but it would go too far to conclude, with Gillis, that “there was no massive revenge on Medizing states when the danger had passed.”¹⁹ In fact, Medizing states faced a host of dangers as the Persian threat waned. After Salamis, Themistocles attempted to extort money from Andros, Paros, and Carystos—all of them Medizing states.²⁰ Andros pleaded poverty and was left alone only when a direct attack failed (8.111–12 and 8.121.1); the Parians and Carystians paid (8.112), but as we shall see in the following, even that did not save the Carystians from invasion. After Plataea the Thebans were besieged and saved only by surrendering their political leaders (9.86–87), who were then summarily executed (9.88). Leotychidas soon led a campaign against the Thessalians and, like Themistocles, would have extorted money from them had he not been caught in the act and recalled to Sparta (6.72).²¹ Both the Thebans and Thessalians were also fined by the Elean authorities at Olympia for violating the sacred truce of 480.²² The Spartans may have also used Medism as an excuse to attack Caryae, a small town on the Arcadian border that had apparently failed Spartan expectations (Vitr. 1.1.5).²³ In addition to outright military action, charges of Medism also invited subtler forms of political interference. The poet Timocreon, himself accused of Medism, speaks directly to this possibility when he recalls Themistocles, meddling in the internal affairs of states across the Aegean, “restoring some wrongfully, killing or exiling others”—all for a tidy profit (727.4–9P, tr. West).²⁴ It is hard to imagine that Themistocles would have been in a position to take such action had these communities not been compromised as a result of their earlier Medism. By the time the list of allies was added to the Serpent Column in 477, the potential repercussions of being branded a Medizer must have been clear to all.²⁵

As I argued in [Chapter 1](#), the final decision about the inclusion or exclusion of poleis from the Delphic list rested with the Spartans. This is not to say that they would not have consulted with their allies or taken their views into consideration when they crafted it. But the result was far from a simple, generally accepted expression of those states that had fought the war, as is often assumed.²⁶ There are some signs of contestation in the list itself,²⁷ but our clearest indications come rather from the counter narratives of other monuments. No fewer than eight were dedicated on or near the temple terrace by parties that had either collaborated with Xerxes or had refused aid to the Greeks: Gelon and Hieron, the Deinomenid tyrants of Syracuse; Alexander I of Macedonia; the poleis of Peparethos, Carystos, Chios, and Samos; and finally, the Delphic Amphictyony.²⁸ There is no good evidence that any of these monuments was erected in specific reaction

to the list of allies, itself a later addition to the Serpent Column.²⁹ For our present purposes, however, it does not greatly matter whether we imagine that the list elicited reactions or rejected the commemorative narratives of monuments already under construction. Either way, a review of these eight counter narratives and the larger strategies they were intended to advance sheds light on this very public and expensive fight over who could rightly stake claim to the glories of the Persian War.

Perhaps the most conspicuous challenge to the Serpent Column was mounted by two tyrants who never claimed that they fought against the Persians at all: Gelon, the Deinomenid ruler of Syracuse, and Hieron, his brother and successor. Both erected monuments just a few meters from the Serpent Column. Each consisted of a golden tripod, supported underneath by a statue of Nike and held aloft by a bronze column no less imposing than that which bore the Plataea tripod.³⁰ Gelon intended to celebrate his victory over the Carthaginians at Himera in 480; Hieron, his defeat of the Etruscans at Cyme in 474.³¹ Much has been made of the possibility that Gelon's monument may have predated the Serpent Column since Himera was fought a year before Plataea.³² But it is extremely unlikely that Gelon would have started work on his monument before the Greek victory at Plataea rendered Delphi safe from Persian attack.³³ If he did wait, then both monuments would have been under construction at the same time. But we might press our evidence a bit further. The implication from Herodotus is that the plans for the Serpent Column were made publicly and within days of the battle (9.81), and so Gelon is likely to have heard of that victory and the manner in which it was to be commemorated at almost the same time. He may have planned his monument long in advance, but if so, he finalized and executed that prior plan in full awareness of the form and location of the Plataea monument.³⁴

At the most basic level, the Deinomenid monuments assert that Himera and Cyme had been equally as grand and magnificent as Plataea had been. But the similarity of form and close proximity suggest something more:³⁵ that the victories in Sicily had complemented those won in the east against the Persians.³⁶ It would go too far to imagine that anyone thought Syracuse deserved a place on the Serpent Column, but the Deinomenid monuments certainly suggested that there was more to the story than the list of allies implied. Pindar speaks to the same purpose a few years later, when in 470 he explicitly compared the victories at Himera and Cyme with those of Salamis and Plataea:³⁷

I beseech you, son of Cronus, grant that the war cry of the Phoenicians and Etruscans may remain quietly at home, now that they have seen their aggression

bring woe to their fleet before Cyme, such things did they suffer when overcome by the leader of the Syracusans, who cast their youth from their swiftly sailing ships into the sea and delivered Greece from grievous slavery. I shall earn from Salamis the Athenians' gratitude as my reward, and at Sparta I shall tell of the battle before Cithaeron, in which conflicts the curve-bowed Persians suffered defeat; but by the well-watered banks of the Himeras I shall pay to Deinomenes' sons the tribute of my hymn, which they won through valor, when their enemies were defeated. (*Pyth.* 1.71–80, tr. Race modified)

Obviously, Pindar hopes to elevate the importance of the western victories by juxtaposing them to Salamis and Plataea. To this extent, it matters only that the battles in mainland Greece had been magnificent.³⁸ But the choice of two victories over the Persians is no accident. Such company not only emphasizes that the west too had endured and defeated a foreign invasion,³⁹ but also implicitly inserts Himera and Cyme into the Persian War.⁴⁰ We might say the same of Pindar's claim that the victory at Cyme had "delivered Greece from grievous slavery" (Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας). The phrase elevates Cyme generally, but by using language evocative of the victory over Persia, he insinuates that this battle too had contributed to the same common cause.⁴¹

The Deinomenids had good reason to draw conspicuous attention to their claims that Himera and Cyme had played a part in the great events of the Persian War. Herodotus's later version is quite hostile and may very well date back to the time of the war (7.157–163).⁴² There, he rejects the Carthaginian invasion as an explanation for Sicilian neutrality and assumes throughout that Gelon was absolutely free to aid the Greeks if he had wanted to do so, but did not because his demands for hegemony were not met. The Sicilian tyrant then sent money to Delphi so that it could be offered to Xerxes upon his victory. Gelon's neutrality was, according to Herodotus, merely a pretense for Medism.⁴³ Such talk represented a serious attack on the reputation of Gelon and his brother Hieron, neither of whom was insensitive to such things. The monuments at Delphi and Pindar's poem were just part of a much larger propaganda campaign that, if not specifically designed to counter such accusations, nonetheless presented a very different picture of the role the Deinomenids played during those events.⁴⁴ At Olympia, Gelon underscored the importance of Himera by constructing a treasury, which by Pausanias's time still contained three linen breastplates and a golden statue of Zeus dedicated from the battle (Paus. 6.19.7).⁴⁵ The statue is particularly suggestive since the Plataea monument at Olympia was also a statue of Zeus.⁴⁶ At home, Persians and the Persian War were staged for the public. Hieron induced Aeschylus to restage the *Persae* at Syracuse.⁴⁷ At roughly the same time, the Sicilian comic poet, Epicharmus, staged a comedy of the same name.⁴⁸ All told, the Deinomenids invested a great deal of

money broadcasting their own particular connection to and interpretation of the Persian War.

Despite so many conspicuous commemorations, the counter narrative of the Deinomenid tyrants enjoyed mixed success. In Sicily it seems to have been readily accepted. In the version Herodotus attributes to the Sicilians, Gelon is sympathetic to the Greek cause and would have even submitted to Spartan leadership had not the Carthaginians invaded. Moreover, Himera and Salamis are said to have been fought on the same day, which serves to reinforce the very connections that Pindar and the Delphi tripods were attempting to advance (7.165–66).⁴⁹ In mainland Greece, however, Deinomenid claims ran into contrary assertions about the war and their role in it. Herodotus obviously took Deinomenid claims with a grain of salt.⁵⁰ Nor was he alone. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle cites Salamis and Himera as an example of events that occurred at the same time, but did not advance the same goal (οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ συντείνουσαι τέλος: 1459a). Nevertheless, the Sicilian version, broadcast over so many different media, eventually bore fruit. Ephorus, a native of Ionian Cyme, elevated the defense of Sicily to a starring role in his presentation of the Persian War (*FGrHist* 70 F186).⁵¹ There, the Carthaginian invasion is no serendipitous explanation for Syracusan neutrality, as Herodotus's Sicilians maintained, but the result of a concerted effort on the part of the Persians and Carthaginians to conquer the entire Greek world. For Ephorus, Himera was not merely a complement to the Persian War, but was a critical part of it that had “liberated . . . all of Greece” (ἐλευθερώσαι . . . σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα).⁵²

An even bolder counter narrative to the Serpent Column was offered by the Macedonian king Alexander I. Unlike the Deinomenids, who merely remained neutral, Alexander was a patent Medizer. Herodotus reports that his father gave earth and water to Darius (Hdt. 5.18), and that Alexander himself gave his sister in marriage to a Persian general (5.21), served on campaign with Xerxes (8.34) and Mardonius (9.44), and also acted as special envoy to Athens on Mardonius's behalf (8.136).⁵³ Nevertheless, Alexander erected a golden statue of himself between the Serpent Column and the Salamis Apollo, to commemorate his actions against the Persians.⁵⁴ This was no subtle expression of memory, and its magnificence was sufficient for Herodotus to use it as a point of reference a generation later (8.121).⁵⁵ No remains of the statue base have been found, but the corpus of Demosthenes preserves a notice of the event it was intended to commemorate. In the spurious letter of Philip, which was likely excerpted from Anaximenes's *Philippica*, the king bolsters his claims to Amphipolis by noting that the Macedonians had taken the place long before, when Alexander

captured a group of Persians there.⁵⁶ He then cites the golden statue as proof of the engagement, which he claims was erected from the first fruits of the prisoners (12.21).⁵⁷ Doubts about the historicity of this attack have been raised,⁵⁸ but for our purposes it only matters that Alexander erected the statue on that pretext.⁵⁹

If Alexander hoped to write himself onto the winning side of the Persian-War tradition, his efforts proved remarkably successful. Herodotus's portrayal of Alexander is quite generous.⁶⁰ Alexander does submit to Persian authority, but not before he secretly murders a group of insulting Persian ambassadors (5.18–21). The story is a self-serving fabrication, perhaps invented by Alexander himself, but Herodotus accepts it nonetheless.⁶¹ So too does he accept that Alexander's status as a Greek was officially confirmed at the Olympic Games (5.22).⁶² When Alexander later alerts the Greeks at Tempe that Xerxes's numerical superiority was irresistible (a natural enough sentiment from a Medizer), Herodotus adds that the Greeks concluded that his advice was "useful" (χρηστά) and that he had thereby "proven himself well disposed to them" (σφι εὖνοος ἐφαίνετο ἔων: 7.173.3). He goes on to state that the Greeks actually abandoned Tempe for other reasons (7.173.4), but this does not detract from the positive impression he leaves of the Macedonian and his intentions.⁶³ Later, Alexander is shown covertly informing the Athenians of Mardonius's battle plans on the eve of Plataea (9.44–45). The event might be fabricated.⁶⁴ Even if true, Alexander would have likely had ulterior motives.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Herodotus accepts the story without reservation and provides no explanation for this daring midnight ride other than that given by Alexander himself: "for I myself am a Greek of ancient lineage and would not wish to see Greece exchange its freedom for slavery" (9.45.2, tr. Purvis modified). Alexander is no hero, and his service to Persia is duly noted, but his characterization is far better than his voluntary Medism warrants.

Herodotus was not alone in his generous estimation of Alexander's Persian-War record. If anything, later generations were kinder still. Demosthenes describes a Macedonian attack on the Persians after Plataea as an action that made Xerxes's defeat "complete" (τέλειον) and so implicitly rates it among the great battles of the Persian War (23.200).⁶⁶ This is not presented as a dubious or debatable assertion, but as a simple statement of fact that Demosthenes presumes his Athenian audience will accept without difficulty.⁶⁷ As we might suspect, the speech in question (*Against Aristocrates*) was one of Demosthenes's earlier works, but even after tensions between Athens and Macedonia flared, even in the midst of war, Demosthenes makes surprisingly little of Alexander's Medism. In fact, he mentions it only once, in the *Second Philippic*.⁶⁸ Demosthenes hoped to show that Philip

was currently favoring the Thebans and Argives because history suggested that they would betray Greece (whereas Athens would not). He then cites Athens's refusal to accept a Persian proposal of peace after Salamis as proof:

For I suppose he learns from history and from report that your ancestors, when they might, at the price of submission to the Great King, have become the paramount power in Greece, not only refused to entertain that proposal, conveyed to them by Alexander, an ancestor of Philip's line, but chose to quit their homes and endure every hardship, and thereafter wrought those deeds which all men are always eager to relate, though no one has been able to tell them worthily. (6.11, tr. Vince)

He then proceeds to contrast Athenian bravery with the treachery and duplicity of Thebes and Argos, not Alexander. This is not to say that Alexander's Medism is not clearly implied or connected to Philip, but it is manifestly not the focus of Demosthenes's invective.⁶⁹ If we consider again Demosthenes's pro-Macedonian contemporaries, whom we examined in [Chapter 2](#), the presentation of Alexander becomes even more positive, as the Macedonian king is transformed into an unqualified hero of the war against Persia.⁷⁰ Ultimately, Alexander's improbable counter narrative saved him and his successors from any serious repercussions of his undoubted Medism.

There are indications that the Peparethians and Carystians may have had a similar counter narrative in mind when they too dedicated monuments on the eastern end of the temple terrace. The Peparethians erected a statue of Apollo. The base has been found, and its inscription declares that "the Peparethians [ca]ptured [t]wo [C]arian ships [in war] and erected this as a ti[t]he to far-shooting Apollo" (*FD* III 4.179). The lettering points to the early fifth century, and the content strongly suggests some connection to the Persian War.⁷¹ The Carystians dedicated the image of a cow and calf in bronze.⁷² Here too the base has been found, but the surviving inscription states merely, "[The Caryst]ians to A[poll]o."⁷³ By Pausanias's day, the calf was apparently no longer present on the monument, and he mentions only an ox, erected "because, having repulsed the barbarian, they had won a secure prosperity, and especially a land free to plough" (10.16.6, tr. Jones).⁷⁴ Both states Medized during the war. The Carystians did so in the wake of Thermopylae (*Hdt.* 8.66.2), after making no apparent effort to aid the Greeks fighting there or at Artemisium. We hear nothing about Peparethos during the Persian War, but the island is located north of Euboea, and it stands to reason that its population Medized as the Persian fleet approached Artemisium. Nevertheless, both states here claim credit for victories that, like Alexander's, are hard to place in the historical record. They may have been minor actions that took

place as the Persian invasion faltered, but we cannot exclude the possibility that they were outright fabrications.⁷⁵ In either case, these monuments were almost certainly erected in an attempt to avoid retribution from the victorious Greeks.⁷⁶ We do not know how successful the Peparethians were since they are seldom mentioned in our sources.⁷⁷ In the case of Carystos, however, we know that their efforts came to nothing. By the time the monument was likely erected, they had already been threatened and extorted by Themistocles (Hdt. 8.112), and within a few years the Athenians launched a full-scale attack that forced them into the Delian League.⁷⁸

In contrast to the belated or perhaps fabricated exploits of Alexander, the Peparethians, and Carystians, few Medizing states could mount a better claim to be included on the Serpent Column's list than the powerful island states of Samos and Chios, each of whom erected their own monuments nearby. By the time the list was added to the Serpent Column, both were members of the Hellenic League (Hdt. 9.106.4) and could claim to have played a decisive role in the battle of Mycale.⁷⁹ A group of Chian conspirators traveled to Sparta in an attempt to gain support for a new revolt in Ionia and later sought King Leotychidas's help at Aegina (8.132). The Samians played an even more direct role in instigating the Greek attack on the Persians at Mycale (9.90–91) and also distinguished themselves in the battle (9.103). Both officially joined the Hellenic League soon thereafter and likely served under Pausanias in the league campaigns against Cyprus and Byzantium in 478.⁸⁰ The decision to exclude them (and the other states that had since joined)⁸¹ from the Serpent-Column list is striking and was perhaps motivated by the role these new allies played in the rejection of Spartan hegemony at sea, a slight that was less than a year old when the list was likely added.⁸² If the Samian and Chian monuments identified on the temple terrace were intended to assert parochial claims to the Persian War in the wake of Mycale (as many have surmised), they would have constituted a powerful answer to the Serpent Column's list.⁸³ The Chians erected a massive altar in front of the temple of Apollo and so between the two league monuments and the principal temple at the site. The remains that can be seen today belong to a hellenistic restoration,⁸⁴ but the magnificence of the original should not be underestimated and was in its day sufficient to earn the Chians the privilege of *promanteia*, or the right to consult the oracle ahead of others (FD III 3.213).⁸⁵ The Samians were more measured, erecting a bronze statue of Apollo near the Deinomenid tripods. A direct connection to the Salamis Apollo may have been intended, but this is a difficult point to press given the popularity of this statue type at Delphi.⁸⁶

Despite their timely defection from Persia and subsequent

commemorations, the Chians and Samians ultimately failed to counter the prevailing sense that they had been on the wrong side when it mattered. The speech of the Athenian Euphemus in Book 6 of Thucydides proves illustrative.⁸⁷ In the course of exculpating Athens of any wrongdoing against its former allies, he claims that the Ionians had submitted to Persia because they lacked courage and preferred slavery (6.82.4). In so doing, he echoes a common bias.⁸⁸ But Euphemus goes further still. The Ionians were not merely worthy of subjugation because of their earlier failures; they had been eager in their Medism and actively sought to bring the Athenians under Persian rule (6.83.1). Herodotus seems to anticipate this very criticism when he notes that at Salamis “few of the Ionians, however, deliberately fought like cowards, as Themistocles had told them to do; in fact, the majority did not” (8.85.1, tr. Purvis).⁸⁹ Both Herodotus and Thucydides are writing decades later, and it is hard to imagine that the Athenians were eager to recall Medism in the early years of the Delian League, when the Samian and Chian monuments were likely under construction.⁹⁰ Indeed, the league itself was largely composed of Xerxes’s former subjects. But over the coming decades several of these allies (including Samos and eventually Chios) revolted, which would have likely given the Athenians and perhaps others ample reason to view the Ionians’ earlier collusion with Persia in an increasingly negative light.

Finally, I turn to a monument erected, not by a Medizing state, but by the international council that oversaw the site of Delphi itself, the Delphic Amphictyony.⁹¹ As a single entity, the Amphictyony never Medized, but a vast majority of its members did, and they quickly found themselves under threat.⁹² The Thessalians, who dominated the Amphictyony at this time, were attacked by a Spartan army under Leotychidas soon after the Greek victory at Plataea, and it stands to reason that other Medizers in the region were similarly harassed.⁹³ It is notable, however, that their monument on the temple terrace makes no specific claim to the Persian-War tradition. Unlike Alexander, the Carystians, or the Peparethians, the Amphictyony’s members did not inflate or invent exploits they did not have. Rather, they celebrated the accomplishments of others. Pausanias tells us that the monument portrayed the famous diver Scyllis of Scione and his daughter Hydna, who allegedly cut away the anchors of the Persian triremes during the storm off Mt. Pelion and thus aggravated the damage (10.19.1–2).⁹⁴ Although the incident occurred near a sanctuary under the supervision of the Amphictyony, neither the honorees nor their home city were affiliated with that body. As a result, this monument does not, strictly speaking, run counter to the commemorative narrative of the Serpent Column. Neither the Amphictyony nor its members are expressly

claiming that they did support the Greek cause during the war. At most, this monument asserts Amphictyonic loyalty in the present and so confronts the Serpent Column only indirectly.⁹⁵ A similar strategy might have been employed at Thermopylae, where the Amphictyones again erected monuments for the heroic deeds of others (Hdt. 7.228).⁹⁶ We might take this argument one step further and see the sheer volume of Persian-War monuments at Delphi as an extension of the same policy of innocence by association. How effective this strategy was is hard to say. Despite several ominous oracles in the early stages of the war, Delphi itself avoided any suspicion of Medism.⁹⁷ The members of the Amphictyony were less fortunate. The Spartan campaign against Thessaly was soon suspended, but that was due to the fall of Leotychidas and not any newfound sympathy for the Thessalians, who remained politically isolated for the next twenty years, until the split between Sparta and Athens offered new opportunities (Thuc. 1.102.4).

The Serpent Column and its conspicuous list of allies threw into sharp relief the commemorative contestations emerging on the temple terrace. Several communities and individuals spent vast amounts of capital to secure for themselves a place among those to be remembered as equal participants in the great struggle against the Persians. These parochial narratives were not invariably accepted. Parties that had Medized, remained neutral, and even those who did not join the Greek cause with sufficient alacrity faced serious consequences that they were eager to avoid. Many of their fellow Greeks were unwilling to let bygones be bygones. The eight parties who challenged (or were challenged by) the commemorative narrative implicit in the list of allies came to various ends. Alexander enjoyed a stunning success. Perhaps the Peparethians did as well. The Carystians, however, failed outright. The Thessalians and most of the other Amphictyones fared little better. The Deinomenids too suffered some damage to their international reputation, but were eventually rehabilitated as heroes of the war. The Samians and Chians, on the other hand, enjoyed initial success, but ultimately failed to escape the negative repercussions of their earlier collaboration with Persia. The ferocity of the competition, the expense borne to continue it, and the potentially severe consequences of failure serve as a salutary reminder that these monuments were not *lieux de mémoire* in the strict sense of the phrase.⁹⁸ They were not “exercises in nostalgia, sad and lifeless.”⁹⁹ Rather, they were intimately connected to larger networks of commemoration and power.¹⁰⁰ They expressed and shaped the political realities of those who dedicated them.

Despite the intensity of the competition that surrounded the Serpent Column, it did not represent a commemorative center around which

counter narratives took up peripheral positions. The Serpent Column enjoyed immense prominence and authority, as both Herodotus and Thucydides attest,¹⁰¹ but not dominance as it is often defined in studies of modern memory. The eight counter narratives we examined in the preceding did oppose the commemorative narrative of the Serpent Column, but did not inevitably do so from a position of inferiority. Each monument likely represented a dominant narrative within the locality that dedicated it. Even within the confines of Delphi, it would be difficult to conclude that the Serpent Column held dominance. The magnificent league dedication did tower over the Samian Apollo and the Carystian cow and calf, but the Deinomenid monuments and the Chian altar were every bit as grand and prominently placed as the Serpent Column itself. Neither the Delphians nor the Delphic Amphictyony constituted a centralized bureaucracy that sanctioned appropriate versions of the past, banishing others to the shadows. Delphi acted rather as a kind of free market of memory, or, in the words of Pindar, an “all-welcoming temple” (*Pyth.* 8.61–62, tr. Race). There, commemorative narratives competed openly for recognition, some more successfully than others. If the Serpent Column could be said to have held dominance, it lacked the sanction, stability, and broad impact of dominant narratives in modern nation-states.

The Entrance to the Sanctuary

The Persian War was a powerful and thereby potentially volatile memory. But if it was a danger to some, to others it proved to be a prize of unimaginable value. The fight against the Persian threat was one of the most consequential in living memory. A relatively large alliance of Greek states faced long odds to defeat a foreign superpower. Leadership in this great event served to justify present hegemony.¹⁰² No one understood this as well as the Athenians. At Delphi alone, they erected at least four sumptuous monuments to their exploits against the Persians over the course of the classical period.¹⁰³ Of these, none evoked so thoroughgoing a response as a statue group commemorating Marathon that was constructed in the mid-fifth century near the southeast entrance of the sacred precinct. The fact has been noted, but the evidence repays further investigation.¹⁰⁴ The Marathon monument instigated an intense debate about the implications of the war for the political disposition of Greece, namely who had earned the right to lead it. To trace this axis of contestation over time, we must move beyond the Persian War. Three subsequent monuments erected in the immediate area by the Argives, Spartans,

and Arcadians engaged the Marathon statue group directly, but none commemorated the Persian War itself. Rather, each was occasioned by the internecine wars that consumed the Greek mainland over the classical period. The Argives commemorated a victory over Sparta, won with the aid of their Athenian allies, soon after work on the Marathon monument had begun. Half a century later, the Spartans commemorated their crushing victory over the Athenians at Aegospotami. A few decades after that, the newly formed Arcadian League commemorated its own victory over a weakened Sparta. With each claim, the memory of the Persian War evoked by the Marathon monument was reoriented, to suit the needs of the dedicating parties. Some of these monuments were among the most lavish at Delphi, but here too dominance remained elusive.

Let us begin by situating the Athenian monument in its proper context and examining its relationship to a nearby Argive monument built at roughly the same time. The Marathon statue group is described in some detail by Pausanias.

On the base below the wooden horse is an inscription which says that the statues were dedicated from the tithe of the spoils taken in the engagement at Marathon. They represent Athena, Apollo, and Miltiades, one of the generals. Of the so-called eponymous heroes, there are Erechtheus, Cecrops, and Pandion; there is also Leos, Antiochus, son of Heracles by Meda, daughter of Phylas, as well as Aegeus and Acamas, one of the sons of Theseus. These heroes gave names to the Athenian tribes in accordance with an oracle from Delphi. But Codrus, the son of Melanthus, Theseus, and Philaeus are also represented, and they are not among the eponymous heroes. The statues enumerated were made by Pheidias, and really are a tithe from the spoils of the battle. But the statues of Antigonos, of his son Demetrius, and of Ptolemy the Egyptian were sent to Delphi by the Athenians afterward. The statue of the Egyptian they sent out of goodwill; those of the Macedonians were sent because of the dread that they inspired. (10.10.1–2, tr. Jones modified)¹⁰⁵

Pausanias places the monument near the southeast entrance to the sanctuary on the south side of the Sacred Way. Because the southeast corner of the sanctuary is not well preserved, no firmly attested archaeological remains have been found. But its relative position is clear enough. As a visitor entered the sanctuary, she would see the Marathon dedication on her left about 30 meters from the entrance.¹⁰⁶ The date is less clear. Pausanias, citing the inscription, connects the monument to Marathon, but such an early date is unlikely. Miltiades, whose image was prominently featured in the group, died in disgrace soon after the battle (Hdt. 6.135–36). His reputation was not rehabilitated until his son, Cimon, rose to prominence in the decades after Xerxes's invasion. A date of construction between 470 and 462/1 seems the most probable.¹⁰⁷

The Marathon statue group is immediately striking because it was the second Marathon monument erected by the Athenians at

Delphi.¹⁰⁸ The first, the Athenian treasury and its accompanying statue group, had been dedicated soon after the battle and likely was funded by the spoils of the battle itself.¹⁰⁹ When work began on the second statue group, the remaining spoils from Marathon would have hardly been sufficient to complete such an elaborate project; rather, the principal funding must have come from other sources.¹¹⁰ Why then did the Athenians choose to erect another monument to Marathon, almost in sight of an older one, some thirty years after the fact? The question should not be handled in isolation. The new statue group was only one of several Marathon monuments erected in the middle decades of the fifth century.¹¹¹ The Athenians constructed the Stoa Poikile in the agora and decorated it with a painting of the famed battle along with three others.¹¹² On the battle site, they replaced the original battlefield trophy with a marble column.¹¹³ On the Acropolis, the Athena Promachos and the Parthenon were perhaps intended to celebrate (at least in part) the victory at Marathon.¹¹⁴ Later, scenes from the battle were carved on the temple of Athena Nike.¹¹⁵

The newfound popularity of Marathon at Athens is most often explained with reference to Cimon, who wished to augment his own standing by emphasizing the role his father had played at Marathon.¹¹⁶ The Delphi statue group lends support to this conclusion.¹¹⁷ Miltiades is the only near contemporary figure included. He stands alongside Athena, the poliad deity of Athens, and Apollo, the patron of Delphi. With them appeared the eponymous heroes of the Cleisthenic tribes and three additional figures from Athenian mythology (Codrus, Theseus, and Philaeus),¹¹⁸ two of whom had a particular connection to Cimon and his father.¹¹⁹ But there was more to the Delphi statue group than Cimon's personal political ambitions. It also stood as a powerful justification for Athenian imperialism internationally. From this perspective, Athena and Apollo stood shoulder to shoulder with fourteen Athenian national heroes against the might of the Persian Empire. The message was clear—Athens fought alone and consequently deserved its newfound place in the Greek world.¹²⁰ Its placement within the sanctuary underscored the message. At the time, only a bronze bull dedicated by the Corcyreans appeared along this stretch of the Sacred Way.¹²¹ The Marathon statue group stood largely alone and far from any other Persian-War monuments.¹²² Upon entering the sanctuary, a mid-fifth-century visitor would be met by Athena and Apollo himself joining a chorus of Athenian notables asserting Athens's singular claim on the glories of the Persian War.¹²³

When the Marathon statue group was first begun under Cimon's influence, the glorification of Miltiades and Athenian imperialism must have presented no obvious contradiction.¹²⁴ Cimon was, of

course, a noted supporter of dual hegemony with Sparta (Plut. *Cim.* 16.7–8),¹²⁵ but he had also led the fight to expand Athenian influence across the Aegean, often at the expense of his fellow Greeks. Marathon and the other Persian-War victories doubtless featured as justifications for the foreign policy Cimon helped execute.¹²⁶ In 462/1, however, Cimon was ostracized, and his political opponents, the radical democrats, rose to power. Nonetheless, Marathon continued to feature prominently on Athenian monuments and in popular culture.¹²⁷ This was not simply a matter of commemorative inertia. Cimon's political opponents wanted to retell the story of the Persian War as an exclusively Athenian exploit, and for this no battle suited better than Marathon. Indeed, the great battles of Xerxes's invasion and the later campaigns of the Delian League had been fought and won by large alliances of states, all of whom could claim a share of the victory.¹²⁸ In contrast, Marathon had been won largely by the Athenians alone. Regardless of Cimon's original intent, this new perspective on Marathon inevitably colored how subsequent audiences saw the earlier Marathon monuments, the Delphi statue group among them. There is no evidence that the monument was physically altered at this time, and Miltiades remained a prominent part of the composition, but it does not strain credibility to conclude that its emphasis on Athenian imperialism would have resonated more with viewers (Athenian and foreign alike) in the decades after its construction.

It is very much in this light that we should examine the nearby Argive statue group. Here again, Pausanias provides a detailed description:

Near the statue of the horse are also the other votive offerings of the Argives, likenesses of the captains of those who with Polyneices made war on Thebes: Adrastus, the son of Talaus, Tydeus, son of Oeneus, the descendants of Proetus, namely, Capaneus, son of Hipponous, and Eteoclus, son of Iphis, Polyneices, and Hippomedon, son of Adrastus' sister. Nearby is represented the chariot of Amphiarus, and in it stands Baton, a relative of Amphiarus who served as his charioteer. The last of them is Alitherses. These are the works of Hypatodorus and Aristogeiton, who made them, as the Argives themselves say, from the spoils of the victory which they and their Athenian allies won over the Spartans at Oenoe in Argive territory. From the spoils of the same action, it seems to me, the Argives set up the statues of those whom the Greeks call the Epigoni. For there stand statues of these also, Sthenelus and Alcmaeon, who in my opinion was honored before Amphilocheus on account of his age. In addition there is Promachus, Thersander, Aegialeus, and Diomedes. Between Diomedes and Aegialeus is Euryalus. (10.10.3–4, tr. Jones modified)

The form and orientation of this monument has been an issue of debate, but recent work has shown that the statues of the Seven against Thebes and the Epigoni both stood on a massive semi-circular base located on the south side of the Sacred Way and just to the west

of the Marathon statue group. At the center of the semi-circle stood the chariot of Amphiaraus.¹²⁹ The relationship between this monument and the Marathon statue group has been clouded by the association of the former with the battle of Oenoe. A full consideration of the vexatious battle would take us too far afield,¹³⁰ but for our present purposes only a few details need detain us. The first is the date. Pliny the Elder (*NH* 34.50) mentions a sculptor named Hypatodorus and dates him to the 102nd Olympiad (372–369 bce). This date was accepted for the Argive monument until an inscription naming both Hypatodorus and Aristogeiton was found at Delphi and dated to the mid-fifth century (*Syll*³ 60).¹³¹ Pliny's date still has supporters, but the majority of scholars have followed the natural implication of the Delphi inscription, concluding either that Pliny was mistaken or that there were two artists named Hypatodorus and that ours was the earlier.¹³² The second detail is the identity of the combatants. Pausanias connects the monument to a battle fought by the Athenians and Argives against the Spartans. That no other source mentions such a battle is the crux of the Oenoe problem, but there is otherwise no good reason to doubt that these parties fought a battle at this time. Indeed, we know that Athens and Argos were joined in an alliance against Sparta from 462/1 to 451, and most conclude that the Argive monument celebrated some such battle, even if its exact date, location, and significance remain uncertain.¹³³

These two points give us good reason to suspect that the Argive monument was constructed with the Marathon statue group in mind. Cimon must have started work on the Marathon monument before his own exile and so before the battle commemorated by the Argive group could have taken place. This makes the placement of the Argive monument immediately beside the Marathon group highly suggestive.¹³⁴ Moreover, the Argive monument appears to have commemorated a battle in which the Athenians also fought. The motives behind the Argive decision to associate their victory closely with Marathon are not hard to surmise. The new alliance between Athens and Argos offered not only geopolitical, but also commemorative benefits for the Argives. Although they had formally remained neutral throughout Xerxes's invasion, Herodotus repeats rumors that they had covertly aided the Persians out of spite for the Spartans (7.150–52 and 9.12).¹³⁵ Whether the Argives had actually colluded with the Persians is ultimately beside the point. Such rumors could be used to link their ongoing hostility to Sparta with their earlier betrayal of the Greek cause. Indeed, Herodotus had heard that the Argives were still sending embassies to the Persians a generation after the war to confirm that their earlier alliance was still in force (7.151). The Athenians, on the other hand, had an unimpeachable

Persian-War record, a record that the Marathon statue group was in part intended to underscore. By connecting their victory over the Spartans with the Marathon monument, the Argives might have hoped to separate hostility with Sparta from their alleged collusion with Persia.¹³⁶

The Athenians too may have seen advantages in a connection between the Marathon statue group and the Argive dedication. Hostility to Sparta was the hallmark of the aggressive new foreign policy championed by the radical democrats. By associating the Marathon statue group with a monument celebrating a recent victory over Sparta, the Athenians could reorient their own monument by underscoring the themes of Athenian imperialism and exceptionalism, while at the same time undercutting its Cimonian resonance.¹³⁷ This is all speculation, of course, but the possibility that a connection between Marathon and the fight against Sparta was the product of an intentional propaganda campaign gains some support from the Stoa Poikile. The Argive monument and the Stoa Poikile are often paired since both are associated with the battle of Oenoe. Pausanias states that the Stoa included paintings of this battle along with the more famous scenes of the Amazonomachy, the trial of the lesser Ajax, and the battle of Marathon. Of the Oenoe painting, he says,

First, this stoa contains the Athenians arrayed in formation against the Spartans at Oenoe in Argive territory. The action in the painting has not yet advanced to the height of the struggle nor to the display of valor. Rather the battle is beginning, and the combatants are still coming to blows. (1.15.1)

Here again, the details of the battle are less important than the overall tenor of the monument. Whatever battle was commemorated in the Stoa, the painting almost certainly depicted a historical fight between the Spartans and Athenians.¹³⁸ The date at which the painting was installed in the Stoa remains uncertain, but it stands to reason that it happened soon after the Stoa itself was completed in the 460s or 450s.¹³⁹ If we can accept these two basic propositions, then something of a concerted propaganda campaign begins to come into view.¹⁴⁰ At both Delphi and Athens, magnificent new monuments were implicitly associating present hostility to Sparta with the glories of the Athenian victory at Marathon.

It may at first glance seem unlikely that the Athenians would draw such a parallel. During the Peloponnesian War, Gorgias of Leontini famously proclaimed that only victories over barbarians were worthy of praise; those over Greeks demanded instead lamentations (DK 82 F5b).¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, hints of a rather closer and more harmonious connection can be found in some of our surviving literary sources. The funerary oration that stands at the heart of Plato's *Menexenus* presents

the first encounter with the Spartans in much the same spirit as Marathon:

These were the first of our men who, after the Persian War and now helping Greeks against Greeks in the cause of freedom, proved themselves men of valor and delivered those whom they were aiding. (242b, tr. Bury)

Plato's funerary oration is, of course, a parody, and we must use caution when extrapolating broader implications from it, but in all likelihood he is here mocking well-known elements of the typical funerary oration.¹⁴² In Thucydides, we find Pericles lavishing praise on this very generation in his funerary oration because they "added to what they themselves had received and by their pains left to us, the present generation, the further legacy of the great empire which we now possess" (2.36.2, tr. Hammond). When he then announces his intention to skip the customary recitation of their feats, he states that

I shall not mention our achievements in war, the campaigns which won us each addition to the empire, our own or our fathers' spirited resistance to the attacks of Greek or barbarian enemies—I have no wish to delay you with a long story which you know already. (2.36.4, tr. Hammond)

Here again, no particular distinction is drawn between the Persian War and the subsequent wars against the Greeks.¹⁴³ Even in the fourth century, Lysias can still hint at something quite similar when he follows his description of the Persian War with a laudatory account of the Athenian empire. He later says of the Athenians who fought after the Persian War that "by means of countless toils, conspicuous struggles, and glorious perils they made Greece free (ἐλευθέραν μὲν ἐποίησαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα), while making their native land surpassingly great" (2.55, tr. Lamb). In each case, the Persian War and the internecine wars that followed represent a seamless continuation of the same Athenian spirit,¹⁴⁴ and it is this spirit, untainted by Medism, that the Argives hoped to coopt with their monument.

For the next fifty years, the Athenian and Argive statue groups dominated the southeast entrance to Delphi's sacred precinct. It is impossible to say what importance Marathon had for the Argives in the decades that followed,¹⁴⁵ but the Athenians continued to proclaim their glorious Persian-War service to anyone who would listen.¹⁴⁶ When the policies the Athenians enacted in light of their own self-serving assertions about the past brought them to ruin, it should come as no surprise that the minds of the victorious Spartans and their allies turned back to the struggle against Persia, and so back to the Sacred Way where the Athenians had once set their pretensions in bronze and stone. Our sources for the last days of the Peloponnesian War and the years immediately following are full of Persian-War remembrances.

Xenophon reports that the Spartans rejected calls for the annihilation of Athens, citing its Persian-War record as their chief reason (*Hell.* 2.2.19–20).¹⁴⁷ The day Lysander chose to begin work on the new Athenian constitution was closely associated with the Persian War at Athens (Plut. *Lys.* 15.1).¹⁴⁸ When the Spartans and their allies began to pull down the Athenian Long Walls, Xenophon states (with no light touch of irony)¹⁴⁹ that participants thought it would be the beginning of freedom for Greece (*Hell.* 2.2.23), an evocative Persian-War-era phrase that Sparta had pointedly reused throughout the Peloponnesian War.¹⁵⁰

It was very much in this mood that the Spartans and their allies began work on a magnificent monument to commemorate their victory over the Athenians at Aegospotami. The location of this statue group within the sanctuary has occasioned much debate, but it is now universally agreed that the monument was erected just where Pausanias suggests: on the left as one entered the sanctuary, between the southeast entrance and the Marathon statue group (10.9.7).¹⁵¹ Here again, Pausanias provides an enumeration of the statues that made up the group (10.9.7–10). The list is long, and I touch on only the most notable pieces here. Lysander, the overall commander, was shown being crowned by the sea god Poseidon.¹⁵² Alongside were the gods Zeus, Apollo, and Artemis, as well as the Spartan heroes Castor and Pollux, the Dioscuri. Lysander's soothsayer, steersman, and herald stood close by.¹⁵³ Behind these figures stood a larger group of admirals, both Spartan and allied.¹⁵⁴ Plutarch also mentions this monument in his biography of Lysander and there associates it with two golden stars: "out of the spoils, Lysander set up at Delphi bronze statues of himself and each of his admirals, as well as golden stars of the Dioscuri, which disappeared before the battle of Leuctra" (18.1, tr. Perrin).¹⁵⁵ Plutarch does not specify the location of these dedications within the sanctuary, but the statues he mentions were certainly part of the Aegospotami group, which raises the possibility that the golden stars were as well. This possibility is much strengthened by the fact that Plutarch immediately goes on to specify the treasury of Brasidas and the Acanthians as the location of further items dedicated by Lysander at Delphi.¹⁵⁶ Pausanias, of course, makes no mention of these stars, but since they disappeared on the eve of the battle of Leuctra (Plut. *Mor.* 397e–f), his silence is hardly conclusive. Some have suggested that the victors of Aegospotami also constructed the massive unidentified portico on the north side of the Sacred Way directly across from the statue group, perhaps to contain the golden stars, but no literary or archaeological evidence supports such a conclusion.¹⁵⁷

Before the construction of the Aegospotami monument, a visitor to

Delphi, entering by the Sacred Way, would have immediately seen the Marathon statue group on the left. The location of the new monument obstructed that view.¹⁵⁸ This was no accident. The Aegospotami monument was specifically designed to outdo the earlier statue group.¹⁵⁹ The Marathon monument originally contained sixteen figures: one contemporary, two gods, and thirteen heroes. The Aegospotami monument contained no less than thirty-seven (the total in the text of Pausanias), but more likely thirty-nine or forty statues.¹⁶⁰ Lysander took the place of Miltiades, but whereas Miltiades stood beside Apollo and Athena alone, Lysander was crowned by Poseidon and was attended by three other gods and two heroes. Whereas thirteen Athenian heroes stood behind Miltiades, Lysander was attended by over twice as many Spartan and allied notables. Whatever Athens did, Sparta set out to do better; whatever Marathon was to mean for Greece, Aegospotami was to mean that and more. If the Athenians claimed to save Greece from foreign aggression, Sparta could now boast of saving Greece from a far more immediate threat to freedom—Athens itself.¹⁶¹ The parallel between Athens and Persia implied here was nothing new. Explicit comparisons had been drawn throughout the war.¹⁶² By evoking it here, the Spartans not only vilified the Athenians further, but also upended the Argive monument. If Athens was now the new Persia, Argos was shown, once again, to have been on the wrong side of history.

While the location and form of the Aegospotami monument linked it closely to the nearby Marathon statue group, the overall message conveyed by the Spartan dedication could not have been more different. For meaning, the Aegospotami monument looked rather to the temple terrace and the earlier Persian-War commemorations erected there. In their statue group, the Athenians appeared alone, accompanied only by their poliad deity and Apollo. Lysander, his staff, and the other Spartan notables, however, appeared in front of and among a diverse chorus of allies. The overall effect is strikingly similar to the Serpent-Column list. There too, the Spartans had no desire to claim the whole victory for themselves, only to assert their hegemony within a broader group.¹⁶³ The two golden stars, if indeed they were part of the Aegospotami group, may have called to mind another famous Persian-War commemoration—the three golden stars on a bronze mast, dedicated by the Aeginetans from their prize of valor at Salamis. This possibility is strengthened if we accept that the Salamis stars were also intended to symbolize the Dioscuri (along with Apollo).¹⁶⁴ The Aegospotami stars would then seem to invite a comparison between the great naval victories of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. The implications for the Athenians and their claims on the Persian-War past are twofold. An allusion to Salamis

would have served to divert attention away from the Athenian victory at Marathon and back to the league efforts against Xerxes. It would also implicitly dispute Athenian claims to Salamis by reminding viewers that the Greeks had in fact conferred the prize of valor on the Aeginetans, not the Athenians (Hdt. 8.93.1).¹⁶⁵ The focus of the Aegospotami monument was, of course, the victory of Sparta and its allies in the present war against Athens, but by looking back to the monuments of the temple terrace, the Spartans were also systematically challenging Athens's self-serving assertions about the Persian War and simultaneously undercutting Argive efforts to take advantage of them.¹⁶⁶

Whatever dominance the Aegospotami monument achieved did not last long. The grand coalition the Spartans put together against the Athenians survived the war by less than a decade. Sparta proved just as oppressive as Athens had been. Hegemony was again in question, and again the stretch of the Sacred Way around the Marathon statue group was the commemorative epicenter of that competition.¹⁶⁷ One monument in particular challenged Spartan claims by evoking the earlier Marathon statue group. Directly across from the Aegospotami monument, the newly formed Arcadian League erected a statue group featuring Apollo, Nike, and seven mythological founders of Arcadia (Paus. 10.9.5–6).¹⁶⁸ The surviving epigram records in detail the identity of those portrayed and ends by proclaiming that “the Arcadians, the descendants of these heroes, after they la[id waste] Laconia, erected in your [i.e.. Apollo's] honor a memorial for future generations” (*FD* III 1.3.9–10).¹⁶⁹ The form and placement of the monument recalls the Athenian heroes in the Marathon statue group.¹⁷⁰ By connecting their successes against Sparta to a famous victory over Persia, the Arcadians not only inflated the significance of their own accomplishments, but also reversed the Aegospotami monument's interpretation of the Persian War. The Spartans maintained that they had won the fight for freedom against the new Persia, but if the Arcadian victory was a new Marathon, then the implication must be that the Spartans had themselves also turned from liberator to oppressor. In so doing, the Arcadians were repurposing the Persian War to advance an accusation that had been made against the Spartans almost since the Aegospotami monument had been built.¹⁷¹

When the Athenians placed their second Marathon monument near the entrance of the sanctuary, they obviously had high ambitions. The war against Xerxes had been won by a coalition of Greek states, but the Marathon statue group had a very different story to tell, a story in which Greece owed its salvation to Athens alone. The Athenians were now aiming for hegemony over their former allies and used Marathon as a way to justify it. The present implications of this narrative were

soon sharpened by the nearby Argive monument, which celebrated an Argive/Athenian victory over Sparta. The Argives themselves had little interest in Athenian ambitions to monopolize the memory of the Persian War, but saw distinct advantages in separating their fight against Sparta from ongoing rumors about their collusion with Persia and connecting it rather to Athens and its glorious Persian-War tradition. For the next fifty years, these two monuments dominated the entrance to the sanctuary. Visitors from across the Greek world saw precisely what the Athenians and Argives wanted them to see. But when political fortunes changed, the Spartans erected a sumptuous commemoration that countered and physically overshadowed these earlier commemorations. The Aegospotami monument reasserted Spartan claims to the Persian-War tradition just as it commemorated their recent victory over Athens, the new Persia. It dominated the entrance to the sanctuary for a few decades, until it too was countered by the Arcadians, who looked to Marathon as a model for their own victory over Sparta's imperial ambitions. As on the temple terrace, here too the Persian War was used to give voice to the bitter disputes that animated Greek political life. Again, dominance in the modern sense of the word remained elusive. These monuments, though magnificent and prominently placed, never came to dominate contemporary thinking about the past in the broader Greek world. There is no evidence that the Greeks of the classical period generally followed the Athenians in seeing Marathon as a crucial victory to which they owed their freedom.¹⁷² Attempts to justify Spartan hegemony with Aegospotami and a suitably reoriented Persian War fared little better. Despite the broad alliances that Athens and Sparta led, their commemorative narratives, dominant as they may have been within their respective poleis, never gained anything like dominance within the Greek world.

Conclusion

The struggle over the memory of the Persian War at Delphi was fierce and long-standing. These monuments did not represent lifeless attempts to recapture a lost past. They were not, in Nora's terms, *lieux de mémoire*; rather, they were fully integrated into the power relationships that dominated and infiltrated every aspect of the lives of the individuals doing the remembering across Greece. Exclusion from those who had fought the war could result in political isolation, extortion, or outright invasion. Claims to leadership in the Persian War were used to justify the hegemonic ambitions that would rip the Greek world apart over the course of the fifth and fourth centuries.

Delphi, despite its manifest importance within the Greek world, did not constitute a center that could sanctify a particular commemorative narrative, repudiating the rest (implicitly or explicitly) as heresy. Even the most powerful states, publicizing their parochial Persian-War narratives through some of the most magnificent monuments of the classical period, failed to gain dominance in the modern sense of the word. Delphi did not establish a panhellenic story of the Persian War against which local traditions could be judged. Rather, it served as a free market of memory. What dominance these monuments achieved was fleeting and always countered by other commemorations. Parochial narratives could be publicized before a larger panhellenic audience, but acceptance was not a given. If Delphi reaffirmed any single impression of the war, it was that those who fought it were proudly divided.

These conclusions provide an important supplement to Gehrke's influential study of Greek social memory in "Myth, History, and Collective Identity: Uses of the Past in Ancient Greece and Beyond."¹⁷³ He approaches the topic through the specific case of hellenistic Magnesia. The Magnesians dispatched ambassadors across the Greek world to win recognition for their city's sacred status. To bolster their case, the ambassadors cited past benefactions and connections that proved Magnesia's worthiness. These traditions were in large part invented for the occasion, but they succeeded nonetheless. Magnesia's new status was broadly recognized, and several localities erected monuments to commemorate the fact. Gehrke takes this to indicate that these parties also accepted Magnesia's version of the past. He assumes that the situation is representative of the dynamics that underlay Greek commemorative culture generally,¹⁷⁴ concluding that "every innovation . . . became another binding fact, as long as it was received, or 'believed.'"¹⁷⁵ The principle is sound, but the ease with which Magnesia's past was accepted was certainly not typical of the Persian-War tradition in the classical period. Rather, the memory of that war was an extremely valuable and potentially dangerous commodity. Past events were stretched, reoriented, and sometimes fabricated, and each party hoped to have its version of events accepted within the larger community, but this process was marked by much more contestation and failure than the example of hellenistic Magnesia might suggest.¹⁷⁶

It is this intensely competitive culture of memory that ultimately stood behind the monument with which we began in the [Introduction](#), the golden shields dedicated by the Athenians on the temple of Apollo at Delphi and subsequently defended by Aeschines. When the orator ascended the Sacred Way, he would have seen numerous competing stories about the Persian War set in stone and bronze along his path.

Time did little to dissipate the intensity of the disputes these monuments were meant to maintain. Aeschines himself would soon act out the very same tensions he saw consecrated all around him. The golden shields that now decorated the architraves of the temple of Apollo celebrated Athenian accomplishments in the Persian War and supported claims of Athenian hegemony. At the same time, they drew particular attention to the betrayal of the Thebans. Here again, claims to participation and hegemony sparked intense reactions and led to disastrous consequences. The site of Delphi is in many ways unique in the Greek world, but as we shall see in [Chapters 4 and 5](#), the contestations that engulfed Aeschines and others were not restricted to the great panhellenic sites. Throughout Greece, contrary commemorative narratives of the Persian War competed endlessly, often with equally devastating consequences.

¹ For some examples of this trend in classical scholarship, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 4–8. For the distinction between commemorative narratives, master narratives, and cultural paradigms, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 14–16.

² See the [Introduction](#), pp. 15–16 for more on the use of these terms in the present study.

³ See particularly [Foucault 1978](#): 95–96 and 2000: 346–48.

⁴ See, for example, [Schwartz 1982](#), [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#), [Nora 1996](#), [Jarausch and Geyer 2003](#), and [Lebow 2006](#).

⁵ For more on the importance of the polis to memory production in classical Greece, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 57–58.

⁶ There is a clear intersection here with peer-polity theory, which was applied to the panhellenic sites by [Snodgrass 1986](#). His point is that peer interactions at Delphi acted as a kind of clearinghouse of information from across the Greek world, which produced a degree of homogeneity throughout. As we shall see in this chapter, however, the results of these peer interactions in the realm of memory were anything but homogenizing, at least in the classical period (see also [M. Scott 2010](#): 16–17 and 255–56). For a more general discussion of peer-polity interaction, see [Renfrew 1986](#).

⁷ For a recent study of competition in Greece and the ancient world more generally, see [Fisher and van Wees 2011](#).

⁸ For the management of the site and its dedications, see [Davies 1998](#), [Jacquemin 1999](#): 101–107, and particularly [M. Scott 2010](#): 35–40, who hazards some conclusions about the likely situation in the fifth century.

⁹ For the popularity of Delphi as a site of Persian-War memory, see [Jacquemin 1999](#): 250–54 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 87; for the broader trends of monumental self-display and competition at Delphi, see [Jacquemin 1994](#) and [2001](#), [Rosenberger 2001](#), [Neer 2007](#), and, of course, [M. Scott 2010](#) generally.

¹⁰ [M. Scott 2010](#): 12–28 provides a useful summary of the state of scholarship on space (so too does [J. Shear 2011](#): 9). [Scott](#), drawing on [D. Clarke 1977](#), argues for the importance of the semi-micro or middle-level analysis of space; that is, the examination of structures in relation to other nearby structures, as opposed to the analysis of a single structure in isolation (micro) or the larger landscape (macro). Spatial analysis has a long pedigree in memory studies as well, and indeed formed the basis of [Halbwachs's 1941](#) study of topography and memory in the Holy Land.

¹¹ For more on the nature of the Hellenic League, see [Yates 2015](#) with earlier bibliography.

¹² For more on the heading and list of allies generally, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 42–45.

¹³ For those states excluded from the list, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 44–45.

¹⁴ See [Chapter 1](#), p. 44. Apollodorus, or rather his source, comes to a similar conclusion, but then erroneously infers that the spoils from both battles were used in the construction of the monument ([Dem.] 59.97; *contra* Hdt. 9.81.1). For a convenient list of those states that fought in each of the major battles of Xerxes's invasion (according to Herodotus), see [Steinhart 1997](#): 61–62; see also [Chapter 5](#), pp. 182–83.

¹⁵ See [Chapter 1](#), p. 44 n.61.

¹⁶ [Wolski 1973](#).

¹⁷ This might, of course, mean the imposition of a kind of war indemnity, but might also imply the utter destruction of the offending community (see [Kienast 1995](#): 123, [Steinbock 2013b](#): 313–14, and [Vannicelli 2017](#): 452 with earlier bibliography).

¹⁸ The proposal in Herodotus is “to depopulate the trading centers of those Greek peoples who had Medized and to allow the Ionians to inhabit those lands” (9.106.3, tr. Purvis). While it is certain that the Ionians were to migrate, the fate of the Medizers is less clear, but would likely have entailed selling them into slavery or pushing them from their coastal lands ([Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 288). The historicity of this proposal has been doubted, but see [Herrmann-Otto 2002](#) for a defense of its basic probability (see also [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 285–86 and [Asheri et al. 2006](#): 323–34).

¹⁹ [D. Gillis 1979](#): 81. This conclusion is largely accepted by [McMullin 2001](#), who focuses rather on the dangers faced by individuals after the war.

²⁰ For more on this incident, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 49–50.

²¹ For the date and purpose of Leotychidas's campaign, see [Burn 1962](#): 557–58, [Lotze 1970](#): 263–66, [Wolski 1973](#): 7–8, [Schieber 1982](#), [Connor 1985](#): 99–102, [Lewis 1992](#): 499, and [P. Rhodes 2007](#): 34.

²² [Siewert 1981](#).

²³ [Huxley 1967](#), [Wolski 1971](#): 646 and 1973: 14, and [Vickers 1985](#).

²⁴ For more on Timocreon and his relationship to Themistocles, see [Mattingly 1977](#): 231–36, [Robertson 1980](#), [Scodel 1983](#), [Stehle 1994](#), and [McMullin 2001](#).

²⁵ The Serpent Column's list was, of course, not the only proof of loyalty to the Greek cause. It was not even the only list of allies. The statue of Zeus dedicated at Olympia after Plataea also contained a list, and many have posited that the Poseidon at Isthmia did as well (for more on these lists, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 64–68). But neither had the authority of the Serpent Column. This is not simply a deduction from the prominence of this monument. In the classical period, both Herodotus (8.82.1) and Thucydides (3.57.2) found occasions to mention the list of allies on the Serpent Column. Later, Plutarch has his Themistocles refer to the number of allies listed in the Serpent Column, 31, as an established count of the number of states that fought against the Persians (*Them.* 20.4). In contrast, only the travel-writer Pausanias mentions the list at Olympia some six centuries later (5.23.1–2), and no surviving source mentions a list at Isthmia. The list at Delphi was manifestly worth being on.

²⁶ See [Chapter 1](#), p. 44 n.61.

²⁷ Elis appears on the list, but never fought against the Persians in any battle. It has long been surmised that the Eleans leveraged their control of Olympia to gain a spot on the list of allies both there and at Delphi ([Gauer 1968](#): 95 n.431, [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 60, and [Steinhart 1997](#): 63). The names of Tenos and Siphnos may have been added later ([Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 59; *contra* [Steinhart 1997](#): 64). If so, we do not know the reason, but Tenos's wartime record may shed some light. That state

had actually supported the Persians, but one of their triremes defected before Salamis with important consequences (Hdt. 8.82.1). Perhaps they were initially and understandably excluded and only included after some negotiation. The Naxians, whose four ships also defected before Salamis (8.46.3), may have made a similar, but timelier case for inclusion. Finally, four states appear on the Serpent Column list that do not appear in Pausanias's transcription of the Olympian list (see [Chapter 2](#), p. 67 n.24). If the Olympian list is an earlier version of the Delphic list ([Chapter 2](#), p. 67), their appearance at Delphi might represent a conscious correction of the Olympian list in light of objections raised by the offended poleis. Certainly the fact that Siphnos may have been added later to the Serpent-Column list speaks to this possibility. This is all conjecture, of course, but may nonetheless point to commemorative contestations in the makeup of the list itself.

²⁸ To this list we might add four other monuments dedicated by Thrasybulus and Polyzelus, the younger brothers of Gelon and Hieron, Phayllus of Croton, and the state of Croton, but the connection between these monuments and the Persian War is much less certain. For the monuments of the other Deinomenid princes, see [Krumeich 1991](#): 56–60, [Cummins 2010](#): 6–7, [M. Scott 2010](#): 88–89, and [Morgan 2015](#): 41; for the statue of Phayllus, see [Morgan 2015](#): 32; and for the monument erected by the Crotonians, see [Bommelaer 1991](#): 164–65, [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 192, [M. Scott 2010](#): 89, and [Nicholson 2016](#): 193–94.

²⁹ For more on the Serpent Column generally, see [Chapter 1](#).

³⁰ [Bommelaer 1991](#): 188, [Krumeich 1991](#): 43–48, [Zahrnt 1993](#): 363–65, and [Morgan 2015](#): 34–35.

³¹ The connections between both monuments and battles has been doubted. [Adornato 2005](#) calls the connection to Himera into question, but the balance of evidence supports the traditional interpretation ([Morgan 2015](#): 35–36). There is also a strong chance that Hieron's monument was intended to commemorate Himera as well, since he did serve as Gelon's second-in-command on that occasion ([Krumeich 1991](#): 49), but many have concluded that Hieron ultimately had Cyme in mind when the monument was completed ([Jacquemin 1999](#): 252–53, [M. Scott 2010](#): 88 n.65, and [Morgan 2015](#): 40–41); see also [Cummins 2010](#): 5–6.

³² [Krumeich 1991](#): 49–50, [Cummins 2010](#): 7–8, and [Morgan 2015](#): 37.

³³ [Zahrnt 1993](#): 363 n.35 makes this point explicitly in a detailed rebuttal of [Krumeich 1991](#); see also [Jacquemin 1999](#): 176 for a later date.

³⁴ Diodorus gives us no reason to assume that Gelon announced his planned monument at Delphi before construction began (11.26.7), nor would a tyrant have been under any obligation to do so.

³⁵ [Krumeich 1991](#): 49–52 argues that too much has been made of the similarities between the Sicilian monuments and the Serpent Column, and while he rightly notes several differences as to detail, their overall appearance and proximity would have surely invited comparison (see [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 61, [Amandry 1987](#): 89, [Rougemon 1992](#): 158–59, [Jacquemin 1992](#): 195, 1994: 195, 1999: 252 n.41, and 2001: 102, and [Harrell 2002](#): 454).

³⁶ See [Amandry 1987](#): 89, [Jacquemin 1994](#): 195, [M. Scott 2010](#): 88, [Trifirò 2014](#): 15, [Nicholson 2016](#): 182–83, and [Stephenson 2016](#): 93; *contra* [Krumeich 1991](#): 56–62, [Luraghi 1994](#): 321 and 364–65, [Cummins 2010](#): 7–8, and [Morgan 2015](#): 37–38, who attribute this element of Deinomenid propaganda to Hieron alone. But this conclusion presses our available evidence too far and takes insufficient account for Gelon's likely awareness of the Serpent Column's form and location prior to the construction of his monument.

³⁷ In connection with this portion of the poem, a scholion to Pindar (*P.* 1.152b = “Simon.” 34P) adds that the tripods dedicated by the Deinomenids included an inscription, which read, “I say that Gelon, Hieron, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus, the

sons of Deinomenes, dedicated the tripods, after defeating the barbarian tribes, and gave the Greeks a strong helping hand in the cause of freedom” (πολλήν δὲ παρασχεῖν / σύμμαχον Ἑλλήσιν χεῖρ’ ἐς ἐλευθερίην, tr. Campbell). An epigram in the *Palatine Anthology* (6.214) opens in largely the same way, but mentions only one tripod and ends in lines 3 and 4 by noting the weight of the dedication. There is, however, no trace of either epigram on the remains of the monument. The consensus is that the poem is a later rhetorical exercise (Page 1981: 247–50, Zahrnt 1993: 366–68, Luraghi 1994: 314–15, and Harrell 2002: 455 n.51); Morgan 2015: 42–45 and 156–57 is more sympathetic, but ultimately uses the epigram as proof of the monuments’ reception.

³⁸ Bowra 1964: 115 and Cummins 2010: 4.

³⁹ Race 1986: 45 and 1990: 140, Zahrnt 1993: 368–71, and Trifirò 2014: 14–15.

⁴⁰ Gauthier 1966: 8–11, Kirkwood 1982: 137, and Luraghi 1994: 362–63.

⁴¹ Burton 1962: 105–106, Zahrnt 1993: 370, and Raaflaub 2004: 61; for the use of the language of freedom and slavery in the contemporary commemorations of the Persian War, see Chapter 6, pp. 231–32. For more on the connection Pindar forges between the Persian War and the Deinomenid victories in Sicily, see Morgan 2015: 300–346, esp. 336–40.

⁴² For the tradition Herodotus is drawing on here, see Zahrnt 1993: 373–74 and Morgan 2015: 27–30.

⁴³ Zahrnt 1993: 374. Pace Nicholson 2016: 184, it is only in the Sicilian version that Gelon appears willing to aid the Hellenic League despite the rejection of his claims to leadership (7.165.1 with Vannicelli 2017: 503). Aelian preserves a story in which Themistocles stops Hieron from competing in the Olympic Games on the grounds that he had not contributed to the war against Persia (VH 9.5), but the story can hardly be accurate. Aside from manifest improbability, we know that Hieron did compete in every Olympic Games held between the war and his death. Morgan 2015: 138–39 is, however, open to the possibility that Themistocles did engage in such rhetoric.

⁴⁴ Morgan 2015: 109–15 argues persuasively that Pindar’s poetry would have been performed in Sicily multiple times at both large and small venues over the course of some years. Beyond the sphere of Deinomenid control, we might imagine more scattered private performances.

⁴⁵ Pausanias does not specify the occasion for the construction of the treasury, but there is strong circumstantial evidence to connect it to the battle of Himera (see Morgan 2015: 31 and Nicholson 2016: 131–33).

⁴⁶ Morgan 2015: 31 raises the possibility, but is right to add a note of caution since there were at the time several Zeus statues at Olympia (Krumeich 1991: 61–62; see also Felten 1982).

⁴⁷ Luraghi 1994: 363, Palladini 2013: 28–35, and Morgan 2015: 96–98.

⁴⁸ Morgan 2015: 107.

⁴⁹ Gauthier 1966: 6–14; see also Ruffing 2006: 17 and Vannicelli 2017: 506.

⁵⁰ Gauthier 1966: 14–25.

⁵¹ For more on Ephorus’s presentation of Himera, see Gauthier 1966: 25–31, Garland 1970: 630–34, Zahrnt 1993: 377–82, Marincola 2007: 112–13, and Trifirò 2014: 16–17. For more on the relationship between this version and that of Diodorus Siculus, see Chapter 4, pp. 147–48.

⁵² The literary epigram that was connected (erroneously in all likelihood) to the Deinomenid monuments at Delphi makes a strikingly similar point (see note 37).

⁵³ For a discussion of Macedonia’s policy toward Persia both before and during Xerxes’s invasion, see Hammond and Griffith 1979: 58–69 and 98–101, Borza 1990: 98–131, and Badian 1994a.

⁵⁴ Gauer 1968: 40 and 101.

⁵⁵ The form and expense of this monument would have been ironically un-Greek, given Alexander's apparent hopes of placing himself on the Greek side of the war (see [Jacquemin 1999](#): 204 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 87 n.57). Julius Solinus (9.13), writing in the second or third century ce, notes that Alexander erected a similar statue at Olympia ([Mari 2002](#): 42–43).

⁵⁶ For the attribution of this letter to Anaximenes, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 95–96.

⁵⁷ A Macedonian attack on the Persians appears in several of our surviving sources. Demosthenes himself mentions an attack in the aftermath of Plataea, but erroneously attributes it to Alexander's son Perdiccas (23.200). [Cole 1977](#) attempts to defend Demosthenes's version, but see [Mari 2002](#): 39 for a persuasive rebuttal. The passage is largely repeated in the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech, *On Organization* (13.24; see [Fossey 1986](#)). Aristodemus also notes that Alexander killed all the Persians throughout Macedonia, "claiming in his defense that he had Medized unwillingly" (*FGrHist* 104 F1.3.1).

⁵⁸ See [Hammond and Griffith 1979](#): 101, [Badian 1994a](#): 119, [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 261, [Mari 2002](#): 38–39 and 2011: 86, [Fearn 2007](#): 121 n.52, and [Sprawski 2010](#): 140.

⁵⁹ [Gauer 1968](#): 40, [Jacquemin 1994](#): 192–93, and [M. Scott 2010](#): 87. Even [Mari 2002](#): 39–40, who doubts the historicity of the Macedonian attack and further conjectures that the Alexander statue must have celebrated something else, ultimately concludes that it had a close connection to the Persian War and Alexander's former Medism.

⁶⁰ [Hignett 1963](#): 273, [Hammond and Griffith 1979](#): 98–99, [Borza 1990](#): 112, [Mari 2002](#): 31 and 2011: 85–86, and [Sprawski 2010](#): 138. [Scaife 1989](#), [Badian 1994a](#), and [Fearn 2007](#), on the other hand, maintain that Herodotus's view is rather negative or at the very least conflicted. [Zahrnt 2011](#) concludes that Herodotus's account of Alexander reflects the diverse opinions of his sources.

⁶¹ The historical accuracy of this story is roundly rejected; see [Hammond and Griffith 1979](#): 99, [Errington 1981](#), [Scaife 1989](#): 132, [Borza 1990](#): 100–102, [Badian 1994a](#): 108–10, [Gschnitzer 2001](#): 94, [Cawkwell 2005](#): 52, [Kertész 2005](#): 120, [A. Bowie 2007](#): 224, [Fearn 2007](#): 115, [Sprawski 2010](#): 136, [Mari 2011](#): 85, [Zahrnt 2011](#): 761–62, and [Hornblower 2013](#): 109. Fearn provides a detailed analysis of this episode and argues that Alexander's characterization here is far more problematic than it might seem at first glance, but even he concludes that the story reflects, in origin, a piece of Macedonian propaganda (2007: 101–102; see also [Scaife 1989](#): 132–33 and [Badian 1994a](#): 113–14).

⁶² If the story is true and rightly dated to 476 (as [Badian 1982](#): 34–35 and [1993](#): 222n.31, [Kertész 2005](#), and [Sprawski 2010](#): 142 maintain), we might cite the event itself as proof of Alexander's quick success in persuading others to excuse his earlier Medism, but both propositions have been doubted. For the likelihood of an earlier date, see [Cole 1978](#): 39–40, [Hammond and Griffith 1979](#): 60, [Roos 1985](#): 167–68, [Mari 2002](#): 33–36, [Zahrnt 2011](#): 766–67, and [Hornblower 2013](#): 118. See [Borza 1990](#): 111–12 and [Fearn 2007](#): 117 against the basic historicity of the episode.

⁶³ The episode has been read as an attack on Alexander's philhellenic propaganda ([Scaife 1989](#): 130–31, [Badian 1994a](#): 117, [Fearn 2007](#): 119, and [Sprawski 2010](#): 138), but see now [Vannicelli 2014](#) and [2017](#): 517–18.

⁶⁴ See [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 188–89 and [Asheri et al 2006](#): 239 with earlier bibliography.

⁶⁵ [Badian 1994a](#): 118 and [Fearn 2007](#): 121

⁶⁶ [Zahrnt 2011](#): 762 suggests that the Athenians may have been particularly eager to exculpate Alexander of wrongdoing because of their need for Macedonian timber in the years after the war.

⁶⁷ [Mari 2002](#): 38–39.

⁶⁸ The only other notices of Macedonia's Persian-War record in Demosthenes are laudatory (13.24 and 23.200; see pp. 110–11). He does, however, draw a parallel between Persia then and Macedonia now (9.36–37) and moreover calls Philip's Greek ancestry into question (3.16–17, 3.24, and 9.31; see also [Chapter 6](#), p. 243 n.198). Either line of attack may hint at Macedonia's earlier Medism, but that is to read quite a bit into the evidence. Even when he mockingly summarizes a lost speech of Aeschines in which the orator had called Philip a barbarian on several occasions (19.305) and separately reminded the Athenians of their glorious victories at Marathon and Salamis (19.311), Demosthenes does not draw the easy contrast with the Medism of Philip's ancestors. A little over a decade later, Lysurgus presents a rather more biting summation of Alexander's embassy to Athens (71), but that is to be explained by the changed political circumstances of Macedonian domination (see [Chapter 6](#), p. 241).

⁶⁹ [Pace Squillace 2004b](#): 32–33 and 2010: 72, who makes rather more of Alexander's role here.

⁷⁰ For more, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 94–97.

⁷¹ [Gauer 1968](#): 40–41, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 70 and 2001: 102 n.56, and M. [Scott 2010](#): 84.

⁷² [Gauer 1968](#): 113–15.

⁷³ For this inscription, see [Courby 1927](#): 310–11. Although the name of the dedicator is largely in brackets, the conjecture is supported by a hellenistic reinscription that appears on the other side of the monument and begins with “[Ca]r[y]stians.”

⁷⁴ [Gauer 1968](#): 114; Pausanias actually implies that the remaining animal was a bull when he qualifies “ox” (βούν) with a masculine adjective (χαλκοῦν). This might reflect a rare occasion in which Pausanias misreports what he saw ([Gauer 1968](#): 114), or perhaps it is a copyist's error in which the “original,” feminine χαλκήν was changed into the masculine ([Jacquemin 1999](#): 208 n.397 and 2001: 101 n.52).

⁷⁵ There are, of course, other alternatives. M. [Scott 2010](#): 84 suggests that the Peparethians may have fought for the Greeks at Salamis, but this is unlikely ([Jacquemin 2001](#): 102 n.56). Herodotus mentions the few states that defected on that occasion, and Peparethos is not among them. We might also note their absence from the Serpent Column. [Daux 1936](#): 166 n.2 suggests that the Carystian dedication might have had the Persian attack of 490 in mind. There the Carystians yielded to Datis and Artaphernes after a brief attempt at resistance failed (Hdt. 6.99). But if so, then the action must have been much inflated since Pausanias speaks of driving away the barbarians (ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον: 10.16.6).

⁷⁶ The possibility has long been hypothesized in connection with the Carystian monument, which has generally received more attention than the Peparethian Apollo (see [Daux 1936](#): 166 n.2, [Jacquemin 1994](#): 192 and 1999: 254, and [Zaccarini 2017b](#): 80).

⁷⁷ It is perhaps notable in this connection that the artist credited in the Peparethian inscription was an Athenian. Moreover, when Thucydides later notes the effects of an earthquake and tidal surge on the island in 426, he mentions that the city wall was damaged (3.89.4). Neither fact is telling in itself, but together they may suggest that Peparethos entered the Delian League peacefully (with its walls intact) and that its self-serving Persian-War story was easily accepted at Athens (and so increasing the likelihood that an Athenian would take on the project).

⁷⁸ The attack is noted by Herodotus (9.105) and Thucydides (1.98.3), but neither mentions its stated or true cause. It is hard to imagine that Medism did not play some part, even if only as a pretext ([Wolski 1973](#): 14 and [Zaccarini 2017b](#): 79–85; *contra* [Meiggs 1972](#): 69–70).

79 For a discussion of the role played by the Ionians at Mycale and their subsequent actions against the Persians, see [Heinrichs 1989](#): 3–88.

80 The role Plutarch (*Arist.* 23.4–5) attributes to the Samians, Chians, and Lesbians in transferring leadership to the Athenians in 478 (whether true or more likely not) suggests that these states had served along with the Athenians under Pausanias. For more on Plutarch’s account, see [note 82](#).

81 The exact membership of the Hellenic League in 478, when the Spartans yielded leadership of the fleet, is unknown, but certainly included a number of island and Ionian states not mentioned in the Serpent Column. Herodotus notes the admission of the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, “and the other islanders who had joined the Greek side in the fight” after Mycale in 479 (9.106.4, tr. Purvis). Diodorus reports the admission of the Ionians and Aeolians generally on this occasion (11.37.1), but his account can hardly be preferred to Herodotus’s ([Meiggs 1972](#): 413–14 and [Green 2006](#): 95 n.151). By the next year, Thucydides speaks of the Ionians generally and “all others recently liberated from the King of Persia” in reference to the alliance (1.95.1, tr. Hammond). It is best to conclude that by 478 the Hellenic League included all the states that had by then revolted from Persia (see [Hornblower 1991](#): 141–42).

82 Thucydides suggests that the rejection of Spartan leadership was amicably accepted (1.95.7). Diodorus speaks of a push for war at Sparta, barely put down by the intervention of a respected member of the Gerousia, Hetoemaridas (11.50). We need not accept Diodorus in full, however, to reason that feathers had been ruffled at Sparta. Plutarch reports that the Samians and Chians (along with the Lesbians) played a notable role in transferring leadership of the fleet to Athens (*Arist.* 23.4–5). The possibility itself is unobjectionable ([Meiggs 1972](#): 42–43 and [Quinn 1981](#): 9), but Plutarch’s further assertion that a Samian and Chian ship attacked Pausanias’s flagship seem too fantastic to be true ([Meiggs 1972](#): 42; *contra* [Barron 1986](#): 90); [Quinn 1981](#): 9 and [Sansone 1989](#): 199–200 conclude that the story likely has some basis in fact.

83 The base of the Samian statue survives, along with its inscription, but it provides no clues about what was being commemorated, reading simply “The Samians to Apollo” (*FD* III 4.455). The lettering points to the first quarter of the fifth century, and so might have been occasioned either by the Ionian Revolt or the battle of Mycale. Jeffery suggests a low date and the latter occasion (1990: 330; see also [Gauer 1968](#): 110), but that must remain a conjecture. The date and occasion of the Chian altar is rather more difficult to ascertain since it was extensively restored in the hellenistic period (see [Amandry 1986](#): 212–18, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 70, and [Ohnesorg 2005](#): 127–32). Suggestions for the date at which the original was erected thus range from the late sixth century and the construction of the Alcmeonid temple to the years after the battle of Mycale in 479 ([Gauer 1968](#): 110, [Holmberg 1979](#): 29–30, [Amandry 1986](#): 205–18, [Barron 1986](#): 95–96, [Jeffery 1990](#): 338, [Jacquemin 1994](#): 189, [Ohnesorg 2005](#): 127–32, and M. [Scott 2010](#): 71).

84 See [note 83](#).

85 That this was granted upon the initial construction of the altar and not its reconstruction, see [Amandry 1986](#): 217–18.

86 For the popularity of the Apollo statue at Delphi, see [Felten 1982](#) and [Jacquemin 1999](#): 170–73.

87 For more on Euphemus’s speech, see [Chapter 4](#), pp. 157–59.

88 [Alty 1982](#) and [Raaflaub 2004](#): 172–73.

89 For Herodotus’s treatment of the Ionians in general, see [Immerwahr 1966](#): 230–33, [Evans 1976](#), [D. Gillis 1979](#): 1–37, [Hart 1982](#): 84–90 and 181–82, [Waters 1985](#): 125–28, [Stadter 1992](#): 803–808, [R. Thomas 2004](#), [Munson 2007](#), and [Forsdyke 2002](#): 528–31. For more on the conspicuous service of the Ionians on behalf of the

Persians, see [Quinn 1981](#): 2–3 and [Shipley 1987](#): 108. For the connection between Euphemus's claims and Herodotus's presentation, see [Hornblower 2008](#): 503.

⁹⁰ [Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1970](#): 355; see also [Chapter 5](#), pp. 177–80.

⁹¹ [Pace M. Scott 2010](#): 82, there is no evidence that this monument was the first commemoration to the victory over Xerxes erected at Delphi. [Jacquemin 1999](#): 312 hazards no more specific conjecture than to say that it was possibly dedicated in the fifth century.

⁹² Herodotus provides a list of the Medizers (7.132.1) to which he later adds the Dorians of Doris (8.31) and the Phocians, who served under the Persians at Plataea (9.17–18). These states constitute a majority of the Amphictyony's likely members in the classical period (for a list, see [Sánchez 2001](#): 518). Nevertheless, [Sánchez 2001](#): 92–94 is quite right to say that the Amphictyony itself never Medized.

⁹³ For more on the Medism of Thessaly, see [Westlake 1936](#) and [Keaveney 1995](#). For Leotychidas's campaign against Thessaly, see [note 21](#). We might also adduce the Spartan proposal to resettle the Ionians on the land of the Medizers in this connection (Hdt. 9.106.2–4). Even if the event was invented (see [note 18](#)), the invention itself might nevertheless reveal Spartan attitudes toward the Medizers of mainland Greece.

⁹⁴ Herodotus knows of Scyllis, but mentions only his skill as a diver and that he defected (8.8). His silence about the monument at Delphi has led [Jacquemin 2001](#): 101 to conclude that Pausanias misidentified the monument, but that must remain a conjecture.

⁹⁵ [M. Scott 2010](#): 82.

⁹⁶ [Sánchez 2001](#): 91 rejects the notion that the actions of the Amphictyony after the Persian War should be explained by the Medism of its members and argues rather that the dedication of the monuments at Delphi and Thermopylae were fully within the purview of the Amphictyony and so require no special explanation. Thermopylae was under the control of the Amphictyony; Artemisium was nearby. Naturally they honored those who fell defending it on land and sea (2001: 97). This is somewhat more persuasive for the monuments at Thermopylae than the celebration of Scyllis's acts at Artemisium, but even if we accept Sánchez's premise, his argument does not exclude the possibility that the Amphictyony used these traditional means to exculpate its members from charges of Medism.

⁹⁷ For Delphi's delicate position during the war, see [Hignett 1963](#): 439–47, [Elayi 1979](#): 116–43, [Kienast 1995](#), and [Jacquemin 2014](#): 168–69.

⁹⁸ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 18–19. [Jacquemin 2011](#) applies this very term to a brief study of Delphi (see also 1999: 263–80), but there she focuses largely on the reception of these monuments under the Roman Empire, where the term might be more rightly applied (see [Chapter 7](#), p. 267).

⁹⁹ [Nora 1996](#): 7.

¹⁰⁰ [Hölkeskamp 2007](#): 491–92 makes a similar point about the monuments that populated the urban space of Rome.

¹⁰¹ See [note 25](#).

¹⁰² [Marincola 2007](#): 114.

¹⁰³ The Athenians dedicated a treasury and adjacent statue group for the battle of Marathon (see p. 121), a bronze palm tree for their victory at Eurymedon ([Gauer 1968](#): 105–107, [Bommelaer 1991](#): 186, and [Jacquemin 1994](#): 193), another statue group for Marathon (see pp. 120–24), and golden shields for Plataea (see [note 108](#) and the [Introduction](#), pp. 1–3). We might also add here a fifth, the Athenian portico which some have argued was originally designed to hold the cables of Xerxes's bridge ([Gauer 1968](#): 101–102, [Bommelaer 1991](#): 147–50, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 84 n.29 and 119 n.68, [Meyer 2005](#): 281, [Maass 2010](#): 72, and [Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012](#): 46–47).

104 Holmberg 1979: 37–38, Pedley 2005: 150, Maass 2010: 67–68, M. Scott 2010: 105–107 and 114–18, and Jacquemin 2011: 24.

105 The names in the text are debated, but I follow Rocha-Pereira 1989–90 here. For a defense of the major supplements and changes, see Vidal-Naquet 1986: 302–315.

106 Gauer 1968: 65–67, Vidal-Naquet 1986: 306–307, Bommelaer 1992: 279–80, Ioakimidou 1997: 66, and Krumeich 1997: 96.

107 For more on the date of this monument, see Gauer 1968: 69–70, Vidal-Naquet 1986: 303–304, Ioakimidou 1997: 69–75, Krumeich 1997: 94, and Zahrnt 2013: 146–47.

108 I leave aside the golden shields on the temple of Apollo since our earliest source for them (Aeschin. 3.116) suggests that they were dedicated (or re-dedicated?) in memory of the battle of Plataea. Only Pausanias, writing centuries after the fact, records the presence of shields commemorating Marathon, but interestingly not those commemorating Plataea (10.19.4). In all probability the shields originally commemorated Plataea (as Aeschines attests), but were later emended (see Chapter 7, p. 257 n.29).

109 For recent discussions of the Athenian treasury, see Amandry 1998, Jacquemin 2001: 99–100, Neer 2004: 65–67, and M. Scott 2010: 77–81 with earlier bibliography. Since Pausanias inexplicably fails to mention the statue group attached to the Athenian treasury (Gauer 1968: 49), some have posited a close and convoluted relationship between the two statue groups (e.g., Raubitschek 1974, Partida 2000: 50–52, and Jung 2006: 96–108), but such reconstructions appear less probable than the most obvious reading of the evidence: that the Athenians dedicated two separate groups and that Pausanias simply opted not to mention the older, less notable one attached to the Athenian treasury. Indeed, his description of the treasury itself is remarkably brief (10.11.5).

110 Ioakimidou 1997: 70, Miller 1997: 32, and Zahrnt 2010: 116 and 2013: 146. For a discussion of the monuments likely erected immediately after the battle, see E. Bowie 2013.

111 For more on the rising popularity of Marathon at this time, see Hölkeskamp 2001: 341–49, Gehrke 2003: 20–23 (= 2007: 97–100), M. Scott 2010: 97, Sfyroeras 2013, and Zahrnt 2013: 145–50.

112 For the likely date at which the Stoa Poikile was constructed, see L. Shear 1984: 13; see also Develin 1993: 235, Taylor 1998: 223, and Luginbill 2014: 283.

113 Vanderpool 1966 and L. Shear 2016: 13–14.

114 For more on the Athena Promachos, see Palagia 2013. For an explicit connection between the Parthenon and Marathon, see Boardman 1977, 1984, and 1999, but his arguments have been called into question (Hurwit 1999: 224 and 2004: 228–29 and Neils 2005: 220). More broadly accepted is an implicit connection between the Parthenon and Marathon or the Persian War generally (see Hurwit 2005a: 26, Neils 2005: 220, and L. Shear 2016: 117–20).

115 For the identification of the scene depicted in the south frieze of the temple of Athena Nike as the battle of Marathon, see Hurwit 1999: 212–13 and 2004: 186, Palagia 2005: 184–85, and L. Shear 2016: 352–54.

116 Loraux 1986: 161, Vidal-Naquet 1986: 303–304, Stähler 1992: 28–29, Evans 1993: 303–307, Ioakimidou 1997: 190–91, Miller 1997: 32, Flower 2000b: 86–89, Hölkeskamp 2001: 341–49, Gehrke 2003: 20–23 (= 2007: 97–100), Jung 2006: 96–125, Maass 2010: 68, Zahrnt 2010: 118–21 and 2013: 145–47, and Sfyroeras 2013: 80–82. Zaccarini 2017b: 281–300 expresses reservations about attributing such a widespread public building program to Cimon personally, concluding that “it may be more reasonable to regard these monuments as a collective celebration focused on the great themes and figures that represented Athenian supremacy, in which

Cimon might have played a role, but hardly any sort of strong control” (2017: 298).

¹¹⁷ So too does the Stoa Poikile (Jung 2006: 109–122).

¹¹⁸ Pausanias’s description mentions only seven of the ten eponymous heroes of Athens. It has been proposed that Codrus, Theseus, and Philaeus were substituted for the missing three (Vidal-Naquet 1986: 304–309, Amandry 1998: 84, Jacquemin 1999: 191, and M. Scott 2010: 97), but this seems an impossibly unpatriotic and unnecessarily divisive choice in the mid-fifth century. It is rather more plausible that all ten eponymous heroes were part of the original monument, but were later removed to make room for the addition of the three hellenistic monarchs noted by Pausanias (Ioakimidou 1997: 183–84, Krumeich 1997: 99 n.385, and Brogan 2003: 197).

¹¹⁹ Philaeus was the eponymous ancestor of their family; Theseus was alleged to have fought at Marathon, and his bones were restored to Athens by Cimon a few years before the erection of the monument (Ioakimidou 1997: 187–91 and Krumeich 1997: 100).

¹²⁰ Ioakimidou 1997: 180–87, Jacquemin 1999: 190–91, and Zahrnt 2010: 119–20 and 2013: 148. For a similar conclusion, see also Miller 1997: 32 in reference to the Marathon trophy and Athena Promachos; Bollansée 1991: 108–10 and Hölkeskamp 2001: 344–46 in reference to the Stoa Poikile; R. Thomas 1989: 221–26 in reference to the broader literary tradition; and Evans 1993: 305–307 generally.

¹²¹ For the recent expansion of the sacred precinct to include this area, see Holmberg 1979: 24 and M. Scott 2010: 56–59.

¹²² The next Persian-War monument along the Sacred Way would have been the Athenian treasury and statue group, which was also associated with Marathon (M. Scott 2010: 97).

¹²³ Zahrnt 2010: 119 and 2013: 147.

¹²⁴ Ioakimidou 1997: 191–92; Herodotus later drew a direct (and anachronistic) connection between Miltiades at Marathon and Athens’s later imperial ambitions (6.109 with Zahrnt 2010: 120 and 2013: 148, Jung 2013: 260, and Hornblower and Pelling 2017: 248).

¹²⁵ See the recent discussion in Zaccarini 2017b: 38–40.

¹²⁶ Hölkeskamp 2001: 347–48. For more on this justification in the surviving literature, see pp. 127–28.

¹²⁷ For the ongoing popularity of Marathon and its likely causes, see Bollansée 1991: 106–110 in specific reference to the Stoa Poikile, as well as Hölkeskamp 2001: 346–49, Zahrnt 2010: 119–20 and 2013: 147–48, and Sfyroeras 2013: 86–94 more generally; *contra* Gehrke 2003: 23 (= 2007: 100), who assumes that the fall of Cimon must have caused a drop in Marathon’s popularity.

¹²⁸ It is easy to overlook Ionian claims on the victories of the Delian League, but as we shall see in Chapter 4 (p. 153–54), Thucydides’s Mytileneans can speak of their participation in those battles as service on behalf of Greece, not in subordination to Athens. We might also consider two dedications found at the Samian Heraion, one for Eurymedon and another for a battle in Egypt, both of which speak to a Samian claim to those victories (see Dunst 1972: 149–53 and Osborne and Rhodes 2017: 62–65).

¹²⁹ Bommelaer 1991: 113–14 and 1992: 275–79 with earlier bibliography; see also Ioakimidou 1997: 226–32.

¹³⁰ For some notable treatments of the battle of Oenoe, see Jeffery 1965, Meiggs 1972: 469–72, Francis and Vickers 1985a and 1985b, Bollansée 1991, Badian 1993: 97–98, Pritchett 1994, Taylor 1998, Sommerstein 2004, Stansbury-O’Donnell 2005, and Luginbill 2014.

¹³¹ Jeffery 1990: 93.

¹³² For a date in the mid-fifth century, see Jeffery 1965: 49, Meiggs 1972: 469,

Hölscher 1973: 68, Bollansée 1991: 97 n.24, Badian 1993: 97–99, Develin 1993: 240, M. Scott 2010: 101–102, and Luginbill 2014. A vigorous defense of Pliny's date has been mounted by Pritchett 1994: 7–14 and Sommerstein 2004: 140–41 (see also Taylor 1998: 239–40). Pritchett cites a statue base found at Alipheira in Arcadia (SEG 25.450), which dates from the late fifth/early fourth century and has been persuasively identified as the base of a statue that Pausanias attributed to Hypatodorus (8.26.7; see also Polyb. 4.78.1–5). There is, however, no good reason to doubt the date assigned to the Delphi inscription (*pace* Pritchett 1994: 10–14). This would, at the very least, suggest that there were two artists named Hypatodorus, one working with Aristogeiton in the mid-fifth century (our Hypatodorus) and another, perhaps a relative, active in the early fourth (see Orlandos 1968: 130–31). There is an understandable reluctance to accept a second Hypatodorus (Develin 1993: 239 and Pritchett 1994: 9), but that is where our best evidence takes us.

¹³³ See, for example, Jeffery 1965: 49, Meiggs 1972: 469, Hölscher 1973: 68, Bollansée 1991: 96, Badian 1993: 97, and Luginbill 2014: 280–81.

¹³⁴ Even the choice of Delphi as a venue for the monument is significant, since the Argives had historically commemorated their victories at Olympia (M. Scott 2010: 101).

¹³⁵ For more on Argos's alleged Medism, see D. Gillis 1979: 61–62, Lazenby 1993: 106–107, and Green 1996a: 81–82.

¹³⁶ It is worth noting, however, that Herodotus adds that an Athenian embassy under Callias was also in Persia at the same time as the Argives (7.151). This passage has long been associated with the so-called Peace of Callias, whose historicity remains an issue of debate (see Chapter 7, p. 259 n.41). True or not, Herodotus's decision to connect the Athenians with the Argives in such a compromising episode suggests that perhaps their alliance with Argos did as much to incriminate them as it served to exculpate the Argives—at least in certain circles.

¹³⁷ The basic tenor of this shift in Athenian self-presentation has been examined in reference to the Stoa Poikile, where a painting of Marathon and Oenoe were initially or ultimately paired. For a growing emphasis on imperialism, see Bollansée 1991: 106–126 and Hölkeskamp 2001: 345; for an attempt to undercut the Cimonian influence, see Luginbill 2014: 282–88.

¹³⁸ Even this modest claim has long been questioned (Jeffery 1965, Francis and Vickers 1985a, and Boardman 2005: 68), but iconographic clues alone should have made both the participants and their disposition clear to an astute observer. Pausanias was not above error, but throughout his work, he shows himself to be a careful and conscientious reporter of what he saw (Habicht 1985: 28–94). If he says that he saw a battle between Spartans and Athenians, we would be advised to trust him (Bollansée 1991: 112–13, Develin 1993: 237, and Luginbill 2014: 287–88).

¹³⁹ For the date of the Stoa Poikile itself, see note 112. Many doubt that the Oenoe painting was original to the Stoa (Meiggs 1972: 471–72, Develin 1993: 235–37, Ioakimidou 1997: 72–74, and Stansbury-O'Donnell 2005: 74–81). The arguments in favor of such an interpretation are not exceptionally strong (see Francis and Vickers 1985a: 106–107 and Bollansée 1991: 93–94), but even if we follow it *ex hypothesi*, it is likely that the painting was added soon thereafter and so at roughly the same time as the Argive statue group was under construction (Meiggs 1972: 471–72, Develin 1993: 237, De Angelis 1996: 140–42, Ioakimidou 1997: 74, and Luginbill 2014: 282–88).

¹⁴⁰ Stier 1934: 30–31 and Schreiner 1997: 27–28. In this context, we might also note that the Argives who fell at Tanagra were given the exceptional honor of a public monument at Athens (Papazarkadas and Sourlas 2012).

¹⁴¹ For this same sentiment, see Plato, *Rep.* 469b–471c.

¹⁴² For more on the likely evidentiary value of Plato's funerary oration, see [Chapter 4](#), p. 145.

¹⁴³ Although Thucydides has not provided a transcription of Pericles's original funerary oration, it is beyond doubt that he intended his speech to reflect popularly held notions about Athenian history and ideology ([Loraux 1986](#): 8–12).

¹⁴⁴ For a similar conclusion, see [R. Thomas 1989](#): 227 and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 56–57. In this connection we might consider again the temple of Athena Nike. As noted on pp. 121–22, the south frieze likely depicted the battle of Marathon. If one of the other friezes included a depiction of a battle against the Spartans or their allies, as is often suggested (see [Palagia 2005](#): 185–86 with earlier bibliography) or if other elements of the decoration expressly evoked that conflict ([Schultz 2009](#)), we could conclude that that temple ultimately prompted the same basic connections I am positing here.

¹⁴⁵ Very little is known about Argos during the period of their thirty years' truce with Sparta (451–421); see [Tomlinson 1972](#): 116–17.

¹⁴⁶ [R. Thomas 1989](#): 223–24.

¹⁴⁷ [C. Hamilton 1979](#): 48 and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 224.

¹⁴⁸ Plutarch here states that Munychion 16 was the anniversary of the battle of Salamis (see also *Mor.* 349f), but in another context indicates that Boedromion 20 was the actual anniversary (*Cam.* 19.3). Of the two, Boedromion 20 is almost certainly on or about the actual anniversary ([Simon 1983](#): 81 and [Lazenby 1993](#): 118–19), but it remains possible that Munychion 16 was also associated with the famous battle of Salamis ([Simon 1983](#): 81–82 and [Chaniotis 1991](#): 124 and 136) or perhaps even the victory over Persia at Cyprian Salamis ([Badian and Buckler 1975](#)). [Green 1991a](#): 11–13 suggests that Plutarch is in error here and has confused the day on which Lysander first entered Athens (Munychion 16) with a later, second ceremony that did in fact take place on the anniversary of Salamis on Boedromion 20. However the problem is resolved, Lysander seems to have set out to connect Athens's present defeat with their earlier victories over Persia.

¹⁴⁹ [Krentz 1989](#): 189.

¹⁵⁰ [Rood 1999](#): 150 and [Raaflaub 2004](#): 193–202. For more on the uses of this phrase in the Peloponnesian War and beyond, see [Chapter 6](#), pp. 231–32.

¹⁵¹ Pausanias clearly states that it was on the opposite side of the Sacred Way as the Corcyrean Bull (10.9.7), long identified on the right of the street as one enters. Yet quite early on, scholars wanted to see an unidentified portico, also on the right, as the Aegospotami monument (*FD* III 1.50–69). More recent work, however, has proven Pausanias correct (see [Pouilloux and Roux 1963](#): 16–35; see also [Bommelaer 1971a](#): 23–25, 1981: 14–15, and 1991: 108, [Vatin 1981](#): 453, [Habicht 1985](#): 71–75, [Ioakimidou 1997](#): 281, and [M. Scott 2010](#): 105–107).

¹⁵² For Lysander's personal role in the construction of the monument, see [Chapter 1](#), p. 41 n.48.

¹⁵³ The last does not appear in Pausanias's text, but is confirmed by the surviving inscriptional evidence ([Bommelaer 1991](#): 109).

¹⁵⁴ For some possible reconstructions of the monument, see [Pouilloux and Roux 1963](#): 55–60, [Bommelaer 1971a](#), [1971b](#), [1981](#): 14–16, and [1991](#): 108–110, [Ioakimidou 1997](#): 281–82 and 291–97, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 191–92, and [Förtsch 2001](#): 60–61.

¹⁵⁵ Plutarch alludes to these stars on two other occasions. Earlier in the *Lysander* (12.1), he notes that the Dioscuri portended victory before the battle by appearing as twin stars on either side of Lysander's ship. In the *Moralia* (397e–f), he mentions their disappearance as one of several occasions in which the monuments of Delphi presaged disaster for the dedicating party.

¹⁵⁶ [Bommelaer 1981](#): 10 separates the stars from the Aegospotami monument, but

even he concedes that he has no strong reason to do so. [Jacquemin 1999](#): 258 suggests that the stars may have been located near the stars dedicated by the Aeginetans after Salamis and so on the temple terrace, but here again there is no evidence to support such a conclusion.

¹⁵⁷ [Bommelaer 1991](#): 108 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 107, but see [Jacquemin 1999](#): 153 n.319 against this identification of the monument, as well as its association with the golden stars.

¹⁵⁸ [Jacquemin 1999](#): 258–59 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 105–107.

¹⁵⁹ [Hölscher 1974](#): 77–78, [Bommelaer 1981](#): 16, [Ioakimidou 1997](#): 283, [Krumeych 1997](#): 101, and [M. Scott 2008](#): 432 and [2010](#): 107.

¹⁶⁰ [Bommelaer 1971a](#): 22 and [1981](#): 15–16 and [Ioakimidou 1997](#): 281.

¹⁶¹ [M. Scott 2010](#): 107.

¹⁶² For more on Spartan representations of Athens during the Peloponnesian War, see [Chapter 6](#), pp. 231–32.

¹⁶³ [Ioakimidou 1997](#): 282 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 107. [Nafissi 2004a](#): 74 comes close to a similar conclusion when he notes Lysander’s willingness to acknowledge the role of the Spartans and their allies in contrast to Pausanias’s unacceptable epigram. [Ioakimidou 1997](#): 282–87 observes that the presence of divinities associated with Sparta would have further underscored that Lysander was here acting as a representative of the state. We might also note the accompanying epigram in honor of Lysander, which is careful to mention “unconquered Sparta . . . the acropolis of Greece, a fatherland known for the beautiful dance” (*FD* III 1.50). There is, however, a strong possibility that this inscription was added sometime later in the fourth century ([Pouilloux and Roux 1963](#): 59, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 220, [M. Scott 2010](#): 117, and [Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012](#): 51–52).

¹⁶⁴ [Gauer 1968](#): 73–74, [Bommelaer 1981](#): 10–11, [Jacquemin 2001](#): 103, [Meyer 2005](#): 282, and [Stephenson 2016](#): 47. The Aeginetan monument was presumably still located in the temple of Apollo, where Herodotus had seen it some years before work on the Aegospotami monument began (8.122).

¹⁶⁵ For the place of Salamis in Athenian social memory, see [Ruffing 2006](#).

¹⁶⁶ [Pace Jacquemin 1999](#): 259, who concludes that the Spartans have only the Marathon monument in mind here.

¹⁶⁷ For more on the challenges posed to Spartan power at Delphi in the years after Leuctra, see [Jacquemin 1999](#): 259 and [M. Scott 2010](#): 114–18.

¹⁶⁸ Pausanias says that this monument was erected by the Tegeans alone (10.9.5), but the surviving inscription clearly points to the Arcadian League (*FD* III 1.3); see [Pouilloux and Roux 1963](#): 23–30, [Bommelaer 1991](#): 104–106, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 62, [M. Scott 2008](#) and [2010](#): 117, [Maass 2010](#): 68, and [Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012](#): 71.

¹⁶⁹ We do not know what event the Arcadians are here commemorating. Our principal source for their actions in the fourth century, Xenophon, records no major engagement they won over the Spartans (see [M. Scott 2008](#): 431 n.8). For the possibility that the Aegospotami monument was itself changed in reaction to this monument, see [M. Scott 2010](#): 117.

¹⁷⁰ [M. Scott 2008](#): 433.

¹⁷¹ For more on Spartan imperialism after the Peloponnesian War, see [C. Hamilton 1979](#) and [Cartledge 1987](#).

¹⁷² See [Chapter 4](#).

¹⁷³ [Gehrke 2001](#).

¹⁷⁴ [Gehrke](#) surmises that “the wide resonance of the Magnesians’ initiative and the marked correspondences in the references and in the structures of argumentation between their appeals and the answers they received show very clearly that we are dealing with quite ordinary, indeed typical, phenomena (2001: 297).

¹⁷⁵ Gehrke 2001: 301.

¹⁷⁶ Gehrke is, of course, not unaware that Greek recollections of the past were also marked by contestation, but it receives relatively little attention in his study of Magnesia (2001: 304); but see Gehrke 2010: 17–23 for a more extensive discussion of the divisive impact of the polis on Greek memory.

Time and Space

Introduction

Our examination of memorial contestation at Delphi provides an important, but ultimately limited view on the larger tradition, one that privileges individual points of disagreement. What remains to be seen is whether these differences extended to larger perceptions of the Persian War as a whole. Did individual commemorations compete within the conceptual limits of a single, broadly accepted master narrative, or did each evoke its own more or less distinct parochial master narrative? To give this theoretical question a bit more life, we might summon again the image of Aeschines walking through Delphi on his way to that fateful meeting of the Amphictyony in 340/39. When he saw the various contradictory commemorations that lined his path, how did he contextualize the events those monuments recalled? When did the war commemorated all around him begin, when did it end, and what had it all meant? Were the answers to these questions fully formulated and firmly held long before he arrived at Delphi, or were they fungible and contingent on the monument that happened to catch his eye?—and if so, to what extent? Finally, would his fellow delegates walking that same path on that same day have had roughly similar notions of the war evoked all around them? The relationship between master narratives and the commemorative narratives publicized by the states has gone largely overlooked. The focus has remained firmly on specific points of contestation, and the overall impression is one of self-interested quibbling within a generally agreed-upon narrative frame.¹ In this chapter and the next, however, I argue that the bitter disputes we examined in [Chapter 3](#) represent merely the most visible peaks of fundamental disagreements about the length, extent, and meaning of the war that the Greeks so often called to mind at Delphi and elsewhere.

I begin here by examining the temporal and spatial boundaries the Greeks set on the Persian War. Memorial communities organize a

nearly infinite web of past happenings into discrete and meaningful master narratives, in part by imposing *narrative frames* that indicate the proper time and space in which a significant grouping of events occurred. The imposition of temporal boundaries is called *periodization*, and its implications have received significant scholarly attention.² The process by which master narratives are mapped onto geographical space has received less, perhaps because it has traditionally been thought a less problematic notion.³ But complex collections of events do not always have an obvious epicenter, and their consequences seldom stop completely at political or geographic boundaries. In analogy with periodization, this process is called *spatialization*.⁴ Some of these spatial and temporal boundaries are imposed with the express purpose of emphasizing or excluding certain events; others appear the result of more casual thought. A citizen of the United States may, for example, date the beginning of the Second World War to December 7, 1941, while not explicitly or even consciously intending to exclude earlier events in Europe or Asia. Such choices are telling nonetheless. Some may at first glance appear more obvious (or historically accurate) than others, but all are socially constructed. As scholars routinely lament, these divisions in time and space say more about those imposing them than they do about the events themselves.⁵ It is, however, this very defect of periodization and spatialization that can shed light on the master narratives that Aeschines and others would have used to understand and contextualize the commemorative narratives they encountered. In the following I examine the surviving indications of the periodizations and spatializations imposed on the Persian War, to show that there was not one narrative frame for the Persian War, but several; that these different versions of the Persian War were natural extensions of the same kinds of contestations we examined in [Chapter 3](#); and finally, that the choice between one narrative frame or another corresponded to an individual's polis.

The Persian War and Its Narrative Frames

It is important to begin by demonstrating the simple fact that the Greeks did not recall the Persian War within the confines of a single, broadly accepted narrative frame, since a quick survey of modern studies of the war and its memory could easily leave the opposite impression. When scholars refer to the conflict between the Greeks and Persians, they often call it the Persian Wars (or *die Perserkriege*, *les guerres médiques*, *le guerre persiane*, and so forth). The term has strong ancient support and could legitimately be used to designate any

number of the conflicts between the Greeks and Persians that occurred between Cyrus's conquest of Ionia in ca. 545 and the effective conclusion of the Delian League's war of revenge in ca. 450.⁶ But very often it is used to refer to a specific combination of events that occurred in mainland Greece and spanned the eleven years from Marathon in 490 to the "final" defeat of Xerxes's invasion at Plataea (and Mycale) in 479.⁷ For ease of reference, I call this the *canonical* narrative frame in the following. Such a frame privileges certain events (Marathon, Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, and Plataea), participants (Athens and Sparta—in that order), and ways of thinking about the war (an unprovoked foreign invasion). It is for this reason that I have avoided the seductively familiar term in the present study, opting rather for "the Persian War" throughout.⁸ To be fair, the canonical narrative frame detailed earlier is no modern invention and has significant ancient support,⁹ but there is ultimately no good reason to privilege this particular way of periodizing and spatializing the war. As we shall see in the following, the Greeks used a variety of narrative frames throughout the classical period. The basic point is amply demonstrated by a brief examination of the periodizations and spatializations used by Herodotus, Thucydides, Plato in the *Menexenus*, and Diodorus Siculus, who drew extensively on the fourth-century historian Ephorus for his account of the Persian War.

Herodotus's Persian War is much longer than the canonical periodization. Its beginning occupies Herodotus's attention already in the preface of his work. There, he sets himself the specific task of establishing why (and implicitly when) the Greeks and barbarians began to fight each other:

Herodotus of Halicarnassus here presents his research so that human events do not fade with time and so that the great and wonderful deeds—some brought forth by the Greeks, others by the barbarians—not go unsung, especially the cause that led them to make war on each other. (τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι: tr. Purvis modified)

After rejecting a mythological explanation for the war, Herodotus argues that the cause of the fighting between the Greeks and barbarians was Croesus, the king of Lydia (1.6). He holds this distinction because he was the first of the barbarians who "subjugated and demanded tribute from some of the Greeks" (1.6.2, tr. Purvis modified).¹⁰ It is important to note that Herodotus is not here trying to establish that Croesus initiated a series of events that would eventually lead to war with the Persians.¹¹ Indeed, the Persians are not even mentioned in the preface.¹² Rather, Herodotus begins a much longer Greco-barbarian war, of which the early conquests of Ionia by the Lydians and Persians, the Ionian Revolt, Marathon, and

Xerxes's invasion are all part.¹³ Herodotus concludes his chronological narrative of this longer war with the campaign year of 479 (9.121), and there is a strong case for setting the ending of his war in that year as well.¹⁴ But unlike the beginning of the war, Herodotus does not expressly demarcate its end. His historical narrative of the war simply stops.¹⁵ Herodotus was aware that the conflict with Persia continued in both Europe and beyond,¹⁶ but it is unclear whether he would have considered these actions as part of the same war begun by Croesus in Book 1.¹⁷ When he looks forward to the removal of Pausanias from command and the institution of the Delian League, Herodotus does draw a distinction between driving out the Persians (διωσόμενοι τὸν Πέρσῃν) and fighting over their land (περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἤδη τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο: 8.3.2), but this can hardly be pressed. We might, however, look back to the causes of the war for clues about its conclusion. For Herodotus the war begins when Croesus compels the Greeks of Ionia to pay tribute. Before that time, all the Greeks had been free (πρὸ δὲ τῆς Κροίσου ἀρχῆς πάντες Ἕλληνες ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι: 1.6.3). Perhaps with the campaign year of 479 the conditions were now present to return the Aegean world to its prior state.¹⁸ Of course, the dark irony of the *Histories* is that this opportunity will be lost, as Athens quickly picks up where Persia left off.¹⁹ But this important change of cast may have convinced Herodotus that the war begun almost eighty years before had now come to a definitive close.

Herodotus's account of this massive Greco-barbarian war is not without seams, points at which the narrative signals a significant break within or expansion of the conflict. Before a Persian attack on Naxos in ca. 500, Herodotus notes that there was "a rather brief reprieve from troubles" (οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄνεσις κακῶν: 5.28, tr. Purvis). Soon thereafter followed the Ionian Revolt and the Athenian decision to support it, which, for Herodotus, constituted "the beginning of evils (ἀρχὴ κακῶν) for both the Greeks and the barbarians" (5.97.3, tr. Purvis modified).²⁰ We might also consider the opening chapters of Book 7, where Herodotus seems to reintroduce the characters and causes of the war and then proceeds at a significantly slower pace down to the end of the work.²¹ It is notable, however, that even within the internal architecture of Herodotus's larger war narrative, Marathon does not act as a beginning, nor Plataea as an end. Marathon is lauded (incorrectly) as the first time the Greeks "endured the sight of the Persians' clothing and the men wearing it" (6.112.3, tr. Purvis modified),²² but the campaign is presented as part of the Ionian Revolt and its aftermath.²³ Even the narrative of the battle itself is relatively brief in comparison with those of Xerxes's invasion.²⁴ Plataea is a much grander affair, but is

immediately followed by the battle of Mycale, which Herodotus closely connects to the former by repeating the claim that the two occurred on the same day (9.100). Even after these two battles, Herodotus's narrative of the war goes on to describe a subsequent meeting of the war council (9.106) and concludes with the last significant action of the 479 campaign year, the Athenian-led attack on Sestos (9.114–21). This periodization of the Persian War ultimately bears little resemblance to the one so familiar from modern studies.

Herodotus's periodization of the war has clear implications for his spatialization. By beginning the war with Croesus, Herodotus focuses our attention initially on Ionia (1.6 and 1.92.1). Mainland Greece plays a tangential and somewhat ambiguous role in this early phase of the war. Indeed, soon after Croesus completes his conquest of Ionia, the foreign aggressor pursues friendly relations with the most powerful states of mainland Greece (1.56), ultimately concluding an alliance with the Spartans (1.69). Our focus remains on the east as Croesus falls to Cyrus, and Ionia comes under threat once again (1.141). The Spartans are asked for military aid and refuse. They do send an embassy to the Persian king, but to little effect (1.152–53). When Ionia too falls to the Persians, Herodotus evokes Croesus's earlier conquest by concluding "that, then, is how Ionia was enslaved for the second time" (1.169.2. tr. Purvis). This spatial focus in Book 1 is reinforced by the central role played by the failed Ionian Revolt, which stands at the heart of Herodotus's overall account and represents arguably the most significant expansion of the Greco-barbarian war.²⁵ When the Ionians are defeated, Herodotus recalls the beginning of his work, concluding that "thus the Ionians were reduced to slavery for the third time, the first being at the hands of the Lydians, and then twice in succession by the Persians" (6.32, tr. Purvis).²⁶ The remainder of the *Histories* is set in motion by this revolt, as Darius and then Xerxes attempt to punish the Athenians and Eretrians for the aid they gave to the Ionians in three successive punitive campaigns: Mardonius's in 492, Datis and Artephernes's in 490, and finally, Xerxes's invasion in 480 and 479.²⁷ The narrative of the remaining books does remain largely in mainland Greece, but returns to Ionia in the final chapters of Book 9 with the battle of Mycale, the debate at Samos, and the attack on Sestos. As his account of Mycale draws to a close, Herodotus notes that "thus for the second time Ionia revolted from the Persians" (9.104, tr. Purvis). The last major battle of the *Histories* is therefore made to evoke both the Ionian Revolt and by extension the initial subjugation of Ionia to Croesus with which Herodotus opened his account.²⁸ By beginning the war much earlier than Marathon and extending it down to include the final battles of 479, Herodotus embeds the invasions of mainland

Greece within a much larger conflict centered on Ionia.²⁹

Thucydides framed the Persian War much more narrowly than did Herodotus and most modern studies. When Thucydides compares the Persian War to the Peloponnesian War, he claims that “the most extensive action in previous history was the Persian War (τὸ Μηδικόν): yet even that was brought to a swift conclusion by two battles at sea and two on land” (1.23.1, tr. Hammond).³⁰ The identity of these four battles has occasioned much speculation, but Marathon was almost certainly not among them.³¹ Indeed, Thucydides’s claim that the war had a “swift conclusion” (ταχέϊαν τὴν κρίσιν) is most easily understood if we assume that he had only the great battles of Xerxes’s invasion in mind. Earlier references to the war give us further reason to exclude Marathon. When Thucydides dates the use of triremes in Greece, he notes that the Sicilians and Corcyreans acquired them “shortly before the Persian War and the death of Darius” (ὀλίγον τε πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν καὶ τοῦ Δαρείου θανάτου) and concludes that “these were the last navies of any significance in Greece before the expedition of Xerxes” (πρὸ τῆς Ξέρξου στρατείας: 1.14.2, tr. Hammond modified). By using these three events in conjunction, Thucydides leaves the distinct impression that the Persian War did not properly begin until after Darius’s death and so after Marathon.³² We get much the same impression when Thucydides briefly reviews the events of the Persian War in the course of his Archaeology:

Not many years after the deposition of the Greek tyrants the battle of Marathon was fought between the Persians and the Athenians (ἡ ἐν Μαραθῶνι μάχη Μήδων πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐγένετο). Ten years later the barbarians returned with their huge armament for the subjection of Greece (ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δουλωσόμενος ἦλθεν). With great danger impending, the Spartans, as the leading power, took command of the Greeks allied for the war, and in the face of the Persian invasion the Athenians decided to abandon their city: they decamped, took to their ships, and became sailors. A joint effort had driven away the barbarians. (1.18-1-2, tr. Hammond)

Both invasions are mentioned together, but they are hardly part of the same war. The battle of Marathon is an attack on the Athenians alone, not the Greeks generally, as the Athenians often claimed and Herodotus affirmed.³³ There is no talk of enslaving the Greeks until Thucydides turns to Xerxes’s invasion, which receives almost seven times as much attention. For Thucydides, the Persian War begins with Xerxes and the Spartan-led resistance to his invasion.

The exact point at which the war ended is discussed explicitly in the second preface to the Pentecontaetia (1.97). The digression itself begins eight chapters earlier with the aftermath of the battle of Mycale (1.89). Thucydides goes on to note the siege of Sestos (1.89.2), the reconstruction of Athens’s walls (1.89.3-93), the ouster of

Pausanias in the next year (1.94–95), and finally the institution of the Delian League (1.96). It is at this point that Thucydides reintroduces the Pentecontaetia:

At first the Athenians were the leaders of autonomous allies who met together to make their policy in common. But in the period intervening between the Persian War and this war there was huge Athenian activity in the prosecution of war and the management of political affairs, activity undertaken against the barbarians, against their own rebellious allies, and against any Peloponnesian state which crossed their path at any time in their various ventures. (1.97.1, tr. Hammond)

Thucydides defines the events described within the following digression as occurring between the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars (μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ), which implies that before this point the narrative was still concerned in some way with the Persian War proper and that the institution of the Delian League in 478/7 sets off that period from the interwar years that followed.³⁴

Thucydides's chronologically short Persian War encompasses events from mainland Greece to Ionia and even Cyprus, where Pausanias led the Hellenic-League fleet before being removed from command (1.94.2). But his account is manifestly focused on mainland Greece, specifically Sparta. By excluding Marathon, Athens loses place of pride in the contest against Persia. Rather, the war begins when the Spartans organize resistance to Xerxes's invasion (1.18.2) and ends when they yield leadership in the fight to the Athenians (1.97).³⁵ Thucydides is fully aware that the conflict with the Persians will continue under Athenian leadership long past 478/7 and explicitly mentions later campaigns undertaken "against the barbarians" (πρὸς τε τὸν βάρβαρον) in the second preface. He will go on to recount the capture of the Persian outpost at Eion (1.98.1) and the battle of Eurymedon (1.100.1) as well as campaigns to Egypt (1.104 and 109–110) and Cyprus (1.112), all of which could be considered part of the Persian War (and indeed was by others). But Thucydides's Persian War is inextricably linked to Sparta and its allies.³⁶

Plato's *Menexenus* stands out among the sources discussed here, since its Persian-War narrative is embedded in a funerary oration delivered by Socrates within the context of a conversation with an aspiring Athenian politician, named Menexenus. It is therefore not Plato, but rather his speaker, Socrates, who imposes the narrative frames that appear there. Moreover, the funerary oration itself is clearly a parody, and we must use caution when extrapolating broader implications from it. But in all likelihood Plato is here mocking well-known elements of the typical funerary oration. If so, then those elements can still shed light on the narrative frames in use at the time.³⁷ Socrates begins his account of the Persian War with the

Marathon campaign and so is very much in accord with our canonical war.³⁸ He does set out to provide some context for the Persian menace, but despite enumerating the other peoples that Cyrus, Cambyses, and Darius conquered, he never mentions the Ionians by name. Rather, he notes only that Darius had control of the sea and islands (239d–e). The event that Herodotus saw as the immediate cause of the Marathon campaign, the Ionian Revolt (specifically Athenian and Eretrian participation in the attack on Sardis) is noted only in passing and is given far less emphasis. Plato’s speaker maintains that Darius justified the Marathon campaign by “accusing us and the Eretrians, as a pretext, of having plotted against Sardis” (αἰτιασάμενος δὲ Δαρεῖος ἡμᾶς τε καὶ Ἐρετριᾶς, Σάρδεσιν ἐπιβουλεῦσαι προφασίζόμενος; 240a, tr. Bury modified). The larger Ionian Revolt is omitted. The attack on Sardis is reduced to a plot, and he even calls the reality of that plot into question by presenting it as a self-serving allegation.³⁹ Without the Ionian Revolt, the attack on Marathon becomes the opening salvo in a war of Persian aggression.⁴⁰ This war does not, however, end with Plataea, Sestos, or even with the foundation of the Delian League. Plataea does constitute the point at which “the greatest and most formidable danger” had passed (241c, tr. Bury), but Plato goes on to mention the final effort to sweep away the Persian threat and to “put the finishing touch to the work of salvation” (τέλος τῆς σωτηρίας ἐπέθεσαν; 241d, tr. Bury).⁴¹ Here he notes the very campaigns that Herodotus implicitly and Thucydides explicitly exclude: the battles of Eurymedon, Cyprian Salamis, and even the campaign in Egypt. It is only after these battles that Plato concludes his narrative of the Persian War: “this war was endured to the end (οὗτος . . . διηγντλήθη ὁ πόλεμος) by all our citizens who warred against the barbarians in defense of all the other Greek-speaking peoples as well as themselves” (241e–242a, tr. Bury).

Plato’s Socrates spatializes his war within an even wider area than does Herodotus—from mainland Greece to Cyprus and Egypt—but this remains a story centered on Athens, which is to be expected given the genre in which he is speaking.⁴² Not only does Marathon check the initial Persian campaign against Greece, but earns the first prize among the Persian-War victories (240e). Athenian heroics at Artemisium and Salamis, another battle fought in Attica, secure second place (240e–241a).⁴³ Thermopylae, where Athens played no role, is omitted.⁴⁴ Third place is given to Plataea (241c), but the battle itself garners significantly less attention than Marathon or Artemisium/Salamis.⁴⁵ Spartan participation is noted, but undercut: “in this exploit, at last, the Spartans cooperated with the Athenians” (κοινὸν ἦδη τοῦτο Λακεδαιμονίων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων; 241c, tr. Bury). The Spartans’ involvement is late and merely equal to that of

the Athenians, despite the popular tradition that credited the victory largely to the Spartans.⁴⁶ By ending with the campaigns of the Delian League, Plato might at first glance seem to acknowledge the contribution of a broader cast of allies. In point of fact, the Ionians played an active role in their own liberation and the subsequent fighting against Persia.⁴⁷ But in the *Menexenus* these are Athenian victories (241c–e). There is no indication that the Ionians participated at all. In fact, Plato mentions the Ionians only once at the beginning of his treatment of these battles, and it is hardly flattering: “in the period that followed [Plataea], many cities of the Greeks were still with the barbarians” (μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο πολλὰ μὲν πόλεις τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔτι ἦσαν μετὰ τοῦ βαρβάρου: 241d, tr. Bury modified). This might simply indicate that the Ionians were under Persian rule at the time, but might just as easily imply that they were arrayed against the Athenians.⁴⁸ In either case, the Ionians hold an ambiguous position, which serves to alienate them from the glorious battles fought in the east. The horizon of the Persian War has expanded, but the center remains firmly in Athens.

Our final example, Diodorus Siculus, offers a chronologically small, but geographically massive war. In so doing, he is almost certainly drawing on his principal source, Ephorus.⁴⁹ After briefly describing the siege of Sestos, Diodorus concludes his account of the Persian War: “now the Persian War, as it has been called, after lasting two years, came to the end which we have described” (ὁ μὲν οὖν Μηδικὸς ὀνομασθεὶς πόλεμος γενόμενος διετὴς τοῦτο ἔσχε τὸ πέρας: 11.37.6, tr. Oldfather modified). This places the ending of Diodorus’s war in agreement with the implicit ending in Herodotus.⁵⁰ But by giving his Persian War a mere two-year duration, Diodorus’s account resembles the much shorter confines of the war as defined by Thucydides.⁵¹ Spatially, Diodorus’s vision of the Persian War is much broader, however. In the opening chapters of Book 11, Xerxes dispatches ambassadors to the Carthaginians and convinces them to join him by invading Sicily at the same time as he invades mainland Greece (11.1.4).⁵² This is no mere diversionary tactic. The size of the force assembled by the Carthaginians is remarkable—over 300,000 troops and 200 ships (11.1.5). Their ultimate defeat at Himera is a Greek victory on par with Plataea, and its mastermind, the Sicilian tyrant Gelon, is compared with Themistocles (11.23.1). These laudatory comparisons may well echo Timaeus, a hellenistic historian and Diodorus’s likely source for Sicilian affairs,⁵³ but the sentiment certainly appeared in Ephorus as well, who claimed that “Gelon . . . by fighting it out [at Himera] not only liberated the Sicilians, but all Greece as well” (Γέλωνα . . . διαμαχησάμενον μὴ μόνον τοὺς Σικελιώτας ἐλευθερῶσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύμπασαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα:

FGrHist 70 F186).⁵⁴ The close connection Diodorus/Ephorus drew between events in Sicily and those in mainland Greece serves to expand the spatial boundaries of the conflict greatly and at the same time to dispute its center, as the victory at Himera is placed into competition with those of mainland Greece.⁵⁵ Emphasis on mainland Greece is further dissipated in Diodorus's treatment of Mycale.⁵⁶ There the Ionians do not just play a notable role, as they do in Herodotus, but the critical role. Indeed, the battle hangs in the balance until the Samians and Milesians defected to the Greek side (11.36.4). Once the tide had been turned, almost all of the other Greeks in Persian service defected and joined in the battle (11.36.5–6). Diodorus's Persian War, though chronologically short, is spatially coextensive with almost the whole of the Greek world.

The four preceding examples yield a variety of periodizations and spatializations of the Persian War. In time the war could start as early as Croesus's attack on the Ionians in the mid-sixth century and end as late as the mid fifth-century victories of the Delian League. Within that range, the war could have as short a duration as two or three years (Diodorus and Thucydides, respectively), extend to 40 years (Plato), or swell to almost 70 (Herodotus). Spatializations show no greater consistency, as the boundaries of the conflict could be extended far to the east or west. Within these shifting borders, our authors variously centered their accounts in mainland Greece (Athens or Sparta), Ionia, and Sicily. The range of possibilities presented by these four authors alone suggests that we have no good reason to assume that the Greeks viewed the Persian War through a single narrative frame, much less the canonical one that modern scholars tend to use in their historical reconstructions.

Narrative Frames in Practice

The authors cited in the preceding prove particularly illustrative because they are expressly interested in narrative frames for their own sake. Herodotus, Thucydides, and Diodorus were historians; Plato, a philosopher. They often articulate their narrative frames within the context of ongoing academic debates about such questions. Herodotus argues for beginning the war with Croesus in opposition to the views of the “learned Persians,” who maintained that the beginnings of the war lay in mythological conflicts between East and West.⁵⁷ Thucydides asserts that the Persian War had a “swift conclusion” to show that the Peloponnesian War was far longer and so far greater, likely with Herodotus himself in mind.⁵⁸ Diodorus's source, Ephorus, may have also been thinking of Herodotus's rather ungenerous view of

Sicily's contribution to the war when he asserted its central importance.⁵⁹ Plato's *Menexenus* might at first glance seem to offer a more popular view of the matter since it is written in the style of a funerary oration, but Plato is nevertheless critiquing those views for his educated readership.⁶⁰ At best, such sources leave us blind to the relationship between these narrative frames and the bitter contestations we examined in [Chapter 3](#); at worst, they suggest that these debates were exclusively academic and so largely divorced from the actual process of collective remembering, veritable examples of Nora's *lieux de mémoire*. It is important to show that the practice of reshaping the temporal and spatial boundaries of the Persian War was no pedantic enterprise, but featured prominently in public discourse on the past.⁶¹

One way to approach this question would be to return to the very commemorative narratives that occupied our attention in [Chapter 3](#), and indeed there is much to say in this regard. The Serpent Column, for example, claims to enumerate the allies who "fought the war," but includes only those who fought at Salamis and Plataea. Obviously such a claim imposes a rather narrow periodization of the war (480–79) and an even tighter spatialization by excluding those who participated at Mycale in Ionia. Each of the surviving counter-narratives on the temple terrace (and the Marathon statue group as well) contests that narrow frame by directing attention to victories won earlier, later, or further afield. But much here must be inferred, and while some inferences may be drawn with relative confidence, the sum total does not make a firm basis for a detailed examination. Better results emerge from our literary sources, which are on the whole more explicit about such matters. We might naturally think of the Attic orators, but we would then be restricted unnecessarily to the political discourse of a single state. We need an interstate perspective, and for that we must turn to the embassy speeches composed by our extant historians. Such evidence naturally raises questions of authenticity, but for our present purposes it does not greatly matter whether the references to the Persian War or even the larger arguments they advance were actually used on the occasions our historians claim. It matters only that they have accurately related how the various periodizations and spatializations of the Persian War were generally used in contemporary political debates.⁶² I focus here on six speeches in which representatives of one state employ a discernable narrative frame of the Persian War before the representatives or populace of another. The first comes from Herodotus, but the remaining five are found in Thucydides.⁶³

It may at first glance be surprising that Herodotus's speakers were already imposing narrative frames on the war before its conclusion,

but as his war neared its climax, the thoughts of his characters turned progressively to its beginnings.⁶⁴ It was certainly on the minds of the Spartans who were hastily dispatched to Athens, to counter Persian peace proposals after Salamis in the winter of 480/79. The Spartans bluntly ask the Athenians to refuse the offer and remain within the Hellenic League. They begin by claiming that their defection would be unjust since the Athenians were the cause of the present war: “you are the ones who incited this war (τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον), while we, for our part, had no desire for it” (8.142.2, tr. Purvis). The logic of this argument—that the Athenians foisted their own troubles onto the rest of Greece and so must now see it through—works only within the temporal frame presented by the Spartan speakers. Their Persian War begins with the Ionian Revolt, when (according to Herodotus) the Spartans wisely refused to participate, but the Athenians foolishly agreed (5.97.2).⁶⁵ An earlier beginning (as Herodotus himself maintained) would show the Spartans involved since the time of Croesus, while a later beginning might suggest that the Athenians were the innocent victims of unprovoked Persian aggression directed at the whole of Greece.

The implications of the Spartans’ periodization are reinforced when they immediately proceed to spatialize the war: “the conflict was over your *archê*, but now it spreads to all Greece as well” (περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρης ἀρχῆς ὃ ἄγων ἐγένετο· νῦν δὲ φέρει καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα: 8.142.2). The word *archê* has caused some problems. Its most natural meaning is empire, but talk of an empire in 480 would be patently anachronistic and indeed even more so when we remember that the Spartans have the earlier Ionian Revolt in mind. We might soften the translation by suggesting that Herodotus here understands *archê* to mean something closer to power, dominion, or sphere of influence, but since the conflict the Spartans have in mind took place in Ionia, any of these renderings must still imply a level of Athenian influence that is not strictly accurate for the first decades of the fifth century. An Athenian *archê* over Ionia did, however, exist when Herodotus was writing, and many have concluded that he is here presenting the Spartan argument in terms familiar to his audience.⁶⁶ However we understand the Athenian *archê* in this passage, Herodotus’s Spartan speakers have constructed a political space of particular concern to the Athenians and have restricted the early phases of the Persian War to it. The Persian War is not then a war over Greece, but rather a war over an Athenian *archê* in Ionia that has subsequently expanded to endanger the rest of Greece.⁶⁷ The implication of the Spartans’ narrative frame is that the Persian War was fought by Greece on behalf of Athens, not (as Plato will articulate in his *Menexenus*) by Athens on behalf of Greece.⁶⁸

Our next example comes from an Athenian embassy that, according to Thucydides, delivered a speech before the Spartans and their allies on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. In 432/1 delegates from the Peloponnesian League arrived at Sparta and demanded a declaration of war. Athenian ambassadors, in Sparta on other business, were allowed to respond. They begin their case against war by showing that the Athenians are worthy of the empire they currently hold (1.73.1). It is here that they provide an extended treatment of the Persian War (1.73.2–75.2). The narrative frame Thucydides has his Athenians apply to the war is markedly different from his own, but evocative of that used in the *Menexenus*. After dismissing the usual appeals to mythology, the Athenian ambassadors turn to the Persian War (τὰ Μηδικά: 1.73.2). The first event mentioned is the battle of Marathon: “we claim that at Marathon we alone faced the barbarian threat in the forefront” (1.73.4).⁶⁹ The Athenians evade the messy question of causation that so interested the Spartan embassy in Herodotus.⁷⁰ Here Persia is presented as an unprovoked aggressor.⁷¹ The Athenian ambassadors then jump directly to Salamis, skipping both Thermopylae and Artemisium. The effect is to keep the action of the war centered on Attica, where Athens once again takes the lead in turning back the Persian threat (1.73–74).⁷² These temporal and spatial frames serve to underscore the heroic actions of the Athenians on behalf of Sparta and others. In so doing, they reverse the implications of the Spartan embassy. There, the beginning of the Persian War suggested that Athens was in Sparta’s debt; here it is the Spartans and others who owe the Athenians for bearing the brunt of the war.

Equally telling is where the Athenian ambassadors choose to end the Persian War. In the course of arguing that they had gained their empire justly, the Athenians claim that “it came about because you were not willing to stay on to deal with the remnants of Persian power, and because the allies, approaching us of their own accord, asked us to become their leaders” (1.75.2, tr. Hammond modified). As in the *Menexenus*, the Persian War here does not stop with Plataea or Mycale, but includes the later Delian-League campaigns against Persia.⁷³ Extending the Persian War in this way presents some distinct advantages for the Athenian ambassadors. A short war runs the risk of giving (undue) credit to the Spartans for leading the allied effort during Xerxes’s invasion and for their decisive contribution to the victory at Plataea. A longer war ends with Athens once again in a commanding role. Sparta, on the other hand, fades to the background, “not willing to stay on to deal with the remnants of Persian power” (οὐκ ἔθελεῖν παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου). The Athenians again hint at Sparta’s failure to see the war to its

putative conclusion when they observe that “we have no doubt that if at that time you had stayed on through the whole affair (ὑπομείναντες διὰ παντός) and had become hated in your command, as we did and were, you would have become just as burdensome to the allies” (1.76.1, tr. Hammond modified).⁷⁴ Despite the fact that this longer war ends with events in Ionia, Athens remains the center of attention. The Ionians, who played a central role in the subsequent campaigns against Persia, are credited with nothing except seeking out Athenian leadership (1.75.2). As in the Spartan embassy, events in the eastern Aegean are closely tied to the Athenian *archê*, here certainly their empire (1.75.1). The expanded boundaries of the war serve only to emphasize further Athens’s central role.

Our third example comes from the opening years of the Peloponnesian War when in 428 a planned revolt by Athens’s nominally independent ally, Mytilene, is exposed. The Athenians attack and besiege the city. Mytilenean ambassadors are dispatched to Sparta, where they are asked to address the Peloponnesian allies at the upcoming Olympic Games. The Mytileneans are principally concerned to justify their present revolt to their would-be allies, and it is in that connection that they trace the beginnings of their alliance with Athens to the Persian War: “our alliance with the Athenians began when you withdrew from the Persian War and they stayed on to finish the task” (ἀπολιπόντων μὲν ὑμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου, παραμεινάντων δὲ ἐκείνων πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων: Thuc. 3.10.2, tr. Hammond). This periodization of the Persian War’s end is evocative of Plato’s *Menexenus* and the speech of the Athenian ambassadors. Here too the war extends beyond Plataea and Mycale, as the Spartans again leave a conflict that is still ongoing.⁷⁵ But this basic similarity is here reframed as the Mytileneans begin, not with Marathon, but after Mycale. The change is understandable since the Mytileneans would hardly want to draw attention to those phases of the war in which they fought on the Persian side. But a late beginning posed its own problems. Athens undeniably led the effort to punish the Persians after Xerxes’s invasion. By focusing on these later campaigns, the Mytileneans risked reinforcing the very relationship they were most eager to downplay before their Peloponnesian audience. Thucydides’s ambassadors seem aware of the problem and in the next sentence qualify their initial claim by insisting that “we did not become allies with the Athenians for the enslavement of the Greeks, but rather allies of the Greeks for their liberation from the Persians” (ζύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἑλλησιν: 3.10.3).⁷⁶ It is not certain what Thucydides means by “the Greeks” here. Some have suggested the Delian League; others, the ethnic group.⁷⁷ We might

also consider the Hellenic League, which the Mytileneans joined after Mycale (Hdt. 9.106.4).⁷⁸ However understood, the term evokes the broader community of Greeks and serves to reframe Mytilenean participation in these events significantly. Both the Spartan and Athenian ambassadors, noted earlier, had presented events in the eastern Aegean as falling within the Athenian *archê*. By connecting their actions, not to Athens, but the Greeks generally, the Mytileneans challenge this assumption and place the later campaigns against Persia firmly within the Greek sphere and so of concern to the Peloponnesian allies assembled at Olympia.⁷⁹ The overall effect is to cast the Mytileneans as the high-minded victims of Sparta's failure to prosecute a manifestly relevant war to its "natural" conclusion.⁸⁰

Within a year of the Mytilenean speech, Plataean delegates cite the Persian War in their desperate plea for mercy before a commission of five Spartans. Plataea had been under siege since 429. By 427 its defenders were on the point of starvation and surrendered themselves to the Spartans, only to find that they would be judged solely on whether they had benefited the Spartans during the present war (3.52). Faced with the prospect of summary execution, the Plataeans begged for leave to address the Spartans at greater length. Throughout their rambling speech, the Plataeans make repeated references to the Persian War, to show that they had been Sparta's benefactor in the past, if not in the present.⁸¹ Their Persian-War narrative is specifically framed for that purpose. When they first turn to that topic in earnest, they begin with the events of Xerxes's invasion:

At the time of the Persian War we were the only Boeotians to join the fight for the freedom of Greece. Although we are inlanders, we fought with the fleet at Artemisium, and in the battle which took place in our own territory we were there in support of you and Pausanias: in all the other dangers which threatened the Greeks in those times we took a part out of proportion to our strength. (3.54.3-4, tr. Hammond)

The choice to begin in 480 is striking, since the Plataeans famously took part in the battle of Marathon in 490.⁸² The Plataeans do make mention of "all the other dangers which threatened the Greeks in those times," and Thucydides may very well have Marathon in mind here, but if so, he has made his speakers go out of their way to obscure it.⁸³ The Plataeans elsewhere acknowledge their close alliance with Athens, but are reluctant to begin their account of the Persian War—their most notable service to Sparta—with talk of Marathon and Athens.⁸⁴ The attempt does not go unnoticed, and in their response the Thebans are eager to point out that Plataean loyalty during the war was simply a matter of their alliance with Athens (3.62.1).⁸⁵ For the Plataeans, however, the war is centered, not in Attica with its great battles of Marathon and Salamis, but in central Greece, at

Artemisium and particularly Plataea. It is indeed the battle of Plataea that dominates the Plataean narrative of the Persian War, and understandably so.⁸⁶ The victory was closely associated with both Sparta and Plataea and additionally featured the Thebans fighting on behalf of the Persians.⁸⁷ The Plataeans exploit this fact to the fullest, by ignoring every other participant in the battle except these four.⁸⁸ The contrast between Plataean service and Theban betrayal could not be clearer.⁸⁹

The central place of the battle of Plataea is underscored further by the claim that the Persian War ended there. When the Plataeans ask their Spartan judges to consider the broader, moral ramifications of their judgment, they note that “you will be enslaving the land in which the Greeks were freed, you will desolate the sanctuaries of the gods to whom they prayed before defeating the Persians” (3.58.5, tr. Hammond modified). Mention of “defeating the Persians” (Μῆδων ἐκράτησαν) might simply refer to the battle itself, but the claim that Plataea was the place where Greek freedom was won (γῆν ἐν ᾗ ἡλευθερώθησαν οἱ Ἕλληνες) implies that the war effectively ended in 479. As we have seen, such a periodization, however popular in modern scholarship, was not a given among the Greeks. But the Plataeans have good reason to end the war where they do. Aside from drawing added attention to the battle of Plataea, such a periodization serves to insulate Plataea’s Persian-War record from that of Athens. As the Mytileneans lament, the Delian League’s efforts were soon turned against the Greeks, and any association between the Plataeans and subsequent actions against Persia might ultimately discredit them in the eyes of their judges. Here again, the Thebans take note and chastise the Plataeans for choosing the Athenian side after the war and for their “betrayal of the whole community of Greeks with whom you were sworn confederates, when they were intent on the liberation of Greece and the Athenians on its enslavement” (3.63.3, tr. Hammond).⁹⁰ Anything but the narrowest of Persian Wars shows the Plataeans to be exactly what they were, inveterate Athenian allies.

Our final two examples were delivered on the same occasion, a meeting of the Camarinaean assembly during the first year of the Sicilian expedition. Camarina had ties to both Athens and Syracuse, and in the winter of 415/4 each power dispatched ambassadors to win a deeper commitment in the present conflict. Hermocrates, the Syracusan, speaks first and opens by admonishing the Camarinaeans that the Athenians’ true intent in Sicily was conquest. It is to support this argument that Hermocrates cites the Persian War.

That program of control in Greece and their attempts now in Sicily are one of a kind. They accepted the leadership freely offered them by the Ionians and their own allied colonies for a campaign of reprisal against the Persians, but then forced them

into subjection on a variety of pretexts—failure to provide troops, misuse of troops against one another, any specious charge they could bring in any particular case. This front against the Persians was not, then, the Athenians fighting for Greek freedom, nor the Greeks fighting for their own: the Athenians were looking to replace Persian enslavement with theirs, and the Greeks to make a change of slave-master—to one just as clever, but clever for the worse. (6.76.3-4, tr. Hammond)

At first glance, Hermocrates seems to frame his Persian War in much the same way as the Mytileneans and to much the same effect. Focus falls on the war after Plataea and Mycale, where the Athenians, rather than continuing the fight against Persia, betray their allies and reduce them to slavery. There is obviously no mention of Marathon or the great events of Xerxes's invasion, which the Athenian ambassadors had once cited to justify their subsequent policy in the Aegean,⁹¹ but neither does Hermocrates elide those events entirely, as the Mytileneans had done. Rather, he reminds his audience of the Ionians' former status under the Persian Empire, noting that they were in effect "making a change of slave-master." This nod to earlier phases of the war turns the Ionians from the noble victims of the Mytilenean speech into willing and worthy targets of Athenian exploitation.⁹² The change is hardly surprising. Hermocrates is no friend to the Ionians and will shortly leverage ethnic hostilities in his attempt to keep the Camarinaeans on the side of their fellow Dorians (6.77.1).⁹³

Hermocrates's Athenian opponent at Camarina, Euphemus, presents a starkly different vision of the Persian War. Before he turns to the alliance at hand, he feels compelled to refute Hermocrates's interpretation of Athenian policy in the Aegean. He too begins with the campaigns of the Delian League.

We acquired a navy, and after the Persian War (μετὰ τὰ Μηδικά) broke free from the command and leadership of the Spartans, since there was no more reason for them to dictate to us than the other way around, except to the extent of their greater power at the time. We ourselves then became leaders of the King's former subjects. Our thinking was that this way, with the power now to defend ourselves, there would be the least danger of falling under the Peloponnesians. (6.82.3, tr. Hammond modified)

Euphemus rejects the extended war advanced by Hermocrates (as well as the Mytilenean and Athenian ambassadors before him).⁹⁴ Here the Persian War ends before the institution of the Delian League in 478/7 and so before the Ionians had contributed to the fight against Persia. That, at least, is the implication from Euphemus. The reality was more complicated. The Ionians had already been fighting the Persians under the auspices of the Hellenic League when the Delian League was founded.⁹⁵ But this is not the story Euphemus wants to tell. The Athenians do not here take up leadership of free and independent allies, but rather assume managements of "the King's former subjects"

(τῶν ὑπὸ βασιλεῖ πρότερον ὄντων). Athenian hegemony is not characterized by any continuing hostility to the Persians, but is rather established to counter Sparta.⁹⁶ Consequently, there can be no implication that the Athenians betrayed their allies, as both the Mytileneans and Hermocrates insist. Without the pretext of an ongoing war with Persia, the Athenians simply and candidly act in their own self-interest by taking over what had once belonged to their Persian enemies.

Euphemus does not stop at excluding the Ionians from the fight against Persia. His decision to end the war where he does lends support to a striking reinterpretation of the role the Ionians did play in the (now shorter) war.

Even on the strictest view there was no injustice in our subjection of the Ionians and islanders, which the Syracusans describe as “enslavement of our kinsmen.” We were their mother-city, and they came against us with the Persians; they did not have the courage to revolt and lose their homes, as we did when we abandoned our city; they chose slavery for themselves and wanted to impose the same state on us. (6.82.3-4, tr. Hammond modified)

Far from the heroic comrades envisioned by the Mytileneans, the Ionians are presented as a hostile threat.⁹⁷ They are, in fact, the grammatical subject of the attack on Athens with the Persians in mere accompaniment (ἦλθον γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν μητρόπολιν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς μετὰ τοῦ Μήδου). The Athenians do not betray their allies, but rather take just vengeance on enemy combatants. Nevertheless, the Ionians remain willing slaves (much as Hermocrates claimed).⁹⁸ Here, too, the characterization depends largely on a sleight of periodization. Euphemus claims that the Ionians “did not have the courage to revolt and lose their homes.” Behind this claim must stand a periodization of the Persian War that begins no earlier than Marathon.⁹⁹ For in the years before Marathon the Ionians did revolt, and in the course of that conflict several cities were taken and sacked, most notably Miletus.¹⁰⁰ But Euphemus’s narrower Persian War allows him to exclude those events from the Persian War proper, just as he does the second Ionian revolt after Mycale. This periodization also has ramifications for his spatialization of the war, which is throughout restricted to mainland Greece. Both frames place the Ionians on the wrong side of the war and so support Euphemus’s immediate efforts both to disparage Hermocrates’s would-be victims and by implication to exculpate the Athenians of wrongdoing.¹⁰¹

Our survey of these six embassy speeches provides at the most basic level additional evidence for the kinds of heated disputes we examined in [Chapter 3](#). This is in itself important since recent studies of the Persian-War references in Thucydides’s speeches have concluded that they betray the same basic understanding of the

war.¹⁰² Rather, these speeches, along with that of the Spartan ambassadors in Herodotus, show a variety of very different commemorative narratives of the Persian War. If they are at all indicative of contemporary diplomacy, it would be reasonable to conclude that Greek interstate relations evinced no greater consensus about the Persian War than did the panhellenic site of Delphi. Here, too, those disagreements could have serious ramifications. Indeed, Herodotus and Thucydides place Persian-War memory at the center of some of the most momentous policy decisions of the fifth century. But our embassy speeches allow us to take the argument further and conclude that these bitter debates were not restricted to details within a generally accepted narrative frame. When the Greeks recalled the Persian War, they disputed both the details and the larger story into which those details fit. Of course, the evidence cited in the preceding supports this conclusion only at second hand, but the overall impression from our speeches is that disagreements over the periodization and spatialization of the Persian War were not restricted to ancient historians and philosophers. In the daily business of collective remembering, the overall shape of the Persian War could look very different depending on who was recalling it.

Narrative Frames and the Polis

Our survey of the narrative frames applied to the Persian War in interstate diplomacy focuses on isolated points of recollection and so naturally emphasizes the specific rhetorical demands of the moment. While such an examination amply demonstrates the broad use of divergent narrative frames, it also raises important questions about the relationship between individual and collective memories. The problem is most clearly seen if we return to the Athenian evidence discussed in the two preceding sections—Plato's *Menexenus*, Thucydides's authorial conclusions, and the narrative frames employed by two of his Athenian speakers, the ambassadors to Sparta and Euphemus. Those examples yield no less than three distinct temporal/spatial frames: a short war focused on the Aegean basin, though extending briefly into the eastern Mediterranean (Thucydides); a longer war that includes Marathon, but is now restricted to mainland Greece (Euphemus); and finally, a much longer war that runs from Marathon to the mid-fifth century and includes events in the eastern Mediterranean prominently (Plato and the Athenian ambassadors). At first glance, the sheer number of options available to these Athenians might suggest that the polis had little, if any, impact on which narrative frame was used. It might then be tempting to

conclude that the alternatives noted here represented a common store of options equally open to all and deployed as the argument at hand required. A closer look at our comparatively extensive evidence from Athens presents a rather more complex picture, however. Although several narrative frames can be found in the works of Athenian authors, their choice of periodization and spatialization was nevertheless circumscribed by broader commemorative trends within their home state.

The most frequently attested narrative frame used at Athens is (unsurprisingly) the one favored by most modern scholars, a war beginning with Marathon, ending with the defeat of Xerxes, and spatially restricted to mainland Greece, but manifestly centered on events in Athens.¹⁰³ In addition to the speech of Euphemus noted in the preceding, we find clear indications of this frame in more or less detailed retellings of the Persian War in Lysias's *Epitaphios Logos*, Plato's *Laws*, Isocrates's *Panegyricus* and *Areopagiticus*, Xenophon's *Anabasis*, and Apollodorus's *Against Neaera*.¹⁰⁴ We can also infer the same when our authors present the events or generals of both Marathon and Xerxes's invasion in a discrete group, as do Aristophanes in *Knights*, Aeschines in *On the Embassy* and *Against Ctesiphon*, Demosthenes in his *Third Olynthiac*, *On the False Embassy*, *On the Crown*, and *Against Aristocrates*, Isocrates in the *Philip* and *On the Peace*, and finally Hyperides in his *Funerary Oration*.¹⁰⁵ Aside from the sheer number of attestations, it should be noted that the majority of these works were written for broad public consumption and so are more likely to reflect popular views of the past at Athens.¹⁰⁶

Perhaps nowhere do we see the intimate connection forged between Marathon and Xerxes's invasion more clearly than when an author or speaker manifestly confuses the two. The most famous example comes from Aristophanes's *Wasps*, where the leader of the chorus of old Athenians recalls the glory days of the chorus's youth at the time of the Persian War.

The barbarian came spewing smoke over all the city and incinerating it, intent upon forcibly eradicating our hives. Right away we ran out (ἐκδραμόντες) with spear, with shield, and we fought them, steeped in bitter spirits, each man standing beside the next, biting his lip in fury. We couldn't see the sky for all the arrows overhead, but still, with the gods' help, toward evening we pushed them back; for before the battle an owl had flown over our troops. Then we pursued them, harpooning their baggy pants, and they kept running, stung in the jaw and eyebrows. (1078–88, tr. Henderson modified)

The chorus leader begins with an apparent reference to Xerxes's invasion of Attica in 480, when Athens was in fact burned. But then the subsequent hoplite battle evokes Marathon. Certainly the running charge described here recalls Herodotus's claim that Marathon was the

first battle in which anyone attacked at the run (6.112). Reference to the sky being clouded by arrows seems to have Herodotus in mind again, but the context is Thermopylae, where a Trachinian speaker makes the same observation (7.226). The omen of the owl pulls the account to Salamis, where Plutarch later mentions this very omen occurring on the eve of the battle (*Them.* 12.1). Aristophanes's description reads like a confused "every-battle," which incorporates elements of several notable engagements from the two Persian invasions of mainland Greece.¹⁰⁷ Subsequent campaigns against Persia, however, are noted later and by the chorus generally, which serves to mark out these battles as part of a distinct and separate episode (1091–1100). Earlier events are ignored entirely. Within the comedy, the confusion between Marathon and Xerxes's invasion may have been intended to mock the memories of Athens's "greatest generation,"¹⁰⁸ but behind the joke stands the very real and close connection Aristophanes's contemporaries saw between the two invasions.

A less famous, but more telling example of the same basic confusion can also be found in Andocides's *On the Mysteries*.¹⁰⁹ There the orator hopes to show the wisdom of recalling exiles with immunity from prosecution and cites the Persian War as an example:

Later the Great King invaded Greece. As soon as our fathers saw what an ordeal faced them and what vast forces the King was assembling, they decreed that exiles should be restored and disfranchised citizens reinstated, that these too should take their part in the perilous struggle for deliverance. After passing this decree, and exchanging solemn pledges and oaths, they fearlessly took up their stand as the protectors of the whole of Greece, and met the Persians at Marathon; for they felt that their own valor was itself a match for the enemy hordes. They fought, and they conquered. They gave back Greece her freedom, and they delivered Attica, the land of their birth. After their triumph, however, they refused to revive old quarrels. And that is how men who found their city a waste, her temples burnt to the ground, and her walls and houses in ruins, men who were utterly without resources, brought Greece under her sway. (1.107–8, tr. Maidment)

Like Aristophanes's chorus leader, Andocides has conflated the events of the Marathon campaign and Xerxes's invasion.¹¹⁰ Marathon is mentioned, and the common claim that the Athenians fought alone there on behalf of all Greece is repeated, but this event is embedded within the context of Xerxes's invasion. For it was only then that Athenian exiles were recalled. The destruction of Athens, the burning of its temples, and ruination of its wall were also products of the 480 and 479 campaign years, not 490. What is perhaps most important for our present purposes is that, unlike Aristophanes, Andocides is not aiming at parody. This is a serious legal matter that will determine whether he can remain in Athens or must return to exile. He has either confused these events in the casual or sincere belief that this

was what happened, or perhaps in the cynical hopes that such a rendition would better persuade his jurors.¹¹¹ In any case, Andocides's account reinforces the impression that we gain from Aristophanes and others: for the Athenians these two campaigns constituted a single, discrete historical event.

After the Marathon-to-Xerxes narrative frame, the next most frequently attested at Athens is a Persian War that extends down to the mid-fifth century and expands the boundaries of the conflict to include Ionia and points further east. This is what we find in Plato's *Menexenus* and the speech of the Athenian ambassadors in Thucydides. But if the frequency with which this narrative frame was mentioned by our surviving authors is any indication, its popularity remained a distant second among Athenians. Indeed, only two other narrative sources employ such a frame, Demosthenes and Lycurgus.¹¹² Demosthenes makes passing reference to the longer afterlife of the Persian War in his funerary oration. He begins by citing those who fought at Marathon and during Xerxes's invasion (60.10). To demonstrate their superiority to those who fought at Troy, he goes on to note that they "single-handedly not only repulsed a host assembled from an entire continent, which had already subdued all other lands, but also inflicted punishment for the wrong done the rest of the Greeks" (60.11, tr. DeWitt and DeWitt). Mention of subsequent punishments after the defense of Greece seems very much to evoke the continuing war against Persia prosecuted by the Delian League and its stated purpose of seeking revenge against the Persians (Thuc. 1.96). Lycurgus is more explicit when he recalls the Persian War in his speech against Leocrates. This Leocrates had cited the Athenian evacuation of 480 as precedent for his flight from the city at the time of Chaeronea. Immediately after contrasting the heroic events of Salamis with Leocrates's shameful behavior, Lycurgus goes on to describe subsequent Athenian campaigns against the Persians in Phoenicia, Cilicia, and at the Eurymedon. He ends by claiming that "this was the crowning point of their triumph: they were not satisfied with setting up a trophy at Salamis but fixed a boundary for the barbarians to protect the freedom of Greece and stopped them from crossing it" (73, tr. Harris). More than any of the other authors who advance this particular periodization, Lycurgus emphasizes the afterlife of the war. In Plato's *Menexenus* these campaigns collectively ranked fourth behind the other major battles of the two Persian invasions; here the treaty that follows the later campaigns against Persia is noted as "the crowning point of their triumph" (τὸ κεφάλαιον τῆς νίκης).

There are indications of two further narrative frames employed at Athens, but neither is broadly attested. The narrow periodization

imposed by Thucydides himself, though not his spatial focus on Sparta, finds voice in only one other Athenian source, Isocrates's *Panathenaicus*.¹¹³ To show that Athens had always put good reputation ahead of base gain, Isocrates adduces Athenian behavior in three separate wars apart from the Trojan War (12.188–89). The first is defined as the struggle against Xerxes (εἰς μὲν ἣν ὁ πρὸς Ξέρξην), the second is connected with the original colonization of Ionia. The last is defined more loosely as a series of invasions of Attica, beginning in mythological times, but ending with the battle of Marathon (12.195).¹¹⁴ Even less popular at Athens was a narrative frame that directly connected the events of Marathon and Xerxes's invasion with the Ionian Revolt.¹¹⁵ Only Aristotle—not himself an Athenian, but a long-time resident nonetheless—adduces it to demonstrate the nature of causality in the *Posterior Analytics*: “why was there a war between the Persians and the Athenians? or in other words, what was the cause of the Athenians becoming involved in war? Because Athens had, in company with Eretria, attacked Sardis; this was what first set the war in motion” (94a–b, tr. Tredennick modified). The contrast with Plato, who also mentions Sardis in the *Menexenus*, is striking. Whereas Plato questioned the reality of the attack (or plot, as he termed it) and minimized its relevance for the subsequent Persian invasions, Aristotle affirms its reality (εἰς Σάρδεϊς . . . ἐνέβηλον) and presents it as the event that “first set the war in motion” (τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκίνησε πρῶτον).¹¹⁶

This brief survey of our Athenian evidence has naturally simplified subtle expressions of time and space into four broad categories. Finer distinctions are possible, and in some cases (discussed in the notes) the evidence could be interpreted to yield a different narrative frame. But we should not allow these inevitable ambiguities to obscure the larger trend. Our Athenian evidence reveals a clear preference for certain narrative frames. A war that ran from Marathon to the defeat of Xerxes's invasion manifestly dominated. The remaining attested alternatives—a longer war that ends in the mid-fifth century, a short war restricted to Xerxes's invasion, and a war that includes the Ionian Revolt—were used by only a handful of authors. Nevertheless, there is every reason to conclude that the longer war of revenge was in popular use; at least that seems a safe inference to be drawn from its appearance in a funerary oration, a mock funerary oration, a court speech, and a literary speech manifestly intended to represent popular self-perceptions at Athens.¹¹⁷ The same cannot be said of the final two alternatives. Neither Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* nor Thucydides's *Histories* appear to have been written for popular consumption. Thucydides, for one, famously contrasts his own conclusions with commonly held notions of the past (1.20 and 6.54), and tellingly

attributes his own periodization of the Persian War to neither of his Athenian speakers. Isocrates was rather more susceptible to popular tradition, but it should be noted that his periodization in the *Panathenaicus* is itself an aberration within his own writings, where he otherwise employs the canonical narrative frame.¹¹⁸ We might well conclude that these two periodizations of the war represented counter narratives within the Athenian memorial community. A fifth possibility—that the war included or was itself centered on events in Sicily—was apparently never seriously contemplated at Athens. Indeed, although the boundaries of the war could expand to include Ionia or the eastern Mediterranean, very few of our Athenian authors could imagine any center other than Athens.¹¹⁹

It might at first glance be tempting to organize these variations into an evolutionary model with one narrative frame yielding dominance to another in succession as networks of power at Athens shifted throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. But our surviving evidence lends little support to such an endeavor.¹²⁰ The examples discussed in the preceding range from the mid-fifth century to the end of the classical period and show little variation over time. The pairing of Marathon and Xerxes's invasion dominates throughout. The extension of the war into the mid-fifth century is attested from Thucydides, here describing events in 432/1, to Demosthenes and Lycurgus writing in the 330s.¹²¹ The two remaining possibilities are too poorly attested to discern changes in popularity over time. Efforts have been made to show that a periodization restricted to Xerxes's invasion was popular before the mid-fifth century,¹²² but we simply do not have the evidence to sustain such a conclusion. Only Aeschylus's *Persae* provides an extended narrative of the war from that period,¹²³ and the indications of periodization that emerge from his presentation are too ambiguous to be probative. True, Marathon does not feature as prominently as it would in later Athenian narratives,¹²⁴ but the battle nevertheless looms large in the play, even if only in the background.¹²⁵ As the conversation between the queen and chorus turns to Athens, Marathon is alluded to twice as the scene of an earlier Persian defeat (236–38 and 244).¹²⁶ Later, after the queen has learned the fate of the Persian forces at Salamis, she draws a direct causal connection between the two battles:¹²⁷

O cruel divinity, how I see you have beguiled the minds of the Persians! My son has found his vengeance upon famous Athens to be a bitter one; the Eastern lives that Marathon had already destroyed were not enough for him. My son, in the belief that he was going to inflict punishment for that, has drawn upon himself this great multitude of sorrows. (472–77, tr. Sommerstein)

Again, this is very much less attention than Marathon generally

garners in the Athenian tradition, but we should not forget the simple fact that this is a play about Salamis, not the Persian War generally. No other Persian-War battle receives significant attention. Indeed, Marathon joins Plataea as the only other battle mentioned within the play (816–17). None of this is to suggest that Aeschylus must have seen Marathon as an integral part of the Persian War. He may have simply considered it a separate event that happened to set the stage for the present war. Ultimately, neither his opinion nor that of his audience can be discerned from the play.

What evidence we do have speaks not to an evolutionary model, but to a range of narrative frames that individual Athenians were more or less likely to impose on the Persian-War past throughout the classical period.¹²⁸ These predispositions were quite strong, even if they were not infrequently ignored. Such a conclusion should come as no surprise. Collective remembrance always exists in tension with the individual acts of commemoration that compose it. Depending on the writer, his audience, and the rhetorical demands of the moment, the dominant narrative frame of the war could be variously and selectively employed, altered, or challenged. In fact, two of the Athenian authors cited earlier, Demosthenes and Isocrates, are not even consistent in their own body of work.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, the totality of our surviving evidence at Athens suggest that Athenians were very likely to work within a fairly narrow spectrum of possible narrative frames. It is perhaps notable that the two frames an Athenian was most likely to use were the very two that Thucydides attributes to his Athenian speakers.

Conclusion

The disputes we examined in [Chapter 3](#) were not framed by a generally accepted understanding of the spatial and temporal boundaries of the Persian War. Rather, there were numerous permutations of differently spatialized and periodized Persian Wars used throughout the classical period. The basic fact is most easily observed in those ancient authors who reflect on the size and duration of the conflict explicitly, but clear indications of it can also be found in more quotidian uses of the past. The various city-states did not (and likely could not) compel their citizens to accept a single narrative frame of the war, but nor were individuals wholly free to select any frame that suited the needs of the moment. If our conclusions drawn from the Athenian evidence are any indication, they were very likely to choose from a much narrower set of alternatives that were particularly popular in their state, even if some maintained counter

narratives. We would be right to assume that most, like the Athenians, centered accounts on their home poleis, which would add a distinctly parochial touch to the Persian-War stories in circulation. But in terms of the spatial boundaries of the conflict and its periodization, there were a finite number of options, and it stands to reason that there was some degree of overlap in this regard. We might speculate about the different constellations of narrative frames popular in the various Greek city-states, but none of these conjectures could be pressed. Ultimately, we do not have the evidence to duplicate for the rest of Greece the sensitive reconstruction permitted by our Athenian sources. Nonetheless, the few sources we do have are sufficient to hint at the variety of narrative frames within and between which the disputes that modern scholars have long noted took place.

¹ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 4–8 and 14–16.

² See, for example, [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#): 8–12, [Besserman 1996](#), [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 82–100, and [Donner 2014](#): 24–36; see also [Strauss 1997](#) for a discussion of periodization through the example of the Peloponnesian War.

³ For a similar observation, see [J. Cobet 2003](#): 105.

⁴ For this usage of the term, see [Donner 2014](#): 20–24 and [Sebald 2014](#); for issues of geography and memory more generally, see also [Y. Zerubavel 1995](#): 13–36, [Said 2000](#), [Brenner et al. 2003](#), and [S. Friedman 2015](#): 84–93 with a particularly focus on the intersection of spatialization with periodization.

⁵ See, for example, [Baker 1997](#), [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 95–100, and [S. Price 2012](#): 16.

⁶ The modern term is an approximation of τὰ Μηδικὰ or τὰ Περσικά, both of which were frequently used in the classical period to refer to the conflict with Persia (see, for example, *Hdt.* 9.64.2; *Thuc.* 1.14.2, 1.73.2, and 6.82.3; *Andoc.* 1.77; *Aristot. Pol.* 1303a and *Ath. Pol.* 23.1; and *Isoc.* 4.158, 7.75, and 8.37).

⁷ The popularity of this particular definition of the Persian Wars can be seen in both the fourth edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* and *Der Neue Pauly*. It also appears in several introductory surveys of Greek history ([Osborne 2009](#): 311–30, [Sansone 2009](#): 113–20, [Martin 2013](#): 126, and [V. Parker 2014](#): 151–67), as well as historical studies of the Persian War itself ([Lazenby 1993](#), [Green 1996a](#), and [Pigaillem 2004](#)). Even [Cawkwell's 2005](#) treatment of the extended conflict between Greece and Persia from the fall of Lydia to the collapse of the Achaemenid dynasty instinctively responds to the influence of this periodization by pairing Marathon and Xerxes's invasion into a single chapter (2005: 87–125). Perhaps most notable is [Jung's 2006](#) study of the memory of the Persian War, which is explicitly bounded by Marathon and Plataea (2006: 13–26), even though Jung is fully aware that the reality was more complicated than his introductory comments might otherwise suggest (see especially 2006: 152–53 and 162 n.118). We should not, of course, imagine that this periodization represents scholarly consensus, and several recent works draw on different periodizations. We might consider [Murray 1988](#): 465–66, [Will 2010](#), [Pomeroy et al. 2012](#): 210–29, [Demand 2013](#): 189–204, and [Fischer 2013](#), all of whom present the Ionian Revolt as an integral part of the Persian Wars. Despite this rather broader view of events, it is notable that all agree that the war ended in 479.

⁸ The singular is also well attested, and although it is sometimes used to designate Xerxes's invasion alone (*Thuc.* 1.23.1 and 1.95.7; *Isoc.* 14.57 and 15.233; and *Diod.* 11.37.6), it can also be found in contexts where it must refer to a large sequence of

events that includes Marathon and occasionally the Ionian Revolt or the Delian-League campaigns against Persia (Hdt. 8.142.2, Plat. *Men.* 242a, Isoc. 4.71, and Aristot. *An. Post.* 94a-b).

⁹ See pp. 160–63.

¹⁰ Herodotus here excludes earlier attacks on the Greeks by the Cimmerians and the previous kings of Lydia (1.6.3 and 1.14.4–1.25); see [Wardman 1961](#): 136–37, [Hohti 1976](#): 42, [Hart 1982](#): 73, [Lloyd 1984](#), [Arieti 1995](#): 12–15, and [Rood 2007](#): 115–16.

¹¹ The assumption that this passage is principally concerned with the Persian invasion of mainland Greece is often made (see, for example, [Lang 1984](#): 3, [Corcella 2006](#): 46, [Scardino 2007](#): 63, and [Stadter 2012](#): 56).

¹² [Moles 1993](#): 92.

¹³ [Erbse 1956](#): 219–22, [Immerwahr 1956](#): 251 and 1966: 18, [Evans 1976](#): 36 and 1991: 31–32, [Hohti 1976](#), [Gould 1989](#): 121, [Lateiner 1989](#): 35–40, [Arieti 1995](#): 4–6, and [Rösler 2012](#): 85–88.

¹⁴ See [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 310, who go further and suggest that Herodotus understood Mycale to be the end of the Persian War, but there is little in the text to support this more precise ending. For what it is worth, Diodorus seems to have thought that the end of Herodotus’s historical narrative (i.e., the siege at Sestos) marked the end of the war proper (see p. 147).

¹⁵ This is not to suggest that the work is incomplete. Numerous studies of the digressions with which Herodotus ends his account show clear signs of a carefully crafted conclusion to the *Histories* ([Boedeker 1988](#), [Lateiner 1989](#): 44–50, [Herington 1991](#), [Dewald 1997](#), and [Desmond 2004](#)).

¹⁶ [Rood 2007](#): 117.

¹⁷ [Herington 1991](#): 149–51, for one, concludes that Herodotus’s narrative does not include the end of the war.

¹⁸ [Heinrichs 1989](#): 143–44 and [Moles 1996](#): 271; Dionysius of Halicarnassus appears to have understood the larger arc of Herodotus’s narrative in just this way when he states that “he begins with the reasons why the barbarians injured the Greeks in the first place, and proceeds until he has described the punishment and the retribution which befell them” (*Pomp.* 3.8, tr. Usher).

¹⁹ [Fornara 1971b](#): 75–91, [Stadter 1992](#), [Derow 1995](#), [Moles 1996](#), [Dewald 1997](#), and [Bridges 2015](#): 68–69.

²⁰ The importance of the Ionian Revolt and its immediate antecedents in Herodotus’s understanding of the Persian War has been noted, and rightly so ([Immerwahr 1956](#): 265 and 1966: 113–20, M. [White 1969](#): 43, [Evans 1976](#): 36, 1982: 79, and 1991: 32, [Lang 1984](#): 3, [Heinrichs 1989](#): 141–42, [Lateiner 1989](#): 35–40, [van der Veen 1996](#): 90–98, [Calame 1999](#): 168–70, [Cawkwell 2005](#): 66–67, [Munson 2007](#), [Rösler 2012](#): 87, and [Hornblower 2013](#): 125). Some have gone so far as to suggest that the revolt constituted the proper beginning of Herodotus’s Persian War ([Sealey 1957](#): 8, [Scullion 2006](#): 195–96, and [van Wees 2012](#): 346), and indeed that seems to be the accepted opinion of Herodotus’s secondary narrators (see pp. 150–52 along with [notes 27](#) and [64](#)). [Evans 1991](#): 17, however, calls the decisiveness of this moment into question when he observes that “nowhere does Herodotus suggest that Persian aggression would never have taken place if the Athenian contingent of twenty ships had not set sail for Ionia in the first year of the revolt.” Herodotus’s language gives us further reason to connect the Ionian Revolt with prior barbarian aggression. As [Immerwahr 1966](#): 114 n.110 rightly notes, ἀνεσις κακῶν (5.28) presupposes that what precedes and follows is part of a unity. The phrase itself, however, is a conjecture for the incomprehensible MSS reading, ἀνεος / ἀνεως κακῶν. There is another, perhaps preferable, solution, ἀνανέωσις κακῶν, “a renewal of troubles” (see [Nenci 1994](#): 188 and [Hornblower 2013](#): 123–

25), but for our present purposes, the sense, as [Macan 1895](#): 170 notes, is largely the same.

²¹ [Macan 1908a](#): 1, [How and Wells 1928b](#): 124, [Fornara 1971b](#): 37–39, [Raaflaub 2010a](#): 232–33, and [Vannicelli 2017](#): ix–x. Here too we might see indications that Herodotus is signaling the beginning of the Persian War proper ([Jung 2006](#): 147, 152–53, and 2013: 261), but it should be noted that the opening chapters of Book 7 provide extensive linkages between Xerxes’s invasion and the earlier phases of the war, most notably Marathon (7.1) and the Ionian Revolt (7.8β.2–3); see [Immerwahr 1956](#): 273 and [Baragwanath 2008](#): 248.

²² The Ionians had by this point faced the Persians on a number of occasions ([Nenci 1998](#): 287, [L. Scott 2005](#): 389, [Zahrnt 2010](#): 120 and 2013: 148, and [Hornblower and Pelling 2017](#): 254).

²³ [Immerwahr 1956](#): 266–67 and 272–73, [McCulloch 1982](#): 35, [Evans 1993](#): 280–81, [Jung 2006](#): 147 and 153 n.88, [Raaflaub 2010a](#): 230–31, and [Zahrnt 2010](#): 120 and 2013: 148–49, and [Jung 2013](#): 261.

²⁴ [Raaflaub 2010a](#) and [Pelling 2013](#): 24.

²⁵ See [note 20](#).

²⁶ [Nenci 1998](#): 196–97 and [L. Scott 2005](#): 157.

²⁷ See [Munson 2007](#): 152–53. The role of the Athenians and Eretrians in the Ionian Revolt is the stated reason for Mardonius’s invasion (6.43–44) as well as the Marathon campaign (6.94), though in both instances Herodotus concludes that the Persians had broader ambitions to conquer all of Greece ([Romilly 1971](#): 325–26 and [van der Veen 1996](#): 95–96). When he takes up his account of Xerxes’s invasion, he begins with Darius’s initial plans and there remarks that the Persian king was “exasperated by the Athenians’ attack on Sardis” (7.1.1, tr. Purvis). After Darius’s death, he has Mardonius cite revenge as the central reason for launching a new campaign against Greece (7.5.2). When Xerxes later reviews the reasons for attacking the Greeks, he parrots back Mardonius’s sentiment: “first of all, they went to Sardis . . . and set fire to the groves and sanctuaries there” (7.8β.3, tr. Purvis). Here too, however, revenge is only one of several reasons cited for the invasion ([Romilly 1971](#): 328–29).

²⁸ [Macan 1908b](#): 806, [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 283, and [Asheri et al 2006](#): 321. The use of the word revolt—“Ionia revolted (ἀπεστῆ) from the Persians”—as opposed to liberate, might also serve to underscore the active role played by the Ionians in the final events of the *Histories* ([R. Thomas 2004](#): 35); it might also point to their ultimate failure to gain freedom from these events ([Immerwahr 1966](#): 303 and [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 283–84).

²⁹ [R. Thomas 2004](#); see also [Evans 1976](#): 32, [Walter 1993](#): 257, and [Munson 2007](#): 146.

³⁰ [Hammond 1957](#) argues that Thucydides uses the singular τὸ Μηδικόν here rather differently than he uses the plural τὰ Μηδικά or the phrase ὁ Μηδικὸς πόλεμος, concluding that they designate Xerxes’s invasion of 480–79, the larger conflict from 490–79, and finally the war begun by Xerxes and ended with the formation of the Delian League in 478, respectively (see also [Hammond 1973](#): 312). Such a precise categorization is supported by Thucydides only with difficulty (see, for example, [note 32](#)) and stands on so few attestations that it can hardly garner much confidence. We might also note that other classical authors were not so careful, which at the very least suggests that these distinctions were not in common use (see [notes 6 and 8](#)).

³¹ [Jung 2006](#): 153n.89 and 2013: 261–62 suggests that Marathon may have been one of the four, but the consensus of opinion holds that Thucydides has Thermopylae and Plataea in mind as the two land battles (the two naval battles were likely Artemisium and Salamis); see [Gomme 1945](#): 151, [Hammond 1957](#): 101,

Classen and Steup 1963a: 81, Hornblower 1991: 62, and Markantonatos 2013: 73. Plutarch later identified these two land and two sea battles as “the four battles that were fought with the barbarians at that time” (*Mor.* 873e–f, tr. Pearson).

³² Gomme 1945: 175 and Classen and Steup 1963a: 55. Hammond 1957: 100 wants to see the three events as marking a progression in the use of triremes, as he paraphrases “in terms of dates these fleets arose shortly before 490/89 and 486/5 and were the last considerable fleets before 480 BC.” He goes on to provide a modern parallel: “in the same way we might say of tanks, that they did not appear until the World Wars, indeed until 1916, and only on a large scale in 1940.” This seems a somewhat tortured explanation and in any case underestimates the close coordination between the first two events, implied by the τε . . . καί. The meaning, I think, is rather simpler. The key point is Xerxes’s invasion of Greece, before which there were only two significant fleets in Greece.

³³ Zahrt 2013: 150; see also J. Price 2001: 338. That Herodotus considered the attack on Athens a mere excuse for the subjugation of all Greece, see note 27. For Athenian views of the matter, see pp. 160–63.

³⁴ Hammond 1957: 101 and 1973: 312. Thucydides goes on to state that the period had been largely overlooked by earlier historians, whose histories “are either of the Greek world before the Persian invasion or of the Persian War itself” (ἡ τὰ πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν Ἑλληνικὰ ξυνετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά: 1.97.2, tr. Hammond). This would suggest that fifth-century historians routinely terminated their accounts of the Persian War at roughly the same point that both Thucydides and Herodotus ended theirs (Hammond 1973: 312).

³⁵ Classen and Steup 1963a: 55 and 81.

³⁶ The sharp difference imposed by Thucydides between Xerxes’s invasion and the subsequent campaigns of revenge undertaken by the Delian League is underscored by the relative inattention Persia receives in the Pentecontaetia (Munson 2012: 246–50).

³⁷ Loraux 1986: 8–12, R. Thomas 1989: 210–11, Rosenstock 1994: 333–36, and Trivigno 2009: 34–41.

³⁸ Tsitsiridis 1998: 264. It should be noted that Plato also mentions the attack on Eretria immediately before the battle of Marathon, but his emphasis in this section falls on the subsequent Athenian victory over Persia (240a–e; Pownall 2004: 51).

³⁹ Lévy 1996: 345 n.39; Herodotus also maintained that Darius used the attack on Sardis as a pretext (6.94.1), but for the conquest of all Greece, not (as here) for the punishment of Eretria and Athens. Tsitsiridis 1998: 267–68, following C. Cobet 1874: 242, suggests that προφασίζόμενος should be deleted as a marginal insertion. Its removal does not impact my basic argument, however, since in either case the plot on Sardis is here presented as a mere allegation.

⁴⁰ Clavaud 1980: 141–42 and R. Thomas 1989: 221–23. Nouhaud 1982: 150 n.40, Pownall 2004: 50–51, and Volonaki 2013: 175 are quite right to point out that any mention of the Ionian Revolt constitutes a departure from the Athenian tradition on Plato’s part and likely represents a conscious attempt to undercut the grand events of the typical funerary oration. For more on popular Athenian periodizations of the war, see pp. 160–68.

⁴¹ Clavaud 1980: 142, Nouhaud 1982: 228, Lévy 1996: 346, and Pownall 2004: 52. Clavaud surely goes too far, however, when he characterizes this periodization as a distortion, a value judgment that inevitably privileges the canonical periodization over its contemporary alternatives. Tsitsiridis 1998: 291, on the other hand, suggests that Plato ends the war with Plataea, citing Lysias 2.47 and Plato’s *Laws* 707c as parallels (see also Marincola 2007: 111).

⁴² The funerary oration was an intensely patriotic genre that focused almost exclusively on the exploits of the Athenian people (Loraux 1986: 132–34).

⁴³ Plato's failure to mention the participation of the other allies in either battle raises the possibility that they have been intentionally elided to give the impression that the Athenians fought alone here as well as at Marathon (M. Henderson 1975: 39–40). Tsitsiridis 1998: 281 seems to reject this possibility on the grounds that allied participation at this battle was broadly known, but as Henderson rightly notes, the omission of the allies from both battles was quite common in Attic oratory (1975: 40 n.59), and we should in any case be very cautious when assuming that popular perceptions of the past were inevitably “accurate” at even the most basic level.

⁴⁴ M. Henderson 1975: 39.

⁴⁵ Starr 1962: 326, Nouhaud 1982: 162, Tsitsiridis 1998: 281, and Jung 2006: 291–92 n.234.

⁴⁶ M. Henderson 1975: 40, Tsitsiridis 1998: 286, and Jung 2006: 292 n.237; for the popular association of this battle with Sparta, see Chapter 2, p. 91 n.145.

⁴⁷ For Ionian participation in the ongoing war against Xerxes, see Chapter 3, pp. 114–16; see also the version of events presented by Diodorus and Thucydides's Mytilenean speakers (pp. 147–48 and 153–54).

⁴⁸ For the former interpretation, see Tsitsiridis 1998: 288–89; for contemporary accusations that the Ionians were active Persian allies in the war, see pp. 158–59 and Chapter 3, p. 116.

⁴⁹ The consensus opinion holds that Diodorus followed Ephorus quite closely for his account of mainland Greece in the classical period (see, for example, Andrewes 1985, V. Parker 2004: 29, and Haillet 2001: x–xiii).

⁵⁰ Diodorus seems to have Herodotus very much in mind at this point in his narrative as he immediately goes on to note “and of the historians, Herodotus, beginning with the period prior to the Trojan War, has written in nine books a general history of practically all the events which occurred in the inhabited world, and brings his narrative to an end with the battle of the Greeks against the Persians at Mycale and the siege of Sestos” (11.37.6, tr. Oldfather).

⁵¹ To what extent this sharp distinction between the Persian War proper and its antecedents at Marathon or Lade was recognized in Diodorus's narrative can only be guessed, however, since the bulk of Book 10 has been lost.

⁵² A surviving fragment of Ephorus relates much the same story (FGrHist 70 F186). For more on this alleged alliance and its sources, see Gauthier 1966: 25–30, Garland 1970: 630–35, and Haillet 2001: 120.

⁵³ See Sacks 1990: 123–24, Haillet 2001: 136–37, and Priestley 2014: 162–68; see also Baron 2013: 110–11, who expresses greater caution here.

⁵⁴ For more on Ephorus's treatment of Himera, see Chapter 3, p. 110 n.51.

⁵⁵ Marincola 2007: 112–13.

⁵⁶ For the likelihood that Diodorus followed Ephorus for his account of Mycale, see Hignett 1963: 257–58; for more on Diodorus's treatment of Mycale generally, see Heinrichs 1989: 58–59 and Green 2006: 93–94.

⁵⁷ For the possibility that earlier Greek logographers or poets stand behind these “learned Persians,” see Arieti 1995: 10–11, Corcella 2006: 46, and Asheri et al. 2007: 74.

⁵⁸ Hornblower 1987: 108 and 1992b: 145, Moles 1993: 111–12, Rood 1999: 141, Corcella 2006: 51–52, Markantonatos 2013: 73, and Zali 2016: 36.

⁵⁹ For Herodotus's treatment of Sicily's role in Xerxes's invasion, see Chapter 3, pp. 108–110.

⁶⁰ While the funerary oration within the *Menexenus* can certainly be used as a representative model of the genre (see p. 145), it should never be forgotten that Plato has manipulated that model to undercut many of its basic claims (see, for example, Loraux 1986: 304–27, Rowe 2007: 92–98, and Trivigno 2009).

⁶¹ [Marincola 2007](#): 114 makes a similar claim in reference to the fourth-century debates about the relative importance of the individual battles of the Persian War; see also [K. Clarke 2008](#) for broad public interest in the construction of time generally. For more on the importance of public discourse about the past for the present study, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 24–26.

⁶² For speeches and their possible authenticity in Thucydides, who provides the majority of the examples examined here, see [Hornblower 1987](#): 45–72, [Garrity 1998](#), and [Schütrumpf 2011](#); see [Scardino 2007](#) for a study of speeches in both Herodotus and Thucydides. If we follow [Grethlein 2012](#) and conclude that Thucydides employs his speeches to juxtapose rhetorical uses of the past and his own historical methodology, we would have further reason to conclude that the speeches reflect contemporary practice. Some of the speeches we examine may also reflect dominant narratives of the speaker's home state (as [Tzifopoulos 1995](#), for example, assumes), but I set that question aside here.

⁶³ Xenophon also shows a keen interest in the continued importance of the Persian-War past for contemporary political discourse, but his embassy speeches do not yield the rich detail that can be seen in Herodotus or Thucydides. For more on Xenophon's use of the past in his speeches, see [Baragwanath 2012](#), [Pontier 2013](#), and [Zali 2016](#).

⁶⁴ Both Darius and Xerxes reflect on the causes of their present hostility with Athens (see [note 27](#)), and Themistocles cites the Ionian Revolt as the cause of the war to induce the Ionians to defect after Artemisium (8.22.2).

⁶⁵ That the Spartans are here thinking of the Ionian Revolt, see [Masaracchia 1977](#): 229, [Evans 1991](#): 17 and 1993: 280, [Nenci 1994](#): 307, [Gilula 2003](#): 85, [A. Bowie 2007](#): 233, and [Munson 2007](#): 152 n.30. [Raubitschek 1973](#): 36–37 (here followed by [Jung 2013](#): 255 and 263) suggests Marathon, but only in passing.

⁶⁶ [Masaracchia 1977](#): 229–30, [Gilula 2003](#): 85–87, [A. Bowie 2007](#): 233, [Scardino 2007](#): 285 n.565, and [Baragwanath 2008](#): 178–79. Attempts have been made to remove the anachronism altogether by emending the text to read “the conflict has been over your [territory?] from the beginning” (περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆν / ἀρχῆθεν ὁ ἄγων ἐγένετο: see [Asheri et al. 2003](#): 359). This is the solution preferred by [Hude 1927](#), but see now [Rosén 1987–97](#), who retains ἀρχῆς. Leaving aside the methodological problems of emending a perfectly comprehensible text to suit modern assumptions about what an author must have said, the change does not ultimately solve the anachronism. The conflict in question must be the Ionian Revolt, and so Ionia is still being conceived as somehow belonging to the Athenians (περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας).

⁶⁷ [Evans 1991](#): 31.

⁶⁸ [Evans 1982](#): 130 and 1991: 31–32 maintains that this version of events was popular at Sparta. While this is a logical inference from this passage and would advance a broadly pro-Spartan narrative, there is no corroboratory evidence to support this assertion. The Serpent-Column list, itself a Spartan creation, betrays a rather different focus, but that need not exclude the presence of other narrative frames at Sparta (see pp. 167–68).

⁶⁹ That Thucydides here has his speaker include Marathon as part of the Persian War, see [Romilly 1963](#): 244, [W. West 1970](#): 277, [Flashar 1996](#): 69, and [Zali 2016](#): 39. [Classen and Steup 1963a](#): 55 and 207 incorrectly conclude that the Athenian view of Marathon expressed here is basically the same as that expressed by Thucydides himself—that Marathon was a preliminary action to the Persian War proper (see also [Jung 2006](#): 153 n.89). It cannot be denied, however, that Thucydides's ambassadors lavish little attention on this opening event of the war ([Romilly 1963](#): 244, [Kierdorf 1966](#): 102, [Tzifopoulos 1995](#): 96, and [Zahrnt 2010](#): 120–21 and 2013: 149).

⁷⁰ For the possibility that Thucydides had Herodotus's account of Alexander's embassy to Athens in mind when composing his tetralogy of speeches at Sparta, see [Lang 1984](#): 138 and 1999.

⁷¹ Thucydides may have also intended the Athenian ambassadors to imply that Marathon had been fought on behalf of Greece, which is one possible implication of the claims that the Athenians had fought alone (μόνοι) and faced the threat in the forefront (προκινδυνεύσαι), but that conclusion is debatable; see [W. West 1970](#): 276–77, [Nouhaud 1982](#): 141, [Jung 2006](#): 154 n.91, [Wiesehöfer 2006](#): 658 n.2, [Konstantinopoulos 2013](#): 64, and [Sfyroeras 2013](#): 87.

⁷² The Athenian ambassadors do not attempt to monopolize the victory at Salamis, and Peloponnesian participation is certainly recognized, though not emphasized ([Debnar 2001](#): 51–52).

⁷³ [Orwin 1994](#): 46.

⁷⁴ The counterfactual claim is, of course, nothing of the sort. The Spartans did lead the Greeks against the “remnants of Persian power” in 478 under Pausanias, and the results had been disastrous, a fact the Athenians go on to state explicitly in the next chapter (1.77.6).

⁷⁵ [Wickersham 1994](#): 42 and [Debnar 2001](#): 111; *contra* [Tzifopoulos 1995](#): 106, who expressly defines this period as following the Persian War.

⁷⁶ I take both datives, Ἀθηναίοις and τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, closely with ξύμμαχοι ([Classen and Steup 1963b](#): 16), and not, as [Gomme 1956](#): 262 suggests, as datives of advantage with the prepositional phrases ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων and ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου.

⁷⁷ The case for the Delian League ([Gomme 1956](#): 262 and [Classen and Steup 1963b](#): 16) turns largely on a later reference to “the Greeks” in this speech (3.13.1 with [Gomme 1956](#): 268); for the ethnic group, see [MacLeod 1978](#): 66–67 and [J. Price 2001](#): 135–37.

⁷⁸ For “the Greeks” as a byword for the Hellenic League, see [Chapter 1](#), p. 40 n.39.

⁷⁹ [MacLeod 1978](#): 67; see also [J. Price 2001](#): 134–35.

⁸⁰ [J. Price 2001](#): 132 comes to a similar conclusion about the speech generally, though he does not address the question of periodization specifically.

⁸¹ For the tone of the speech generally, see [MacLeod 1977](#): 227–37, [Hornblower 1991](#): 445–46, and [J. Price 2001](#): 105.

⁸² [Gomme 1945](#): 234 registers his surprise that the Plataeans would omit the famous battle in their speech, or rather that they made very little of it ([Gomme 1956](#): 339).

⁸³ [Gomme 1956](#): 339 and [Debnar 2001](#): 129.

⁸⁴ [Hornblower 1991](#): 448, [Tzifopoulos 1995](#): 104–105, and [Markantonatos 2013](#): 75–76.

⁸⁵ [MacLeod 1977](#): 239, [Orwin 1994](#): 72, [J. Price 2001](#): 115–16, and [Grethlein 2012](#): 62–63.

⁸⁶ [Tzifopoulos 1995](#): 105.

⁸⁷ See [Chapter 2](#), p. 91 n.145 for Spartans claims to Plataea and [Chapter 5](#), pp. 171–77 for the Plataean commemoration of the battle.

⁸⁸ The Plataeans do, of course, recognize the broader efforts of the Greek allies in their speech (3.56.4–6), but never explicitly connect this group to events at Plataea (see, for example, 3.54.4, 3.57.2, and 3.58.4–5).

⁸⁹ Theban Medism is mentioned on three separate occasions (3.54.3, 3.56.4, and 3.58.5), enough for the Thebans themselves to note this recurrent theme in their speech (3.62.1); see also [Cogan 1981a](#): 15 and 1981b: 68 and [J. Price 2001](#): 105–107.

⁹⁰ [MacLeod 1977](#): 240 and [Jung 2006](#): 286–87. It is unclear what role the

Plataeans played in the campaigns of the Delian League, but the Thebans at least suggest they were active participants (see Thuc. 3.63–64 generally).

⁹¹ J. Price 2001: 147.

⁹² Fauber 2001: 46.

⁹³ Orwin 1994: 127, Wickersham 1994: 56, Fauber 2001, and Hornblower 2008: 497–98.

⁹⁴ For more on the relationship between the speeches of Euphemus and the Athenian ambassadors, see Romilly 1963: 243–50, Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1970: 353, Raubitschek 1973: 36–38, Rawlings 1981: 120–22, Connor 1984: 183–84, Tzifopoulos 1995: 102–104, Crane 1998: 287, J. Price 2001: 165–69, and Pelling 2012: 309–10.

⁹⁵ See Chapter 3, pp. 114–16.

⁹⁶ Cogan 1981b: 109–11 and Wickersham 1994: 59.

⁹⁷ Connor 1984: 183–84 and Hornblower 2008: 503.

⁹⁸ Orwin 1994: 127 and Raaflaub 2004: 172–73.

⁹⁹ In contrast to the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta, Euphemus is not interested in an extended account of the Persian War. His tale is rather more selective, but it is still possible to see the outline of a war that begins at Marathon (W. West 1970: 277; *contra* Zahrnt 2010: 121 and 2013: 149). After condemning the Ionians for their service on behalf of Persia, Euphemus proceeds to dismiss the relevance of Athens's Persian-War exploits: “we make no fancy claims to justify our empire on the grounds that we were the sole agents in overthrowing the barbarians, or that we put ourselves at risk for the freedom of our allies” (6.83.2, tr. Hammond). In this brief passage we can discern references to Marathon, where the Athenians often claimed to have defeated the barbarians single-handed, and Salamis, where the Athenians could (and did) claim to have taken an exceptional risk.

¹⁰⁰ For Miletus, see Hdt. 6.18; for the other Ionian cities and nearby islands attacked in the wake of the Ionian Revolt, see Hdt. 6.31–33.

¹⁰¹ Wickersham 1994: 59.

¹⁰² See Munson 2012: 242 and Stadter 2012: 41.

¹⁰³ For more on the use of this narrative frame of the war at Athens generally, see R. Thomas 1989: 221–27 and Jung 2006: 152–65.

¹⁰⁴ Lys. 2.21–47, Plat. *Laws* 707b–c, Isoc. 4.85–99 and 7.75, Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.11–13, and [Dem.] 59.94–96. It is notable that in the *Panegyricus* Isocrates concludes the Persian War with Salamis, not Plataea or Mycale (4.93–98), but for our present purposes it only matters that he ends with the defeat of Xerxes's invasion. Plato's *Laws* might at first glance seem to split its focus between Athens and Sparta since the view expressed by the Athenian interlocutor—that the war began with Marathon and ended with Plataea—is said to be shared by the Spartan, Megillus, but the larger discussion of the Persian War in this section betrays a manifestly Athenian perspective. Note, for example, the absence of Thermopylae.

¹⁰⁵ Aristoph. *Eq.* 781–85, Aeschin. 2.74–75 and 3.259, Dem. 3.26, 18.208, 19.311–12, and 23.196–98 and 207, Isoc. 5.147 and 8.75, and Hyp. 6.37; see Nouhaud 1982: 147–49 and 169–77. We might add here the enigmatic monument that on some interpretations mentions Marathon and Xerxes's invasion together, but much depends on the restoration of the damaged epigrams (*IG* I³ 503/504; see Meyer 2005: 299–305, Petrovic 2007: 158–77 and 2013: 47–53, and E. Bowie 2010: 204–12 with earlier bibliography). Aeschines's treatment of the Persian War in *On the Embassy* (2.74–75) deserves some additional comment. He mentions Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea as exemplary battles to emulate, but also adds an invasion of the Peloponnese led by Tolmides in the mid-fifth century. Since this event was manifestly not thought part of the Persian War, it raises the possibility that the other battles were, to Aeschines's mind, just a random assemblage of famous Athenian

battles and not part of a single Persian War. But the order in which Aeschines treats these events speaks against that possibility. He begins with the battles of the two Persian campaigns against mainland Greece, then proceeds to mention Tolmides. Afterward, he notes a series of historical examples the Athenians should avoid, all from the second half of the Peloponnesian War (2.76–77). The overall organization is chronological, but the Persian-War battles are mentioned indiscriminately: Plataea first, then Salamis, Marathon, and finally Artemisium. The distortion of chronological order in this one case suggests that Aeschines views these battles collectively as part of a single event, the Persian War.

¹⁰⁶ For the impact of popular notions about the past on public oratory, see [Perlman 1961](#), [Harding 1987](#), [Worthington 1994](#), [Pownall 2004](#): 38–39, and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 94–96.

¹⁰⁷ [Hammond 1968](#): 50–51, [MacDowell 1971](#): 271–72, [C. Austin 1973](#): 134, [Sommerstein 1983](#): 220, [R. Thomas 1989](#): 225–26, [Byl 2001](#): 41–42, [Carey 2013](#): 135–36, [Sfyrroeras 2013](#): 91–92, and [Bridges 2015](#): 37.

¹⁰⁸ [Sommerstein 1983](#): 220; see also [Loraux 1986](#): 309 and [R. Thomas 1989](#): 226. For more on the presentation of the Persian-War generation, particularly the *Marathonomachoi*, in Aristophanes's comedies, see [Jung 2006](#): 140–42.

¹⁰⁹ We might also consider here Isocrates's *Plataicus*, where it has been suggested that the Plataean speaker conflates the events of Marathon and Salamis (14.57 with [Nouhaud 1982](#): 153).

¹¹⁰ [Perlman 1961](#): 163, [Nouhaud 1982](#): 160–61, [Missiou 1992](#): 51–52, [Jung 2006](#): 162 n.119, and [Zahrnt 2010](#): 121. [MacDowell 1962](#): 140, following [Raubitschek 1955](#): 259 n.2, attempts to salvage the historicity of Andocides's recall of exiles and restoration of rights before Marathon, but even he concedes that the later reference to the destruction of the city must have the events of Xerxes's invasion in mind (1962: 141).

¹¹¹ See [Loraux 1986](#): 162–63 and [Missiou 1992](#): 51–52 for more on the logic behind Andocides's confused account of the war.

¹¹² It might, at first glance, be tempting to add Isocrates here who mentions the Peace of Callias in his *Panegyricus* (4.117–18) and there presents it as punishment for the earlier invasion: “these same barbarians, who dared to cross into Europe and thought more highly of themselves than they ought, we dispatched in such a way that they not only stopped making campaigns against us but also endured the destruction of their own land. We also humbled them so much that they brought no war ships to this side of Phaselis—though they had a navy of 1200 ships—but held their peace and waited for a better time, not trusting the military force that was theirs at the time” (tr. Papillon). Despite the clear connection drawn here, the passage itself appears in a discussion of the Athenian and subsequent Spartan hegemonies and is thus explicitly separated from Isocrates's extensive Persian-War narrative (4.85–99; W. [Thompson 1981](#): 165), which ends rather with Xerxes's invasion. Isocrates also notes the Peace of Callias in his *Areopagiticus* (7.80)—so too do Demosthenes (15.29 and 19.273–74) and Lysias (2.56–57)—but none draws an explicit connection to the earlier Persian invasions of mainland Greece.

¹¹³ Some have seen a short war restricted to Xerxes's invasion in Aeschylus's *Persae*, but see pp. 166–67.

¹¹⁴ [Nouhaud 1982](#): 145 n.28 and [Loraux 1986](#): 164; see also Isoc. 12.49.

¹¹⁵ [R. Thomas 2004](#): 27 overstates the case when she asserts that “there is a total Athenian silence on the Ionian element of the Persian wars,” but the basic point is well taken.

¹¹⁶ We might note that Isocrates seems to mention the Ionian Revolt in his *Panegyricus* (4.164 with [Nouhaud 1982](#): 149–50), but as in the case of the Peace of Callias ([note 112](#)), he does not include the event in his narrative of the Persian War,

even though the very different reactions to Aristagoras's plea at Sparta and Athens could have been made to advance his larger argument that Athens had shown itself more worthy of hegemony than Sparta (see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 88–92).

¹¹⁷ For the tendency of orators to reflect the popular biases of their audience, see [note 106](#); that Thucydides intended the speech of his Athenian ambassadors to reflect public opinion at Athens, see [Romilly 1963](#): 242, [Tzifopoulos 1995](#): 102, and [Rood 1999](#): 144.

¹¹⁸ For the elite nature of Isocrates's likely readership, however, see [Pownall 2007](#): 15–17.

¹¹⁹ See [note 42](#) for this same predisposition in funerary orations generally. There were exceptions, however. Thucydides's own view of the war centers events rather on Sparta. Plato's *Laws* recognizes a broader view of the war, even if it does not ultimately reflect that view particularly well (see [note 104](#)). We might say the same for Apollodorus's account of the Persian War in *Against Neaera*, which adopts a somewhat Plataean perspective, but only to demonstrate the services that state rendered to Athens at the time ([Dem] 59.93–96).

¹²⁰ This is not to suggest that Athenian perceptions of the Persian War remained static, merely that these changing perceptions were framed by the same constellation of periodizations over the course of the classical period. For more on the evolving Athenian traditions of the Persian War, see [Flashar 1996](#), [Hölkeskamp 2001](#), [Gehrke 2003](#) (= 2007), [Jung 2006](#): 27–169, [Zahrnt 2010](#) and [2013](#), and [Sfyrroeras 2013](#).

¹²¹ [Zaccarini 2017b](#): 131 suggests that this periodization represents a development of the fourth century, but his conclusion is based principally on a reading of Thucydides's authorial periodization and some implications in Diodorus's narrative of the period between his own ending of the Persian War (see p. [147](#)) and Cimon's campaign in Cyprus ([Zaccarini 2017b](#): 141–42).

¹²² See [Hölkeskamp 2001](#): 335–37, [Jung 2006](#): 152–53, [Zahrnt 2010](#): 117 and [2013](#): 143–45, and [Sfyrroeras 2013](#): 76–86.

¹²³ Much has been made of Pindar's silence and the possibility that Simonides may have shown notably greater interest in the events of Xerxes's invasion ([Hölkeskamp 2001](#): 336, [Jung 2006](#): 152 n.87, and [Zahrnt 2010](#): 117 and [2013](#): 144, and [Sfyrroeras 2013](#): 76–77), but such arguments can hardly be pressed too far, given how little survives of what must have been written at the time. For more on the pre-Herodotean sources for Marathon, see [Petrovic 2013](#).

¹²⁴ [Broadhead 1960](#): xxii, [Hölkeskamp 2001](#): 336, [Jung 2006](#): 147 n.70 and [2013](#): 261, [Ruffing 2006](#): 9, [Zahrnt 2010](#): 117 and [2013](#): 143–44, and [Sfyrroeras 2013](#): 85.

¹²⁵ [Garvie 2009](#): 215–16, [Dimopoulou 2010](#), [Papadodima 2013](#): 143–47, and [Sampson 2015](#).

¹²⁶ The ghost of Darius presents a rather different picture of Marathon when he contrasts his own successes with his son's present failure (780–81 with [Hölkeskamp 2001](#): 336–37, [Jung 2006](#): 152 n.87, and [Zahrnt 2010](#): 117 and [2013](#): 144), but we should not assume that the ghost here acts as a cipher for the views of Aeschylus or his audience ([Broadhead 1960](#): xxxi–xxxii, [T. Harrison 2000](#): 85–86, [Garvie 2009](#): 267–68, [Bridges 2015](#): 26–27, and [Sampson 2015](#)).

¹²⁷ [Garvie 2009](#): 215–16, [Papadodima 2013](#): 145, and [Bridges 2015](#): 24–25.

¹²⁸ [Walters 1981](#): 211 comes to a very similar conclusion with regard to the Athenian attitude toward Plataean service at Marathon—that they both claimed to have fought alone and simultaneously celebrated the aid delivered by the Plataeans as occasion demanded (see also [Jung 2006](#): 131–33).

¹²⁹ Both Demosthenes and Isocrates generally adhered to the canonical narrative (see pp. [160–61](#)), but Demosthenes in his funerary oration opted to emphasize the ongoing war against Persia (see pp. [163–64](#)), while Isocrates insisted that Marathon

was part of a separate war in the *Panathenaicus* (see p. 164) and at least acknowledges the continuation of the war in his *Panegyricus* (see [note 112](#)). I leave aside the contrast between Plato's *Laws* and *Menexenus* since the latter was a parody and thus cannot be assumed to reflect Plato's considered view on the matter ([Moggi 1968](#): 225–26).

Meaning

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I considered whether the differences observed in our surviving Persian-War commemorations extended to the master narratives that framed them, by surveying the spatial and temporal boundaries the Greeks imposed on that conflict. In this chapter, I pursue the same question, but now through an examination of the overall meaning the Greeks assigned to the war.¹ The process by which the past is organized to convey meaning has been studied extensively by Hayden White, who coined the term *emplotment* to describe it. In short, he argues that the past is not meaningful in itself, but is only made so by ignoring some facts, emphasizing others, and arranging all (within suitable spatial and temporal frames) to tell a story about the past that has significance for a present audience.² White is thinking largely about modern historiography and draws his conclusions in very broad strokes,³ but his concept of emplotment still proves quite valuable for understanding how the raw facts of the Persian War could be assembled to tell very different kinds of stories.⁴ As we shall see in the following, this war could be variously presented as a glorious victory over a foreign invader or a disturbing civil war, a story of divine salvation or deep loss, the achievement of restrained masculinity or the gift of untrammelled female sexuality. These are not matters of mere detail, but go to the heart of what the Persian War represented and continued to represent to those who actually and then metaphorically remembered it.⁵

At the most basic level, this chapter complements the last and shows that the Greeks had no greater consensus about what the war meant than they did about when it took place, where, and for how long. But we can press the evidence here further. We established in previous chapters that the Greeks were predisposed to commemorate the war as members of their respective polities, but it remains to consider why these memorial communities chose to recall and frame

those events as they did and not in some other, equally distinct way. In the present chapter, I narrow our focus to three case studies that compare contrary plot elements in Athens and another allied state (Plataea, Megara, or Corinth), in order to demonstrate how the idiosyncratic needs and assumptions of these city-states influenced memory production.⁶ I organize these local pressures into three broad categories: the present interests of a community, its actual experience of the past, and the preexisting social memory onto which new experiences had to be grafted.⁷ Although all the commemorations examined here respond to a complex mix of influences, one category has been highlighted in each case for the sake of exposition: present interests in the case of Plataea, real experience with Megara, and finally, preexisting social memory with Corinth.

Present Interests

Long ago Maurice Halbwachs laid down the tenet that present circumstances shape our perceptions of the past, and this precept has remained a cornerstone of memory studies ever since.⁸ Simply put, the past is always used to engage the present since past events that are felt to have no relevance will quickly be forgotten. Only those recollections that advance the interests of a significant number of individuals within the collective will continue to be circulated in the exchange that forms a community's social memory. The evolving present needs of those states that participated in the Persian War would have had an immediately centrifugal effect on the overall Persian-War tradition, even if we were to imagine that those states had an identical notion of the war in 479, which (as we shall see in the following) they did not. To demonstrate the point, I turn to Plataea and the interior decoration of its temple of Athena Areia.⁹ There, the Persian War was emplotted as a tragic civil war against the Medizing Greeks, in sharp contrast to the more popular Athenian version of the war as a glorious struggle against an alien invader.

The surviving evidence for both the temple of Athena Areia and its unique focus on Medism is limited. The remains of the temple have not been found.¹⁰ Pausanias is our only source for its artistic program,¹¹ and he wrote roughly six centuries after its completion. In the meantime, the town of Plataea was twice destroyed, once in 426 and again in 373,¹² but on both occasions the temples were left unharmed.¹³ Pausanias's eyewitness description can be trusted as a reliable source for the fifth-century temple:¹⁴

The Plataeans have a temple of Athena, called Areia [the Warlike]. It was built from

the spoils given them by the Athenians as their share from the battle of Marathon. The statue of the goddess is a carved image of wood overlaid with gold, but the face, hands, and feet are made of Pentelic marble. In size it is not that much smaller than the bronze Athena on the Acropolis, the one which the Athenians erected also as the first-fruits of the battle at Marathon; Pheidias was the builder of the Plataean statue of Athena as well. The paintings within the temple are Odysseus after slaying the suitors by Polygnotus and the earlier expedition of Adrastus and the Argives against Thebes by Onasias. These paintings are on the walls of the front hall, while at the feet of the statue is an image of Arimnestus, who commanded the Plataeans at the battle against Mardonius, and yet before that at Marathon. (9.4.1–2, tr. Jones modified)

Let us for the moment set aside the circumstances of construction and consider first the temple and its artistic program. The temple of Athena Areia was located within the hellenistic walls of the town of Plataea¹⁵ and boasted a statue of the goddess, whose dimensions must have required a sizable structure to house it.¹⁶ Indeed, the temple was likely Plataea's most conspicuous monument to its own Persian-War exploits.¹⁷ For our purposes the two murals in the front hall are its most telling feature. Pausanias does not spend much time describing these paintings. What he provides seems little more than the title and artist for each work: "Odysseus after slaying the suitors by Polygnotus" and "the earlier expedition of Adrastus and the Argives against Thebes by Onasias."¹⁸ To these brief notices we can add a further detail about the Seven-against-Thebes composition, which Pausanias provides in another context. While arguing that Euryganeia (not Jocaste) was in fact the mother of Eteocles and Polyneices, he states that "at Plataea Onasias depicted Euryganeia downcast at the fight of her sons" (9.5.11).

These few details permit at best a rudimentary understanding of the temple's murals. What little is said about the Odysseus scene can only be tentatively augmented by the narrative of the *Odyssey*, in which Odysseus is accompanied by Athena, Telemachus, Eumaeus, and Philoetius.¹⁹ Indeed, the fact that this is a temple to the warlike Athena makes her presence almost obligatory.²⁰ Pausanias's later reference to the Seven-against-Thebes painting suggests that the aspect of the "earlier expedition" there depicted was the battle for the seven gates itself, perhaps with Euryganeia on the city wall where Eteocles and Polyneices were fighting.²¹ David Castriota has advanced a far more detailed reconstruction in which Theseus appears prominently in the Seven-against-Thebes painting.²² He supports the addition of Theseus to the scene described by Pausanias in part by arguing that the temple of Athena Areia was nothing more than a mouthpiece for Athenian propaganda.²³ Castriota's conclusions about the Plataean temple have important implications for how we interpret its commemorative narrative. As an Athenian monument with a

manifestly Athenian outlook, the temple would cease to say anything about a Plataean perception of the war. But Athenian control over the decoration of the temple is far from certain.

Arguments in support of Athenian control over the decoration of the temple depend on Pausanias's statement that spoils from the Athenian victory at Marathon were used in its construction (9.4.1). Plutarch, however, claims that it was funded by the booty realized from the battle of Plataea (*Arist.* 20.1–3). The disagreement of the only two sources that bear on the question has occasioned a fair amount of debate, with most favoring Plutarch's position.²⁴ Indeed, even Castriota concedes that Pausanias cannot be entirely correct.²⁵ Any temple built in the years after Marathon would have been destroyed when Xerxes sacked the town of Plataea in 480 (Hdt. 8.50.2).²⁶ The temple Pausanias saw was almost certainly begun after the battle of Plataea, which lends strong support to Plutarch's version. But must Pausanias then be entirely wrong about the circumstances of construction? Some have argued that there was indeed an earlier temple associated with Marathon and that Pausanias (or rather his sources) simply mistook the current structure for the earlier one.²⁷ But the level of Athenian control that Castriota posits requires more than funds used on an earlier project destroyed a generation before. The basis of Athenian influence must be more immediate. He suggests that Pausanias refers, not to the original distribution of booty after the battle, but to additional funds provided by the Athenians for the current temple in the 460s or 450s. The possibility cannot be dismissed since the Athenians were building a number of Marathon monuments at this time.²⁸ But we are now on extremely shaky ground. Athenian influence through funding can only be maintained by blending our surviving accounts, privileging Marathon as a source, arguing that Pausanias had a later re-disbursement of funds in mind, and finally by assuming that those funds came with significant strings attached. It is a possibility, but a remote one.²⁹ It is rather more probable that this temple, built by the Plataeans in Plataean territory, represented a primarily, if not exclusively, Plataean memory of the war. Even if funds associated with Marathon were used on this or (more likely) a previous construction, they would have had the same status as those realized from the victory at Plataea—well-earned recognition for excellence on the battlefield.³⁰

Leaving aside the question of funding, Castriota's Athenocentric reading of the interior decoration remains on its face difficult to accept. As mentioned earlier, the most notable element of his reconstruction is a prominent place for the consummate Athenian hero, Theseus, whose depiction within the temple would go a long way to supporting a claim of Athenian influence.³¹ But his appearance

is a matter of conjecture. Theseus is present on a number of vases depicting the aftermath of the attack of the Seven, but their connection to the Plataean temple is not at all clear.³² Onasias's work is simply described as representing the "earlier expedition" (ἡ προτέρα στρατεία); that is, Adrastus's failed campaign to capture Thebes on Polyneices's behalf. To place Athens on center stage, Castriota must argue that the attack itself was mere prelude to Adrastus's subsequent supplication of Theseus.³³ But if so, Pausanias's description is oddly misleading. Moreover, none of the vases cited by Castriota depicts the mother of Eteocles and Polyneices,³⁴ the one detail we know the work in Plataea contained. Ultimately, Pausanias's meager description, however unsatisfactory, remains a firmer basis of interpretation than any intricate reconstruction of the lost originals, especially when based on Athens's possible, but I believe unlikely, control over the artistic program.

What Pausanias tells us hints at a Plataean recollection of the Persian War as a tragic fight between Greeks. In both paintings the mythic conflict is in some sense civil. The opponents figured in this prominent Persian-War monument are not the inhuman Centaurs or foreign Amazons familiar from Athenian commemorations of the war.³⁵ The suitors, however despicable, remain by and large Odysseus's countrymen.³⁶ The fight in the Seven-against-Thebes composition is at its heart a fight between brothers.³⁷ The parallel to Medism has not escaped scholarly notice,³⁸ but very little has been made of the somber tone that such mythological analogues impart. Although we ultimately know very little about the full scale of these paintings, we have every reason to believe that the painful implications of civil strife were central to both. Odysseus is not depicted suffering outrage or in mid-vengeance, but rather amid the corpses of the suitors after the grisly deed had been done. Ahead stands the gruesome punishment of his disloyal handmaidens and the prospect of fighting the families of the dead, characterized in the *Odyssey* as evil (κακός) and grim (αἰνός) by no less than Athena herself (24.475).³⁹ The Seven-against-Thebes composition included a mother "downcast" (κατηφής) at the sight of her two ill-fated sons locked in combat. It is impossible to determine whether this element was particularly prominent within the painting since it is cited by Pausanias only because it names the mother of Polyneices and Eteocles. But whatever else the painting contained, the mere presence of the fight between the two brothers and its discernable effect on their mother would have underscored the dark repercussions of civil strife.

We should not, of course, push one surviving report of a single temple too far. The Plataeans obviously did not ignore the Persians.⁴⁰

Even the temple of Athena Areia itself suggests a more textured recollection of the war. Arimnestus, who appeared within the temple beneath the statue of Athena, commanded the Plataeans against the Persians at Marathon before he led them against the Medizers at Plataea.⁴¹ Moreover, we cannot discount the very real possibility that subtle allusions to the Persians in one or both compositions were lost with the originals. Nevertheless, the surviving evidence gives ample reason to conclude that the conflict between Greeks, with all its fratricidal connotations, played a prominent, if not dominant, role in Plataea's principal Persian-War memorial. This emplotment stands in marked contrast to the ways in which these events were recalled at Athens, where the war was popularly represented as a grand ethnic struggle between a Greek "us" and a barbarian "them." The fact of Medism was not, of course, absent from Athenian memory,⁴² but despite boasting more surviving Persian-War monuments than any other single state,⁴³ the Athenians consistently avoided the topic or muted its disturbing connotations when mentioned.

We might consider a host of notable omissions. An Athenian epigram celebrating the victory at Artemisium begins by identifying the defeated foe as "tribes of all manner of men from the land of Asia" ("Simon." 24P, tr. Campbell), a phrase that ignores or at the very least obscures the significant contribution of the Ionians to the Persian fleet.⁴⁴ Aeschylus was similarly reticent about Ionian participation in the battle of Salamis.⁴⁵ Other suggestive omissions could be multiplied.⁴⁶ We might also consider the artistic programs of such Persian-War monuments as the Stoa Poikile or the Parthenon in this context.⁴⁷ Between these two buildings four mythological parallels—the Amazonomachy and the sack of Troy from both, and the Centauromachy and Gigantomachy from the Parthenon alone—hint at a conception of the Persian War as a victory over an alien foe.⁴⁸ A stronger case is made, however, if we turn to one of the few instances in which the Athenians do commemorate Medism: the golden shields with which we opened our study.⁴⁹ The inscription that accompanied these shields cited Theban Medism explicitly: "The Athenians, from the Persians and Thebans when they were fighting against the Greeks" (Aeschin. 3.116). The date and authenticity of the dedication are difficult to determine, and I am inclined to see it as a product of the fourth century,⁵⁰ but for the sake of argument let us say that it can be traced back to the years after the Persian War. The inscription reveals a radically different perspective on Medism from the one we find in the temple of Athena Areia. Key to the Plataean version is the Greekness of the opponents, past and present. The dedication at Delphi, however, calls the Greekness of the Thebans into question by placing them on the wrong side of a clear ethnic war. The simple

brevity of the phrase “against the Greeks” (τάναντία τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν) belies the extent of Medism and leaves the impression that the Thebans alone fought at the side of a foreign invader against an otherwise united Greece. Medism is acknowledged, but the focus of the monument still falls on an ethnic war against barbarians, here joined by their lone (un)Greek ally.⁵¹

By playing down Medism, the Athenians appear to have been very much in line with broader commemorative trends that can be seen elsewhere. Despite the prominence of the Thebans and others in Herodotus’s account of the battle of Plataea, the inscription that Pausanias the regent intended for the Serpent Column claimed only the destruction of the army of the Persians as the occasion for the monument.⁵² A similar shorthand can be found in other dedications.⁵³ The popularity of the Plataean version outside of Plataea is harder to discern. No surviving Persian-War monument draws as much attention to the disquieting implications of civil conflict, but with so many monuments lost or only attested at second hand we should not press the point too far. Surely the Thespians, Phocians, Ionians, and islanders had as much cause as the Plataeans to tell more complex Persian-War stories. But occasion does not guarantee a corresponding memory. Without corroborating evidence, we are left with Plataea alone.

The emergence of a memory of the Persian War as a civil war in Plataea was no doubt influenced by both real experience and preexisting social memory. In the battle of Plataea, the Plataeans seem to have fought the Medizing Greeks, not the Persians, and so an emphasis on the Medizers would be in keeping with that city’s actual experience in the war.⁵⁴ Moreover, Plataea’s hostility with Thebes was long-standing (Hdt. 6.108) and surely held a cherished place in that community’s social memory. Yet it is the role played by present interests in the production of memory at Plataea and Athens that is of concern here. Let us begin with Athens. There, growing imperial ambitions quickly made it impolitic to memorialize Greek collaboration with Persia.⁵⁵ Within two years of the battle of Plataea, Athens rose to hegemony over the Delian League, whose purpose was to seek revenge against the Persians (Thuc. 1.96.1)—not the Medizers.⁵⁶ Indeed, the vast majority of this league’s members were islanders and Ionians who had fought under Xerxes just a few years before. Athens needed an ethnic war that unified its Greek allies against a foreign threat. The Thebans could be singled out as scapegoats, but reminding the allies generally of the role they played at Artemisium and Salamis was not in Athens’s best interests. The Athenians had even less reason to draw attention to Medism after 462/1 when they broke with their former Hellenic-League allies and

joined with Thessaly and Argos (Thuc. 1.102.4), both accused of collaboration with Persia during Xerxes's invasion.⁵⁷ As long as Athenian security relied on the independent states of the Delian League and then Argos,⁵⁸ past collaboration was better left in the past.

The situation at Plataea was very different. Plataea was one of only two Boeotian states (the other was Thespieae) to remain loyal to the Greek cause (Hdt. 8.50.2). The rest followed Thebes and Medized in the wake of the allied defeat at Thermopylae. After the battle of Plataea, Thebes was besieged, but not destroyed or punished beyond the arrest and execution of some of the most prominent proponents of Medism (Hdt. 9.86–88). Satisfied, the victorious allies departed for home, leaving the Medizing states of central Greece behind. The Plataeans, however, returned to a devastated land largely surrounded by hostile neighbors. Soon Tanagra seems to have made claims to regional hegemony.⁵⁹ Within a decade, even Thebes was in a position to reassert influence over the relatively distant border sanctuary of Apollo at Delium (Hdt. 6.118).⁶⁰ For now these states remained politically isolated, but whatever security that fact offered began to unravel when Athens turned from its alliance with Sparta in 462/1. In 458/7 a Peloponnesian army marched to Doris and then defeated the Athenians in Boeotia at the battle of Tanagra (Thuc. 1.107–108.2).⁶¹ Athenian influence was quickly restored (1.108.2–3), but Boeotia was now openly contested ground.⁶² I believe it is no coincidence that the paintings in the temple of Athena Areia were likely commissioned at the very time (the late 460s or early 450s) that the old alliance against the Persians was beginning to fall apart.⁶³ Indeed, both scenes of civil strife anticipate further troubles. Odysseus's fight against the suitors is over, but the close brush with open civil war that ends the *Odyssey* remains on the horizon. The attack of the Seven against Thebes is merely the first round of an extended conflict. Unlike the Athenians, the Plataeans had no interest in unifying a grand coalition of Medizing states against enemies at home and abroad. For the Plataeans, the Persian War lived on in the fears that a resurgent Thebes inspired—fears that prompted them to recall Medism more emphatically than is apparent in any other Greek state at the time.

Real Experience

The second factor that influenced the production of idiosyncratic Persian-War memories across the Greek world was the real experience of those who participated, which could differ dramatically from state to state. In contrast to present interests, the realities of a given past

are seldom mentioned and occasionally ignored in discussions of social memory. Yet the role of real experience should not be underestimated. As Schwartz argues,

given the constraints of recorded history, the past cannot be literally constructed; it can only be selectively exploited. Moreover, the basis of exploitation cannot be arbitrary. The events selected for commemoration must have some factual significance to begin with in order to qualify for this purpose.⁶⁴

Schwartz is speaking here of modern America, but even in the pre-modern world, where recorded history exerted far fewer constraints, the basic principle stands.⁶⁵ A community's actual experience of an event is likely to influence how that event is initially remembered and passed on to subsequent generations. Put differently, individuals within a memorial community are more likely to exploit what experiences and resulting traditions they have, rather than invent something on the spot from nothing. Apart from a radical break in existing power relationships, changes are generally subtler and mindful of current perceptions. Real experience supplies the most natural store of places, characters, and episodes for commemoration. It can also suggest the basic emplotments into which the individual elements can be placed.⁶⁶ The Plataeans, for example, did not invent the Medism of Thebes or their fight against that state in the Persian War; they selectively exploited a set of useful facts to create a valid, but not inevitable, narrative about the war as their present needs demanded.

Differences of experience are not difficult to find, even among the member states of the Hellenic League. Soldiers fought by state. Participation was ultimately voluntary, and as a result few states participated in the same collection of battles. For the sake of convenience, let us consider the Herodotean version. Only Athens and Plataea fought at Marathon (6.108.1). Of the major battles of Xerxes's invasion, only Sparta and Corinth served in all five (Thermopylae, Artemisium, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale). Several allies fought at either Thermopylae or Artemisium, but not both.⁶⁷ At Salamis a number of smaller states joined the fighting for the first time,⁶⁸ but by now the Plataeans had left the fleet (8.44) and the Locrians had Medized (8.66). The battle of Plataea boasted wide participation, with Tiryns, Potidaea, Anactorium, Lepreum, and Pale in Cephallenia now serving as well (9.28). Yet of those states that had served in at least one prior battle, Thebes, Mantinea, Locris, Phocis, Ceos, Melos, Tenos, Naxos, Cythnos, Siphnos, Lemnos, Seriphos, and Croton did not contribute to the league army.⁶⁹ Finally, although the exact participants in the battle of Mycale are not known, it is hard to imagine that all the allies who fought at Salamis also fought at Mycale

if we can trust Herodotus's figure of 110 for the total number of league ships assembled for the campaign of 479 (8.131).⁷⁰ On the other hand, several Ionian and island states (most notably Samos and Miletus) took this opportunity to revolt from Persian rule and materially aided the Greeks in the battle (9.103–104). There were also substantial differences of experience on the home-front. Xerxes's army penetrated as far west as Delphi (8.36–39) and as far south as Megara (9.14). States to the north and east of that line were forced to Medize or faced the devastation of their territory to a degree unheard of in the Greek world, whereas those beyond the Persian advance escaped the war largely unscathed. It is from the disparate experiences on the home-front that we see a significant contrast in the Persian-War stories told in Megara and Athens.

From Megara we have two related memories about the impact of the Persian invasion on the Megarid.⁷¹ One appears in the *Theognidea* and likely dates from the period of Xerxes's invasion; the other appears in Pausanias and is first attested in the imperial period. Although separated by hundreds of years, both commemorations fit the same basic plot—salvation through divine intervention. The plot draws much from the Megarians' real experience inasmuch as they barely escaped the devastation of their homeland. Yet among the Athenians, whose territory was ravaged as a result of two separate Persian invasions, such a memory would have been unthinkable. Rather, they developed a recollection befitting their own experience of the war.

The corpus of Theognis, a Megarian poet traditionally dated to the mid-sixth century,⁷² contains a prayer that gives voice to fears of a possible Persian invasion. Since the precise wording of the passage is of some concern, I cite it in full following the translation.

Lord Apollo, you fortified the acropolis as a favor to Alcathous, the son of Pelops. Keep now the arrogant army of the Persians away from this city, so that when spring comes the people may joyfully send illustrious hecatombs to you while they take pleasure in the lyre and lovely abundance, in the dances and sounds of paeans around your altar. For I am truly afraid when I see the stupidity and destructive discord of the Greeks. But you, Apollo, graciously protect this city of ours. (773–82)

Φοῖβε ἄναξ, αὐτὸς μὲν ἐπύργωσας πόλιν ἄκρην,
Ἀλκαθόω Πέλοπος παιδί χαριζόμενος·
αὐτὸς δὲ στρατὸν ὑβριστὴν Μήδων ἀπέρυκε
τῆσδε πόλεως, ἵνα σοι λαοὶ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ
ἦρος ἐπερχομένου κλειτὰς πέμπωσ' ἑκατόμβας
τερπόμενοι κιθάρῃ καὶ ἐρατῇ θαλίῃ
παιάνων τε χοροῖς ἰαχῆσί τε σὸν περὶ βωμόν·
ἦ γὰρ ἔγωγε δέδοικ' ἀφραδίην ἐσορῶν
καὶ στάσιν Ἑλλήνων λαοφθόρον. ἀλλὰ σύ, Φοῖβε,
ἵλαος ἡμετέρην τήνδε φύλασσε πόλιν.⁷³

The date of this poem has been much discussed. Early occasions have been proposed to explain the reference to the Persians—the initial conquest of Ionia under Cyrus or the battle of Marathon—but neither suits the desperate mood of the prayer.⁷⁴ Scholarly opinion now decisively favors Xerxes’s invasion, specifically the months between the battles of Thermopylae and Plataea, when the Hellenic-League army had taken up positions at the Isthmus behind Megara, and all points north were vulnerable.⁷⁵ Consequently, our poet is almost certainly not *the* Theognis (if ever there was such a poet),⁷⁶ but was nevertheless a Megarian and a contemporary of the events he describes.⁷⁷ As such, the poem provides a unique insight into the mood in Megara at the time of the Persian War. What is of more interest for our present purposes, however, is that the Megarians continued to find the commemorative narrative of the poem indicative of something they perceived to be true and significant about their Persian-War past. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that a poem by an unknown Megarian poet would have survived if it did not have some purchase in Megara for years to come.⁷⁸

The poem begins by identifying Apollo as a past benefactor of the city: “Lord Apollo, you fortified the acropolis as a favor to Alcathous, the son of Pelops” (773–74). Although there was a prominent temple to Pythian Apollo on the acropolis, Apollo is not here invoked as the panhellenic god of Delphi, but rather as an intimately Megarian one whose close association with Megara’s founder, Alcathous,⁷⁹ was enshrined in the topography and architecture of the city (Paus. 1.42.2).⁸⁰ The specific act of benefaction noted—the fortification of the acropolis—anticipates the larger theme of the poem, the defense of the city. Prior benefactions are juxtaposed with present need in the next clause: “keep now the arrogant army of the Persians away from this city” (775–76). Apollo remains emphatically the subject (αὐτὸς μὲν . . . αὐτὸς δέ),⁸¹ but the imperative (ἀπέρυκε) now underscores the urgency. The poet also neatly implies the threat. The army of the Persians is “arrogant” (ὕβριστήν), a suitable adjective for all things Persian, but in the context of holding that force back from the city, it is especially evocative of the Persian policy of destroying the temples of those who resisted.⁸² The Persian invasion is a threat to Megara’s people and an affront to their patron and protector. Megarian concerns are narrowly targeted.⁸³ It is not on Greece’s behalf that Apollo is invoked, but on this city’s alone (ἀπέρυκε/τῆσδε πόλεως).⁸⁴

After the invocation and request, the poet supplies a lengthy purpose clause, detailing the sacrifices and celebrations the god can expect if the city is spared destruction (776–79). The pleasant scene of future happiness is shattered, however, when the poet explains the urgent plea for help that began the poem: “For I am truly afraid when

I see the stupidity and destructive discord of the Greeks. But you, Apollo, graciously protect this city of ours” (ἡμετέρην τήνδε . . . πόλιν: 780–82). It is recalled that the scene of future happiness is contingent upon Apollo’s acquiescence, that the same people (λαοί: 776) who intend to send hecatombs worthy of note are now on the verge of being undone by destructive, literally people destroying (λαοφθόρον), discord.⁸⁵ Two possible futures stand in the balance: the celebration described in the purpose clause, and the ruinous defeat feared in the final lines. Yet the poet and his countrymen are powerless to sway the outcome through military or political means, not because the Persians are invincible, but rather because the Greeks have proven to be unreliable allies. Apollo alone can save them. The poem ends in ring composition with another plea to Apollo narrowly focused on the city of Megara.

Megara’s situation between Thermopylae and Plataea was indeed as grim as the poet suggests. Although it appears that the league army was to have met the Persians in Boeotia after Thermopylae, no such force materialized (Hdt. 8.40). Most of central Greece Medized; those few who did not suffered their homes to be destroyed as they fled before the Persian army (8.50). The Peloponnesians, now feverishly building a wall across the Isthmus, were of no use to Megara some miles north of that defensive line. In such circumstances, proposals that the fleet abandon Salamis posed as much threat to Megara as Athens (8.60).⁸⁶ Despite the fact that the fleet did remain at Salamis, the full Persian army was headed for Megara before victory at sea stayed Xerxes’s advance (8.71.1).⁸⁷ Even after Salamis, the threat remained very much alive. The Persian army under Mardonius retained effective control over central Greece. The army of the Hellenic League continued to work on the wall across the Isthmus (Hdt. 9.7). Like the Athenians, the Megarians still faced the possibility of a hasty evacuation of their territory if the league army could not be coaxed out of the Peloponnese.⁸⁸ It is hardly surprising that we find the Megarians joining the Athenians and Plataeans on an embassy to Sparta to do just that (9.7).⁸⁹ The construction of the wall and the heated diplomatic exchanges that almost resulted in the defection of Athens may well constitute the very folly and strife the poet mentions in lines 780 and 781. These fears were almost realized when, on the eve of the Plataea campaign, Mardonius launched a brief attack on the Megarid (9.14).⁹⁰

Herodotus provides the backbone of the preceding historical sketch, and for him Mardonius fails to take full advantage of Megara’s vulnerability because of the belated arrival of the league army (9.15.1). What the Megarians thought of their salvation is hard to say, but the continued popularity of the Theognidean poem suggests that a

more miraculous story, one in which Apollo did save his city, may have had currency. Megara was not the first city to fear the Persian approach, and the Megarians were likely not the first people to entrust their city to their poliad deity. If there is any truth to the Themistocles decree, the Athenians too gave their city to Athena to do as she willed (ML 23.4-6; see also Plut. *Them.* 10.2).⁹¹ But whereas Athena did not save her city, Apollo had (apparently) opted to preserve his. Megara and the Megarid were spared almost any significant harm in spite of being totally exposed throughout most of the winter of 480/79. This distinction was likely a point of pride. The commemorative narrative of the poem itself is restricted to the dangers faced by the Megarians, but it likely recalled a larger master narrative in which these desperate prayers were answered and Megara spared.

Pausanias shows that elements of this same plot remained alive in Megara in the second century ce. There, what had been implicitly credited to Apollo was now explicitly attributed to Artemis. Within the city, Pausanias notes a bronze statue of Artemis the Savior located in an unspecified sanctuary (1.40.2-3). He appends an explanation as to why Artemis was so named in Megara. A Persian detachment had overrun the Megarid and was attempting to rejoin Mardonius when, by the will of Artemis, they became lost in the hilly border with Boeotia during the night. Fearing the approach of enemy forces, the cavalry shot off some arrows. A nearby rock groaned when struck, and the Persians, thinking it the groan of enemy troops, expended their supply of arrows. When day broke, a group of Megarian troops attacked and killed a large number of the Persians. On his way to Pagae, Pausanias describes the actual stone, obviously a point of interest to travelers at that time (1.44.4). Immediately thereafter he notes that there was another bronze statue of Artemis the Savior in the town of Pagae, which was identical to the one in Megara. Although Pausanias does not explicitly say so, this statue was in all likelihood also thought to celebrate the defeat of the Persians.

Dating Pausanias's version of events is difficult. We can, of course, confidently say that the story had purchase in the second century ce and likely for some time before. Pausanias is thinking of a traditional tale here that had obviously become part of the Megarian collective memory of the war. Yet we cannot assume that the story was a product of the Persian-War period itself or even the fifth century.⁹² That it is not mentioned by the *Theognidea* presents no problems, in part because we would not expect the poet to include all Persian-War tales associated with Megara, but more decisively because the poem was likely composed prior to the dramatic date of Artemis's intervention.⁹³ Herodotus's silence is of more concern. In Book 9 he specifically treats the Persian foray into the Megarid, but says nothing

about divine intervention or even a battle. As arguments from silence go, Herodotus's is better than most. There is, of course, a *prima facie* case to be made for dating the story to the erection of the statue in Megara. Pausanias credits Strongylion with the work, and he is thought to have been active from the late fifth to the mid-fourth centuries bce.⁹⁴ But this is to assume that the monument was erected for the purpose Pausanias's contemporaries thought. There is no indication of an inscription.⁹⁵ Pausanias's explanation seems to draw rather on a thriving contemporary legend about a stone shot full of arrows, which was almost certainly not an actual artifact from the Persian invasion.⁹⁶ With such evidence, any conclusion about the date of origin for the Artemis story would be conjectural at best.

For our purposes, it is more important to note that these two commemorative narratives of Megara's defense, though quite different as to detail and perhaps separated by centuries, support the same basic plot. The land of Megara, under threat, is saved by the intervention of a patron divinity. Apollo, whose temple sat upon the Alcathean acropolis, is beseeched and for a time remembered as the means of salvation for the city. Artemis, who was also closely associated with Megara's founder,⁹⁷ intervenes more directly by leading a band of Persians to their doom. In both narratives, human action is either secondary or irrelevant. There were, of course, differences, and we should not forget that the impact of real experience on subsequent generations is not direct, but rather mediated through shifting and evolving traditions with which each new act of commemoration is in dialogue.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the persistence of this particular plot structure over the course of almost seven centuries demonstrates the impact that Megara's unique experience of the war had on the initial commemoration of the war and continued to have on its subsequent tradition.

Just across the Gulf of Salamis, the wartime experience of Megara's neighbor, Athens, had been quite different. Whereas the Megarid was spared any significant damage, Attica was overrun and Athens itself sacked twice (Hdt. 8.50 and 9.13). The memory of inviolability provided by the patron gods, so popular in Megara, was not a story of the war that could reasonably be employed in Athens. Rather, the destruction of Athens became one of the most important plot elements within the Athenian recollection of the Persian War. Any visitor to ancient Athens, particularly in the decades immediately after the Persian War, would be struck by a significant number of temples left in ruins on the Acropolis, in the city, and indeed throughout Attica.⁹⁹ These were not, in Nora's terminology, *lieux de mémoire*, but rather part of the daily *milieu* for a large segment of the population.¹⁰⁰ Some must have continued to function as sites for performing recurrent

sacrifices for years to come.¹⁰¹ Such constant contact would have afforded these memorials considerable influence over the Athenian recollection of the war.

The ruins scattered across Attica were in a sense ready-made memorials of the Persian occupation, but the Athenians did not passively accept the narrative these ruins prompted. Rather, they took steps to turn them into consciously crafted commemorations. Nowhere was this policy more apparent than on the Acropolis.¹⁰² Upon their return, the Athenians expended considerable time and effort to display the damage suffered. Today, indications of this policy can be seen clearly along the citadel's northern wall, which includes massive column drums and architectural elements taken from the temples of Athena Polias and the Older Parthenon. Their careful arrangement together on the external face of the wall belies the possibility that mere necessity was at play. If we see obvious remnants of the lost Acropolis temples on the north wall, it is because the Athenians wanted it so.¹⁰³ Perhaps even more prominent in the years after the war were the charred remains of the cella of the temple of Athena Polias. The structure was certainly not obliterated by the Persians.¹⁰⁴ Herodotus can still use it as a point of reference to locate memorials on the Acropolis down to his time (5.77.3). Enough remained into the late fifth (or early fourth) century to catch fire.¹⁰⁵ It is also possible that the structure was shored up after the war and continued to function as a storehouse for temple treasures well into the classical period and perhaps beyond.¹⁰⁶ Even in the unlikely event that the remains of the temple stood completely abandoned, it would still have been the most visible structure on the Athenian skyline until work on the Periclean Parthenon was well underway in the 440s.

The decision to leave temples in ruins for a generation (and in some cases longer)¹⁰⁷ is often connected with the so-called Oath of Plataea, which in part mandated that no temple destroyed by the Persians be rebuilt.¹⁰⁸ The authenticity of the Oath in general and this clause in particular have long been doubted.¹⁰⁹ But for our present purposes, the historicity of the Oath hardly matters. Even if there were an Oath, we would still need to explain why the Athenians (one of a minority of allied states whose temples needed to be restored) would have agreed to such a policy in the first place, or would have continued to follow it punctiliously for over thirty years, even as relations with most of their erstwhile Hellenic-League allies deteriorated. Commemorative trends within Athens provide the most likely explanation.¹¹⁰ There, it appears that the destruction of the city was quickly transformed into a point of pride.¹¹¹ As Herodotus follows the progress of the Persian army into central Greece, he frequently notes the resistance of a community in almost the same breath as he does

the devastation of their territory and the destruction of their temples.¹¹² Medism and escaping devastation are similarly linked.¹¹³ These connections suggest that signs of devastation were being marshalled to prove loyalty and valor on behalf of the Greek cause. It is in this capacity that the sack of Athens appears in two of Thucydides's Athenian speeches (1.74.2–4 and 6.82.4) and in several of the surviving Attic orators.¹¹⁴ Athenians were also forging links between the sack of the Acropolis and the ultimate Persian defeat.¹¹⁵ In Aeschylus's *Persae* the ghost of Darius cites the impious destruction of temples as the chief cause of Persia's loss (809–814). The nearby Athenian temples were certainly foremost in the minds of the playwright and his original audience. Herodotus places a similar explanation of the Persian loss at Salamis into the mouth of Themistocles.¹¹⁶ The desecration of temples will also appear prominently when Philip and Alexander later exploit the Persian-War tradition toward the end of the fourth century, as I will discuss in the next chapter.¹¹⁷ The ruins throughout Attica served and continued to serve as a powerful reminder of Athenian exertions on behalf of Greece, their role in Persia's ultimate defeat, and the honors due to them as a result.

Megara's pride in its inviolability and Athens's pride in precisely the opposite were critical elements of each state's recollection of the war that by and large responded to the actual wartime experience in those communities. This is not to say that these memories were not also influenced by preexisting notions or designed to advance present interests. Preexisting cult associations with Apollo and Artemis loom large in Megara's articulation of their salvation. The loyalty the Athenians had shown to the cause and the great losses they had suffered as a result became central elements of their subsequent defense of empire. But real experience stands out as a particularly decisive feature in this case. We might think of real experience as imposing constraints, but that is to conceive of the matter from our point of view, rather than theirs. It is perhaps more accurate to say that it would not have occurred to the Athenians or the Megarians not to use (selectively) their actual experience to advance their present interests. Memory can, of course, be invented wholesale, but it is far more common to bend the past and its resulting traditions than to break with them completely. Consequently, each state's more or less unique set of experiences would have prompted equally unique ways of assigning meaning to the Persian War.

Preexisting Social Memory

The third factor I want to consider is preexisting social memory, which influences the formation of new memories both before and after the events they recall take place. Every community that played a part in the Persian War did so with certain assumptions about the world that inevitably colored how that event was experienced.¹¹⁸ Before key battles, individuals prayed to different communal gods, recalled festivals or symbols meaningful for their locality, and thought of their present situation within a historical continuum specific to their state, village, or family. After the battle, when the survivors returned to their respective homes, these same factors would have continued to exert significant pressure on each community as it attempted to express its memory collectively through festivals, poetic competitions, dedications, or monumental architecture. Halbwachs argued that to be accepted, new memories have to be integrated within a community's current assumptions about itself and its past.¹¹⁹ Since the Greeks who fought in the Persian War were already members of distinct political communities with equally distinct notions about the past, the process of grafting the experience of the Persian War onto existing social memory would have had a naturally divisive effect, creating a distinct reaction in each case. To illustrate the principle, I turn to Corinth, where a connection between the victory over Persia and female eroticism was forged in large measure because of the powerful part played by Aphrodite in that community's identity. In nearby Athens, a different take on sexuality and the Persian War emerged, itself also influenced by a preexisting conception of the distant past.

Our evidence for this Corinthian plot structure comes from a monument erected in a temple of Aphrodite at Corinth in recognition of aid given by the goddess during the Persian War. The dedication itself was likely destroyed in antiquity, along with the temple, when the Romans sacked Corinth in 146 bce.¹²⁰ Three surviving literary sources record the particulars of the dedication, along with its accompanying epigram: a Scholiast to Pindar (on *Ol.* 13.32b), Plutarch (*Mor.* 871a–b), and Athenaeus (13.573c–e). Much ink has been spilled in the attempt to reconcile these sources. Each contains a slightly different version of the epigram and the context of dedication. None can claim autopsy. Rather, each has his information at second hand. Reconstruction is perilous and remains uncertain. But for our purposes, the details are less important than the basic, largely unobjectionable points of agreement between them. Before we can consider the meaning of the dedication, we must first identify these points.

Let us begin with the epigram. Page makes a case for the basic accuracy of the text provided by the Scholiast to Pindar.¹²¹ There is room for doubt,¹²² but this is as good a place as any to start:

These women stand praying to divine Cypris for the Greeks and their own close-fighting citizens; for the goddess Aphrodite was unwilling to hand over to the bow-bearing Persians the acropolis of the Greeks. (“Simon.” 14P, tr. Campbell modified)

αἶδ' ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάνων τε καὶ ἀγχεμάχων πολιατᾶν
ἔστασαν εὐχόμεναι Κύπριδι δαιμονίᾳ.
οὐ γὰρ τοξοφόροισιν ἐβούλετο δῖ' Ἀφροδίτα
Μήδοις Ἑλλάνων ἀκρόπολιν δόμεναι.

The versions recorded by Plutarch and Athenaeus offer numerous variants. Plutarch describes the citizens not as close-fighting but straight fighting (ἰθυσμάχων); Athenaeus, as broad-fighting (εὐθυσμάχων). Both also use different forms of the verbs for standing and praying.¹²³ In the second distich, Plutarch and Athenaeus record that Aphrodite “was not contriving to betray” the acropolis of the Greeks (οὐ . . . ἐμήδετο . . . προδόμεν),¹²⁴ which imparts a rather more devious tone than the Scholiast, whose Aphrodite simply does not wish to give it.¹²⁵ Finally, Athenaeus identifies the Persians with that term, whereas the others call them the Medes. Although these differences are notable, there can be little doubt about the basic sentiment of the original.¹²⁶ The epigram describes a group of women (αἶδ') who prayed to Aphrodite on behalf of the Corinthians and their allies then at war with the Persians. The last two lines explain why this act was commemorated—because Aphrodite did intervene and through her actions saved Corinth.¹²⁷

There is also broad agreement about the context of the dedication. The monument was occasioned by the invasion of Xerxes and was erected by the Corinthians in a temple of Aphrodite.¹²⁸ There were other temples to Aphrodite in and around the city of Corinth,¹²⁹ but mention of an acropolis within the poem makes it almost certain that the temple in question was the temple of Aphrodite Ourania, located atop the Acrocorinth. Beyond these basic points, there is room for debate. The exact form of the monument remains unclear. Plutarch mentions a bronze statue group; Athenaeus, a painting. In either case, the prayer of these women was commemorated sumptuously. The precise composition of this group of women is also controversial. The Scholiast and Plutarch suggest that the prayer was conducted by the wives of the Corinthian soldiers, who beseeched Aphrodite to cast lust (ἔρωσ) for fighting the Persians upon their husbands.¹³⁰ Athenaeus reports that it included a large group of prostitutes, which he maintains was common practice at Corinth. Scholars have favored Athenaeus, concluding that the prostitutes in question were sacred prostitutes dedicated to Aphrodite, the so-called hierodules.¹³¹ Despite these differences, it is notable that all three of our sources hint

at a sexual component to the prayer. The inclusion of prostitutes, sacred or otherwise, serves to sexualize the prayer overtly. The Corinthian wives pray for lust to be cast upon their husbands. Like “lust” in English, ἔρως need not always denote erotic love, but it cannot be sanitized of that connotation. Greek is not without words that mean courage, verve, or spirit, any of which could have been used to describe what the Corinthian wives wanted to instill in their husbands; ἔρως means something more, something sexual.

The centrality of the erotic within our surviving accounts of this monument has recently been called into question. Stephanie Budin argues that the original dedication did not have sexual overtones and that the role of prostitutes and ἔρως, neither of which appears in the epigram, was subsequently invented.¹³² This possibility needs to be addressed since it points to a very different commemorative narrative for the monument. The criticisms Budin levels against Athenaeus and his principal source, Chamaeleon of Heracleia, have merit and at the very least suggest that scholars have been too eager to accept his version of events.¹³³ But her case against Plutarch and the Scholiast, who here seem to rely on the estimable fourth-century historian Theopompus,¹³⁴ is less persuasive. Budin concludes that Theopompus did not understand why Aphrodite, of all divinities, was evoked in military matters and thus invented the connection to ἔρως to explain the anomaly.¹³⁵ In so doing, she assumes that Theopompus did not know that Aphrodite was the poliad deity in Corinth and that to evoke her aid in Corinth was no more surprising than calling on Athena in Athens.¹³⁶ This assumption is frankly hard to believe. Aphrodite’s position within Corinth’s state cult could not have escaped the attention of a historian who had in all likelihood personally seen the inscription in question.¹³⁷ Budin’s argument against Theopompus cannot stand. We may disregard the presence of prostitutes, but we have no good reason to doubt that the Corinthian dedication had an erotic component nonetheless.

The dedication to the Corinthian women fits well within Corinth’s actual experience of the war. Although behind Megara and the Isthmian wall, the Corinthians too had come close to direct invasion, but had escaped unscathed.¹³⁸ The epigram specifically casts Aphrodite as the defender of the acropolis, and in this regard she functions in much the same way as does Apollo in the *Theognidea*.¹³⁹ There are also hints of Corinth’s present interests. We have no idea when rumors began to spread about Corinth’s half-hearted support for the Greek cause,¹⁴⁰ but the epigram serves to challenge them directly.¹⁴¹ The Corinthian women pray not only for their fellow citizens, but also their Greek allies (ὕπὲρ Ἑλλάνων). When Aphrodite responds, she saves the “acropolis of the Greeks” (Ἑλλάνων

ἀκρόπολιν), which implies that she saved not just Corinth, but all of Greece as well.¹⁴² For our present purposes, however, it is the impact of preexisting social memory that is of particular concern. Aphrodite's temple had long stood on the Acrocorinth. There she was represented as the armed protector of the city. Although her cult name was almost certainly Ourania, Pausanias refers to her as Aphrodite Hoplismene, or armed Aphrodite, because she was represented wearing armor.¹⁴³ The Corinthians linked this cult to their city's identity prominently on their coinage, which featured the head of Aphrodite, complete with a Corinthian helmet, on the reverse.¹⁴⁴ As Corinth's protector deity, armed Aphrodite was embedded within the geography and iconography of that city. But despite all of these martial and political associations, Aphrodite remained the goddess of erotic love. As a result, sexuality, femininity, and warfare were uniquely linked in the civic identity of Corinth. Before the war the Corinthians were probably already making connections between future survival and their poliad deity (as did the Theognidean poet), during the war the Corinthian women acted on these associations, and afterward the male citizens of the state reinforced them by erecting a prominently located and sumptuously decorated monument to the efficacy of their wives' prayers.

The Corinthian wives called on Aphrodite, the goddess of erotic love and their city's defender, to inspire their husbands with lust for fighting the Persians. The agent in this request was a goddess who broke all the rules governing gender relations—she was armed, overtly erotic, non-monogamous, and alone capable of saving all Greece from defeat.¹⁴⁵ In Corinth the prominence of Aphrodite Ourania made the commemoration of a prayer by the Corinthian women a natural step. In Athens the possibility that women might access these attributes typified not the ingredients of a Greek victory, but rather the very threat that foreign invaders past and present posed to the established order. There, the increasingly popular story of the Amazons suggested other commemorative uses for the connection between femininity and warfare. Although the Amazons embody a complex mix of positive and negative traits and although their early representation could vary,¹⁴⁶ two salient attributes can be identified that would eventually come to define the image of the Amazon in Athens—transgressive femininity and alterity. The Amazons represent the power inherent in women who break social norms.¹⁴⁷ Amazons are young, fit, and attractive, and at the same time skilled warriors and dangerous foes. They are also consummate foreigners whose strange and exotic ways represent a threat from the borders of the known world.¹⁴⁸

Much work has been done tracing the evolution of Amazons in art

and literature. It is generally agreed that in the second quarter of the fifth century the image of the Amazon began to shift from a northern to an eastern barbarian.¹⁴⁹ At the same time, the mythology surrounding the Amazons also began to change. Whereas the story had once been dominated by Heracles and his attack on the Amazons, the warrior women were now more popularly represented as leading a massive invasion of Attica. Both changes suggest that the alterity of the Amazons was being brought into parallel with that of the Persians.¹⁵⁰ In this regard they joined the Giants, Centaurs, and Trojans,¹⁵¹ but the Amazon myth additionally brought the Greek cause into alignment with masculinity and that of the barbarian invader with (unconstrained) femininity.¹⁵² In his *Lysistrata*, Aristophanes gives particular voice to this combination of out-of-control women, Amazons, and the Persian invaders:

If any man among us gives these women even the tiniest handhold, there's no limit to what their nimble hands will do. Why, they'll even be building frigates and launching naval attacks, cruising against us like Artemisia. And if they turn to horsemanship, you can scratch our cavalry: there's nothing like a woman when it comes to mounting and riding; even riding hard she won't slip off. Just look at the Amazons in Mikon's paintings, riding chargers in battle against men. Our duty is clear: grab each woman's neck and lock it in the wooden stocks! (671–81, tr. Henderson)

Aristophanes's speaker seamlessly blends warfare and sex, internal and external threats. Athenian women, now in possession of the Acropolis and resisting by force any pressure to end the sex-strike, will, the chorus leader asserts, soon imitate Queen Artemisia, who led a contingent of ships under Xerxes and fought at the battle of Salamis, or will mount horses on which they will be unbeatable.¹⁵³ The sexual pun—"there's nothing like a woman when it comes to mounting and riding"—is hard to miss.¹⁵⁴ As further proof of their skill on horseback, the chorus leader recalls the painting of the Amazons in the Stoa Poikile, which had long since juxtaposed the Persians at Marathon and the Amazonian invasion of Attica.¹⁵⁵ Similar comparisons could be found throughout Athens.¹⁵⁶ The unique combination of traits that had made Aphrodite such an effective ally in Corinth was presented as an existential threat in Athens, more befitting the Persian invaders than their Greek opponents.¹⁵⁷

There is every reason to suspect that some version of this connection between masculinity and the Greek victory was widely held in Greece. When Plutarch introduces the epigram honoring the Corinthian women, he states that "the Corinthian women, alone among Greek women, offered that beautiful and inspired prayer" (*Mor.* 871a). Plutarch had surely seen more Persian-War dedications and epigrams than currently survive. His assertion that only the

Corinthian women made such prayers is strong evidence that the Greeks erected very few, if any, commemorations to the actions of women during the war beyond our current example. The surviving Persian-War commemorations well attest a predominant focus on Greek males. The Serpent Column is a case in point. Behind contestations over which state had rightly earned credit for the victory stands a more elemental conformity: every state is identified by its ethnic in the masculine plural. It is not Sparta, Athens, and Corinth that are honored, but the Spartans (Λακεδ[αιμόνιοι]), Athenians (Ἀθηναῖοι), and Corinthians (Κορίνθιοι); that is, the citizen males of those polities. There is nothing striking or revolutionary in the decision to describe the participating states in this way,¹⁵⁸ but that makes it all the more telling for our purposes. It generally went without saying that the victory had been won entirely by men. Overall reticence about the positive contribution of women to the final victory is even more striking when we consider that it likely masks broad similarities in the ritual actions of women across Greece. Erotic sexuality may not have played a role beyond Corinth, but it is frankly impossible to believe that the prayers of the Corinthian women were the only prayers conducted publicly by the women of Greece, as Plutarch implies.¹⁵⁹ It would be more accurate to conclude that only the Corinthians (that is, the male citizens of Corinth) chose to celebrate what must have been a common occurrence during the dark days of the war. That they did so owes much to the peculiar traits long associated with their poliad goddess.

Conclusion

The Persian War never meant the same thing to all Greeks, not even to those who joined together to resist Xerxes's invasion. Before the first battle, participants from the various poleis would have contextualized the approaching threat within their own recollections about the past. Differences of perception based on preexisting social memories were augmented by the realities of the war itself, which were unevenly experienced across the Greek world and tended very much to differ by state. Afterward, diverse political interests further distorted already distinct memories, as the citizens of the participating states attempted to suit the war to their particular present needs. Under these pressures, Athens, Plataea, Megara, and Corinth developed idiosyncratic stories about the war they had all waged together. A broader survey of the other members of the Hellenic League (not to mention those states that remained neutral or openly sided with Xerxes) would reveal similarly deep divisions.

The relationship between stories and states becomes more complex, however, when we consider the broader master narratives of which our examples were merely a part. Even the small selection of evidence presented here is sufficient to demonstrate that emplotments used within the various states were no more exclusive to one state or the other than were the temporal and spatial boundaries we examined in [Chapter 4](#). Athens was not the only state to emplot the war as a glorious victory over a foreign invader. The trend was, in fact, quite common. Megara was not alone in imagining that divine aid had saved them from the fate endured by others. Corinth comes immediately to mind, but we could also cite Delphi (Hdt. 8.35–39), Potidaea (8.129.3), and Lindus on Rhodes.¹⁶⁰ Athens again seems to have been very much with the majority in seeing the war as the exclusive achievement of the male citizen. Differences between the plot elements used in Athens, Plataea, Megara, and Corinth were not absolute, nor could we realistically expect them to have been so. Despite deep political divisions, the Greeks undeniably participated in a common culture and so remembered the past in light of shared cultural paradigms.¹⁶¹ Moreover, there was a real invasion of Greece whose events formed the basis of the diverse memories we have examined in the last two chapters; or in Hayden White's terms, the chronicle of the Persian War formed the object of narrative representation in each case.

Given these factors, similar plots and narrative frames were bound to emerge. But these individual narrative elements, even when broadly shared, were variously combined with other narrative elements by each state memorial community. Athenian memories of a foreign invasion stopped by Greek masculinity drew on broadly held notions of the war, but their belief that it began with Marathon did not. We might say the same of their near obsession with Persian depredations, which was likely shared only by those who suffered them—at least initially.¹⁶² Plataea was one such state, but the Plataeans do not seem to have placed nearly as much emphasis on the destruction of their city as did the Athenians.¹⁶³ Emphasis there fell rather on the local experience of inter-city strife. Megara and Corinth both celebrated the divine salvation of their cities, and it is tempting to assume that this was the more popular reaction, but both of these states (as well as Delphi and Potidaea) stood at the very edge of the Persian advance. Salvation may not have been as keenly remembered deeper in the Peloponnese. Even between Megara and Corinth, differences emerged. Both looked to deities closely associated with the polis, but in Corinth the existing cult refracted that shared impulse in unique ways. Narrative threads certainly ran throughout the Greek world, but they were in each state woven into largely idiosyncratic

patterns of commemoration.

Our examination of Greek master narratives of the Persian War in this and the previous chapter allows us to return to the figure of Aeschines and to answer some of the questions we posed at the beginning of [Chapter 4](#) about his understanding of the Persian War when he arrived at Delphi as a delegate to the Amphictyonic council in 340/39.¹⁶⁴ He would certainly not have viewed the various conflicting commemorations that met his eye through the same Persian War master narrative as his fellow delegates, but neither would his master narrative have been wholly distinct. Membership within the Athenian memorial community would have greatly predisposed Aeschines to favor a narrow, but by no means exclusively Athenian, set of narrative frames and emplotments (assuming, of course, that he did not personally hold counter narratives of the war). If the variety of periodizations propounded by Isocrates and Demosthenes is any indication, Aeschines is unlikely to have walked into Delphi with a fully formed master narrative in mind.¹⁶⁵ Rather, the monument that caught his eye would evoke specific groupings of the narrative frames and emplotments popularly used at Athens. The Athenian monuments that lined the Sacred Way would comfortably fit within these larger conceptions of the war. The statue groups dedicated to Marathon would suit popular notions about when and why the war began (at Marathon and as a result of unprovoked aggression) and what it had all meant (a glorious victory over a barbarous foreigner). On the temple terrace, the commemoration of Eurymedon would have recalled the long afterlife of the war and the eventual revenge exacted on the Persians, even if those ideas had not occurred to him as he entered the sanctuary.¹⁶⁶ At the same time, the very frames and emplotments that contextualized the monuments of his memorial community would have cast doubt on the commemorations of others. Perceptions of Athenian hegemony after the Persian War might have predisposed him to see the Chian and Samian dedications in a rather different light than the dedicators would have preferred. The Carystian dedication could have provoked outright incredulity, while the connection to the Persian War implied by the Deinomenid dedications might have been so foreign to his own understanding of the war that it was missed entirely.¹⁶⁷ The Serpent Column, which listed the Athenians prominently in the second position, would have perhaps run afoul of Athenian claims to primacy in those events. He might have even entertained the same recollections of Spartan jealousy that came to Apollodorus's mind in his speech against Neaera.¹⁶⁸ A similar constellation of local prejudices would have almost certainly influenced the other delegates who assembled there from across the Greek world.¹⁶⁹ Consequently,

when Aeschines rose to defend the golden shields, his arguments would not have been assessed by the same measures of probability and persuasiveness. Rather each delegate would have seen the shields, the attack on their propriety, and Aeschines's spirited defense through an idiosyncratic (but by no means mutually exclusive) set of narrative frames and emplotments prompted by the coordinating pressures of their own unique preexisting social memory, real experience, and present interests.

¹ For more on master narratives and their relationship to commemorations and commemorative narratives, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 14–16 and [Chapter 4](#), pp. 136–37.

² [White 1978](#): 46 defines emplotment as “the encodation of the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures.” This process of encodation entails the arrangement of events, which are in themselves value-neutral (i.e., the chronicle), “into a story by the suppression or subordination of certain of them and the highlighting of others, by characterization, motif repetition, variation of tone and point of view, alternative descriptive strategies, and the like” (1978: 47). For more on emplotment, see [White 1987](#): 1–25 and 2010: 273–92.

³ [White 1978](#): 49, 54, and 1987: 27 refers to a number of emplotment types throughout his analysis—deterministic, tragic, comic, romantic, satiric, epic, ironic, and eschatological—but never insists that these represent the total possible number of emplotments. Nevertheless, his types are rather more universal and encompassing than those that will concern us here, even though our following examples could fit into some of these larger types.

⁴ [Halbwachs 1992](#) (= 1925): 183 briefly describes a process quite similar to White's emplotment in reference to collective memory (see also [Cubitt 2007](#): 204–205).

⁵ See also [White 1987](#): 21–25.

⁶ We could, of course, broaden our examination by including a Medizing state like Thebes, but such examples would tell us little more than we might guess from the outset, that those who resisted and those who Medized remembered the war differently. The examples here are selected rather to show that substantially different master narratives emerged even among those who fought on the same side.

⁷ These categories also formed the basis of two earlier examinations of Persian-War memory ([Yates 2013](#) and [2018](#)).

⁸ For the bibliography on this principle in modern memory theory, see the [Introduction](#), p. 17; for its application in the study of the ancient world, see [Flashar 1996](#): 64–66, [Gehrke 2001](#): 306, [Alcock 2002](#): 22–23, [Jung 2006](#): 16–20, [Forsdyke 2011](#): 149, [Galinsky 2014](#): 3 and 2016: 8, [Arrington 2015](#): 16, [Ng 2016](#): 236–40, and with no reference to modern theory, [Starr 1962](#): 328.

⁹ A more detailed treatment of this temple and the light it can shed on the overall Persian-War tradition can be found in [Yates 2013](#). I would like to thank Hans-Joachim Gehrke of *Klio* for allowing me to reproduce parts of it here.

¹⁰ For the findings of the Plataiai Research Project, see [Aravantinos, Konecny, and Marchese 2003](#), [Konecny et al. 2008](#), and now [Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013](#); see also the earlier work of [Fossey 1988](#): 102–12.

¹¹ Pausanias twice discusses the interior of the temple of Athena Areia in Book 9 (4.1–2 and 5.11). He also refers in passing to the cult statue of Athena in an earlier part of the work (7.27.2). Plutarch provides some context about the temple's construction in his *Aristeides* (20.1–3) and notes that its interior paintings survived

to his own day (20.3), but says nothing about their content. Otherwise, Athena Areia is named in an extant third-century treaty between the Boeotians and the Aetolians and Phocians (*IG* 9.1² 170a8), but there is no guarantee that the cult of Athena Areia at Plataea is meant (see [Schachter 1981](#): 128 n.3). Two temples at Plataea are noted in a fragment of the third-century comic poet, Poseidippus, but he does not refer to the temples by name and provides no other details about them (*PCG* 7 F31.1).

¹² For more on the various destructions and reconstructions of Plataea in the classical period, see [Chapter 2](#), p. 74 n.57.

¹³ That the Thebans did not destroy the Plataean temples in 373 is explicitly stated by Pausanias (9.1.8). That they also spared them in 426 is implied by Thucydides. After noting the utter destruction of the town, Thucydides states that the Thebans constructed a massive temple to Hera and an equally impressive hostel within her precinct, presumably to accommodate the attendees of the ongoing festivals there (3.68.3; see also [Chapter 2](#), p. 74 n.59). This punctilious concern for religious obligation is echoed in a later pair of speeches delivered by Theban and Athenian heralds after the battle of Delium in 424. The Athenians had taken up positions around a Boeotian temple. The Theban herald complained that this violated the universal custom of respecting enemy temples in wartime (4.97.3). The Athenian retorted that in fact the custom was to maintain existing cults and temples whenever possible and that this was the policy the Thebans themselves used in their conquests (4.98.2–3). Such an exchange would verge on satire if the Thebans had ostentatiously destroyed a major temple only two years before. For more on the generally recognized prohibition against violence toward temples during wartime, see [Pritchett 1991](#): 160–68 as well as [R. Parker 1983](#): 168 and 1994.

¹⁴ That Pausanias was a careful and honest reporter of the monuments he saw, see [Habicht 1985](#): 28–94.

¹⁵ Pausanias does not supply an exact position, but since he enters the town at 9.2.7 and leaves at 9.4.4, it stands to reason that the temple stood within the later hellenistic walls. It cannot, however, be determined from Pausanias if the temple also stood within the much smaller circuit of the classical walls. For more on the changing settlement patterns and defensive works of the town, see the archaeological and topographical analyses listed in [note 10](#).

¹⁶ [E. Harrison 1996](#): 34 rightly warns that Pausanias's estimate of the Plataean Athena's size should not be taken too literally, but nevertheless concludes that it must have been a relatively large statue.

¹⁷ Although we know very little about fifth-century Plataea, the primacy of the temple of Athena Areia is justified by the available evidence for near-contemporary commemorations of the war. The veneration of Zeus Eleutherios and the obsequies for the fallen, although much more popular in our surviving sources, were not formalized and elaborated until the hellenistic period (see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 72–81 and [Chapter 6](#), pp. 224–27). Only the temple of Artemis Eucleia had a similar focus on the Plataean experience at the site of Plataea (*Plut. Arist.* 20.5–6), but the connection between the temple and the Persian War is difficult to confirm for the fifth century ([Schachter 1981](#): 102 and [Jung 2006](#): 187–88).

¹⁸ The reading suggested by [Jeppessen 1971](#)—Ὀνασία δὲ ἀργοῦσά που κατὰ τὸ θεῖον ἐπὶ Θήβας ἢ προτέρα στρατεία—seems less likely than the one adopted by [Jones 1935](#), [Rocha-Pereira 1989](#), and used here—Ὀνασία δὲ Ἀδράστου καὶ Ἀργείων ἐπὶ Θήβας ἢ προτέρα στρατεία.

¹⁹ Telemachus, Eumaeus, and Philoetius stand armed with Odysseus early in the fight (22.108–115). Although Eumaeus and Philoetius are sent to deal with the traitor Melanthius (170–79), they quickly return to the great hall (200–202). Athena appears briefly disguised as Mentor (205–235) and then transforms into a swallow, flies to the rafters of the palace (239–40), and from there influences the battle in

Odysseus's favor (256, 273, and 297–98).

²⁰ See [Castriota 1992](#): 75.

²¹ For the possible placement of Euryganeia within the composition, see [Gauer 1968](#): 99–100.

²² [Castriota 1992](#): 65–73.

²³ The basic assumption that the interior decoration of the Plataean temple reflects Athenian interests has been made before [Castriota](#) ([Gauer 1968](#): 98–99, [Touchefeu-Meynier 1968](#): 287, [E. Thomas 1976](#): 70 and 74, and [Tiverios 1981](#): 152–54), and his detailed treatment of that possibility has won some scholarly support (see, for example, [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 29 and [Stephenson 2016](#): 92). [Jung 2006](#): 257–59, however, presupposes that its perspective was Plataean in his brief treatment of the temple.

²⁴ See [Frazer 1898](#): 21, [Gauer 1968](#): 98–99, [Siewert 1972](#): 103–104, [E. Thomas 1976](#): 69, [Schachter 1981](#): 128, [Prandi 1988](#): 58–60, [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 28–29, [Jung 2006](#): 257, and [Beck 2010](#): 65.

²⁵ [Castriota 1992](#): 64.

²⁶ If work on the temple of Athena Areia had begun prior to Xerxes's invasion, its fate would have likely mirrored that of the Older Parthenon at Athens (see [Hurwit 1999](#): 132–36). Construction of this predecessor to the Periclean Parthenon was started in the years after Marathon. When Xerxes entered the city, the temple had only begun to rise from its foundation. The scaffolding was burned, and the heat was sufficient to fracture many of the blocks that had already been set in place.

²⁷ This possibility is maintained by [Siewert 1972](#): 103–104, [Schachter 1981](#): 128, [Prandi 1988](#): 58–60, [Beck 2010](#): 65, and [Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013](#): 28, and indeed finds some textual support in the manuscript tradition of Plutarch's *Aristeides* where there is equal authority for both “build” (ᾠκοδόμησαν) and “rebuild” (ἀνᾠκοδόμησαν) as the verb used to describe the erection of the temple (20.3). The only serious objection to “rebuild” comes from the so-called Oath of Plataea, some versions of which contain a clause that prohibits the restoration of temples destroyed by the Persians. But the authenticity of the Oath and this clause in particular has frequently been called into question (see pp. 190–91).

²⁸ See [Chapter 3](#), pp. 121–22.

²⁹ [Castriota 1992](#): 65 supports his contention with two further arguments. Neither adds much weight to his discussion of the temple's funding. Two of the artists involved in the project (Pheidias and Polygnotus) were closely associated with Athens, but he cites no evidence that an artist's personal or profession associations with one state precluded the possibility of working for other states or reflecting their interests when paid to do so. Citing [Gauer 1968](#): 98–99, [Castriota](#) also argues that the very decision to dedicate wartime spoils to Athena may have been due to Athenian influence. Although the cult of Athena is not attested at Plataea before the Persian War, this observation should not be pressed too far. [Gauer's](#) primary evidence is Plutarch's much later account of the battle of Plataea, in which an oracle fails to mention Athena in a list of local deities (*Arist.* 11.3; see also [Touchefeu-Meynier 1968](#): 287 and [E. Thomas 1976](#): 69–70). Although [Gauer](#) notes and dismisses possible objections based on the historical accuracy of this account, there were in point of fact quite a few twists and turns of tradition standing between Plutarch and any actual cult practice in archaic Plataea (see [Chapter 6](#), pp. 224–27 and [Chapter 7](#), pp. 263–64).

³⁰ If the Plataean speech in Thucydides is any indication (3.53–59), the Plataeans did not feel especially beholden to Athens or Sparta for the Persian-War victory, but rather saw themselves as equal benefactors of all Greece (see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 80–81). A similar attitude toward war service can be detected in other small states. Even under the auspices of so unequal an alliance as the Delian League, allies who

participated in campaigns expected remuneration as their right, not a gift (see Plut. *Cim.* 9). Those allies in turn had no qualms about erecting monuments from wartime profits without any apparent cognizance of Athenian interests (see [Chapter 3](#), p. 123 n.128). For the role of self-interest in the distribution of wartime profits generally, see [Garlan 1977](#): 158–64.

³¹ [Castriota 1992](#): 65–73.

³² See [Boardman 1982](#): 21–22 on the difficulties associated with reconstructing a lost mural from vase paintings and [Neer 2001](#): 293–94 for the methodological pitfalls of relying too much on those elements of a myth not demonstrably present in a particular work.

³³ [Castriota 1992](#): 70–71.

³⁴ As [Castriota 1992](#): 67 acknowledges.

³⁵ See p. 177.

³⁶ The point is best made by Eurymachus when he urges Odysseus to spare his own people now that Antinous has been killed (σὺ δὲ φείδεο λαῶν / σῶν: 22.54–55).

³⁷ The exact analogy intended in the Seven-against-Thebes painting is debatable. If we consider the myth in isolation, Thebes serves as an ideal parallel for Plataea: a Boeotian town attacked by a foreign (Argive) invasion supported by native collaboration (Polyneices). Indeed, both Aeschylus (*Sept.* 375–682) and Sophocles (*Ant.* 100–161) portray the Thebans as the victims of Polyneices’s treachery and Argive arrogance. But the Medism of Thebes in the present conflict and Plataea’s otherwise tense relationship with its neighbor make an analogy between the two states extremely unlikely. The Plataeans must have drawn on a tradition more favorable to Polyneices’s cause (for contemporary Argive commemorations of this myth, see [Bommelaer 1991](#): 113–14 and 1992). It remains curious that the Plataeans appear to have analogized themselves to the losers in the battle, but if the devastating loss wrought by civil war was, as I argue, the point of the paintings, that fact is less perplexing.

³⁸ The role of civil strife (and by analogy Medism) has long been noted in the Seven-against-Thebes composition ([E. Thomas 1976](#): 74, [Tiverios 1981](#): 154, [Castriota 1992](#): 65–73, [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 29, and [Jung 2006](#): 258). [Castriota 1992](#): 73–76 makes the case for a similar focus in the Odysseus painting (see also [Stähler 1992](#): 49), which had previously been seen as an analogue for the fight with the Persian outsiders ([Gauer 1968](#): 100 and [E. Thomas 1976](#): 69). These arguments are followed by [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 29, but [Jung 2006](#): 258, citing Gauer, maintains the more traditional reading.

³⁹ [Gauer 1968](#): 100 suggests that Odysseus’s rebuke of Eurycleia’s glee (*Od.* 22.411–18) captures the mood of the painting.

⁴⁰ The Plataean speech before the Spartans in Thucydides is a case in point (3.53–59; see also [Chapter 2](#), pp. 80–81 and [Chapter 4](#), pp. 154–65).

⁴¹ For Plataea’s role in the battle at Plataea, see p. 179.

⁴² The Erythrae decree, for example, refers to the continued activities of Medizers along the Ionian coast in the mid-fifth century (ML 40.27). A few decades later, Herodotus will give Medism a prominent place in his history (see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 81–88).

⁴³ For a convenient survey of all surviving Persian-War monuments, see W. [West 1967](#) and [Gauer 1968](#).

⁴⁴ Herodotus estimates that the Medizing Greeks contributed 307 ships to the Persian armada (7.93–95). This would make the Ionian portion of Xerxes’s fleet comparable to the entire allied fleet, which was initially composed of 271 ships (8.1–2) and later reinforced by 53 Athenian ships (8.14). It is possible that Simonides intended the Ionians to be understood as one of the tribes of Asia, but if

so, he has embedded Greek Medism within an umbrella term that emphasizes rather the foreignness of the invader. For more on contemporary conceptions of Europe and Asia, see [Heinrichs 1989](#) and [Stadter 1992](#): 785–95.

⁴⁵ See [Broadhead 1960](#): 44 and [Garvie 2009](#): 63, 116, and 304. [Kim 2013](#): 31 goes further still, suggesting that Aeschylus here takes a favorable view of the Ionians, by adopting the Persian custom of calling all Greeks (including those who had recently defeated Xerxes at Salamis) Ionians.

⁴⁶ For a more detailed discussion of these instances, see [Yates 2013](#): 375–77.

⁴⁷ For the association of these two buildings with the Persian War, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 121–22.

⁴⁸ [Castriota 1992](#): 17–32. For more on the connection between these myths and contemporary stereotypes of the Persians, see [Woodford 1974](#): 162, [Boardman 1982](#), [duBois 1982](#), [Shapiro 1983](#): 114, [Tyrrell 1984](#): 9–21 and 49–52, [Vickers 1985](#): 13, [Blok 1995](#): 441, [R. Rhodes 1995](#): 92–93, [Stewart 1995](#), [Hölscher 1998a](#): 163–69, [Hurwit 1999](#): 169–70 and [2004](#): 124, [J. Hall 2002](#): 178, [Johnson 2005](#), [Meyer 2005](#): 289, [Whitaker 2005](#): 166, and [L. Shear 2016](#): 117–20. At first glance the Trojans may stand out, but, as [E. Hall 1989](#): 11–12 has argued, the Trojans of the fifth century underwent a metamorphosis that turned the culturally similar foes of the *Iliad* into the orientalized “Other” of the tragic stage.

⁴⁹ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 1–3.

⁵⁰ Aeschines is our only source, and he states that the shields were dedicated shortly before the new temple of Apollo was consecrated and thus not long before he served as representative to the Amphictyony in 340/39. Most support their authenticity, arguing that the original shields were rehung at this point or that the new shields were a faithful reproduction of an earlier commemoration (see, for example, [Parke 1939](#): 72, [Roux 1979](#): 30, [Croissant 1996](#): 133, [Habicht 1997](#): 93, [M. Scott 2010](#): 132–33, and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 111). A few, however, have expressed serious reservations ([Gauer 1968](#): 26–27 and [Yates 2013](#): 377).

⁵¹ A similar emphasis can be seen in two other Athenian monuments in which Medism seems to play a part. The interior decoration of the Theseion, a heroön constructed in the second quarter of the fifth century, may have alluded to Medism ([Castriota 1992](#): 33–63), but seems to have been otherwise dominated by the specter of the alien invader—and this in a monument commemorating a campaign (the attack on Scyros) in which the Persians did not even take part ([Yates 2013](#): 377–79). The version of the Oath of Plataea preserved on a stele in Acharnae singles Thebes out for punitive action, but in so doing replicates the basic tenor of the Delphi shields (RO 88.31–33). For bibliography on the vexed question of the Oath’s authenticity, see pp. [190–91](#).

⁵² See [Chapter 1](#), p. 39.

⁵³ See, for example, Simonides’s epigrams for the battles of Thermopylae (7P and 23P), Artemisium (24P), Salamis (11P, 12P, 13P, and 14P), and Plataea (15P). Some of these are authentic, while others are almost certainly inventions of the hellenistic period (see [Chapter 2](#), p. 63 n.6). For our present purposes, however, only the broader trend is of note.

⁵⁴ It should be noted that Herodotus does not give the Plataeans any specific role in the battle, and we might infer that they too withdrew to Plataea, along with the rest of the allies, in defiance of orders from Pausanias (9.52). Only our later sources (Lys. 2.46 and Diod. 11.32.1–2) credit the Plataeans with remaining by their Athenian allies (see also [S. C. Todd 2007](#): 248). Lysias does so on the assumption that the other allies (aside from the Spartans and Tegeans) did abandon their posts; Diodorus, however, proceeds as though no such dereliction of duty had occurred. Normally, this would suggest a later invention, and that must remain a possibility, but the credit Thucydides has his Plataeans claim for that victory before their

Spartan judges gives additional credence to the later tradition in this case (see particularly 3.54.3–4, 3.58.4, and 3.59.2; see also [Chapter 2](#), pp. 80–81). Indeed, the event was only then beginning to fade from living memory. If Thucydides recognized the claim as false, he has attributed to his Plataeans a bold gamble before a group of judges who would presumably have known better, as the Plataeans themselves were well aware (3.53.4). We might also consider here the admittedly later claim that the Plataeans had been awarded the prize of valor (Plut. *Arist.* 20.1–3), a difficult fabrication to sustain if their service in the battle were subject to serious doubt.

⁵⁵ For the focus on the barbarian antitype at Athens, see [J. Hall 2002](#): 187–89.

⁵⁶ [Hornblower 1991](#): 144 (with earlier bibliography) rightly notes that the word Thucydides uses to describe this objective is *πρόσχημα*—a pretext, and not even the pretext. This allows us to consider other stated objectives and, of course, an array of real, but unspoken objectives for Athens and its various allies. But as Hornblower himself concedes, Persia was almost certainly the enemy the league's original members had in mind. Herodotus gives us a further indication that the Athenians were not interested in pursuing a punitive campaign against repentant Medizers in his account of a meeting of the Hellenic League's war council after the battle of Mycale. The Athenians opposed a Spartan proposal to remove the Ionians from their homes in Asia Minor and settle them on the land of the Medizers in mainland Greece (9.106.2–3), who would presumably be displaced or sold into slavery (see [Chapter 3](#), p. 104 n.18). The thrust of the Athenian objection is that the fate of Ionia was theirs to decide, but the result is that Xerxes's former allies in Greece and Asia Minor are spared any significant disruption.

⁵⁷ For the Medism of Thessaly, see [Chapter 3](#), p. 117 n.93; for accusations that Argos's neutrality had amounted to Medism, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 125–26.

⁵⁸ The number of independent states within the Delian League dwindled from its foundation in 478/7 until only Chios and Lesbos remained at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. For a survey of Athens's relationship with the two powerful island states (along with Samos, which lost its independence in 439), see [Quinn 1981](#). The alliance with Argos was first formed in 462/1 (Thuc. 1.102.4) and remained, off and on, a key element of Athenian foreign policy throughout the rest of the fifth century and beyond (see [Tomlinson 1972](#): 101–41 and [Kelly 1974](#)).

⁵⁹ For Tanagra's attempt at hegemony, see [Fowler 1957](#), [Amit 1971](#), and [Buck 1979](#): 141–48.

⁶⁰ For the possible implications of Thebes's intervention at Delium, see [Buck 1979](#): 142, [Schachter 1981](#): 46 and 2004: 350–51, and [Demand 1982](#): 27.

⁶¹ Diodorus (11.81.2–3) states that the Spartans restored Thebes to a position of hegemony at this time, but see [Buck 1989](#) for a strong case against the reliability of Diodorus's account of mid-fifth-century Boeotia.

⁶² Twice Thucydides's Theban speakers characterize the period immediately before the beginning of Athenian hegemony over Boeotia in 457/6 as one of *stasis* (3.62.5 and 4.92.6); see also [Buck 1979](#): 143.

⁶³ [E. Thomas 1976](#): 70 also concludes that the decoration of the temple should be dated to a period of tension between Athens and Sparta.

⁶⁴ [Schwartz 1982](#): 396; see also [Schudson 1989](#): 109, [Irwin-Zarecka 1994](#): 17–18 and 145–58, [Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000](#): 34–36, [Misztal 2003](#): 67–73, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 206.

⁶⁵ [Burke 1989](#): 104–105, [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 130–31, and [Steinbock 2013b](#): 18–19.

⁶⁶ [White 1978](#): 47, 55, and 1987: 44 argues that events are in themselves neutral and can fit into any emplotment. This is correct in theory, but once these facts are placed into a specific social milieu, [Klein 2000](#): 139 rightly argues that the options

become rather more limited. Even [White 1978](#): 47–48 seems to acknowledge this practical limitation when he states that a comic retelling of the life of President John F. Kennedy would be unacceptable (to a mainstream contemporary American audience). In specific social contexts, events do prompt certain emplotments, while making others significantly less appealing.

⁶⁷ Phlius, Mycenae, Thespieae, Thebes, Phocis, Mantinea, Tegea, and Orchomenos, in addition to 1,000 men “from the rest of Arcadia” at Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.202–203); Athens, Sicyon, Aegina, Megara, Epidaurus, Troezen, Plataea, Ceos, Eretria, Chalcis, and Styra at Artemisium (8.1). A Lemnian ship also defected during the battle (8.11) and went on to serve at Salamis (8.82).

⁶⁸ Hermione, Melos, Naxos, Leucas, Cythnos, Siphnos, Ambracia, Seriphos, and Croton joined the fight for the first time (Hdt. 8.43–48). A Tenian ship also defected on the eve of the battle (Hdt. 8.82).

⁶⁹ Since we are only concerned with Herodotus’s version of events here, we do not need to go into the difficulties surrounding Croton’s alleged participation in the war, but see [Chapter 3](#), p. 106 n.28 and [Chapter 6](#), pp. 220–22 for more on this question.

⁷⁰ The size of the fleet assembled in 479 is notably smaller than the one that faced the Persians in 480 ([Asheri et al. 2003](#): 332 and [A. Bowie 2007](#): 219). [Munro 1904](#): 146–47 suggests that the shortfall can be explained if we assume that this figure does not account for the Athenian contingent, which he surmises was initially held back, but later joined the fleet prior to the battle of Mycale. Diodorus Siculus does indeed provide a much higher figure of 250 ships (11.34.2). [Hignett 1963](#): 249–50, however, persuasively argues that Athens (and indeed the other allied states) did not have the manpower to send out all their ships and simultaneously mount a major action on land. The figure of 110 ships more likely represents what the allies could assemble along with the army sent to Plataea.

⁷¹ For more on the memory of the Persian War at Megara, see [Yates 2018](#), which takes some of the conclusions reached here as a point of departure for a closer look at the themes of fear and discord. I would like to thank Hans Beck of *Teiresias Supplements Online* for permission to reproduce it here.

⁷² This date is supplied by the Suda (s.v. Theognis). See M. [West 1974](#): 70 for an earlier date and Beloch [1888](#) and [1895](#): 250–55 for a later one, but most support the traditional date ([Hudson-Williams 1910](#): 6–12, [Ligon 1981](#): 110–11, [Gerber 1997](#): 123, [Lane Fox 2000](#): 37–40, and [Selle 2008](#): 21–27). [Nagy 1985](#): 33–36 proposes a tempting conclusion that the historical Theognis is a myth, not unlike the lawgiver Lycurgus, and that the body of poetry that comes down under his name is simply a collection of traditional Megarian poetry. I leave aside the question of Theognis’s home (Nisaeon or Hyblaeon Megara) since it is obvious that our poem (regardless of authorship) refers to Nisaeon Megara. For more on this debate, see M. [West 1974](#): 65, [Figueira 1985](#): 123–28, [Gerber 1997](#): 121, [Lane Fox 2000](#): 36–37, and [Selle 2008](#): 27–36.

⁷³ [Hudson-Williams 1910](#) and [van Groningen 1966](#) end this poem at line 782. M. [West 1971](#) includes the next six lines (783–88) with this poem, but notes line 782 as a possible alternate division. Since lines 783–88 turn to a different theme and, in my view, disturb the balance of the poem, I follow Hudson-Williams and van Groningen.

⁷⁴ [Hudson-Williams 1910](#): 9–10 suggests that the poem conveys concerns over the initial fall of Ionia to the Persians in the 540s; [Burn 1960](#): 170 suggests a slightly later date. [Highbarger 1937](#): 109–10 argues that an aged Theognis could have written this poem in response to the Persian attempt on Marathon in 490. Yet the repetition of the poet’s plea evinces a feeling of desperation unlikely when the Persians conquered Ionia, a relatively distant region that had already been under foreign domination for some time ([Van Groningen 1966](#): 302, M. [West 1974](#): 65,

Gerber 1997: 122, and Selle 2008: 236–37). Had the campaign against Marathon stirred such emotion in Megara, we might well expect them to have sent a contingent along with the Spartans to aid the Athenians. Indeed, the Spartan expedition must have marched right by Megara on its way to Athens (Hdt. 6.120). As it is, the Megarians did nothing, presumably considering resistance futile or the whole issue an Athenian problem (Legon 1981: 163).

⁷⁵ Van Groningen 1966: 301–302, M. West 1974: 65, Legon 1981: 106–107, Figueira 1985: 122, Nagy 1985: 33, Gerber 1997: 122, and Selle 2008: 235–37 with further bibliography. One other poem in the *Theognidea* (757–64) makes reference to a Persian threat and likely dates to this period as well (see Figueira 1985: 123, Nagy 1985: 33 n.2, Gerber 1997: 122, and Yates 2018: 143–44; contra van Groningen 1966: 302 and Selle 2008: 237).

⁷⁶ See note 72.

⁷⁷ For this conclusion, see M. West 1974: 65, Legon 1981: 157 n.1, and Gerber 1997: 121. Selle 2008: 372–73 keeps open the possibility that an aged Theognis could have written this poem. I leave aside any attempt to identify an alternative to Theognis himself, but see Selle 2008: 246 for a useful discussion.

⁷⁸ Figueira 1985: 126–27 has argued that Theognis’s poetry lost meaning in Megara sometime before the fourth century, which would help to explain the later confusion about his place of origin and why the poet does not seem to have been used by the Megarian local historians.

⁷⁹ This acropolis (one of two in Megara) was called Alcathoan in honor of the city’s founder (Paus. 1.42.1). He also figured prominently in Megarian local history; see Dieuchidas (*FGrHist* 485 F10) and an anonymous fragment that appears in Pausanias (1.42.1 = *FGrHist* 487 F 5). See also Hudson-Williams 1910: 225 and Polignac 1995: 144–45.

⁸⁰ Plutarch mentions a temple to Pythian Apollo, incomplete at the time of the second triumvirate (*Ant.* 23.3). Pausanias draws attention to a new marble temple to Pythian Apollo, completed by Hadrian and intended to replace an older structure made of brick (1.42.5). But at the same time, Pausanias mentions two other manifestations of Apollo—Apollo Decatephorus (the Bringer of Tithes) and Apollo Archegetes (the Founder)—and we cannot know which the poet had in mind, although Archegetes feels the most likely given the parochial focus of the poem (see also Farnell 1977: 374 n.64). Highbarger 1937: 100–109 argues that the Apollo in question should be seen as Delian Apollo (see also Young 1964: 328), but there is no evidence to suggest that Delian Apollo was particularly popular at Megara. Apollo also plays a prominent role in the other poem from the *Theognidea* that mentions the Persian invasion (759–61), but there he is paired with Zeus and “the other blessed immortal gods” (757–59).

⁸¹ See also van Groningen 1966: 300.

⁸² Highbarger connects this adjective to the Persian tendency to “plunder for the sheer joy of plundering” (1937: 92–93), but draws no attention to the destruction of temples specifically. Van Groningen 1966: 300 suggests that it is intended to indicate that the Persians are an army of aggression. For more on the Persian policy of temple desecration generally, see Funke 2007 and Rung 2016.

⁸³ Contra Nagy 1985: 36, who maintains that the poet “speaks of the Persian threat to Hellas” (see also Carrière 1975: 175). Nagy is, however, certainly right to note that the overall perspective of the *Theognidea* is panhellenic, even if the present poem is an obvious exception to that rule (see Carrière 1948: 193 and Figueira 1985: 121–24).

⁸⁴ The focus on the home state is repeated at the end of the poem and also appears in the other Theognidean Persian-War poem: “May Zeus, who dwells in heaven, forever hold his right hand over this city (τῆσδε πόλῃος) to keep it safe”

(757–58). In both cases, I would suggest that the poet responds to the broader, state-centered trends examined in [Chapters 1 and 2](#).

⁸⁵ For more on the role of *stasis* in the Theognidean corpus, see [Nagy 1985](#): 36 and [Yates 2018](#): 153.

⁸⁶ Themistocles makes the point explicitly here in his speech to the war council. Later Herodotus notes that the Megarians (along with the Athenians and Aeginetans) opposed the withdrawal of the fleet to the Isthmus (8.74.2). For more on Megara's position during the debates before the battle of Salamis, see [Hignett 1963](#): 191 and 201, [Legon 1981](#): 165, [Hammond 1988](#): 572, [Lazenby 1993](#): 158–66, [Balcer 1995](#): 264, and [Green 1996a](#): 164.

⁸⁷ For more on the movement of the Persian army immediately before the battle of Salamis and its purpose, see [Burn 1962](#): 448–49, [Hignett 1963](#): 205, [Lazenby 1993](#): 166–67, and [Green 1996a](#): 175–76. [Hammond 1988](#): 582–83 argues that the Persian army may have made significant progress on this occasion, devastating not merely the Megarid, but perhaps burning the temple of Poseidon at Isthmia as well, but see [Lazenby 1993](#): 219 n.10 and [Balcer 1995](#): 269 n.52 against this possibility.

⁸⁸ See [Green 1996a](#): 211–12.

⁸⁹ [Hignett 1963](#): 282, [Legon 1981](#): 165, [Lazenby 1993](#): 213, [Green 1996a](#): 229, and [Asheri et al. 2006](#): 183. For more on this diplomatic exchange in Herodotus, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 87–88.

⁹⁰ For more on the actual strategy that may have stood behind this incursion into the Megarid, see [Hignett 1963](#): 291–92, [Legon 1981](#): 168–69, and [Lazenby 1993](#): 219.

⁹¹ For more on the Themistocles decree, see [Chapter 7](#), pp. 261–62.

⁹² As does [Legon 1981](#): 169–70, who further speculates that a Megarian epigram, honoring those who fell in the war (“Simon.” 16P), may have contained a reference to it in a missing portion of the text (line 6).

⁹³ [Highbarger 1937](#): 110 argues that the very existence of a story about Artemis (rather than Apollo) speaks against the possibility that the Persian-War poem in the *Theognidea* dates from Xerxes's invasion. [Nagy 1985](#): 33 and [Figueira 1985](#): 122, on the other hand, go so far as to suggest that this episode may have actually inspired the Theognidean poem.

⁹⁴ For Strongylion's period of activity, see [Lippold 1950](#): 189–90 and [Todisco 1993](#): 42. [Piccirilli 1975](#): 134–36 adds the passage from Pausanias that describes the statue in Megara to a list of unidentified fragments from the lost histories of Megara (P5 F22), which raises the possibility that Pausanias is here drawing on a literary source, possibly from the fourth century bce. Since there is no mention of an author or title, such an attribution must, of course, be taken with a grain of salt, as Piccirilli himself notes (1975: 136). Jacoby, more conservatively, leaves this passage out of his collection of unattributed fragments of Megarian local histories (*FGrHist* 487).

⁹⁵ Pausanias begins his explanation of the circumstances of dedication with “they say” (φασι), which points to an oral or literary tradition, not an inscription.

⁹⁶ [Legon 1981](#): 169–70 argues that the stone was what remained of the battlefield trophy, but it seems incredible that a battlefield trophy would have survived over 600 years and be in the state Pausanias describes (see also [Lazenby 1993](#): 219 n.10).

⁹⁷ Pausanias reports that near the Carian acropolis (Megara's other acropolis) there was a temple to Apollo Agraeus and Artemis Agrotera, dedicated by Alcathous himself after he had killed the Cithaeronian Lion (1.41.3).

⁹⁸ [Olick 1999](#); see also [Schudson 1989](#): 108 and [Cubitt 2007](#): 202–203.

⁹⁹ See, for example, [Meiggs 1972](#): 505–507, [H. Thompson 1981](#): 344–46, and [Boedeker 2007](#): 70–72.

¹⁰⁰ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 18–19.

¹⁰¹ [Kousser 2009](#): 269.

¹⁰² For more on this policy, see [Ferrari 2002](#), [Hurwit 2005a](#): 20–25, and [Kousser 2009](#).

¹⁰³ [Meiggs 1972](#): 506; see also [Dinsmoor 1932b](#): 315, [R. Rhodes 1995](#): 32–34, [Hurwit 1999](#): 142, [Ferrari 2002](#): 25, [Kousser 2009](#): 271, [L. Shear 2016](#): 8, and [Garland 2017](#): 116. Although Thucydides reports that the city walls were completed quickly with existing materials (1.90–93.2), there is no indication that (or reason why) the Acropolis itself would have been completed with similar haste.

¹⁰⁴ [Hurwit 1999](#): 144, 2004: 70, and 2005a: 23–24.

¹⁰⁵ Xenophon records that in 406 bce the “old temple of Athena” caught fire (*Hell.* 1.6.1). The precise date of this event is, however, debatable (see [Dinsmoor 1932a](#) for a discussion).

¹⁰⁶ There is considerable debate about the date at which the remains of the temple of Athena Polias ceased to be used. [Linders 2007](#) argues for the late fifth century, [Dinsmoor 1932a](#) and [1932b](#) for the fourth, and [Ferrari 2002](#) for the imperial period. See also [R. Rhodes 1995](#): 189 n.6, [Hurwit 2005a](#): 23–24, [Kousser 2009](#): 270, and [Garland 2017](#): 117 on this question.

¹⁰⁷ See [note 106](#). Even in the imperial period, Pausanias can point out two Athenian temples that showed the marks of Xerxes’s invasion (10.35.2).

¹⁰⁸ The Oath is preserved in three slightly different versions, two literary (Diod. 11.29.2–3 and Lycurg. 81) and one inscription dated to the fourth century (RO 88). The clause prohibiting the restoration of temples appears only in the literary versions, however.

¹⁰⁹ The bibliography on the Oath is extensive. [Siewert 1972](#) provides the most detailed analysis. For more up-to-date treatments, however, see [Rhodes and Osborne 2003](#): 440–49, [van Wees 2006](#), [Krentz 2007](#), [Kellogg 2008](#), [Cartledge 2013](#), and [L. Shear 2016](#): 8–9. While Siewert supports the authenticity of the Oath, he remains in the minority, with most rejecting it outright or at least expressing serious reservations. Even [Siewert 1972](#): 102–106, however, doubts the clause prohibiting the restoration of temples.

¹¹⁰ [Hölscher 2010](#): 140 and [Garland 2017](#): 117. [L. Shear 2016](#): 9–11, however, suggests that a lack of skilled laborers, who were drawn from across the Greek world, may have caused work on the Acropolis to be delayed.

¹¹¹ Despite the focus the Athenians placed on the devastation of their homeland, they did not allow it to imply defeat. In Aeschylus’s *Persae*, the Queen asks, “is the city of Athens still unsacked then,” to which the messenger replies, “while she has her men, her defenses are secure” (348–49, tr. Sommerstein modified). Herodotus includes a similar sentiment. When Adeimantus the Corinthian claims on the eve of Salamis that Themistocles should have no say in the debate because he had no city, Themistocles responds that “in fact the Athenians’ city and land were greater than theirs, as long as they had 200 ships of their own, fully manned” (8.61.2, tr. Purvis). In both cases, Athens remains in effect unconquered. For more on the exchange in Aeschylus, see [Garvie 2009](#): 180–81; for Herodotus, see [Asheri et al. 2003](#): 262 and [Blösel 2004](#): 193; and for the connection between the two passages, see [Podlecki 1966](#): 16 and 158–59 n.24 and [T. Harrison 2000](#): 71.

¹¹² The resistance and devastation of Phocis (8.32–33), Athens (8.50.1), and the Boeotian towns of Thespieae and Plataea (8.50.2) are so described.

¹¹³ See Doris (8.31) and most of Boeotia (8.34). Even when Mardonius cuts down some trees in Theban territory before the battle of Plataea, Herodotus is at pains to remind the reader that this was not done for any hostility on Mardonius’s part, but merely out of strategic necessity (9.15.2).

¹¹⁴ *Lys.* 2.33–43, *Isoc.* 4.96–98, 5.147, 6.43, and 12.50, *Dem.* 18.204, and Lycurg. 68–69. It was in response to just such self-aggrandizement that Theopompus famously questioned the veracity of the Oath of Plataea (*FGrHist* 115 F153; see also

Chapter 7, p. 267 n.74).

¹¹⁵ See [Kousser 2009](#): 272–75 for a survey of the evidence.

¹¹⁶ When Themistocles convinces the Athenians not to pursue Xerxes's fleet after Salamis, he notes that the gods had punished Xerxes in part because he “made no distinction between sacred and private property when he burned and demolished the statues of the gods” (8.109.3, tr. Purvis).

¹¹⁷ The value of devastation as a proof of loyalty seems to have remained alive and well long after the classical period. When Pausanias discusses the Boeotian town of Haliartus, he makes a point of saying that it had been loyal to the Greek cause and had thus been destroyed by Xerxes (9.32.5; see also 10.35.2). There is, in fact, no indication that Haliartus remained loyal (*contra* [Steinbock 2013b](#): 128). Pausanias's claim may derive from a later apologist for that town or a simple error on his part (see [Habicht 1985](#): 99), but in either case he takes the signs of devastation as proof positive that Haliartus had remained loyal to the Greek cause.

¹¹⁸ For the basic principle in memory theory, see [Halbwachs 1980](#) (= 1950): 30–31, [Burke 1989](#): 100–105, [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 130–31, [Winter and Sivan 1999](#): 13 and 28, [Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper 2000](#): 34–36, [Misztal 2003](#): 67–73, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 208–209.

¹¹⁹ [Halbwachs 1992](#) (= 1925): 83, 86, and 160; see also [Appadurai 1981](#).

¹²⁰ But see [Bookidis 2005](#): 141–51, who concludes that the remains of hellenistic Corinth were still standing when the site was colonized by the Romans in 44 bce.

¹²¹ [Page 1981](#): 207–11; see also [Pirenne-Delforge 1994](#): 108.

¹²² See, for example, [Palumbo Stracca 1985](#), [C. Brown 1991](#), [Kurke 1996](#): 73–75 n.38, and [Budin 2008a](#): 335–40. Even [Page 1981](#): 211 emends ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΑΙ which appears at the end of line 2 in all versions, to read δαίμονια. For a defense of the received tradition of this adjective, see [C. Brown 1991](#), who argues that it should be construed as a nominative plural, agreeing with the women. More often, this adjective, when retained, has been understood as a dative singular with Cypris. I render it a dative singular, but neither alternative (nor Page's emendation) affects the argument I make here.

¹²³ Plutarch and Athenaeus use the aorist passive ἐστάρθεν, paired in the case of Plutarch with the aorist participle εὐξάμεναι and the present infinitive εὐχεσθαι in Athenaeus.

¹²⁴ Athenaeus uses the aorist ἐμίσατο rather than the imperfect that appears in Plutarch and is reproduced here.

¹²⁵ [Page 1981](#): 211, [Kurke 1996](#): 64–65, and [Budin 2008a](#): 338.

¹²⁶ [Higbie 2010](#): 195.

¹²⁷ See [Page 1981](#): 211 for the identification of Corinth with the phrase “the acropolis of Greece.”

¹²⁸ [Page 1981](#): 207, [C. Brown 1991](#): 5, [Kurke 1996](#): 64, and [Budin 2008a](#): 339.

¹²⁹ [Williams 1986](#), [Pirenne-Delforge 1994](#): 93–127, and [Blomberg 1996](#): 93–95.

¹³⁰ The Scholiast, citing Theopompus, says that “even their wives prayed to Aphrodite.” Plutarch agrees to a point: “the Corinthian women, alone among Greek women, offered that beautiful and inspired prayer.” Both define the group involved as γυναῖκες, which can mean either wives or women. While the Scholiast makes it clear through context that these are the wives of those in whom they hope to cast desire (τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν with [Budin 2008a](#): 336 n.2), Plutarch's phrasing leaves the question open (αἱ Κορίνθιαι γυναῖκες), but given the overall similarity of their accounts, it stands to reason that they have the same group in mind, the wives of the Corinthians now engaged in war with the Persians (see also [Page 1981](#): 208 and [C. Brown 1991](#): 8).

¹³¹ See, for example, [Page 1981](#): 209, [Williams 1986](#): 17–18, [C. Brown 1991](#), [Kurke 1996](#): 64–65, [Blomberg 1996](#): 82, and [Dillon 2002](#): 200–201.

¹³² Budin 2008a: 340–41 and 2008b: 145–46.

¹³³ For the weaknesses of Athenaeus's version generally, see Budin 2008a: 346–51 and 2008b: 148–52. It is an inference that the fourth/third-century peripatetic writer Chamaeleon is Athenaeus's principal source, but a thoroughly argued and broadly supported one (see Page 1981: 207–10 with earlier bibliography). For some earlier doubts about the presence of sacred prostitutes in Corinth, see Flemberg 1991: 14, Pirenne-Delforge 1994: 109–27, and Lanci 2005: 211–13.

¹³⁴ For Theopompus as the likely source for the Scholiast and Plutarch, see Page 1981: 207–208 and Budin 2008a: 337–38.

¹³⁵ Budin 2008a: 341 and 345–46.

¹³⁶ Budin 2008a: 340–41 and 2008b: 145–46; for the role of Aphrodite in Corinth, see Williams 1986 and Blomberg 1996: 82–95.

¹³⁷ We have every reason to believe that Theopompus had seen the monument in Corinth. The implication of autopsy remains in the Scholiast when (paraphrasing Theopompus) he notes the exact placement of the dedication within the temple (Page 1981: 207 and Higbie 2010: 194). Moreover, Theopompus was well traveled, as he himself seems to have boasted (*FGrHist* 115 F 25.20–23 with Connor 1968: 2–3 and Flower 1994: 201). These points are acknowledged by Budin 2008a: 343, but she does not bring them to bear on the overall probability of her own conclusions.

¹³⁸ See Salmon 1984: 254–55, Balcer 1995: 258–59, and Green 1996a: 157–58. For the unlikely possibility that the Persians sacked Isthmia, see note 87.

¹³⁹ For a similar reading of the Corinthian epigram, see Budin 2008a: 339.

¹⁴⁰ They were certainly in the air by the time Herodotus was doing his research in the 440s and 430s. The Corinthian general, Adeimantus, advises withdrawal from both Artemisium (8.5) and Salamis (8.59–61). His continued presence is bought in the former case and compelled in the latter. Even then, the Athenians claimed that divine intervention alone stopped the Corinthians from fleeing Salamis (8.94). At Plataea, they betray the cause and retreat along with the rest of the Greek center (9.52). Only at Mycale does Herodotus offer some passing praise (9.105). But in reality the Corinthians had been central members of the alliance. Only they and the Spartans served in every major battle (see p. 182). Athenian accusations of cowardice at Salamis were refuted by the rest of the Greeks (8.94.4), and their actions at Plataea had earned them the praise of Simonides (see Chapter 2, p. 71). Corinth's third-place appearance on the Serpent Column (ML 27) could also be read as a recognition of valor, but see Chapter 1, p. 43 n.56 on the significance of the sequence of allies after the first two names. For more on Corinth's Persian-War service, see Salmon 1984: 253–56.

¹⁴¹ Budin 2008a: 339. Morgan 2015: 153 suggests that the epitaph of Adeimantus ("Simon." 10P) may have served much the same purpose.

¹⁴² Marincola 2007: 114.

¹⁴³ Paus. 2.5.1; see also Kurke 1996: 65 and Budin 2008a: 341. For more on armed Aphrodite, see Williams 1986: 15–17, Flemberg 1991 and 1995, Pirenne-Delforge 1994: 103, and Blomberg 1996: 82–84.

¹⁴⁴ See Blomberg 1996: 67–96. Ritter 2001 has revived arguments in favor of identifying the goddess on Corinthian coinage as Athena, but see now D. Smith 2005 with new evidence in favor of Aphrodite.

¹⁴⁵ See also Kurke 1996: 65.

¹⁴⁶ Hardwick 1990, Stewart 1995, and Goldberg 1998.

¹⁴⁷ Merck 1978: 107–110 and Stewart 1995: 578–80.

¹⁴⁸ DuBois 1982: 61, Tyrrell 1984: 55–63, Hardwick 1990: 14–19, Castriota 1992: 51–52, and Stewart 1995: 583–85.

¹⁴⁹ Shapiro 1983; see also Tyrrell 1984: 49–52 and 55–63, Goldberg 1998: 91, J. Hall 2002: 178, and Cartledge 2002: 40. Hardwick 1990: 29, however, notes several

examples of Amazons presented in eastern garb prior to the Persian invasion (see also [Merck 1978](#): 103).

¹⁵⁰ [Merck 1978](#): 103–104 and [Boardman 1982](#); see also [duBois 1982](#): 54–62, [Tyrrell 1984](#): 5, [Castriota 1992](#): 44–47 and 2005: 91, [Blok 1995](#): 182, [Stewart 1995](#): 580–82, and [Martini 2013](#): 173–79. [Mayor 2014](#): 280–83, however, reminds us not to oversimplify the analogy between Persians and Amazons. Even after the Persian War, the myth of the Amazons remained a complex, multivalent story.

¹⁵¹ See p. 177.

¹⁵² See [Stewart 1995](#): 583–85 and [Castriota 2005](#).

¹⁵³ For more on this passage, see [J. Henderson 1987](#): 160, [Castriota 1992](#): 51–53 and 2005: 96, [Stewart 1995](#): 591–92, [Cartledge 2002](#): 98–99, and [Mayor 2014](#): 314–15.

¹⁵⁴ [J. Henderson 1987](#): 160.

¹⁵⁵ The Stoa Poikile was constructed in the 460s (see [Chapter 3](#), p. 121 n.112).

¹⁵⁶ See [duBois 1982](#): 61–64, [Tyrrell 1984](#): 9–21, and [Castriota 1992](#) generally.

¹⁵⁷ It is perhaps significant that when Herodotus states that a bounty had been offered for the capture of Artemisia, it is said in reference to the Athenians alone, not the Greeks generally, “since they considered it a disgrace that a woman should wage war on Athens” (8.93.2, tr. Purvis). The Athenians were not, however, the only people to take special note of her participation. At Sparta, Artemisia was represented along with other Persian notables in the Stoa Persike (Paus. 3.11.3).

¹⁵⁸ For the common use of masculine plurals to describe political collectives, see [M. Hansen 1996](#) and [Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012](#): 41.

¹⁵⁹ For the typical role of women in such crises, see [Graf 1984](#): 246.

¹⁶⁰ For more on this final example, see [Chapter 7](#), p. 259.

¹⁶¹ For emplotment as a reflection of culture, see [White 1987](#): 44–47.

¹⁶² See [Chapter 6](#) for the later appropriation of this plot by Philip of Macedonia and Alexander the Great.

¹⁶³ If the temple of Athena Areia was indeed a restoration of an earlier temple begun after Marathon (see p. 174), then the Plataeans would seem to have begun to repair the damages wrought by Xerxes’s invasion almost immediately, in striking contrast to the Athenians for whom a generation passed before they began work on the Parthenon (see pp. 189–92). This is not to suggest that no attention was paid to Persian depredations. Indeed, the Persian-War recollections associated with the temple of Artemis Eucleia might point in that direct, but see [note 17](#).

¹⁶⁴ See [Chapter 4](#), p. 136.

¹⁶⁵ For the periodizations used by Isocrates and Demosthenes, see [Chapter 4](#), p. 167; the conclusion that these master narratives were somewhat fungible in the minds of the individuals who maintained them finds additional support in the study of collective memory generally (see the [Introduction](#), pp. 15–16).

¹⁶⁶ For more on the Eurymedon monument, see [Chapter 3](#), p. 119 n.103.

¹⁶⁷ For more on the Chian, Samian, Carystian, and Deinomenid monuments at Delphi, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 106–110 and 113–16.

¹⁶⁸ For Apollodorus’s version of events, see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 35–36.

¹⁶⁹ As [M. Scott 2010](#): 23 rightly surmises in reference to the Greeks generally.

A New Persian War

Introduction

The battle of Chaeronea, the unintended result of Aeschines's defense of the golden shields in 340/39 bce, made Philip of Macedonia the most powerful man in the Greek world, but the peoples whose destinies he now controlled were hardly united under his leadership.¹ Philip needed something to weld the fractious city-states of Greece together under Macedonian domination, and the Persian War of old was that something. It has long been recognized that the Persian War was used as propaganda by Philip and his son, Alexander the Great,² but their extensive reinterpretation of that complex tradition and its impact on the later reception of the war has been largely overlooked in discussions of Persian-War memory.³ Philip and Alexander did not continue to use the existing classical paradigm, through which the war was recalled as the victory either of a single state or, at most, the separate states that fought it. Macedonia did, indeed, have a parochial tradition of the Persian War focused on the exploits of Alexander I, but Philip ultimately chose to ignore it.⁴ Scholars have argued that, despite his apologists, Alexander I was still too problematic a figure to build a Persian-War narrative around, and there is much to commend that conclusion.⁵ But I believe there was more at play in Philip's decision than the unsuitability of his ancestor's war record. If Philip wanted to foster unity, the Persian War, as recalled in the classical period, offered no guarantees of success. As we have seen, the Persian-War tradition had never been a united whole. It was not a single memory that could now be evoked. Rather, the memory of the Persian War had always been a tangle of various recollections that could on occasion differ radically from each other. Far from prompting unity in the past, the Persian War had played center stage in a nearly continuous string of political disputes and military conflicts. If Philip required an object lesson in the potential volatility of Persian-War memory even in his own day, he need have looked no further than the

altercation over the golden shields that brought him to Chaeronea and victory. To use the Persian War as an effective symbol of unity, Philip had to invent a new Persian War that transcended the competing interests of the participating states.

The invention of tradition is a popular concept in memory studies that is increasingly being applied to the ancient world.⁶ According to Eric Hobsbawm, who coined the term, *invented traditions* are recent commemorative practices that respond to novel circumstances in ways that imply continuity with the past.⁷ They emerge

when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which “old” traditions had been designed, producing new ones to which they were not applicable, or when such old traditions and their institutional carriers and promulgators no longer prove sufficiently adaptable and flexible, or are otherwise eliminated: in short, when there are sufficiently large and rapid changes on the demand or the supply side.⁸

Such invented traditions are not materially different from those we have examined thus far. They too are subject to the demands of present needs, real experience, and preexisting social memories,⁹ but because of the disruptive social changes that prompt them, invented traditions are rather more open to innovation; or, said differently, present needs have an outsized impact on their formation.¹⁰ Nevertheless, invented traditions are not presented or remembered as innovative reactions to a recent moment of disruptive social change. Rather, their “inventors” go to great lengths to obscure the novelty of these traditions, presenting them rather as continuations or restorations of age-old practice. Consequently, invented tradition can appear more patently utilitarian than those traditions that evolve within a more stable social milieu.¹¹ Hobsbawm identifies three overlapping functions that invented traditions are generally designed to serve:

a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimizing institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behavior.¹²

Invented traditions are not entirely fabricated to meet these needs.¹³ Indeed, the traditions invented by Philip and Alexander were largely adapted from the preexisting traditions of the participating states.¹⁴ These adaptations should not, however, be confused with the continuation of tradition. Invented traditions selectively exploit past traditions in unprecedented ways. Their implied continuity is a masquerade. As we shall see in the following, Philip and Alexander, despite extensive borrowings from preexisting traditions, tended to avoid the specific, parochial details that so defined (and separated)

those traditions in the classical period. Rather, the Macedonian dynasts emphasized what Hobsbawm would later call the “undefined universality” of invented tradition and thus the Persian War’s potential both to inspire cohesion among their Greek allies and legitimate their newly won hegemony.¹⁵

Examining how this invented tradition of the Persian War came into existence and its consequences for subsequent recollections of the war requires two different approaches. In the short term, this is a story about a massive propaganda campaign launched by Philip soon after his victory at Chaeronea, which sought to repurpose the Persian War as an historical precedent for and present call to panhellenic unity, specifically by unseating the polis from the position of dominance it had held within that tradition. This was, in effect, to bring back to the fore the transcendent panhellenism that had remained latent within the Persian-War tradition throughout the classical period.¹⁶ In the long term, however, this is a story about a significant change to the fabric of Greek political life and consequently to the memories used to justify it. Philip’s propaganda was richly staged and continued by his son, but as we shall see in the following, its short-term impact was limited.¹⁷ It was only in the decades after the death of Alexander and the collapse of the empire he and his father hoped to build that their propaganda took root. I propose to examine the short- and long-term perspectives separately in the next two chapters. In the present chapter, I focus on those commemorations that gave voice to the new tradition and its contemporary reception in the Greek world. In the next chapter, however, I consider the evolution of Philip and Alexander’s self-interested propaganda into the dominant narrative of the Persian War in the hellenistic period.

Philip's Hellenic League

Philip lost no time associating himself with a new type of Persian-War memory. Within a year of his victory at Chaeronea, he called together all the states of mainland Greece to Corinth, where he launched his invented tradition with a grand restoration of the Hellenic League of old. Even our sparse evidence for the proceedings suggests that a new way of thinking about the Persian War was already taking shape.¹⁸ This was no longer to be a war centered on the heroic deeds of this or that state (much less the kingdom of Macedonia). Where there had once been a dissonant chorus of competing parochial versions, there would now be a truly panhellenic Persian-War narrative designed to transcend the individual states and thereby reinforce Greek unity under Macedonian authority.

As a rule, historians do not consider the meeting Philip called at Corinth a restoration of the Hellenic League, and with good reason. The old Hellenic League had been an ad hoc alliance consisting of a relatively small group of states and organized loosely under Spartan hegemony to face an immediate Persian threat, which then promptly ceased to function after that threat subsided.¹⁹ The new league, dubbed the Corinthian League or the League of Corinth by moderns, included almost the entirety of mainland Greece, was entirely subject to Macedonian power, and entailed much clearer treaty obligations that were not limited to the upcoming war with Persia.²⁰ As a matter of historical fact, what Philip set up at Corinth was indeed something new. That said, it is commonly recognized that Philip intended the Corinthian League to recall the Hellenic League.²¹ The decision to hold the meeting at Corinth was itself evocative of the old league, which had famously met at nearby Isthmia (Hdt. 7.172.1). Even before the meeting, Philip had let it be known that he intended to attack the Persians and justified the move by citing, not Persian hostility to Macedonian interests in the recent war with Athens or routine Persian interference in Greek affairs since the Peloponnesian War, but rather the profanation of temples at the time of Xerxes's invasion (Diod. 16.89.2).²² War was soon declared and carried out on those grounds. The connection to the Hellenic League could not have been lost on anyone.

There was, however, much more than mere reminiscence of the old Hellenic League in Philip's Corinthian League. When Diodorus introduces the new league, he refers to its governing body as "the common council" (τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον: 16.89.3). The title can at first glance seem quite generic, more descriptive than technical. But in

a later portion of his narrative, Diodorus supplies the full name of this body, “the common council of the Greeks” (τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον).²³ In so doing, he (or rather his source) was following contemporary usage (Hyp. 4.20).²⁴ What is notable for our purposes is that this is also the name Diodorus employs to designate the council of the Hellenic League against Xerxes.²⁵ Although it has been argued that Diodorus was quite casual with the terminology he applied to the various leagues mentioned in his massive history, this is not borne out by the evidence.²⁶ In the surviving portions of his work, “the common council of the Greeks” applies only to the Hellenic and Corinthian Leagues.²⁷ If we follow the natural implication of Diodorus’s terminology, we should conclude that he at least believed that the organization Philip called to Corinth was none other than the Hellenic League. But what can this tell us about Philip’s intentions? While the council of the Corinthian League was certainly called the common council of the Greeks by contemporaries, our best evidence for the old Hellenic League suggests that it was not.²⁸ Here again, Diodorus proves helpful. For his account of the Persian War, he seems to have relied on Ephorus of Cyme, who was writing (and circulating?) the early portions of his history in the decades before Philip’s victory at Chaeronea.²⁹ If Diodorus took his name for the Hellenic League from Ephorus, then we can conclude that the term, however historically inaccurate, had likely gained currency before the institution of the Corinthian League. Philip’s choice of nomenclature then becomes highly significant, as he invites the states of the Greek world not merely to recall the Hellenic League, but to restore it and then to reenact its famous war against Persia.

The restoration of the Hellenic League in 337 would then be a near-perfect example of [Hobsbawm’s invention of tradition](#). There had, of course, been a real Hellenic League that had nominally managed the war against Xerxes some 140 years before, and Philip had taken clear steps to underscore the continuity between the two leagues, most notably its putative name (the common council of the Greeks), the location of its inaugural meeting (Corinth), and its stated purpose (to continue the war against Persia). But much about the restored league and the peculiar memory of the Persian War it implied was, like the name of its governing body, a recent invention. To start with, the very idea that the Hellenic League was a natural or desirable focal point for a recollection of the Persian War was largely unprecedented. The memory of the Hellenic League had not fared particularly well in the classical period. Pausanias the Regent’s effort to draw attention to the larger collective (and himself) was a spectacular failure.³⁰ State monuments studiously avoid even the implication that there was any such larger collective managing the war effort.³¹ Extended accounts in

Attic oratory often acknowledged broader allied participation, but not the league itself.³² Herodotus, of course, has much to say about the league, but little of it is positive.³³ Given the reticence or pessimism of our sources, it should come as no surprise that the Hellenic League features in none of the extant calls for a renewed war against Persia that began to proliferate in the later years of the Peloponnesian War.³⁴ Calls for unity were couched rather in general terms and often centered on dual hegemony between Athens and Sparta or the leadership of the “great man,” not a restoration of the Hellenic League per se. Even at Sparta, where the tradition of the Hellenic League seems to have resonated rather more,³⁵ it is notable that when Agesilaus initiated his own campaign against the Persians in the years after the Peloponnesian War, he tellingly chose to inaugurate it at Aulis, not Corinth or Isthmia (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3–4).³⁶ The overall trend must have started to change in the course of the fourth century when Ephorus gave the Hellenic League a more prominent and positive role in his historical account of the period.³⁷ But in deciding to restore the Hellenic League and to place that organization at the heart of his Persian-War propaganda, Philip was elevating the league to a place of prominence it had not enjoyed since the dedication of the Salamis Apollo.³⁸

The novelty of accessing the Persian War through the memory of the Hellenic League is underscored further when we consider that decision from the parochial perspective of Macedonia. As we have seen, Philip was not without Persian-War exploits of his own, and several of his supporters had over the past years burnished those credentials.³⁹ But of the many things Philip could claim about the Persian War through his ancestor Alexander I, membership in the Hellenic League was emphatically not one of them. In fact, when Philip attempted to build support for his new league, he made no mention of his homeland’s role in the old war (as other would-be hegemonies had done before him), but rather presented the war from a notably Greek perspective: “he spread the word that he wanted to make war on the Persians in the Greeks’ behalf and to punish them for the profanation of the temples” (16.89.2, tr. Welles).⁴⁰ We might well object that Diodorus’s version of events is simply too jejune to say that Philip did not also bolster his case by recalling Alexander I’s exploits, but our surviving evidence for the subsequent uses to which he and his son put the Persian War suggests that the parochial perspective played nothing like the role it played in the classical tradition.⁴¹ Among the many times Philip and Alexander cited the Persian War as a justification for the present invasion of Persia, Alexander I is never mentioned and Macedonia is mentioned only once, in a letter attributed to Alexander and supposedly written to Darius III after

Issus.⁴² In it, Alexander begins:

Your ancestors came to Macedonia and the rest of Greece and did us great harm, though you had suffered no harm before then. I, having been made leader of the Greeks and wishing to take vengeance on the Persians, made the crossing into Asia, but it was you who began the quarrel. (Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.4, tr. Mensch)⁴³

We may, of course, doubt the strict authenticity of the letter, but there is no good reason to doubt that its contents represent contemporary propaganda.⁴⁴ Here Macedonia features, along with the rest of Greece, as an object of Darius I and Xerxes's past abuses and thus as a justification for the present conflict.⁴⁵ But Macedonia does not approach, even in this one instance, the prominence enjoyed by the classical states in their respective recollections. When this passage is placed among the others that recall the Persian War in connection with the restored league and its panhellenic campaign against Persia, the contrast with the classical tradition becomes even sharper.⁴⁶ Philip's Macedonia was not the first power in Greece to use the Persian War to justify present hegemony, but his was the first to do so without centering that memory on the exploits of the homeland.

In contrast to the muted role given the homeland, the call for revenge that stood at the heart of Philip's justification for both league and war did have an impressive pedigree, dating back to the years immediately after Xerxes's invasion.⁴⁷ But this element of the classical tradition has here been radically reshaped. Neither Philip nor most of his new Greek allies had suffered the destruction of their temples. Megara and Corinth (among others) had in fact made much out of the survival of theirs.⁴⁸ Indeed, only a few states in mainland Greece could point to signs of Persian sacrilege,⁴⁹ and none seems to have done so with greater interest or frequency than Athens. There the destruction of temples had long featured as a prominent part of local Persian-War memory,⁵⁰ and the emphasis Philip placed on this particular wartime experience likely added a distinctly Athenian flavor to his restoration of the Hellenic League.⁵¹ This does not emerge from Diodorus's brief description, but if we look forward to the other occasions on which our sources mention this justification of the war, the sack of Athens clearly emerges as the preferred example.⁵² If the same was true for the league's first meeting, however, it would not necessarily follow that Philip was blindly adopting a popular Athenian narrative or flattering their vanity by using it so conspicuously.⁵³ Rather, by staging the commemoration at Corinth, as opposed to Athens, and associating it with the Hellenic League, rather than the Athenian demos, Philip was reframing this characteristically Athenian story as a Greek one. Thus presented, Athens's wartime sufferings were no longer an argument for Athenian

hegemony, as they had been in Isocrates and countless other Athenian narratives, but an argument for all Greeks to avenge the wrongs done to their gods by a foreign invader, regardless of whether their ancestors had indeed suffered such depredations. Even the descendants of Medizers (Philip included) were called to take their revenge in a grand ethnic war, Greek versus Other. Athens and her story of the war had in a sense been nationalized.⁵⁴

The decision to restore the long defunct Hellenic League on the grounds that old wrongs had never truly been requited also had ramifications for the periodization of the Persian War. Although the Greeks could assign various endings to the war, they were agreed that the Persian War had ended in victory. From the perspective of Salamis, Aeschylus's Darius looked forward to Plataea as due vengeance for Xerxes's invasion of Greece, making specific reference to the desecration of the temples (*Pers.* 800–842). Later, Herodotus's Themistocles would look back on Salamis itself as just requital for the destruction of temples (8.109.2–4). The Delian League was famously founded on the premise that the defeat of Xerxes's invasion was insufficient and that the need for vengeance had yet to be satisfied (Thuc. 1.96.1).⁵⁵ A significant minority of our Athenian authors agreed and ended the war with the culmination of the punitive campaigns against Persia in the mid-fifth century.⁵⁶ Persia remained the perennial enemy in popular thought, and advocates of a new war cited the need for revenge throughout the fourth century, but they focused on more recent events, particularly the subjugation of Ionia to Persian rule after the Peloponnesian War and then the imposition of the King's Peace in 387/6.⁵⁷ None suggested that the Persian War had failed to achieve due vengeance; the fault lay rather with subsequent generations.⁵⁸ The presentation of the Persian War within Philip's propaganda was quite different, however. By reconstituting the old Hellenic League and giving it the mission of avenging, not the recent indignities of the fourth century, but rather the impieties of Xerxes's invasion, Philip implied that the Persian War had never achieved a satisfactory conclusion and so was still in a sense ongoing.⁵⁹ At the same time, such a periodization implied that Sparta and Athens, for all their claims and commemorations, had both failed to win the Persian War, which Philip would now see to its conclusion.

That the task of seeking vengeance fell to Philip personally, and not to Macedonia, as it had before to Sparta or Athens, represents perhaps the most striking innovation of the restored Hellenic League. The old Hellenic League had been led by a state. Of course, Sparta's commanders, Leonidas, Eurybiades, Leotychidas, and Pausanias, had played an outsized role in the decisions made on the field (and perhaps in the deliberations at Isthmia as well), but only as

representatives of the polis.⁶⁰ When Pausanias styled himself as the leader of the Greeks on the Serpent Column and so implied a kind of individual leadership position within the league, Sparta moved quickly to disabuse him of such pretensions.⁶¹ The restored Hellenic League was very different. According to Diodorus, Philip personally called the allies to Corinth, proposed the war with Persia, and was then elected commander-in-chief of Greece (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος; 16.89.3), an unprecedented position and title, even in Ephorus's more recent rendition of the Persian-War past. The extant portions of the oath sworn by the members of the restored league are similarly focused on Philip personally (RO 76).⁶² There is no indication from our sources that Philip's unprecedented position within the restored Hellenic League was accompanied by an invented tradition designed to justify it,⁶³ but as we shall see in the following, Alexander was not unmindful of the tensions between the individual and the state that had so defined the early years of the Persian-War tradition.

Philip's restoration of the Hellenic League in 337 invited the Greeks to remember the Persian War quite differently than they had before. The glorious victory of a select group of city-states and their citizens was recast as an unrequited injury suffered by all ethnic Greeks, now in need of redress under the leadership of a single individual. The building blocks of this new tradition were in many cases quite old, but they were now rearranged, uprooted from their parochial context, and presented as the commemorative property of all Greeks. Other local traditions that did not advance the master narrative—Macedonia's included—were ignored. Philip presented the Persian War as a monolithic experience that transcended the old differences of the state-centered traditions.⁶⁴ All were now equal victims of Persian depredations and so were obliged to right that wrong under the auspices of the once and present Hellenic League. It was a vision of the past decorated with all the trappings of the grand old classical tradition, but was in essence an invention of the fourth century.

Alexander's Persian War

The Persian-War tradition invented to support the restoration of the Hellenic League and its new (or rather continuing) war against the Persians was not restricted to the initial meeting of the league councilors at Corinth. After Philip's assassination in the next year, Alexander the Great took up his father's invented tradition and went on to associate it with some of the most prominent commemorative acts of his short reign. I begin by reviewing four such

commemorations: the iconography of Alexander's golden coinage, a dedication sent to Athens after Granicus, spoils from the battle of Gaugamela sent to Croton, and the allocation of funds for the continued restoration of Plataea, also after Gaugamela. I end by exploring in greater detail a set of new rituals (invented traditions in their own right) then emerging at Plataea and the likely connections between these rituals and Alexander's decision to honor that town after Gaugamela specifically. There were, of course, other instances in which Alexander prominently connected his present war with Persia to the Persian War of old, but a full examination of them all would take us too far afield.⁶⁵ The five examples discussed here will prove sufficient to show how the tradition invented by Philip at Corinth was continued and elaborated under Alexander the Great.

I begin with Alexander's golden coinage, but with no particular conviction that it was issued immediately upon Alexander's accession. The date is controversial, and solutions range from the beginning of his reign in 336 to his return to Tyre in 331.⁶⁶ However dated, the iconography of these coins constitutes a striking commemoration of Philip's invented tradition of the Persian War. On the reverse, they show the goddess Nike holding a wreath and a ship's ornament (or *styli*). On the obverse is the bust of a helmeted female figure. Consensus opinion holds that this figure is Athena,⁶⁷ but work on the archaic and classical coinage of Corinth suggests a tempting alternative. The helmeted female figure on these coins was also long identified as Athena, but in a detailed study Peter Blomberg demonstrates that she is actually Aphrodite Ourania, also known as Aphrodite Hoplismene (or armed Aphrodite), who was the poliad deity of the city.⁶⁸ Two iconographic distinctions between Aphrodite and Athena are particularly notable here. First, armed Aphrodite is often depicted with a necklace made up of beads, whereas Athena is seldom, if ever, represented with such an adornment. Second, Athena (of Athens at least) is represented with round flat earrings; Aphrodite is depicted with grape cluster earrings or no earrings at all.⁶⁹ A quick look through the numerous examples of Alexander's golden issue provided by Price in the second volume of his massive study shows that the helmeted figure is frequently portrayed with a distinct beaded necklace and either no earring or one of the grape-cluster type.⁷⁰ The figure on the obverse of Alexander's gold coinage is therefore Aphrodite, not Athena. The propaganda function served by what was thought to be Athena has been variously interpreted (often in conjunction with the date),⁷¹ but once identified as Aphrodite, a connection to Corinth and the restored Hellenic League becomes inescapable.

That Alexander would wish to broadcast his connection to Corinth

and the Hellenic League is quite reasonable. Indeed, it was not a foregone conclusion that the league would survive the assassination of Philip or Alexander's long absence in the east.⁷² Nevertheless, we should not underestimate the novel manner in which he chose to forge this connection. Alexander placed the poliad deity of a state other than his own on his coinage.⁷³ To the extent that this issue is meant to evoke the Persian War, it is not a Persian War centered on Macedonia. What emerges is not properly a Corinthian memory either. Although the iconography marks the helmeted figure out as Aphrodite, it has been rightly noted that the figure on Alexander's coinage is not identical to the one that appears on Corinthian issues.⁷⁴ This is not a copy of a Corinthian coin, but an adaptation of its iconography. Corinth is prominent, but it is not Corinth the city-state, but rather Corinth the seat of the restored Hellenic League and locus of panhellenic unity that is being evoked. On the reverse, Aphrodite is paired with Nike holding a wreath and ship's ornament. Scholars often assume that a reference to Salamis is meant and, although certainty is not possible, that great naval victory over the Persians remains the most likely referent.⁷⁵ But if the helmeted figure on the obverse is Aphrodite, we should avoid the temptation to interpret this reference to Salamis in a predominantly Athenian context. Salamis is paired rather with Corinth and the Hellenic League and thus, like the memory of the desecrated temples, is framed within a thoroughly panhellenic context.⁷⁶

Alexander also evoked his father's invented tradition after his first victory over the Persians at Granicus in 334. From the spoils of the battle Alexander had 300 panoplies sent to Athens and dedicated to Athena on the Acropolis (Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.7; see also Plut. *Alex.* 16.17–18).⁷⁷ The accompanying inscription read: “Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks except the Spartans, from the barbarians inhabiting Asia” (Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες πλὴν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων τῶν τὴν Ἀσίαν κατοικοῦντων). Plutarch goes on to supply Alexander's motivation—that he wanted to “make the Greeks partners in his victory” (16.17, tr. Perrin). The dedication itself was obviously not a commemoration of the old Persian War, but the decision to place the panoplies in Athens—in sight of the most famous examples of the impiety the new Persian War was waged to punish⁷⁸—was almost certainly inspired by a desire to further align the new Persian War with the old.⁷⁹ And they did reinforce many of the themes Philip debuted at Corinth. Although the Hellenic League provided a small part of Alexander's army that played almost no active role in the battle, the Greeks are nevertheless given a disproportionate share of the credit, syntactically equal to that of Alexander himself.⁸⁰ Flattery aside, no individual Greek state is

expressly honored. Only Sparta is singled out for condemnation. The others contribute equally and as a collective. The Macedonians are unnamed. They are neither equal contributors along with Alexander and the Greeks, nor are they credited implicitly by association with Alexander, who could have had himself styled “King,” “King of Macedonia,” or simply “the Macedonian,” but rather appears as the “son of Philip.”⁸¹ This remains, much as Philip had envisioned, a Greek war of revenge carried out under the auspices of the restored Hellenic League and its supreme commander.⁸² It is a panhellenic vision worthy of Pausanias the Regent, who attempted to advance a strikingly similar recollection of the old Persian War on the Serpent Column.

Despite the fact that Athens is nowhere named, the placement of Alexander’s Granicus dedication obviously draws attention to Athens and its parochial memory of the Persian War.⁸³ Elements of the Athenian tradition had likely appeared in the historical justification of the war at Corinth,⁸⁴ but in that case Athenian memories had been uprooted and placed within a panhellenic context. To place a monument celebrating the defeat of the Persians by the Greeks generally in Athens is to reframe both the Persian War and the current war of revenge within a decidedly Athenian context. Alexander’s condemnation of Athens’s longtime rival in the text of the inscription furthers this reorientation.⁸⁵ By disgracing Sparta in the very dedication that emphatically connected Athens with the present war, Alexander seems almost to certify long-standing Athenian claims that their city alone should hold center stage in any recollection of the Persian War. The Granicus dedication certainly demonstrates the indisputable importance of Athens within the new Persian-War tradition.⁸⁶ Beneath the surface, however, such a dedication had some disquieting implications for Athens and its much vaunted claim to the Persian-War past. Alexander had planted a decidedly panhellenic monument on the Acropolis in Athens. This was an unprecedented step.⁸⁷ Such monuments had hitherto been erected on battlefields or at panhellenic sites.⁸⁸ Alexander could have done the same, but chose rather to place his 300 panoplies in the heart of the Athenian polis.⁸⁹ In so doing, he was blurring the lines between Athens the sovereign state and Athens the member of a larger Greek community. In this respect, the Granicus dedication, whatever Alexander’s intent or the reaction at Athens, was a much more serious assault on Athenian ownership of its memory than the earlier co-optations.⁹⁰ Greeks throughout the mainland had been called upon to avenge wrongs typified by the sack of Athens, and their achievements were now commemorated by Alexander inside that city. In many respects it was an Athenocentric vision worthy of Isocrates, but it was a vision that

now belonged to Alexander and the Greeks, and no longer to the Athenians exclusively.⁹¹

After his third and final major victory over Darius III at Gaugamela, Alexander again turned to the Persian War of old. Plutarch records that Alexander, now self-proclaimed king of Asia, decreed the abolition of all tyrannies, pledged funds to the ongoing reconstruction of Plataea, and finally sent to Croton a portion of the spoils from the victory (*Alex.* 34.2–4). In the last two cases, a connection to the old Persian War is made explicit. Let us consider the gift to Croton first. Plutarch states that

he sent also to the people of Croton in Italy a portion of the spoils, honoring the zeal and valor of their athlete Phayllus, who, in the Persian War, when the rest of the Italians refused to help the Greeks, fitted out a ship at his own cost and sailed with it to Salamis, that he might have some share in the peril there. (34.3, tr. Perrin modified)

That Alexander would want to link his great victory over Persia to Salamis is understandable and may have been anticipated by the iconography of his golden coinage.⁹² But forging such a link with a gift to Croton was not an obvious choice.⁹³ Unlike Plataea and the other beneficiaries of Alexander's abolition of tyranny, Croton was not part of the restored Hellenic League and had consequently not joined Alexander in his war against Persia. Nor had Phayllus played a particularly notable role in the battle of Salamis, where his principal claim to fame was simply being present. By any objective measure, Athens or Aegina was far worthier of note. Approaching Salamis by way of Croton did, however, serve to emphasize the breadth of the effort and so the panhellenic nature of the enterprise. At first glance it may seem that the effect is here achieved by setting Greek against Greek and so by adopting the divisive Persian-War rhetoric that Alexander eschews elsewhere. But Plutarch's wording repays closer examination. He does not say that the Greeks in Italy failed to help their fellow Greeks; rather, he carefully distinguishes between the Italians (οἱ Ἰταλιῶται) and the Greeks (οἱ Ἕλληνες), a term here used without qualification, but apparently restricted to those living in the mainland and Aegean basin and so to the members of the restored Hellenic League. This may seem like splitting hairs, since both were ultimately Greeks. But ethnicity is not a static notion, and its boundaries are often demarcated by such split hairs. Consequently, the Greeks again stand unified and are indeed helped in this case by a lone Italian (Greek).⁹⁴ We might speculate further that the decision to single out the contribution of a Crotonian served to further undermine the exclusive claims of the Athenians (and others) to the Persian War generally and to the famed naval victory in particular.⁹⁵ By elevating

an outsider, Alexander redefines the rest as an undifferentiated panhellenic collective.

It is perhaps even more notable that although Alexander sent the spoils to Croton, he did not do so to honor that state (as he would Plataea on this same occasion), but rather to honor “the zeal and valor of their athlete Phayllus” (τὴν Φαῦλλου τοῦ ἀθλητοῦ τιμῶν προθυμίαν καὶ ἀρετὴν). Superfluous mention of Phayllus’s athletic prowess further underscores that it is the individual heroics of an aristocrat that here merits praise.⁹⁶ Plutarch goes on to explain that Phayllus had not been dispatched by Croton, but had rather “fitted out a ship at his own cost,” which almost certainly reflects Alexander’s public justification for the gift. In this, Plutarch and Alexander are followed by Pausanias (10.9.2), and they may be right.⁹⁷ It would certainly explain why Phayllus, or rather Croton, was excluded from the Serpent Column’s list, as it made no accommodations for non-state actors.⁹⁸ But true or not, there was another version in circulation that remembered Phayllus’s actions as a state-sponsored endeavor. That is how Herodotus understood it (8.47), and there is a distinct possibility that he was influenced here by parochial traditions at Croton.⁹⁹ Whatever the historical reality, Alexander declared that Phayllus had acted as an individual, even as he awarded Croton a share of the booty. It is tempting to read his decision to do so in connection with the prominence enjoyed by the individual in the new Persian War, both in the person of its commander-in-chief and the scores of mercenaries who were increasingly filling the ranks of his army. It would go too far to suggest that Alexander was here correcting the Serpent Column and its fixation on the polis, but praise for Phayllus did draw attention to the very kinds of elite claims that the list of allies had been designed to combat.

Alexander’s decision to continue the ongoing reconstruction of Plataea similarly responds to the propaganda campaign initiated by Philip. Plutarch tells us that at the same time as Alexander honored Phayllus, he “wrote the Plataeans personally that he would rebuild their city, because their ancestors had furnished their territory to the Greeks for the struggle in behalf of their freedom” (Plut. *Alex.* 34.2, tr. Perrin modified). We learn from the *Aristeides* (11.9) that Alexander was specifically offering to rebuild Plataea’s wall (or rather continue his support of that project)¹⁰⁰ and that the content of Alexander’s letter to Plataea was made public at the Olympic Games.¹⁰¹ At the most basic level, Alexander seems to have intended to draw a parallel between his own decisive victory over the Persians at Gaugamela and the decisive land battle in the war against Xerxes, just as the booty sent to Croton connected his victory to the decisive naval battle of Salamis.¹⁰² Both served to reinforce the periodization implied by the

restoration of the Hellenic League—that the war against Persia had never been satisfactorily concluded and was in fact continued by the present campaign in the east. But the way in which the connection to Plataea was forged—a promise to rebuild that town’s wall—added another layer. The defeat of the Persians at Plataea had been one of the most famous victories in Greek history, but the town had subsequently come to symbolize the depths to which the Greeks had fallen thereafter. Destroyed in 426, restored in 387/6, and then once again destroyed in 373, the ironic fate of the town had long featured as a pathetic reminder of what had come of these heroes of the Greek cause.¹⁰³ By promising to rebuild its walls, Alexander drew particular attention to its defense and may have intended to underscore the failure of earlier hegemonies to protect the town and honor its sacrifice.¹⁰⁴ This would, in effect, reinforce the negative aspects of the new tradition’s periodization—that the heady days of the Persian War had been interrupted by a period of decline, which had now come to an end with the renewal of the war under Philip and Alexander. Such an interpretation presents a rather different side of Alexander’s motives. So too does the preceding interpretation of his decision to honor Phayllus. Both suggest that although he was “desirous of honor among the Greeks” (Plut. *Alex.* 34.2, tr. Perrin), he was just as eager to outdo them.¹⁰⁵

The honors granted to Plataea may have been intended to derive still more meaning from a new set of Persian-War traditions emerging in Plataea at this time. In [Chapter 2](#), we distinguished a group of Plataean traditions, attested by Herodotus and Thucydides in the classical period, from the more elaborate rituals recorded in the hellenistic and imperial periods.¹⁰⁶ It is very likely that these later rituals had their beginnings in the years immediately after the restoration of the town by Philip in the wake of Chaeroneia. Indeed, when the Plataeans returned to their home in 338, almost a generation had passed since any native cult activity had occurred there, and if Isocrates is to be believed, the Thebans had not only discontinued the obsequies for the fallen (14.61), but were also destroying the monuments located there (14.59).¹⁰⁷ Even the last Plataean occupation of the site had been a short interlude in a much longer exile that began almost a century earlier in the opening years of the Peloponnesian War. Desperate to rebuild their community and locate it within the changed political circumstances of Macedonian domination, the Plataeans would have been extremely susceptible to the invention of tradition.¹⁰⁸ And indeed what we find in our later sources seems uniquely adapted to Philip and Alexander’s Persian-War propaganda.

Our earliest source for the new rituals is an inscription found at

Plataea and dated to the mid-third century.¹⁰⁹ It records a decree honoring the Athenian politician Glaucon who in the course of his career had acted as a benefactor of the Persian-War cults at Plataea.¹¹⁰ To explain the honors now bestowed, the decree mentions these cults. Perhaps the most notable is an athletic competition held in honor of those who had fallen in the battle of Plataea (ln. 20–24). Plutarch refers to these games as the Eleutheria or the Freedom Games and notes that they occurred every fourth year (*Arist.* 21.1). The deities most closely associated with the games are Zeus Eleutherios (or Zeus the Liberator) and Homonoia (or Concord), here specifically defined as the Concord of the Greeks (see ln. 17–20, 29–30, and 39–40). Together they shared an altar at Plataea (ln. 39–40). The inscription further notes that these rituals were overseen by a panhellenic supervisory body called “the common council of the Greeks” (τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλλήνων: ln. 25–26). Plutarch later specifies that this group met yearly at the site of Plataea (*Arist.* 21.1). He goes on to describe the obsequies for the fallen, which in his own day included a prayer, not in honor of any individual contingent of troops, but of all the Greeks who fought there: “I drink to the men who died for the freedom of the Greeks” (*Arist.* 21.5, tr. Perrin modified). Traditions evolve,¹¹¹ and we should not imagine that everything recorded by the Glaucon decree or by Plutarch was in place by the time Alexander chose to honor the city after Gaugamela, but those traditions likely represent the general tenor of the festivities invented at Plataea under Macedonian hegemony.

The new festivities were decidedly panhellenic, indeed far more so than the classical traditions on which they were loosely based.¹¹² The games and cults were overseen, not by the state of Plataea, but a council of the Greeks. What this council was in the imperial period or even in the hellenistic context of the Glaucon decree is difficult to say, but if the association dates back to Alexander, this title would likely refer to the council of the restored Hellenic League.¹¹³ The governing council was not, therefore, restricted to states that had participated in the battle of Plataea or even the members of the old Hellenic League, but included almost all of mainland Greece (aside from Sparta and Thebes).¹¹⁴ Consequently, the descendants of those who fought against Persia joined the citizens of neutral and even Medizing states to celebrate a past that now implicitly belonged to them all.¹¹⁵ The cult of the Concord of the Greeks reinforced this point, by stressing the unity of the Greeks, regardless of their historical participation in the battle.¹¹⁶ This stands in marked contrast both to Herodotus’s narrative of the battle and indeed the organization of the site under Plataean management in the classical period, both of which evinced a clear interest in the identity and exact contribution of those

involved.¹¹⁷ Finally, an emphasis on freedom in both the cult and the festival tied the idea of concord—past and present—to the ongoing war against Persia, which (as we shall see in the following) was in part justified as an effort to free the Greeks.¹¹⁸ Indeed, it is this aspect of the Persian-War past that appears most prominently in Alexander's stated decision to honor Plataea after Gaugamela—"because their ancestors had furnished their territory to the Greeks for the struggle in behalf of their freedom" (ὕπερ τῆς ἐλευθερίας; Plut. *Alex.* 34.2, tr. Perrin).

Perhaps no piece of evidence typifies the tone of these new traditions as well as the epigram from the altar of Zeus Eleutherios. Here too, we do not know the date at which this monument was erected, except to say that it was after the restoration of Plataea.¹¹⁹ But it is not unlikely that the altar captured the mood of the invented traditions that were emerging at Plataea under Philip and Alexander.

Once the Greeks, [obedient to the bold resolve of their spirit], after driving out the Persians by the might of Nike and the work of Ares, set up this as an altar of Zeus Eleutherios, an altar common to free Greece. ("Simon." 15P, tr. Campbell modified)

τόνδε ποθ' Ἑλληνας Νίκης κράτει, ἔργῳ Ἄρης,
[εὐτόλμῳ ψυχῆς λήματι πειθόμενοι],
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες, ἐλευθέρῃ Ἑλλάδι κοινόν
ἰδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἐλευθερίου.¹²⁰

The subject of the epigram is not the people of a particular state, but the Greeks generally who together won the victory and erected a common altar to free Greece (ἐλευθέρῃ Ἑλλάδι κοινόν). The contrast to the revised Serpent Column and the statue of Zeus at Olympia is striking. There, it is not the Greeks, but rather the explicitly named participants who are credited with fighting the Persians. They and not the Greeks generally erect a monument, which was implicitly not common to free Greece, but was the commemorative property of those who earned the right to be named.¹²¹ The altar of Zeus Eleutherios avoids such details and focuses rather on the collective achievement of Greece to the benefit or detriment of no particular state.

The connections Alexander drew between his present war against Persia and the Persian War of old continued the substance and methods of the tradition invented by his father Philip. Together, their commemorations allow us to draw some important conclusions about the ways in which they adapted the memory of the Persian War to suit their own ends. Philip and Alexander wanted a Greece unified under their hegemony and chose the old Persian War as a way to legitimize it. Yet they found the classical tradition unserviceable. In its place, the Macedonian dynasts propagated a memory of the Persian War that set out to transcend the claims of the separate city-states. The individual

components of that memory were not new. Corinth had a patent connection with the Hellenic League. Athens's obsession with the destruction of its own temples had played a central role in its own collective memory since the war's end. Phayllus's contribution at Salamis had long been recognized. Many of the new rituals established in Plataea did have classical antecedents. What sets the new tradition apart is how Philip and Alexander recombined these individual elements. The home-state of Macedonia, which in the classical tradition should have held place of pride, was almost wholly ignored. Nor did they allow the tradition of any other state to fill the vacuum. For all the importance that Corinth, Athens, and Plataea each had in their own ways, the new tradition was not properly a story about any of those states. Rather, they supplied the raw material, which was then de-contextualized and juxtaposed with other strands of the larger tradition. Corinth's central position within the Hellenic League was paired with Athens's particular wartime sufferings at the meeting of the Corinthian League and perhaps with the panhellenic victory at Salamis on Alexander's coinage. Croton materially benefited from the memory of Phayllus, but its civic claims on those actions were denied. Athens received a sumptuous dedication for the victory at Granicus, and Plataea was given funds for rebuilding its walls after Gaugamela, but on both occasions the memory of the war being subsidized was Greek, not parochial. Despite the familiar elements and locations of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition, this was not a continuation of the state-centered traditions that had dominated in the classical period. Rather, Philip and Alexander placed Greece itself at the center.

The overall effect of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition was to overturn the primacy of the city-state and in a sense to reverse the decision that had struck Pausanias's epigram from the Serpent Column. Pausanias had hoped for an unmediated connection between himself and a larger (but undifferentiated) collective of Greeks. Sparta's reaction had restored the separate states and so opened space for debates over participation and primacy of the sort that would come to define the memory of the war at Delphi and elsewhere. To be an effective instrument of panhellenic unity, however, the Macedonian dynasts realized that the tradition had to be opened to all the Greeks (or rather all the Greeks within the restored Hellenic League). It could no longer be the property of those who fought the war and certainly not in proportion to their specific achievements. Like invented traditions of the modern period, the new Persian War was thus drawn in broad strokes designed to incorporate the largest number of members within the new commemorative club.¹²² The Greeks were called upon to rally around an ethnic war of revenge that by definition placed them all on the right side of history.

Reactions to the New Tradition

What made the Persian-War tradition invented by Philip and Alexander possible was the force, wealth, and influence they had at their disposal, which in turn gave their invented tradition a prominence that no other could match. Corinth, a nominally free state, was reserved as a stage for a grand Persian-War performance. Plataea, a city that did not exist in 339, was conjured out of extinction and capitalized as a Persian-War theme park. This was not the kind of power an Athens or Sparta had at their disposal even in their heyday.¹²³ For the first time, there was a single concentration of power around which all of mainland Greece had to orbit. For the first time, a panhellenic memory of the Persian War that truly transcended the state stood a chance of gaining dominance (under Macedonian patronage) over the various parochial claims of the individual poleis.

But memories, invented or otherwise, cannot simply be imposed from the top.¹²⁴ Alexander could, of course, disseminate what he wanted about the Persian War, but to influence others, the numerous shareholders of power within the Greek world would have to accept his invented tradition and act as though it were a reality.¹²⁵ Within the city-states of mainland Greece, the surviving evidence suggests that parochial traditions of the Persian War remained strong and were on occasion marshalled as counter narratives against the new panhellenic tradition. Nowhere is this better shown than when three of those states revolted—first Thebes, then Sparta, and finally Athens. In each case, not only was Macedonian rule challenged, but so too was the Persian-War tradition invented to support it. Together these challenges demonstrate the resilience of the classical traditions of the Persian War. As we shall see, the first two additionally underscore Alexander's attachment to the new tradition as he answered both with grand gestures intended to recall and reinforce it. The third was put down by Antipater after Alexander's death, and his use of the Persian War was, tellingly, quite different.

The first challenge to Philip and Alexander's invented tradition emerged before the invasion of Persia even began. In 335 the Thebans revolted from the Hellenic League. Alexander's control over Greece was not yet secure, and when a false report of his death was circulated, several states contemplated revolt; Thebes declared it. The Macedonian garrison in the Cadmeia was besieged, allies were sought, and preparations for a full-scale war were made. Many were sympathetic, but when Alexander arrived in Boeotia with an army, enthusiasm cooled. Alexander was initially determined to be

lenient.¹²⁶ He delayed an assault on the city and announced that he would pardon all but two of the ringleaders (Plut. *Alex.* 11.7). The Thebans publicly rejected the offer, announcing that all who wished to free Greece (ἐλευθεροῦν τοὺς Ἕλληνας) and destroy the tyrant Alexander should join the Persians and themselves against Macedonia (Diod. 17.9.5; see also Plut. *Alex.* 11.8). The Persian-War tradition invented at Corinth had been designed to instill a sense of Greek unity and purpose against Persia. The Theban proclamation constituted a complete rejection of those aims.¹²⁷ Unity was sacrificed for freedom. Persia, far from the defining enemy of the Greeks, was named as a supporter of Greek freedom against Macedonian tyranny.

The Thebans did not mention the Persian War explicitly. This is hardly a lapse in our source material. Thebes had a tortured relationship with the Persian War.¹²⁸ Thebans in the classical period can be found variously denying responsibility for their Medism,¹²⁹ claiming credit for their earlier service against the Persians at Tempe and Thermopylae,¹³⁰ and finally claiming credit from the Persians for their efforts on Xerxes's behalf.¹³¹ Even 140 years later, their reaction to the golden shields, dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi, suggests that it remained a touchy subject. Nevertheless, their rejection of the new tradition did engage with a popular strand of the classical tradition. From the beginning, the fight against Persia had been associated with a fight for Greek freedom from Persian slavery.¹³² By the time of the Peloponnesian War, the slogan of freedom-for-the-Greeks had been recycled by the Spartans and their allies against the Athenians (Thuc. 2.8.4).¹³³ Even before the outbreak of war, Thucydides tells us that the Corinthians were making the connection between past and present explicit: "our fathers liberated Greece (τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν), but we are not even securing our own freedom" (1.122.3, tr. Hammond).¹³⁴ In this context, the ethnic dimension of the Persian War (Greek versus barbarian) was naturally less important and could only have become less so when the Persians joined the Spartans in the later years of the war. This recollection of the Persian War as a fight for freedom seems to have had a particular resonance at Thebes. When in 427 the Thebans responded to Plataean attacks on their Persian-War record, they closely connected the objectives of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars. Seen in this light, the exact parties and circumstances of the earlier war fade before the larger goal of Greek freedom for which both wars were allegedly fought. Thebes, the Medizer, can thus be redeemed by its current fight for freedom alongside Sparta (3.62), while Plataea can be damned (along with Athens) for betraying the Persian War's true legacy (3.63).¹³⁵ The freedom slogan continued to feature prominently throughout the Peloponnesian War and beyond, often with little clear

connection to the memory of the Persian War.¹³⁶ That the Thebans intended their announcement in 335 to evoke thoughts of the Persian War specifically must remain conjectural.¹³⁷ But Alexander's response to their proclamation certainly suggests that he at least understood their revolt in those terms.

Neither Alexander nor his father had overlooked the popular slogan of freedom-for-the-Greeks.¹³⁸ Before his assassination, Philip had dispatched generals to Ionia "to liberate the Greek cities" (ἐλευθεροῦν τὰς Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις; Diod. 16.91.2, tr. Welles). Alexander would soon take a similar line when he too invaded Ionia, assuring the Greeks there "that the freedom of the Greeks was the object for which he had taken upon himself the war against the Persians" (ὅτι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερώσεως ἔνεκα τὸν πρὸς Πέρσας πόλεμον ἐπανήρηται; Diod 17.24.1, tr. Welles).¹³⁹ As we saw earlier, he explicitly connected the current fight against Persia, the Persian War of old, and the freedom slogan after Gaugamela when he honored Plataea "because their ancestors had furnished their territory to the Greeks for the struggle in behalf of their freedom" (ὕπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας; Plut. *Alex.* 34.2, tr. Perrin).¹⁴⁰ But freedom otherwise plays a remarkably muted role in the new tradition of the Persian War.¹⁴¹ At Corinth and elsewhere, the Persian War was remembered rather as an ethnic war between the Greeks and a barbarian invader.¹⁴² It was the past impieties of these barbarians that now justified the renewal of the war, not their present denial of freedom to the Greeks in the east.¹⁴³ By ignoring ethnicity and focusing rather on freedom, the Thebans were alluding to an equally powerful way of recalling the Persian War, whose implications for the present situation were rather different.¹⁴⁴ If the war had been fought principally for freedom and only incidentally against a foreign foe, then history counseled the Greeks to fight, not the weakened and distant Persian Empire, but the Macedonians, who presented a much more immediate and pressing impediment to Greek freedom.

Such a direct challenge to the commemorative supports for Alexander's planned expedition against Persia, not to mention his control over mainland Greece, required severe and pointed retaliation.¹⁴⁵ The defeat of the Thebans and the brutal sack of their city was simply the first act, the necessary precondition for a carefully staged commemoration of the Persian War. Alexander called an assembly of his Greek allies. Diodorus considered this a meeting of the Hellenic League (17.14.1);¹⁴⁶ Arrian speaks of a meeting of the allied contingents present for the battle (*Anab.* 1.9.9).¹⁴⁷ In either case, their judgment would resonate across the Greek world. Four states—Phocis, Orchomenos, Plataea, and Thespieae—led the way in the debate, calling for the annihilation of Thebes.¹⁴⁸ Each had private grievances

against the Thebans and cited their local histories to make their cases, but our sources agree that the Medism of Thebes during the old Persian War loomed large.¹⁴⁹ Alexander played a subdued role in the proceedings and is generally portrayed as merely carrying out the will of his allies,¹⁵⁰ but it seems clear that he orchestrated the meeting and the debates for his own purposes.¹⁵¹ At first glance, the attention paid to the Persian War in the debate may appear fitting, since the Thebans' present revolt from the Hellenic League (for a Persian alliance no less) parallels their earlier Medism. But the appropriateness of the charge is illusory, a construct of the proceedings over which Alexander presided. The formal infraction of which Thebes was guilty was breaking the peace imposed after Chaeronea.¹⁵² At the meeting, however, their present guilt was projected into the past.¹⁵³ It was viewed as part of a continuum of betrayal typified not by their present violation, but rather by their betrayal of Greece some 140 years before. For Alexander's purposes the charge perfectly fit the crime. The Thebans had undercut the message he and his father intended the meeting at Corinth to convey. Their punishment had to be justified in such a way as to nullify their counter memory of the Persian War. If the Thebans had wanted their revolt to evoke thoughts of freedom, Alexander went through a great deal of trouble to see that it evoked instead the memory of treachery.¹⁵⁴

The utter destruction of Thebes and the theater of memory Alexander staged afterward were not sufficient to suppress the old classical tradition of the Persian War. In four years another challenge to Macedonian domination emerged, this time from Sparta. Here again, the rejection of Macedonian power was accompanied by an implicit rejection the new Persian-War tradition. Sparta did not, strictly speaking, revolt from Macedonia. When Philip summoned the Greeks to restore the Hellenic League in 337, Sparta alone remained aloof (Just. 9.5.3; see also Plut. *Mor.* 235b and Paus. 7.10.3). Sparta also refused to attend the installation of Alexander as commander-in-chief after Philip's assassination (Just. 11.2.7 and Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.2), but then declined to help the Thebans in their failed revolt.¹⁵⁵ Over the coming years, Sparta acted against Macedonian interests, but did not attack Macedonian forces or the members of the Hellenic League directly.¹⁵⁶ The driving force behind this policy was Sparta's King Agis III, who was waiting for his moment to strike. It came in 331.¹⁵⁷ Alexander was now moving away from the Mediterranean coast and Antipater, his deputy in Greece, was otherwise occupied with an uprising in Thrace. Sparta declared war and won a significant number of Peloponnesian states to its cause. Our few sources suggest that the Spartans, like the Thebans before them, made use of the freedom

slogan, issuing “an appeal to the Greeks to unite in defense of their freedom” (περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας: Diod. 17.62.6, tr. Welles).¹⁵⁸ This should come as no surprise since the sentiment was both appropriate to the occasion and had featured prominently in earlier Spartan efforts to unify their allies against common foes.¹⁵⁹ Here we can be more confident that a reference to the Persian War was intended, since its alternatives—the Peloponnesian War or the various wars fought by Agesilaus on behalf of the King’s Peace—would have hardly struck the right tone with prospective allies, who were likely weighing the risks posed by a resurgent Sparta.¹⁶⁰

Agis’s use of the Persian War seems to have gone further than calls for Greek freedom. Unlike the Thebans, the Spartans had a very close and positive connection with the Persian War, and there are indications that they made greater use of their parochial traditions on this occasion. When Arrian notes Sparta’s refusal to attend the installation of Alexander as commander-in-chief, he adds that they responded “that it had been their custom never to follow others, but to take the lead themselves” (*Anab.* 1.1.2, tr. Mensch). It is tempting to assume that the Spartans have their leadership of the Peloponnesian League in mind here and that their response constitutes a rejection of Macedonian hegemony generally.¹⁶¹ But in this context—a meeting of the Hellenic League at Corinth to confirm a leader for the renewed war on Persia—their rebuke would seem to call to mind their leadership of that same organization during the old Persian War specifically. Our sparse sources give us no indication that the Spartans made any use of this claim during the subsequent war, but it is notable that when Aeschines later summed up the pathetic fate of the Spartans after their eventual defeat by Antipater at Megalopolis, he opines that “they who once claimed the right to lead the Greeks, are now about to be sent to Alexander to serve as hostages” (3.133, tr. Adams). The case is circumstantial to be sure, but the earlier and later references suggest that Agis supported his claim to fight on behalf of Greek freedom by reminding his prospective allies that the Spartans had led that same effort in the heady days of the old Persian War. If so, he was drawing on a long-standing element of the Persian-War tradition at Sparta. The Serpent Column is a case in point. As we saw in [Chapter 1](#), the list of allies had served to credit the victory to a group of separate poleis, but by placing Sparta first, it also underscored Spartan hegemony over that group.¹⁶² It was this very aspect of their Persian-War past that later featured prominently in the Aegospotami monument at Delphi.¹⁶³ So popular did the claim to hegemony remain at Sparta that Lysias (33.7) and Isocrates (4.18) could cite it as a given. Such claims were obviously rooted in more than just the Persian War, but when Isocrates turned to debunking

that claim in the *Panegyricus*, he tellingly directed significant attention to the events of that war.¹⁶⁴

The Spartan claim to leadership struck at the core of Philip and Alexander's new Persian-War tradition. The Macedonian dynasts were drawing freely on recollections of the Persian War to support their position as the new leaders of a restored Hellenic League. By citing their parochial tradition of leadership as the reason for refusing to join that league and perhaps again to justify their war with Macedonia, the Spartans were suggesting that a particular past could be owned and passed along lines of descent; it was *πατρικόν*, in the words of both Arrian (*Anab.* 1.1.2) and Isocrates (4.18) before him. The assumption that the past is a kind of inheritance is not uniquely Spartan and is indeed quite common,¹⁶⁵ but in the context of 331 it had serious implications for the new panhellenic tradition. If Sparta (and the other participating states) owned the Persian-War tradition, then Alexander was usurping a past that did not and could never belong to him (outside the actions of Alexander I). The present Alexander did not take the implication of Sparta's claim lightly. Even before Agis declared war, Alexander had taken the gratuitous step of excluding the Spartans from the Granicus monument.¹⁶⁶ The inscription neatly undercut Spartan claims to leadership both by emphasizing their present failure to carry on the war with Persia and perhaps by hinting at their close relationship with the foreign superpower since the Peloponnesian War.¹⁶⁷ When war came, Alexander did not ignore the implicit attack on his panhellenic tradition. Badian has argued persuasively that Alexander set about to defend his own Persian-War propaganda by undertaking a pair of actions closely tied to the Persian War of old.¹⁶⁸ The first occurred at Susa, where he promised to give back to its rightful owners the war booty that the Persians had taken at the time of Xerxes's invasion (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.7–8).¹⁶⁹ The return of lost treasures did, indeed, strike the right tone.¹⁷⁰ It emphasized Alexander's role as the avenger of the Greeks, which had been cited so prominently in the restoration of the Hellenic League.¹⁷¹ The Athenians, a critical target of Spartan diplomatic efforts, once again featured prominently inasmuch as their famous statues of the Tyrannicides were the most notable items to be returned.

Alexander continued to defend his new Persian-War tradition when he reached the ceremonial Persian capitol, Persepolis. The timing and details of what happened next are much debated, but within four months of his arrival the treasury had been emptied and the palace complex was looted and burned.¹⁷² It was for Alexander a rare display of gratuitous vandalism,¹⁷³ and scholars have hypothesized various explanations,¹⁷⁴ but whatever the "real" reason (and as to that we can only guess), all of our sources clearly reflect what was publicized and

popularly accepted at the time as the reason for the destruction of Persepolis: vengeance for the wrongs done the Greeks (principally the Athenians) by Xerxes a century and a half earlier.¹⁷⁵ In Arrian, Alexander decides to burn Persepolis as a matter of policy and cites ancient wrongs as his justification: “Alexander declared that he wanted to pay back the Persians, who, when they invaded Greece, had razed Athens and burned the temples, and to exact retribution for all the other wrongs they had committed against the Greeks” (*Anab.* 3.18.12, tr. Mensch).¹⁷⁶ It is not clear whether “all the other wrongs” (ὅσα ἄλλα κακά) refers to later assaults or simply those carried out against the other Greeks at the time of the invasion, but in either case Alexander’s principal motive is the Persian War of old. For our other sources, these motives emerge rather at a drunken party and are prompted, not by Alexander, but an unnamed attendant in Diodorus (17.72.3) or an Athenian courtesan named Thais in Curtius (5.7.3–4) and Plutarch (*Alex.* 38.4).¹⁷⁷ But even if we were to accept this version as historically accurate,¹⁷⁸ such an idea would have hardly been voiced if a favorable reaction from Alexander could not have been reasonably assumed.¹⁷⁹ More to our present purposes, however, this version (just as much as Arrian’s) suggests that the connection between the burning of Persepolis and the old Persian War was very much in the air.¹⁸⁰

The exact relationship between the destruction of Persepolis and Agis’s war is equally difficult to disentangle. Depending on the date of the battle of Megalopolis, the date of Persepolis’s destruction, and finally the speed of communication between Greece and the Persian heartland, Alexander may have acted when the war was ongoing, on the mistaken assumption that it was ongoing, or in full awareness that Agis had been defeated.¹⁸¹ In any case, our sources indicate that he saw an advantage in connecting the destruction of Persepolis closely with the Persian War. The audience for this stunning piece of propaganda must have been the Greeks (both at home and serving in the expedition),¹⁸² and its impact during or even in the wake of Agis’s war cannot be overstated.¹⁸³ The war against Persia had been justified as an effort to take vengeance on the impieties committed by the Persians during the Persian War. The burning of Athens and the desecration of its temples had been used to give this general grievance specific voice. Now the seat of Darius and Xerxes’s empire had been taken and burned. This represented an almost scripted fulfillment of the vengeance promised at Corinth in 337.¹⁸⁴ The destruction of Persepolis would have also added support to the new periodization of the war. The mood is perhaps best captured by a remark attributed to Demaratus of Corinth when he is said to have seen Alexander on the Persian throne. Weeping, he declared that “those Greeks were

deprived of great pleasure who had died before seeing Alexander seated on the throne of Darius” (Plut. *Alex.* 37.7, tr. Perrin modified). The long unfinished war was now complete, or said differently (and more negatively), where the leading powers of old Greece had failed, Alexander had finally succeeded.¹⁸⁵ This too finds voice in Plutarch’s biography. There Thais tempts Alexander to burn Persepolis by observing that “a tradition might prevail among men that the women in the train of Alexander inflicted a greater punishment upon the Persians in behalf of Greece than all its famous commanders by sea and land” (38.4, tr. Perrin modified). The remark may be apocryphal, but it hints at one possible use of Alexander’s propaganda coup. Sparta had fomented revolt in part on the strength of its tradition of leadership during the Persian War, but with the burning of Persepolis, Alexander had rendered the accomplishments of others (particularly Sparta and Athens) insignificant by comparison.¹⁸⁶ If there was credit to be derived from the conflict with Persia, it now belonged to Alexander—and Alexander alone.

The third and final rejection of the tradition invented by Philip and Alexander emerged from Athens and served to justify the revolt of that state (and others) in the Lamian War. As we have seen, several elements of Athenian local tradition featured prominently within the new panhellenic tradition. Nevertheless, Philip and Alexander did not squelch or replaced preexisting social memories of the war there. Indeed, the surviving speeches of the Attic orators allow us to say with some confidence that between Chaeronea and the Lamian War parochial traditions remained strong. Lycurgus’s prosecution of Leocrates in 331 is a case in point. In the course of the speech, Lycurgus takes several opportunities to mention the particular contributions of Athens in the old Persian War. At Marathon, Athens wins freedom for all Greece (104). At Salamis, the Athenians fight against both Persian numbers and Greek cowardice (70). The Oath of Plataea strikes a more panhellenic tone, but its substance is attributed to Athens alone (80–81) and is followed almost immediately by an affirmation of Athenian exceptionalism: “yet out of all the Greeks who demonstrated their valor in the face of danger, your city won the greatest fame” (82, tr. Harris). There are even some hints of an implicit rejection of the new tradition. The restored Hellenic League, the ongoing war with Persia, even the 300 panoplies recently dedicated on the Acropolis: Lycurgus mentions none of them. Chaeronea is the day Greek freedom died (50)—a far cry from Philip and Alexander’s claim to liberate the Greeks and rather more evocative of the Theban proclamation of 335.¹⁸⁷ Nor is Lycurgus’s Persian War in need of conclusion. As we saw in [Chapter 4](#), Lycurgus made much of the Peace of Callias, which he claims the Athenians

imposed on the Persians in the mid-fifth century and thereby ensured both Greek freedom and autonomy (73–74).¹⁸⁸ Even Alexander I, whom Philip and Alexander had tactfully avoided in their propaganda, is mentioned by name: “when Alexander came as an ambassador for Xerxes, they [the Athenians] almost stoned him to death because he demanded earth and water although he had been their friend before this” (71, tr. Harris). This is a notably less generous recollection of Alexander I’s role in the war than had been common even a decade before, and indeed far exceeds Herodotus’s version of this same event.¹⁸⁹ Lycurgus’s attack on Leocrates is in many ways a defiant reassertion of the classical tradition of the Persian War.¹⁹⁰ Nor was Lycurgus alone. Indications of Athens’s long-standing local traditions are similarly visible in the other surviving speeches of the period.¹⁹¹ Despite the prominence afforded the new tradition by Macedonian power, despite even its extensive borrowings from Athenian local tradition, the Athenians themselves continued to think of the Persian War in Athenian terms.

The Athenians had remained notably aloof from the earlier revolts of Thebes and Sparta. When Alexander died in 323, however, an open revolt was finally declared under the leadership of the Athenian mercenary-turned-general, Leosthenes. Like others before them, the Athenians framed their revolt as a fight for the freedom of the Greeks, but naturally cited their own local traditions to support the claim.¹⁹² This connection between freedom and Athens’s glorious Persian-War past appears already in their declaration of war:

The orators . . . moved a decree to the effect that the people should assume responsibility for the common freedom of the Greeks and liberate the cities that were subject to garrisons . . . that envoys should be sent to visit the Greek cities and tell them that in the past as well the Athenian people, convinced that all Greece was the common fatherland of the Greeks, had fought by sea against those barbarians who had invaded Greece to enslave it, and that now too Athens believed it necessary to risk lives and money and ships in defense of the common safety of the Greeks. (Diod. 18.10.2–3, tr. Geer modified)

The emphasis given to Greece as the common homeland of all Greeks seems at first glance to recall Philip and Alexander’s new panhellenic memory,¹⁹³ but even in this declaration intended for a non-Athenian audience, the old Athenocentrism shines through.¹⁹⁴ Although the Persian War was fought in common defense of Greece, it is Athens that does all the fighting (ὁ δῆμος . . . βαρβάρους ἡμύνατο). The rest of Greece stands passive. Any acknowledgment that others had achieved something on land (while the Athenians fought at sea) remains tacit at best.¹⁹⁵ Within the appeal for allied support, this recollection of the Persian War serves a familiar function. It justifies the hegemony of one state (Athens) over the rest, who are indebted to

the hegemon for specific services rendered during the Persian War.¹⁹⁶ The implications for the Macedonians are also quite different from the new tradition. Athenian ambassadors are ordered to begin by stating that “in the past as well (καὶ πρότερον) the Athenian people . . . had fought . . . against those barbarians who had invaded Greece to enslave it” (τοὺς ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ στρατευσαμένους βαρβάρους). The implication is that, far from being the natural leaders of a restored Hellenic League, the Macedonians are rather the metaphorical descendants of the Persians who threatened Greek freedom before. This is to take Theban propaganda one step further. They had, in effect, denied that ethnicity was a significant historical precedent for the present. The Athenians here fully accept the notion of an ethnic war—long part of Athenian tradition¹⁹⁷—but now turn it against the Macedonians, whose claims to Greekness were always debatable.¹⁹⁸

The Athenians and their allies did remarkably well in the first year of the revolt. Macedonian resources were divided among Alexander’s squabbling generals, while Antipater was besieged at Lamia. But the Athenians had lost their brilliant general Leosthenes in the siege, and it was with this figure in mind that Hyperides composed the customary eulogy for the fallen. Large parts of the speech survive, and two references to the Persian War provide unique insight into how the Athenians were using the memory of that war to bolster their opposition to Macedonia. In describing the recent Athenian victory at Thermopylae, Hyperides recalls the earlier battle fought there against Xerxes: “from there he [Leosthenes] reached Thermopylae and occupied the pass through which the barbarians had also once before (καὶ πρότερον) advanced into Greece” (6.12, tr. Cooper modified). Once again reference to the Persian War allows the Macedonians to be compared to the Persians.¹⁹⁹ Mention of Thermopylae does not, however, inspire Hyperides to expand on the larger Greek effort against Persia. If anything, he uses the memory of Sparta’s glorious defeat as a foil to Athens’s recent victory: “never before did men fight for a nobler prize against stronger enemies with fewer allies” (6.19, tr. Cooper modified). An unflattering comparison to the Spartan defeat at Thermopylae is hard to miss.²⁰⁰ Hyperides is not eager to share the credit for the Persian War with any other states. The Greeks are indeed mentioned in this section, but as spectators who at the meeting of the Amphietyony at Pylae will in the future recall the valor of the Athenians (6.18). Then as now, the rest of Greece stands as the passive beneficiary of Athenian action.

This same focus on the particular contribution of Athens can be seen later in the speech, when Hyperides again returns to the topic of the Persian War as he recounts all the heroes of old who will greet Leosthenes in the underworld. After recalling the Trojan War, he turns

to the historical period:

There were also those born after the famous heroes of Troy whose exploits matched their courage: I mean Miltiades and Themistocles and their companions, and the others who liberated Greece, and brought honor to their homeland and glory to their lives. (6.37, tr. Cooper modified)

The exclusive claim of the Athenians on the Persian War is restated. We might, of course, object that “the others” (τοὺς ἄλλους) masks a reference to the broader allied effort, but the fact that these men are said to have “brought honor to their homeland” (ἐντιμον μὲν τὴν πατρίδα κατέστησαν) in the context of a funerary oration makes it almost certain that they are all Athenians. Greece, once again, stands passive as the Athenians single-handedly free it (τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθερώσαντες). Hyperides goes on to compare the achievements of these Persian-War-era Athenians with the accomplishments of Leosthenes, saying that “he actually prevented the invasion of the barbarian force, whereas they only defended against it.” (6.38, tr. Cooper). The connection between Persia and Macedonia, hinted at before, is here made explicit. Both are representatives of a single “barbarian force” (τῇ <ν> τῶν βαρβάρων δύναμιν) that menaces Greece.²⁰¹ The overall effect of the speech is striking. Gone are the broad strokes of Alexander’s panhellenic paradigm designed specifically to undermine the claims of individual states on the Persian War. Hyperides, true to the genre in which he is writing, presents the Persian War as the private possession of Athens.²⁰² The claims of the other participating states are ignored or implicitly denigrated; that of Macedonia is utterly rejected.

When in the next year Athens and its allies fell to defeat, the Macedonians again deployed the Persian War to help define their victory. But the way they chose to do so was quite different from what we have seen in the cases of Thebes or Sparta. Antipater did not share Philip or Alexander’s bold vision of a new Persian-War tradition. The grand gestures intended to support panhellenic unity were abandoned. Rather, the Persian War was evoked as an afterthought and solely to embarrass the recalcitrant Athenians. The day their new Macedonian garrison took up its post on the Mounychian Hill was Boedromion 20 (Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1), the anniversary of the battle of Salamis (Plut. *Cam.* 19.3).²⁰³ This was not the first time a holiday celebrating a Persian defeat had been used against the Athenians. As we saw in [Chapter 3](#), Lysander chose an Athenian holiday associated with the Persian War as the day to begin work on the new constitution.²⁰⁴ Like Lysander, Antipater probably intended to temper the memory of Athens’s glorious past with the reality of its present defeat. If Plutarch can be trusted, the timing had the intended effect. The Mysteries were being

celebrated, and the citizens reflected on their cruel change of luck. They recalled that once the sights and sounds of those deities had protected Athens and terrified its enemies—a likely reference to Salamis (Hdt. 8.65 and Plut. *Them.* 15.1)²⁰⁵—but now the gods were indifferent to the sufferings of the Greeks (Plut. *Phoc.* 28.1–2). Antipater’s decision signaled a larger shift in Macedonian policy. The Hellenic League was soon allowed to fall into abeyance.²⁰⁶ The restoration of Thebes by Antipater’s son, Cassander, in 317 might suggest that Plataea soon lost the high favor in which Philip and Alexander had held it. The Macedonian monarchs had spent vast sums of time and treasure on an invented tradition of the Persian War that Antipater and later Cassander likely saw as an unnecessary distraction.²⁰⁷ The Persian War remained important, and at Athens, Antipater was certainly eager to use it, but the attempt to unify Greece behind the memory of the Persian War was scrapped—at least for now.

The mass defections during the Lamian War more than justified Antipater’s pessimistic view of Philip and Alexander’s invented tradition, but its overall failure to create lasting unity under Macedonian hegemony should not blind us to its limited success in influencing recollections of the Persian War, even among contemporaries. Plataea, for one, seems to have fully embraced the new panhellenic tradition. But as noted earlier, the restoration of that town under Macedonian patronage likely made its population particularly susceptible to the invention of tradition.²⁰⁸ The new tradition was also having an impact at neighboring Thespieae.²⁰⁹ An epigram, recorded in the *Palatine Anthology* and intended to commemorate the Thespians who accompanied Alexander on his war of revenge, states:

Spacious Thespieae once sent these men-at-arms to barbarous Asia as avengers of their ancestors, and having sacked with Alexander the cities of Persia, they set up to Zeus the Thunderer this curiously-wrought tripod. (*AP* 6.344, tr. Paton modified)

The Persian War appears prominently as a past wrong requiring vengeance—a centerpiece of Philip and Alexander’s tradition. The destruction of Persian cities (Περσῶν ἄσκη) is cited, and while this might refer to any grouping of Persian-held centers, a reference to Alexander’s now (in)famous destruction of Persepolis is almost certain.²¹⁰ The influence of Macedonian propaganda is undeniable, but the memory recalled in this epigram is nonetheless Thespian, not Greek. It is Thespieae that sends troops to Asia. Alexander is mentioned, but the other Greeks, who authorized the campaign and ultimately served with the Thespians, are not. The wrongs avenged are not those Alexander used to typify Persian impiety—the burning

of Athens and the profanation of temples there—but rather those related more intimately to Thespieae, or at least that is the implication of epigram’s characterization of the Thespians as “avengers of their ancestors” (τιμωροὺς προγόνων).²¹¹ Indeed, Thespieae too had been sacked by the Persians (Hdt. 8.50.2), and so its citizens naturally had no need to look to Athens for a concrete example of the impieties Philip and Alexander were claiming to punish. The Thespians, though influenced by the new tradition, embedded it within their own parochial social memories of the Persian-War past.

Similar dynamics can be seen at work even in Athens. Although the majority hewed closely to the classical tradition, hints of the panhellenic tradition are nevertheless visible in Aeschines’s *Against Ctesiphon*, which draws a close connection between Alexander’s present war of revenge and Xerxes’s earlier invasion of Greece:

Is not the king of the Persians—he who channeled Athos, he who bridged the Hellespont, he who demanded earth and water of the Greeks, he who dared to write in his letters that he was lord of all men from the rising of the sun unto its setting—is he not struggling now, no longer for lordship over others, but already for his life? (3.132, tr. Adams)

The answer to Aeschines’s rhetorical question is, of course, no. The king of Persia who channeled Athos and bridged the Hellespont was not then fighting for his life, because that man, Xerxes, was long dead. But the license he takes for rhetorical effect neatly summarizes a key assumption of the new tradition, that the present war was a continuation of the old Persian War.²¹² This passage is, however, an exception within a speech whose outlook on the Persian War is otherwise discernably parochial. When Aeschines compares Demosthenes disparagingly to the heroes of the Persian War, those heroes are Athenian: Themistocles, Miltiades, and Aristides (3.181). Their victories at Salamis and Marathon are cited by name. To drive the contrast home, Aeschines then quotes three epigrams, fourteen lines in total, inscribed at Athens and intended to commemorate an Athenian victory over the Persians at Eion (3.183–85).²¹³ A discussion of the Marathon painting in the nearby Stoa Poikile follows (3.186).²¹⁴ Finally, these Athenian heroes are summoned to condemn Demosthenes for taking Persian money:

Think you not that Themistocles and those who died at Marathon and at Plataea, and the very sepulchers of your fathers, will groan aloud, if the man who admits that he has negotiated with the barbarians against the Greeks shall receive a crown. (3.259, tr. Adams)

The excoriation of Demosthenes for siding with the Persians against Alexander does, of course, gain added meaning from the new

tradition's focus on ethnicity, but as noted earlier, a focus on the Persian War's ethnic dimension was nothing new at Athens.²¹⁵ Even if Aeschines has the new tradition foremost in mind here, he has again embedded it firmly within the parochial by focalizing Demosthenes's condemnation through the Athenian heroes of the Persian War.²¹⁶ Aeschines was willing to use the new tradition to advance his case, but on the whole his Persian War remained what it had been at Athens since the war's end, an Athenian victory won by Athenian heroes.

Despite the immense power wielded by Philip and Alexander, the Persian-War tradition they invented enjoyed only modest success in mainland Greece. Some—particularly those who were otherwise well disposed to Macedonia—were certainly open to incorporating elements of the new tradition, but even they generally embedded what they adopted within a decidedly state-centered paradigm. Most, however, continued to recall the Persian War much as they had before Chaeronea. From Athens, Sparta, and (to a lesser extent) Thebes, these older notions of the Persian War inspired and supported serious threats to Macedonian power, even while the Hellenic League was nominally fighting to bring that war to its putative consummation. If Philip hoped to invent a Persian War that could inspire Greek unity, Alexander and Antipater discovered that the war's equal and opposite potential to sow dissention was not so easily suppressed or forgotten.

Conclusion

As a piece of political propaganda, the Persian-War tradition invented by Philip and Alexander was a spectacular failure.²¹⁷ They had intended their tradition to transcend the claims of the separate city-states, by prompting contemporaries to recall the war as Greeks, and not merely as citizens of those states. Transcendent panhellenism had, of course, remained latent within Persian-War memory since the defeat of Xerxes, but Philip and Alexander sought to make it the dominant narrative of the war throughout Greece.²¹⁸ The object was to foster Greek unity under Macedonian hegemony, and they had every reason to expect success. They had accumulated more personal power than any other individuals in the classical period, and that position afforded them the opportunity to publicize their new tradition aggressively throughout the Greek world. Philip began by restoring the Hellenic League and proposing for it the mission of seeking revenge against the Persians, not for recent transgressions, but rather for wrongs suffered during the old Persian War almost a century and a half before. Alexander continued to promote this new

tradition on his golden coinage, after the sack of Thebes, in the Granicus monument, through honorary gifts awarded after Gaugamela, at Susa and Persepolis, and in the cults emerging at Plataea. By the time of Alexander's death, Corinth, Athens, Plataea, Thebes, and Persepolis all bore in their own way commemorations of the invented tradition that could hardly be ignored.

Despite the incredible power wielded by Philip and Alexander, the Greeks who were asked to remember the Persian War in this new way failed to acquiesce. First at Thebes, then Sparta, and finally Athens, older traditions were marshalled to delegitimize Macedonian rule and the Persian-War narrative that supported it. In the case of Sparta and Athens, large numbers of other Greek states responded by joining against Macedonia. Others were more receptive to the new tradition, but acceptance was generally qualified by prevailing parochial outlooks. The failure of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition to create the unity they sought underscores the limits to which top-down propaganda, however well supported, can shape broad perceptions of the past. By the same token, it also underscores the weakness of a purely presentist approach to social memory.²¹⁹ The present needs of the powerful remain an important, perhaps even the most important, factor in memory production. But power is ultimately much more widely dispersed than a focus on two monarchs might imply. It was, indeed, only after the deaths of these monarchs and the collapse of their empire that the new panhellenic tradition gained any significant traction within the Greek world, but more on that in the next chapter.

¹ For more on Aeschines and the golden shields, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 1–3.

² See, for example, [Lane Fox 1973](#): 92–93, [Bosworth 1988](#): 18–19, 85, 93, 108–109, and 196–97, [Flower 2000a](#), and [Kremmydas 2013](#).

³ For some examples of this trend, see the [Introduction](#), p. 8 n.26.

⁴ For a discussion of this tradition and its use in Philip's service by contemporaries, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 94–97; for more on Alexander I's own attempts to present himself as a champion of the Greek cause, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 110–13.

⁵ [Green 1991b](#): 6–7, [Bloedow 2003](#): 265, and [Monti 2009](#): 37–38.

⁶ See, for example, [Flower 2002](#), [Colivicchi 2008](#), and [Howe 2013](#); see also the [Introduction](#), p. 18.

⁷ [Hobsbawm 1983a](#): 2.

⁸ [Hobsbawm 1983a](#): 4–5.

⁹ This point is not given sufficient emphasis by Hobsbawm (see, for example, [Schudson 1989](#), [A. Smith 1991](#), [Otto and Pedersen 2006](#), and [Plant 2008](#)), but some awareness of the inherent limitations on invention certainly seems to inform his thinking about adaptation (1983a: 5–7) and reception (1983b: 263 and 307).

¹⁰ [Hobsbawm 1983a](#): 2–3 argues for a different relationship between invented tradition and other forms of recollection. He maintains a distinction between tradition (invented or otherwise), which is characterized by invariance and repetition on the one hand, and custom, which is loosely defined as occurring more in “traditional societies” and is more open to change and innovation, on the other.

Hobsbawm's conclusion that custom declined in the face of tradition seems to place his terminology in an evolutionary relationship as simpler (ancient/medieval) notions of commemoration (custom) give way to more complex, modern/postmodern ones (tradition). The distinction between the two and the developmental model it implies are problematic (see [Beiner 2001](#): 4–5, [Phillips 2004](#), [Otto 2007](#): 38, and [Plant 2008](#): 178–80) and would in any case be unsuited to the study of ancient social memory.

¹¹ [Said 2000](#): 178–79 and [Otto and Pendersen 2006](#): 33.

¹² [Hobsbawm 1983a](#): 9.

¹³ As later emphasized by [Ranger 1999](#): 140, who co-edited the first study of invented traditions with Hobsbawm ([Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983](#)); see also [Olick 1999](#): 386 and [Otto 2007](#): 41.

¹⁴ For more on the reuse of the past in radically different contexts, see [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 72, [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 48–54, and [Cubitt 2007](#): 191.

¹⁵ [Hobsbawm 1983a](#): 10–11 identifies this tendency to be “unspecific and vague” as a defining feature of invented tradition in the modern period; see also [Hobsbawm 1983b](#), [Fentress and Wickham 1992](#): 72, [Nora 1996](#): 6–7, [Winter and Sivan 1999](#): 7, and [Otto and Pendersen 2006](#): 18–19; see [Cubitt 2007](#): 224 for the importance of forgetting in the creation of larger collectives.

¹⁶ For more on transcendent panhellenism, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 6–7; for its rejection after the Persian War, see [Chapters 1](#) and [2](#).

¹⁷ The sincerity with which Philip or Alexander approached their propaganda is much debated (see [Seibert 1998](#)), but is not strictly relevant for our present purposes.

¹⁸ Our only narrative sources for this event are Diodorus Siculus (16.89), Justin (9.5.1–2), and the *Oxyrhynchus Chronicle* (*FGrHist* 255 F5).

¹⁹ See [Yates 2015](#) with earlier bibliography.

²⁰ For more on the Corinthian League, see [Ryder 1965](#): 150–62, [Wilcken 1967](#): 42–49, [Seibert 1972](#): 74–77, [Sakellariou 1981](#): 142–45, [Perlman 1985](#), [Buckler 1994](#): 111–19, [Hammond 1994](#): 155–63, [Fragoula 2003](#): 99–107, [Rhodes and Osborne 2003](#): 372–79, [Poddighe 2009](#): 99–106, [Dmitriev 2011](#): 73–78, and [Lehmann 2015](#): 39–48. The exact nature of the treaty that stood behind the Corinthian League is much debated, but since our aim is to explore the league as propaganda (and not as a political institution), only the most basic, unobjectionable facts are relevant here.

²¹ See, for example, [Kaerst 1927](#): 275–76, [Wilcken 1929](#): 305 and 1967: 47–48, [Sakellariou 1981](#): 142, [Bosworth 1988](#): 189–90, [Jehne 1994](#): 152, [Flower 2000a](#): 98, [Squillace 2004b](#): 61–62, [Dixon 2007](#): 151, and [Lehmann 2015](#): 39.

²² For more on when and how Philip made his intentions to attack Persia known, see [Wilcken 1967](#): 42, [Ellis 1976](#): 204–205, and [Jehne 1994](#): 154. For the profanation of the temples as a stated justification of the campaign against Persia, see also Polyb. 3.6.13 and 5.10.8 (with [Seibert 1998](#): 27–58) and Cic. *Rep.* 3.9.15.

²³ That Diodorus uses an abbreviated form of the league's full title when he first introduces it should come as no surprise. Diodorus's initial description of the league has long been noted for its curiously casual and brief treatment of the newly founded organization ([Wilcken 1917](#): 10), and many have concluded that Diodorus omitted the first of two league meetings that originally appeared in his source (see, for example, [Ryder 1965](#): 154, [Ellis 1976](#): 298 n.121, [Sakellariou 1981](#): 142, and [Fragoula 2003](#): 102 n.10). If so, then Diodorus would seem to have used the abbreviated term he found in his source's description of the second meeting without correcting for the fact that he had not included the first meeting where the full title was presumably used. The abbreviated title of the council is also used at 17.14.1 and is abbreviated still further at 17.14.4, where it is called simply “the council” (τὸ

συνέδριον). The members of this body were called the “councilors of the Greeks” (οἱ σύνεδροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 17.14.1 and 17.48.6) or simply “the councilors” (οἱ σύνεδροι: 16.89.3, 17.4.9, 17.14.3, and 17.73.5) when context made their exact identity clear.

²⁴ As in the case of Diodorus’s later history, abbreviated versions were also in common use. Aeschines (3.161 and 254 with [Ryder 1965](#): 162) and two contemporary inscriptions (RO 84.14–15 and *Syll.*³ 261.2–5) refer to this body simply as τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον (or a slightly different ordering of these same components). The league’s own charter—with no need to belabor the point—seems to call it “the common council” ([τῷ κοινῷ συνεδ]ρίῳ: RO 76.21). Later literary sources point to the same constellation of variations on the formal title. The *Oxyrhynchus Chronicle* (*FGrHist* 255 F5) calls this body τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων, and it seems likely that συνέδριον is to be understood here ([Wilcken 1917](#): 6 n.1). Arrian uses the same phrase when he observes that Sinope was not yet a member state (*Anab.* 3.24.4), but he may have the league itself rather than its council in mind. Plutarch has his Phocion oppose a motion that “the city take part in the common peace and council with the Greeks” (ἡ πόλις μετέχει τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης καὶ τοῦ συνεδρίου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν: *Phoc.* 16.5), while his Alexander detains Callisthenes for a trial “in the council” (ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ: *Alex.* 55.9). Justin speaks of a *consilium omnium veluti unum senatum ex omnibus* (9.5.2).

²⁵ The full name of the Hellenic League’s council is “the common council of the Greeks,” rendered as either ἡ κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν Ἑλλήνων (11.1.1) or τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον τῶν Ἑλλήνων (11.55.5), which is on occasion abbreviated to “the common council” (τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον: 11.3.4 and 11.55.6). The formal title of the councilors is “the councilors of the Greeks” (οἱ σύνεδροι τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 11.4.1, 11.16.3, and 11.29.1), which can be abbreviated to the councilors (οἱ σύνεδροι: 11.3.5 and 11.55.7) when the context makes their precise identity clear. See also 11.3.3, where the councilors are called οἱ ἐν Ἰσθμῷ συνεδρεύοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων.

²⁶ Heuß 1938: 178, arguing against [Wilcken 1917](#); see also [Bosworth 1980](#): 90, who accepts Heuß’s conclusions. Heuß’s focus falls on Diod. 16.89.3, which is itself an abbreviation of the council’s full title (p. 207). To be fair, Diodorus does indeed use language there that can be found elsewhere in reference to other leagues. But this is akin to denying that the Congress of the United States has a technical name based on the fact that both it and other deliberative bodies can be properly called a congress. We must rather look to those passages in which Diodorus uses the full names of these bodies, and there it becomes clear that he is rather more careful than Heuß suggests (see [note 27](#)).

²⁷ The councils of the Delian League (11.47.1 and 11.70.4), the Peloponnesian League (12.39.4 and 12.41.1), the anti-Spartan leagues of 420 and 395 (12.77.3, 14.82.2, 14.82.5, and 14.82.10), the Second Athenian Naval League (15.28.3, 15.28.4, 15.28.5, 15.29.7, and 15.30.2), the Arcadian League (15.59.1), the Boeotian federation (15.80.2), the Delphic Amphictyony (16.1.4, 16.23.3, 16.59.4, 16.60.1, and 17.4.2), and the Achaean League (29.17) are at most termed “the common council” or just “the council” of either the allies or a specific religious/ethnic group. See also an alliance of Greek states in Italy against Dionysius (14.91.1) and a council called to discuss the renewal of the King’s Peace (15.38.3). The members of these bodies are only ever called councilors (σύνεδροι), as in the anti-Spartan alliance of 395 (14.84.5), the Second Athenian Naval League (15.28.3), and the Delphic Amphictyony (16.60.1); see also the councilors called by Polyperchon in 318 (18.69.3) and Demetrius in 307 (20.46.5).

²⁸ See [Chapter 1](#), p. 40 n.39; *contra* [Kienast 2003](#): 49, who suggests that the term used in Diodorus was in use at the time of the Persian War.

²⁹ See V. Parker’s discussion in [Brill’s New Jacoby online](#) (2011, under “II. The

Histories, A. The Date of the Work”).

³⁰ See [Chapter 1](#).

³¹ See [Chapter 2](#), pp. 62–63.

³² See, for example, the extended Persian-War narratives in Lysias’s *Epitaphios Logos* (2.21–46), Isocrates’s *Panegyricus* (4.85–99), and Plato’s *Menexenus* (239d–242a). It is not uncommon for the orators to make explicit note of Sparta’s leadership position (see [Dem.] 59.96 and Isoc. 12.52), but none expands on the existence or nature of the league over which Sparta had command.

³³ See [Chapter 2](#), pp. 81–88.

³⁴ For more on these calls for a panhellenic war against Persia in the fourth century, see [Dobesch 1968](#): 3–28, [Bellen 1974](#), [Perlman 1976](#): 19–30, [Sakellariou 1981](#): 128–34, [Flower 2000a](#): 97–98 and 2000b: 89–96, and [Romilly 2002](#): 225–33.

³⁵ See pp. 235–36.

³⁶ [Bellen 1974](#): 49–50 is quite right to note the close connections that had long been drawn between the Trojan and Persian Wars, and indeed Xenophon does link Agesilaus’s campaigns in the east to the Persian War elsewhere (Xen. Ages. 1.8). Nevertheless, the choice to associate the campaign explicitly with the Trojan War at Aulis and only implicitly with the Persian War through that earlier event (and not the other way around) surely remains significant.

³⁷ For more on the tradition surrounding the Hellenic League, see [Yates 2015](#).

³⁸ For more on this monument, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 64–68.

³⁹ See [Chapter 2](#), pp. 93–97.

⁴⁰ The Athenians, themselves now implicated in Medism of a kind against Philip, may have been equally reluctant to make much of Alexander I’s earlier Medism ([Squillace 2004b](#): 42), but in any case their silence on the matter was short-lived (see p. 241).

⁴¹ We should not imagine that there was a kind of official amnesia about Alexander I at the Macedonian court. If indeed [Dem.] 12 was originally part of Anaximenes’s *Philippica* and if the work was published after Philip’s assassination (as [Jacoby 1926](#): 105 concludes), then this supporter at least continued to make mention of Alexander I after the restoration of the Hellenic League.

⁴² The old Persian War is cited as a justification for the invasion of Persia in numerous sources and is associated with several different occasions in the campaign: the restoration of the Hellenic League (see p. 207), Alexander’s installation as commander-in-chief of the Hellenic League (Diod. 17.4.9), an exhortation to the troops before Issus (Curt. 3.10 and Just. 11.9.3–7), the return of booty taken during Xerxes’s invasion (Arr. *Anab.* 3.16.7–8), the sack of Persepolis (Diod. 17.72, Curt. 5.7.3–4, Plut. *Alex.* 38, and Arr. *Anab.* 3.18.11–12), and the slaughter of the Branchidae (Str. 11.11.4 and Curt. 7.5.28–35). With the exception of the letter to Darius, wrongs done to Macedonia or indeed any connection between Macedonia and the Persian War is absent. This is particularly notable in the pre-battle speeches Alexander delivers to his various ethnic contingents before the battle of Issus. Although he makes much of the wrongs done by Darius and Xerxes to his Hellenic-League troops, the Persian War plays no part in his remarks to the Macedonians. Dio Chrysostom (2.33) connects Alexander the Great’s decision to spare Pindar’s house in Thebes to a line the poet wrote about Alexander I, but this is (*pace* [Bosworth 1980](#): 91) difficult to accept ([Slater 1971](#): 146–47), and even if true, there is no hint that Alexander I’s Persian-War record was a factor. According to [Atkinson 1994](#): 112, Curtius (5.6.1) implies that Alexander the Great made rather much of his namesake, but this is at best an implication, largely contradicted by other more explicit treatments of the war.

⁴³ Curtius is following a parallel tradition when in his version of this letter he adds to the past offenses of Darius I that “he crossed the sea with a great army and

made war upon Macedonia and Greece” (4.1.10, tr. Rolfe) and later describes the damages wrought by the invasion of Xerxes as being directed against “us” (*nos*): 4.1.11; [Atkinson 1980](#): 274 and [Squillace 2004b](#): 102).

⁴⁴ There is a strong possibility that the letter appeared in Callisthenes ([Griffith 1968](#): 37 and [Monti 2009](#): 50) or perhaps Anaximenes ([Squillace 2004b](#): 104–106).

⁴⁵ [Bosworth 1980](#): 231.

⁴⁶ [Bloedow 2003](#): 267–68 argues that the connection drawn between Greece and Macedonia in the letter was part of a larger trend and cites Alexander’s later justification for his destruction of Persepolis as evidence (*Arr. Anab.* 3.18.12), but there is no mention of Macedonia there. See [Dobesch 1975](#): 85 and [Atkinson 1980](#): 274 for a similar generalization.

⁴⁷ For more on the revenge theme, see pp. 213–14 and 236–40.

⁴⁸ See [Chapter 5](#), pp. 187, 196, and 200. [Lehmann 2015](#): 42 oversimplifies when he implies that there was a shared sense of outrage at the time of the war.

⁴⁹ See [Chapter 5](#), p. 191.

⁵⁰ See *Isoc.* 4.155 in addition to [Chapter 5](#), pp. 189–92.

⁵¹ [Bloedow 1995a](#): 102 and 1995b: 38. Philip and Alexander were certainly not the first to make use of the Athenian tradition. Soon after Xerxes’s invasion, Hieron had invited Aeschylus to restage his *Persae* in Syracuse (see [Chapter 3](#), p. 109). We might also see a reference to Athens in the image of a personified Salamis carrying a ship’s ornament in the temple of Zeus at Olympia, constructed a generation later (*Paus.* 5.11.5), surely with the approval of the Elean authorities. Of course, references to Salamis in the classical period need not invariably allude to Athens, and it should be noted that the figure of Salamis is pictured beside a personification of Greece, not Athena. But the further presence of Theseus, both here and elsewhere, and the fact that an Athenian, Pheidias, designed the interior of the temple certainly raises the possibility that a closer connection to Athens was intended (see [Hurwit 2005b](#): 141 with [note 38](#) and [Arafat 2013](#): 81 for recent discussions of the issue). Nevertheless, such borrowings had remained a minority tradition throughout the classical period.

⁵² As a rule, our sources speak of the wrongs done to the Greeks in general terms (see [note 42](#)), but Diodorus (*17.72.6*), Plutarch (*Alex.* 38.4), and Arrian (*Anab.* 3.16.7–8 and 3.18.12) cite the sack of Athens specifically (see also [Bosworth 1988](#): 197 and [Worthington 2003a](#): 85). Arrian’s second reference is particularly notable since it is attributed to Alexander himself. [Bosworth 1971](#) argues that the Congress decree (*Plut. Per.* 17) was invented after Chaeronea and was consciously framed so as to parallel Philip’s reinstitution of the Hellenic League. Such a conclusion, if true, lends added support to the possibility that the tendency of our sources to cite Athens as the principal example of temple profanation mirrors the (semi-) official propaganda coming out of the meetings at Corinth (but see [Perlman 1976](#): 8–11 against [Bosworth](#)). The only other wrong noted explicitly is the violation of the temple of Apollo by the Branchidae (*Str.* 11.11.4 and *Curt.* 7.5.28), but on both occasions this example is connected with the slaughter of the descendants of the Branchidae, who lived on the border between Bactria and Sogdiana. A reference to the sack of Protesilaus’s shrine during Xerxes’s invasion might have also been intended in Alexander’s sacrifices there before crossing to Asia ([Zahrnt 1996](#): 135–36), but that must remain a conjecture (*J. Hamilton 1973*: 52).

⁵³ [Pace Lane Fox 1973](#): 92–93 and [Squillace 2004b](#): 70–71.

⁵⁴ I stress the phrase “in a sense.” It hardly needs to be said again that the Greeks, even under the auspices of the restored Hellenic League, possessed no nation in the modern sense of the word (see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 100–101). I use the term *nationalize* here merely to indicate that this memory of the war had been opened to all Greeks.

⁵⁵ [Bellen 1974](#): 45 and [Seibert 1998](#): 23, but [Rung 2016](#): 175 is quite right to note

that Thucydides makes no explicit mention of temples here.

⁵⁶ See [Chapter 4](#), pp. 163–64.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Lysias's *Olympic Oration* (33.3 with [Bellen 1974](#): 50–51), Isocrates's *Panegyricus* (4.179–85 with [Wilcken 1929](#): 315, [Dobesch 1968](#): 16–17, [Sakellariou 1981](#): 130, [Green 1996b](#): 18–19, and [Weißberger 2003](#): 97) and his *Letter to Archidamus* (Ep. 9.8–10 with [Weißberger 2003](#): 98). There is a general reference to revenge in the *Philippus* (ἡμεῖς δ' οὐδ' ὑπὲρ ὧν κακῶς ἐπάθομεν ἀμύνεσθαι τολμῶμεν αὐτούς: 5.125), but that could refer either to the old Persian War or more recent wrongs since both are mentioned in the immediate context (5.123–26). Whether Gorgias's influential *Olympic Oration* evinced a focus on recent wrongs is impossible to say since it survives only in a few fragments. [Flower 2000a](#): 102–103 rightly notes the importance of revenge in panhellenist discourse, but does not consider what wrong exactly those authors thought was in need of vengeance.

⁵⁸ For the slight attention paid to revenge generally among the advocates of war with Persia, Isocrates in particular, see [Brunt 1965](#): 207, [Wilcken 1967](#): 47–48, [Dobesch 1968](#): 138, [Ellis 1976](#): 208, [Seibert 1998](#): 23–24, [Faraguna 2003](#): 108, [Weißberger 2003](#): 103–104, [Worthington 2003a](#): 85, and [Rung 2016](#): 175. Isocrates does draw attention to the destruction of temples in his *Panegyricus*, but he mentions it merely as a reason for the mutual enmity between Greeks and Persians, not because those wrongs lacked sufficient vengeance (4.155). [Bellen 1974](#): 52 directly connects this passage to the revenge Isocrates calls for elsewhere, but as [Wilcken 1929](#): 315 rightly notes, revenge is not mentioned there (see also [D. Gillis 1971](#): 71). Bellen's deduction that the need for revenge is implied (1974: 52–53 n.67) stretches beyond what the text can say.

⁵⁹ Some have conjectured that Philip's particular focus on the impieties of the Persian War emerged from his experience with the Third Sacred War (see [Musti 2002](#) with earlier bibliography). Alexander would later note subsequent Persian transgressions against the Macedonians and Greeks (e.g., Arr. *Anab.* 2.14.5), and it is certainly possible (perhaps even probable) that Philip made some use of them at Corinth as well, but they manifestly played a supporting role in justifying the renewed war against Persia.

⁶⁰ For the role of the supreme commanders in allied deliberations, see [Yates 2015](#): 2–10.

⁶¹ See [Chapter 1](#).

⁶² As a parallel, we might note that Philip was personally given representation on the Amphictyonic council ([Badian 1982](#): 37). See also [note 81](#).

⁶³ There were, of course, examples of such outsized individuals successfully writing themselves into the broader Persian-War tradition in the classical period, particularly on the periphery of the Greek world. Philip's ancestor, Alexander I, stands out (see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 110–13). We might also consider the Deinomenid tyrants (see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 106–110). Attempts were also made within the city-states of mainland Greece (see [Chapter 1](#), pp. 45–60). But the practice had remained a minority trend in the overall Persian-War tradition, with most yielding place of pride to the political communities they represented.

⁶⁴ Such a conclusion adds support to Ferrario's discussion of Philip's self-presentation in her study of the “great man” in ancient Greece. Although she devotes little attention to his manipulation of the Persian-War tradition, she otherwise concludes that Philip presented himself to the Greeks “in a manner that might be construed as being broadly panhellenic; that is, he did not commemorate himself or behave in a manner that was indebted to the special cultural norms, language, or practices unique to any one Greek polis. Instead, he used imagery and methods with the broadest possible appeal” (2014: 318).

¹⁰⁸ W. [West 1977](#) and [Wallace 2011](#): 153–57; see also [Bosworth 1971](#): 606–607,

Schachter 1994: 130–32, and Gartland 2016: 154. Étienne and Piérart 1975: 67–74 date most, but not all, of the new Plataean traditions to this period, opting to date one later (see also Nafissi 1995: 124–25 and Dreyer 1999: 249–55). Jung 2006: 321–40 dates all of them to after the death of Alexander (see also Prandi 1988: 163–68). While I do not exclude the possibility that these traditions continued to evolve after 338, the arguments against dating their beginnings to the restoration of the town do not persuade (see notes 113, 115, 116, 118, and 121). For a parallel to the situation of the Plataeans in 338, see Flower’s discussion of the later attempts to restore the Spartan *agôgê* (2002: 196–202).

¹⁰⁹ Étienne and Piérart 1975: 56–62 and Jung 2006: 302–306.

¹¹⁰ For more on the contemporary political and commemorative context of the decree, see Chapter 7, pp. 263–64.

¹¹¹ See the Introduction, pp. 17–18.

¹¹² Wallace 2011: 157 suggests that the site of Plataea itself may have imposed “ideological limits” on what was likely to be invented there, and while this is certainly true, we must not forget that the layout of the site was itself not static and may have changed considerably upon the restoration of the town (Chapter 2, pp. 75 and 79).

¹¹³ See Étienne and Piérart 1975: 68, Schachter 1994: 130 n.1, and Wallace 2011: 153. The council noted in the Glaucon decree would not, of course, have been the deliberative body of the Corinthian League, which ceased to function soon after the death of Alexander (see also Jung 2006: 336). Rather, as Étienne and Piérart suggest, we would have to imagine that the Plataeans continued to associate their invented traditions with “the common council of the Greeks,” which in turn attracted other Greek states to continue participating in the festivities. In so doing, they likely did not have the Corinthian League principally in mind, but rather the Hellenic League against Xerxes and only by extension its subsequent iterations (under Philip and then others). This is certainly the impression Plutarch leaves in his description of the alleged origin of these traditions (*Arist.* 21.1).

¹¹⁴ For more on these states under Alexander, see pp. 230–40.

¹¹⁵ Étienne 1985: 260 finds any use of the battle of Plataea in Macedonian propaganda unlikely, in part because it might stir memories of Macedonian Medism (see also Prandi 1988: 163), in part because Sparta, the state most popularly credited with that victory, remained hostile (see also Jung 2006: 336), but neither consideration stopped Alexander from drawing just such a connection to the famous battle after Gaugamela (see pp. 222–24).

¹¹⁶ That this particular cult dates to the period of Macedonian hegemony has long been questioned (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 71–74, Étienne 1985: 259–60, Erskine 1990: 92, Schachter 1994: 133 n.3, Dreyer 1999: 250–55, and now Jung 2006: 325–27). Jung is quite right to note that the cult of the Homonoia of the Greeks (as opposed to the political concept) is not attested before the third century, but the earliest example is the Glaucon decree itself, and the next does not appear until the Roman period (2006: 325–26). Any firm conclusions based on these two surviving examples seems to press our evidence too far. He is also right to stress that concord played an important part in the anti-Macedonian propaganda that preceded the Chremonidean War (Jung 2006: 326–27; see also Étienne and Piérart 1975: 73–74), but it was also equally important to Philip and Alexander (Dobesch 1975: 77 and W. West 1977: 316–19; see also Perlman 1957: 309–311 and 1976: 27–28 on Isoc. 5.16). Nor is it unlikely, as Étienne 1985: 260, Erskine 1990: 92, and Jung 2006: 337 claim, that a tradition developed to serve Macedonian interests would, within a generation, fall into the service of an anti-Macedonian alliance, the undoubted context in which it appears in the Glaucon decree (Étienne and Piérart 1975: 70–71 and Jung 2006: 302–306). In fact, narratives developed within one political context

can with the greatest ease be adopted by its opponents ([Foucault 1978](#): 100–102). See also [Wallace 2011](#) for a thoroughgoing application of this principle to the rituals at Plataea. We might also consider the ease with which competing parties adopted the slogan of freedom throughout this period (see [Dmitriev 2011](#) and pp. 230–44).

¹¹⁷ See [Chapter 2](#), pp. 72–81; whether the site had by this point been reorganized into what Pausanias would later record in his travel guide (9.2.5) is a matter of debate ([Chapter 2](#), p. 79 n.83).

¹¹⁸ [Jung 2006](#): 336–37 claims that an emphasis on freedom would be anomalous since Philip and Alexander did not associate that theme with the restored Hellenic League, but see p. 232 for the appearance of that theme in both the justification of the present war on Persia and Alexander’s commemoration of the old war. [Wallace 2011](#): 153–55 adds new arguments in support of the connection between this theme and Alexander by proposing that the Freedom Games may have been initiated soon after the destruction of Thebes in 335.

¹¹⁹ See [Chapter 2](#), p. 75.

¹²⁰ The second line of the poem has long been doubted (see [Page 1981](#): 211–13), but its presence or absence does not impact my reading of the monument as an example of transcendent panhellenism.

¹²¹ [Jung 2006](#): 338–39 notes that the foundation stories associated with the Plataean cults in Plutarch betray a distinctly Athenian focus (*Arist.* 20–21) and argues that they reflect Athenian influence on the invention of these cults in the hellenistic period (see also [Prandi 1988](#): 170–71). But it should be noted that Plutarch is writing four centuries later and that indications of Athenian influence may show signs of later changes in the tradition. In any case, a focus on Athens would hardly speak against an origin under Macedonian hegemony since, as we have already seen, Athens was prominently used in Macedonian propaganda.

¹²² See [note 15](#).

⁶⁵ Persian-War recollections have also been seen in Alexander’s sacrifices at Troy (*Diod.* 17.17.2–3, *Plut. Alex.* 15.7–9, and *Arr. Anab.* 1.11.7–8 with [Will 1983](#): 55, [Zahrnt 1996](#), [Flower 1999](#): 422–23 and 2000a: 107–110, and [Squillace 2004b](#): 66–70 and 2010: 77–80), his speech to his Greek soldiers before Issus (*Just.* 11.9.3–7 and *Curt.* 3.10 with [Squillace 2004a](#)), his response to Darius’s entreaty afterward (*Curt.* 4.1.10–11 and *Arr. Anab.* 2.14.4 with [Bellen 1974](#): 57–58, [Bosworth 1980](#): 231, [Bloedow 1995a](#): 100–102, and [Monti 2009](#): 49–50), the return of war spoils at Susa (pp. 237–38), the sack of Persepolis (see pp. 238–40), the slaughter of the Branchidae (*Str.* 11.11.4 and *Curt.* 7.5.28–35 with [Bellen 1974](#): 63–64, [Parke 1985](#), [Hammond 1998](#): 344, and [Flower 2000a](#): 117–18), and modern deductions about the nature of Callisthenes’s court history (*FGHHist* 124 with [Dobesch 1968](#): 14 and 1975: 87–88, [Flower 2000a](#): 105, [Zahrnt 2006](#), and [Monti 2009](#): 46–50). We might also add the trial that followed the sack of Thebes (see pp. 233–34).

⁶⁶ See, for example, [M. Price 1982](#) and 1991: 27–29, [Zervos 1982](#), [Kaiser 1986](#), and [Mørkholm, Grierson, and Westermarck 1991](#): 42.

⁶⁷ [Bellinger 1963](#): 3, [Perlman 1965](#): 63–64, [Lane Fox 1973](#): 92, [Holloway 1980](#): 59, [M. Thompson 1982](#): 113, [Zervos 1982](#): 172, [Will 1983](#): 61–62 n.83, [Kaiser 1986](#): 49–50, [Bosworth 1988](#): 244, [Mørkholm, Grierson, and Westermarck 1991](#): 43, [M. Price 1991](#): 29, [Stewart 1993](#): 159, [Squillace 2004b](#): 152, and [Arnold-Biucchi 2006](#): 34.

⁶⁸ [Blomberg 1996](#); see also [Chapter 5](#), p. 197.

⁶⁹ For these iconographic distinctions, see [Blomberg 1996](#): 86–87.

⁷⁰ [M. Price 1991](#). It should also be noted that the helmet worn by the female figure on Alexander’s golden coinage is a Corinthian helmet, the same as worn by Aphrodite on Corinthian coinage. The fact is noted by [Holloway 1980](#): 60 and [Kaiser 1986](#): 50, but in both cases associated with what they believed was Athena of

Corinth. This is a less telling feature, however, since the Athenians portrayed Athena with this helmet from the classical period on (Blomberg 1996: 90–92).

⁷¹ That the helmeted figure (thought to be Athena) was intended to evoke Athens, see Bellinger 1963: 3–6, Perlman 1965: 63–67, and Will 1983: 62 n.83; that the “Athena” was intended to evoke the ceremonies at Troy, see Zervos 1982: 172–73; see also Kaiser 1986: 49–50, Zahrnt 1996: 144–46, and Faraguna 2003: 108–109 for the possibility that the connection with Troy was additionally intended to evoke thoughts of Xerxes’s later desecration of Athens as well. Holloway 1980: 60, M. Price 1991: 29, and Stewart 1993: 159–60, all writing before Blomberg and so assuming that the figure on Corinth’s coinage was Athena, conclude that the Athena figure was indeed intended to evoke Corinth and the Hellenic League. Arnold-Biucchi 2006: 34 suggests a more general panhellenic reference that encompassed both the “Athena” of Corinth and that of Troy.

⁷² News of Philip’s assassination had fanned the flames of revolt in mainland Greece, which were quickly put out by the arrival of Alexander at the head of a Macedonian army. He then called a meeting of the restored Hellenic League (Diod. 17.3–4, Just. 11.2, and Arr. *Anab.* 1.1.1–3). Another meeting was held after the destruction of Thebes (Plut. *Alex.* 14.1); for more on the unrest in Greece during Alexander’s reign, see pp. 229–40.

⁷³ Alexander’s golden coin type certainly had no precedent in Macedonia (Bellinger 1963: 3, Holloway 1980: 59, Will 1983: 62 n.83, and Mørkholm, Grierson, and Westermarck 1991: 43).

⁷⁴ Bellinger 1963: 5.

⁷⁵ Holloway 1980: 59–60, M. Price 1991: 30, Stewart 1993: 160, Flower 2000a: 101, and Themelis 2003: 162–63. Perlman 1965: 67 proposes a more general reference to future victories that would be won by the league fleet (see also Lane Fox 1973: 92). Mørkholm, Grierson, and Westermarck 1991: 43–44 suggest that the Nike with a ship’s ornament was copied directly from a statue in Athens. Zahrnt 1996: 144–46, adopting a later date for this coin type, puts forth Alexander’s crossing of the Hellespont in 334 as the intended reference.

⁷⁶ Holloway 1980: 60. Zahrnt 1996: 145 n.55 objects to this possibility, citing Corinth’s lackluster performance at Salamis according to Herodotus. This is not entirely fair, however, since Herodotus specifically attributes this conclusion to the Athenians alone. The Corinthians and the other Greeks asserted that the Corinthians had fought “among the first” (ἐν πρώτοις: 8.94.4). Although long associated with Athens, other members of the Hellenic League (Corinth among them) had made claims on the memory of Salamis as well (see, for example, Chapter 2, pp. 62–63 and Chapter 3, p. 131). Indeed, when Alexander did later make an explicit connection between his own victory at Gaugamela and Salamis, he chose to do so through the example of Phayllus of Croton, not Athens (see pp. 220–22). In any case, Corinth’s real or alleged performance is not a critical objection to my own conclusion (or Holloway’s for that matter), since the reference here would be to the restored Hellenic League, not Corinth per se.

⁷⁷ Plutarch and Arrian diverge as to the details of the dedication. Arrian refers simply to 300 panoplies to which the inscription is attached. Plutarch suggests that the shields were dedicated separately from the rest of the armor and that the inscription accompanied only the latter. Furthermore, Arrian notes that the dedication was to Athena; Plutarch, to the Athenians. Arrian’s version is rightly preferred (see Squillace 1992–94: 10–12 and 2004b: 154 and Hammond 1993: 35–36).

⁷⁸ See Chapter 5, pp. 189–92.

⁷⁹ Bosworth 1980: 127, Kaiser 1986: 50, Squillace 1992–94: 19, Bringmann et al. 1995: 18, Schmidt-Dounas 2000: 86, J. Shear 2001: 571, Faraguna 2003: 108–109,

Monti 2009: 39, and Lehmann 2015: 51. See also Callisthenes (*FGrHist* 124 F28 = Str. 13.1.13) for another possible connection between the battle of Granicus and the revenge theme in contemporary propaganda.

⁸⁰ Zahrnt 2006: 144–48.

⁸¹ Alexander's decision to omit his title would not, however, have struck contemporaries as an unprecedented one. Indeed, the inclusion of a title for the Macedonian king was not necessary (Sakellariou 1981: 136, Hammond 1989: 58–59, and Bringmann et al. 1995: 18), but see RO 83 and 86 for the inclusion of Alexander's title "king." SEG 44.414 (= IG VII 3055), a mid- or late fourth century bce inscription, includes the name and title of "Amyntas, son of Perdiccas, King of the Macedonians" (Α[μ]ύντα[ς] Π[ε]ρδίκ[α] Μακεδόνων βασιλεύ[ς]), but see Errington 1974: 25–28 for more on this problematic inscription. We might also recall that Alexander was by this point an Athenian citizen (J. Shear 2001: 571). Neither convention nor citizenship status represented an actual constraint to Alexander's actions, however, and he surely could have made more of Macedonia or his position over it in this dedication if he had wished to do so. Bosworth 1980: 127 and Monti 2009: 37–39 suggest that perhaps the Macedonians have been subsumed by the larger title "Greeks" here, but this would have hardly been obvious to contemporaries and so, even if true, would still have amounted to a diminution of Macedonia's role in the victory.

⁸² Wilcken 1967: 88, J. Hamilton 1973: 58, Lane Fox 1973: 123, Schachermeyr 1973: 173–74, and Squillace 1992–94: 12 and 2004b: 154.

⁸³ Bosworth 1971: 613, 1980: 127, and 1988: 197, Dobesch 1975: 90–91, Will 1983: 56–57, Bringmann 1995: 18, J. Shear 2001: 195, Mari 2002: 261–62, Hoff 2003: 174, Squillace 2004b: 154, Kremmydas 2013: 204, Worthington 2014: 150, and Lehmann 2015: 51. Monti 2009: 49 concludes that Alexander intended to draw a particular connection to Marathon. Like Granicus, Marathon was (or rather could be seen as) the first battle in the Persian War and was (as Alexander underscored in the case of Granicus) fought without the aid of the Spartans. Gauer 1968: 27 suggests that Alexander may have had the golden shields dedicated by the Athenians at Delphi specifically in mind here, but that is only likely if we accept Plutarch's version of the Granicus dedication (see note 77).

⁸⁴ We might say that it had been similarly re-contextualized on Alexander's coinage, but that is to assume that any reference to Salamis automatically evoked thoughts of Athens: true of Athenians to be sure, but doubtful elsewhere.

⁸⁵ Lane Fox 1973: 123–24, Dobesch 1975: 90 n.39, Will 1983: 57, and Squillace 2004b: 154.

⁸⁶ Kremmydas 2013: 203–204.

⁸⁷ See Hurwit 1999: 269 for the parochial character of the monuments erected on the Acropolis before the hellenistic period.

⁸⁸ Neer 2007: 226.

⁸⁹ Bringmann et al. 1995: 18 and Schmidt-Dounas 2000: 86–87 suggest that Alexander may have been motivated in part by the Medism of Delphi at the time of the Persian War, but see Mari 2002: 260–63 against this possibility. For Alexander's commemorative focus on Athens, as opposed to the panhellenic sites, generally, see also Dobesch 1975: 90–91, Zahrnt 2006: 148, and Rathmann 2010: 58.

⁹⁰ Plutarch is clear about Alexander's intentions: "to make the Greeks partners in his victory" (*Alex.* 16.17, tr. Perrin), but this need not imply that he wanted to flatter Athenian sentiment and should perhaps be understood rather within the context of the new, expressly panhellenic, tradition. The mood in which the Athenians received the dedication is a different matter, and on this point our sources are silent. J. Shear 2001: 834–36 suggests that the panoplies were the highlight of that year's Panathenaea, the most likely context for their dedication (Squillace

1992–94: 16 and 2004b: 155, [Habicht 1997](#): 18–19 n.23, and [Barringer 2003](#): 243). [Mitchel 1965](#): 190–91 and [1970](#): 8, [Habicht 1997](#): 18, [Hurwit 1999](#): 254, [Worthington 2000](#): 94, [Barringer 2003](#): 243–44, and [Rathmann 2010](#): 58, however, conclude that the reaction would have been broadly negative, given Alexander's almost simultaneous refusal to release Athenian mercenaries captured at Granicus ([Arr. Anab.](#) 1.29.5–6).

⁹¹ [Hurwit 1999](#): 254 and [Rathmann 2010](#): 58–59.

⁹² For the link between Gaugamela and Salamis, see [Wilcken 1967](#): 138, [J. Hamilton 1969](#): 91, [Dobesch 1975](#): 104, [Flower 2000a](#): 113, and [Squillace 2004b](#): 131.

⁹³ [Lane Fox 1973](#): 242–43 concludes that the episode shows Alexander's "concern for obscurities"; [Flower 1999](#): 425 and 428 suggests that Alexander's ambitions may have even now been turning west, but see [Kremmydas 2013](#): 205 n.37 against this possibility.

⁹⁴ [Plutarch](#) does not explicitly exclude the Sicilians from among those who helped the Greeks, which he might have done, but it would press our meager evidence too far to suggest that Alexander is here implicitly recognizing the achievements of the Sicilian tyrants against Carthage at Himera (see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 106–110).

⁹⁵ For more on the Athenian tradition surrounding this battle, see [Ruffing 2006](#).

⁹⁶ For other instances of Alexander's respect for athletes and aristocrats, see [[Dem.](#)] 17.10 and [Arr. Anab.](#) 2.15.4; for more on Alexander's fondness for athletes generally, see [Trittle 2009](#): 123–25.

⁹⁷ Most do indeed accept this version of events (see [Macan 1908b](#): 431–32, [How and Wells 1928b](#): 250, [Treves 1941](#): 332–34, [J. Hamilton 1969](#): 92, [Bringmann et al. 1995](#): 381, [Cagnazzi 1996](#), [Asheri et al. 2003](#): 249, and [Nicholson 2016](#): 193).

⁹⁸ Constraints imposed by the format of the list were not inflexible, however. [Naxos](#) and [Tenos](#) were named, but their support for the Greeks at Salamis depended solely on the defection of the contingents those polities had sent to support [Xerxes](#), apparently acting on the insistence of their commanders, [Democritus](#) and [Panaetius](#) (see [Hdt.](#) 8.46.3 and 8.82.1, respectively). It might well have been agreed that these commanders and crews reflected the true will of communities that had been compelled to support Persia. [Croton](#), however, would have had no recourse to such an excuse.

⁹⁹ [Nicholson 2016](#): 193–94, who also posits that a [Crotonian](#) monument located near the [Serpent Column](#) was intended to commemorate their participation at Salamis (see [Chapter 3](#), p. 106 n.28 for more on this monument).

¹⁰⁰ The reconstruction of [Plataea](#) and [Macedonia's](#) support for that project are clear in general terms, but difficult to untangle in detail because our sources differ and, when combined, offer an oddly redundant sequence of events. [Pausanias](#) claims that [Plataea](#) had been ordered restored after [Chaeronea](#) (4.27.10 and 9.1.8; see [Roebuck 1948](#): 80, [J. Hamilton 1973](#): 36, [Gullath 1982](#): 12, and [Hammond 1994](#): 156). Although [Pausanias](#) is writing centuries after the event, the claim is not improbable. Philip had long contemplated the restoration of [Plataea](#) and had earlier offered it to the Athenians as an inducement to accept the Peace of [Philocrates](#) ([Dem.](#) 5.10, 6.30, and 19.20–21; and [Aeschin.](#) 2.136–37). We do not know what progress had been made by the time [Thebes](#) revolted and was defeated in 335, but on that occasion [Arrian](#) notes that Alexander's Greek allies voted to rebuild and fortify [Plataea](#) ([Anab.](#) 1.9.10). After [Gaugamela](#), Alexander himself donated funds to this project. If [Pausanias](#) is correct, however, these must have amounted to pledges of support for the ongoing reconstruction of the town and perhaps new commitments to construct a wall ([Gullath 1982](#): 12–13, [Prandi 1988](#): 138–40, and [Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013](#): 32–34).

¹⁰¹ The year of [Gaugamela](#), 331 bc, was not an Olympic year, and so the

announcement (perhaps that the walls were now complete) must have been made at the games of 328 or 324 (Bringmann et al. 1995: 129, Fredricksmeyer 2000: 137–38, and Wallace 2011: 149). Wallace goes on to speculate that an announcement at the Olympic Games would have constituted an announcement before the council of the Hellenic League, which routinely met at the panhellenic games (2011: 166 n.9). See Mari 2002: 242 for an attempt to connect the announcement rather with the Isthmian Games of 330 and Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013: 33 n.147 in support of the Olympic Games of 332, which additionally entails the assumption that Plutarch has mistakenly connected an announcement of the decision to refortify the town in 335 with the later grant announced after Gaugamela.

¹⁰² For the connection to the battle of Plataea, see Wilcken 1967: 138, Dobesch 1975: 104, Squillace 2004b: 131, and Konecny, Aravantinos, and Marchese 2013: 35.

¹⁰³ For the various destructions and reconstructions of the town before 338, see Chapter 2, p. 74 n.57. For the tragic fate of Plataea in literature, see Thucydides's Plataean speech in Book 3 (53–59), Isocrates's *Plataicus* (esp. 14.58–62), and Apollodorus's rendition of Plataean history in his *Against Neaera* ([Dem.] 59.93–107).

¹⁰⁴ Wallace 2011: 152. Prandi 1988: 140 also comes very close to this point when she concludes that Alexander's focus on Plataea after Gaugamela “annullava quasi un secolo e mezzo di controversie e di violenze riportando i Greci al ‘punto di partenza’ costituito dalla vittoria persiana, con una Platea benemerita e gratificata.” See Monti 2009: 51 for a similar observation in reference to Alexander's abolition of tyrannies.

¹⁰⁵ The quotation is from Perrin's translation of Plutarch's φιλοτιμούμενος δὲ πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, but it is also possible to render this phrase “aspiring to outdo the Greeks.” Indeed, the LSJ suggests φιλοτιμέομαι with πρὸς (+ acc.) be translated “to vie emulously with, rival” (sv I.1). Hammond 1993: 66–67 n.22 and 176 n.31 renders the participle “seeking honor for himself,” taking the prepositional phrase with the main verb (ἔγραψε), citing Alex. 29.9 as a parallel, but see Flower 2000a: 113 n.74, citing J. Hamilton 1969: 91, against that possibility.

¹⁰⁶ See Chapter 2, pp. 72–81.

¹⁰⁷ Jung 2006: 332–333 does not consider these passages when he concludes that the obsequies for the fallen continued at Plataea after the destruction of the town.

¹²³ Sparta at its height after the Peloponnesian War failed to stage a similar bit of commemorative theater at Aulis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.3–4). According to Plutarch (*Per.* 17), the Athenians called a panhellenic assembly at the zenith of their power in the mid-fifth century that failed to materialize (the so-called Congress decree), but the authenticity of this “decree” has been rightly questioned (see note 52).

¹²⁴ The observation is not new and is frequently cited against both Hobsbawm and indeed the presentist (or constructivist/inventionist/politics-of-memory) school of memory theory he represents (see, for example, Schudson 1989, A. Smith 1991: 16, Confino 1997: 1393–97, Beiner 2001: 6, Misztal 2003: 60, and Samuel 2012: 16–17). To be fair, however, Hobsbawm was not unaware that invented traditions succeed only to the extent that they are accepted by the broader populace (1983b: 263 and 307), but this concession did not receive sufficient emphasis, particularly in his much-cited introduction to the concept (1983a). Ranger, who co-edited *The Invention of Tradition* with Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), later explored the need for a subtler understanding of the interaction between the inventors and consumers of invented tradition in a later publication (1993). It should be noted, however, that Hobsbawm and Ranger's more sensitive treatments, as well as those of their detractors, are interested in the reception and reaction of subaltern groups. For the ancient period, we have almost no information for such reception (see the

[Introduction](#), pp. 22–23). Here we are obliged to restrict ourselves to reception by privileged groups outside of Macedonia.

¹²⁵ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 10–12.

¹²⁶ It is perhaps tempting to assume that the destruction of the arch-Medizer Thebes was part of a propaganda campaign long in the planning. [Wallace 2011](#): 149–50 and [Kremmydas 2013](#): 202 in particular come perilously close to this conclusion. But it is worth stressing that our sources agree that Alexander had planned to be lenient (Diod. 17.9.1–4, Arr. *Anab.* 1.7.7–11, Plut. *Alex.* 11.7, and Just. 11.3.6; [Goukowsky 1976](#): 172 and [Squillace 2011b](#): 316), just as he had been a year before when Thebes revolted after the assassination of Philip (Diod. 17.3.4; see also Justin 11.2.4). His initial hope must have been to see the Thebans serving in his expedition, along with the other Medizing states who were now part of the restored Hellenic League.

¹²⁷ [Jehne 1994](#): 202 and [Faraguna 2003](#): 103–104.

¹²⁸ [Beck 2010](#): 69.

¹²⁹ This is the position of Thucydides's Theban speakers at the trial of the Plataeans in Book 3. They claim that Thebes had been under the tyrannical domination of a narrow cabal of elites (3.62.2–3; [Beck 2010](#): 69). Herodotus gives us reason to conclude that this argument had some currency, as he has one of the Theban ringleaders state before the assembled Thebans that “we Medized not as individuals, but as part of the community” (9.87.2, tr. Purvis). The assertion is not presented as a controversial one, and the Thebans go on to accept his advice as “sound and timely.” The episode seems almost designed to rebut just such a claim as Thucydides will later put into the mouths of his Theban speakers ([Demand 1982](#): 25–26; see also [Flower and Marincola 2002](#): 258 and [Asheri et al. 2006](#): 296).

¹³⁰ A strident defense of Thebes's actions during Xerxes's invasion appears in Plutarch's *On the Malice of Herodotus* (864e–867b) and seems to derive from the local historian Aristophanes of Boeotia (*FGrHist* 379; [Beck 2010](#): 69). There the Thebans are praised for contributing to Tempe and particularly Thermopylae, where only they and the Thespians remained to fight with Leonidas. Plutarch rejects Herodotus's claim that the Thebans were reluctant participants and betrayed the Spartans at the earliest opportunity (7.222 and 233). Later Medism is not ignored, but explained as the unavoidable consequence of the Greek loss at Thermopylae. This version of events finds some support in Diodorus/Ephorus, who notes that the Thebans who fought at Thermopylae were “from the other party” (11.4.7) and so presumably loyal to the Greek cause. We might also consider Herodotus's insistence that Mardonius had not cut down trees in Theban territory because of any hostility toward Thebes (9.15.2) and conjecture that this was an attempt to counter claims that the Thebans had indeed remained hostile to the Persians even after the Medism of some ([Demand 1982](#): 24).

¹³¹ This extraordinary recollection of the Persian War is attributed to Pelopidas, who was then attempting to win Persian support for Thebes (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.34 with [Buckler and Beck 2008](#): 160–61).

¹³² [Raaflaub 2004](#): 58–67 and 84–89, who, however, rightly stresses that these early expressions of freedom and slavery would not have meant the same thing as they would come to mean in later generations (see esp. 2004: 65–67).

¹³³ [Prandi 1976](#); see also [Raaflaub 2004](#): 193–202 and [Dmitriev 2011](#): 15–24.

¹³⁴ See also Thuc. 2.72.1 with [Jung 2006](#): 286.

¹³⁵ See [Jung 2006](#): 286–89 for more on the Persian-War memory advanced by the Thebans on his occasion.

¹³⁶ For the uses of the slogan of freedom down to Chaeronea, see [Dmitriev 2011](#): 15–66.

¹³⁷ See [Buckler and Beck 2008](#): 252 and [Dmitriev 2011](#): 91–92 on this

announcement and its political resonance.

¹³⁸ Faraguna 2003: 102, Squillace 2004b: 62–64 and 2010: 76, Dmitriev 2011: 96, Wallace 2011: 149–50, and Lehmann 2015: 47–48.

¹³⁹ See also Arr. *Anab.* 1.18–1.2; for more on the political and legal realities of Alexander's claim to free the Greeks under Persian rule, see Badian 1966, Seibert 1972: 85–92, Bosworth 1988: 250–58, Nawotka 2003a and 2003c, and Carlsson 2010: 81–84; for the origin and evolution of this concept as applied particularly to the Greeks living in Asia, see Seager and Tuplin 1980.

¹⁴⁰ Curtius records that Alexander had earlier called his Macedonians the liberators of the entire world before the battle of Issus (3.10.5). For more on the role of freedom in Alexander's actions after Gaugamela, see Poddighe 2009: 116 and Lehmann 2015: 53–57.

¹⁴¹ For more on the relative importance of freedom in Macedonian propaganda, see Seager 1981: 106–107, Jehne 1994: 161–65, Seibert 1998: 16–18, and Nawotka 2003c: 68–69.

¹⁴² Squillace 2004b: 62–64 does not strictly distinguish between the two motives (revenge and freedom), treating them rather as inherent in each other.

¹⁴³ It is not clear if the slogan of freedom was also cited as a cause of the war at the meeting of the Hellenic League at Corinth (M. Austin 1993: 201, Seibert 1998: 17, Flower 1999: 419, and Zahrt 2006: 161 n.40), but if so, the silence of our sources would suggest that it was overshadowed by the theme of revenge on that occasion (see p. 207).

¹⁴⁴ See Lehmann 2015: 50, who here attributes this bit of propaganda to the Persians, but in this case it seems clear that the Thebans were drawing on their own traditions.

¹⁴⁵ Faraguna 2003: 103–104; see also Jehne 1994: 202.

¹⁴⁶ Diodorus is very clear here, saying that Alexander assembled the councilors of the Greeks (τοὺς δὲ συνέδρους τῶν Ἑλληνῶν) to meet in the common council (τῷ κοινῷ συνεδρίῳ); Bosworth 1980: 90 doubts that Diodorus actually means this and suggests that he was prone to use this terminology casually, citing Heuß 1938: 178, but see pp. 207–209 against this conclusion.

¹⁴⁷ Most combine Arrian and Diodorus, concluding that Alexander did call a meeting of the Hellenic League, but that only the delegates of those allies who took part in the battle attended what was in effect a rump meeting of the league's council (Wilcken 1967: 73, J. Hamilton 1969: 30–31, Lane Fox 1973: 88, Gullath 1982: 84 n.3, Green 1991b: 147, Wallace 2011: 150, and Worthington 2014: 133). Hammond 1997: 47–48, however, favors Diodorus, while Bosworth 1980: 89–90 and 1988: 195–96 and Yardley and Heckel 1997: 94 take Arrian's account to mean that he presented it as an ad hoc meeting of the allied contingents present. Justin and Plutarch also mention the meeting, but shed no light on its nature. Justin notes only that the debate occurred *in concilio* (11.3.8); Plutarch mentions the complaints of the allies after the sack of the city, but never clarifies the venue of those complaints (Alex. 11.11).

¹⁴⁸ Arrian discusses the charges earlier in his own voice in the context of the sack of Thebes (*Anab.* 1.9.6–8), but it seems clear that he has taken the substance of what he reports there from the received tradition about the debate among the allies (Bosworth 1980: 84–85). His subsequent discussion of the debate is much shorter and makes no mention of individual states (1.9.9), though he does attribute to the Phocians, Plataeans, and “the other Boeotians” a particularly violent role in the sack of the city (1.8.8). For more on Arrian's treatment of the sack of Thebes, see Prandi 1990b.

¹⁴⁹ Just. 11.3.8–11; see also Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.7 and Diod. 17.14.2. For the importance of the Persian War in this decision, see Bosworth 1980: 88–89 and 1988:

195–96, [Green 1991b](#): 147, [Jehne 1994](#): 203, [Heckel 1997](#): 192, [Flower 2000a](#): 96, [Squillace 2004b](#): 124–26 and 2011b: 316–17, [Poddighe 2009](#): 108, [Worthington 2010](#): 243–44 and 2014: 133, and [Wallace 2011](#): 151–52. [Monti 2012](#) and [Wallace 2011](#): 151 suggest that Alexander may have made particular use of the so-called Oath of Plataea on this occasion.

¹⁵⁰ The point is made explicitly by Diodorus (17.14.4) and Arrian (*Anab.* 1.9.9) and is implied by Justin (11.3.8–11.4.8), who focuses on the complaints of those local states with a grudge against Thebes. Plutarch, however, presents the destruction of Thebes as the will of Alexander, who is principally interested in terrorizing the other Greeks and only secondarily attempting to gratify his allies in the region (*Alex.* 11.11). For more on the disagreement of our sources on this point, see [Squillace 2011b](#): 316–18.

¹⁵¹ J. [Hamilton 1973](#): 50, [Dobesch 1975](#): 81, [Bosworth 1980](#): 90 and 1988: 196, [Prandi 1990b](#): 85, [Green 1991b](#): 147, and [Worthington 2003b](#): 68 and 2010: 244.

¹⁵² [Ryder 1965](#): 103, [Wilcken 1967](#): 72, and [Hammond 1997](#): 47; according to Dinarchus, the Thebans expressly denied that they had any wish to disturb the common peace (likely the King's Peace), but only to topple Macedonian hegemony (1.19).

¹⁵³ [Bosworth 1980](#): 90 and 1988: 195–96 and [Squillace 2004b](#): 129.

¹⁵⁴ For a similar reading of Alexander's motives, see [Wallace 2011](#): 151.

¹⁵⁵ Diodorus suggests that the Spartans contemplated action against Macedonia after Philip's assassination (17.3.3–5), and Arrian attributes to Alexander himself a fear that Sparta might join the revolt (*Anab.* 1.7.4), but [Cartledge and Spawforth 1989](#): 19 are quite right to note that hostilities between Sparta and Thebes would have made coordinated action unlikely.

¹⁵⁶ For a discussion of Spartan activities prior to the declaration of war on Macedonia, see [Badian 1967](#): 170–80, [Neothlichs 1987](#): 396–400, [Bosworth 1988](#): 198–201, [Cartledge and Spawforth 1989](#): 20–21, and [Jehne 1994](#): 226–27.

¹⁵⁷ The exact date of the war is much debated, but it almost certainly began in the spring or summer of 331 and ended either later that same year or in the spring of 330. For our purposes, the ending is more relevant (see p. 239). Although [Lock 1972](#) concludes that our best evidence excludes neither possibility, most have settled on one or the other. For an early ending in 331, see [Badian 1967](#): 190–92, [Borza 1971](#), and [Bloedow 1995b](#): 24–25; for a later ending in 330, see [Cawkwell 1969](#): 170–71, [Bosworth 1975](#): 38–41 and 1988: 200 n.14, [Jehne 1994](#): 227–31, and [Morrison 2001](#): 35. [Badian 1994b](#): 272–77 later recanted his support for an early ending and concluded that the war must have ended in 330.

¹⁵⁸ See also Just. 12.1.6 and Curt. 6.1.8. A contemporary Athenian orator (perhaps Hyperides) hints at that same slogan when he advises the Athenians to join the war, asking “will you actually wait for some other season to claim your freedom and the freedom of all the Greeks” (τῆς ιδίας ἐλευθερίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ἀντιλαβέσθαι: [Dem] 17.9, tr. Vince modified); see also [Poddighe 2009](#): 114.

¹⁵⁹ See pp. 231–32.

¹⁶⁰ [Flower 2000a](#): 130–31; for a detailed study of the attitudes of the individual Peloponnesian states to Agis's war, see [McQueen 1978](#).

¹⁶¹ See also [Bosworth 1980](#): 50–51 and 1988: 198 on Sparta's refusal to acquiesce to Macedonian hegemony on this occasion.

¹⁶² [Cartledge 2013](#): 135; see also [Chapter 1](#), pp. 42–45. The list at Olympia would have carried much the same message (see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 66–67). We might add here that the accounts of the embassies to Argos and Gelon in Herodotus evince a deep interest in questions of hegemony and feature Spartan ambassadors prominently (7.148–163). In the case of the Gelon embassy, the Spartan ambassador, Syagros, is

named three times (7.153.1, 7.159, and 7.160.1). None of this guarantees that Herodotus was here following a Spartan source, but if he did, it would supply additional support to the conclusion that questions of hegemony held a prominent place in the collective memory of the war at Sparta.

¹⁶³ For the Aegospotami monument, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 129–31.

¹⁶⁴ For more on the treatment of the Persian War in Isocrates's *Panegyricus*, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 88–92.

¹⁶⁵ For the importance of ancestry (real or fictive) to the production and maintenance of memory, see [E. Zerubavel 2003](#): 55–81 and [Cubitt 2007](#): 200.

¹⁶⁶ For the inscription, see pp. 218–20. This may not have been the first slight against Sparta in the new tradition. If [Bosworth 1971](#) is correct and the Congress decree was a product of Macedonian propaganda, it would have served much the same purpose as the condemnation of Sparta in the Granicus dedication since there too the Spartans emerge as the saboteurs of Greek unity (1971: 614). [Holloway 1980](#): 58–59 also suggests that the prominent place enjoyed by Heracles on Alexander's silver coinage may have hinted that the mantel of Spartan leadership in the Persian War (represented by the Heraclid ancestry of their kings) had now been taken up by another Heraclid dynasty, the Temenids of Macedonia.

¹⁶⁷ See [J. Hamilton 1973](#): 58, [Lane Fox 1973](#): 123–24, [Flower 1999](#): 423 and 2000a: 110, and [Monti 2009](#): 39–53. [Will 1983](#): 56 n.55 further speculates that the exact number of panoplies dedicated on this occasion—300—was intended to evoke the memory of Thermopylae and the extent to which Sparta had fallen from its glory days (see also [Wallace 2011](#): 152, [Kremmydas 2013](#): 204, and [Worthington 2014](#): 150). Something similar may have been intended with the conspicuous honors to Plataea, whose safety Sparta had sacrificed during the Peloponnesian War ([Wilcken 1967](#): 138 and [Hammond 1997](#): 111; see also pp. 222–24).

¹⁶⁸ [Badian 1967](#); see also [Morrison 2001](#), [Squillace 2004b](#): 130–38, and [Heckel 2009](#): 37–41.

¹⁶⁹ Arrian here suggests that Alexander immediately returned the war booty, most notably the statues of the Athenian Tyrannicides. Later, however, he states that Alexander dispatched the statues and other war booty upon his return to Babylon from the east (7.19.2). The only other source that bears on this contradiction, Pliny the Elder, implies that the statues were not given back until Persia had been conquered (*victa Perside Atheniensibus remisit Magnus Alexander*: 34.70), but his brief notice should not be pressed too far. Some have simply assumed that the return of the booty did occur at Susa ([Badian 1967](#): 188 and [Green 1991b](#): 308–309) and others ([Brunnsåker 1971](#): 44–45, [J. Hamilton 1973](#): 177 n.11, and [Gafforini 1989](#): 19) have rightly observed that Arrian is more guarded about his claim in the second instance (note the use of λέγεται). The later date does, however, have its supporters as well (see, for example, [Squillace 2004b](#): 133 and [Azoulay 2017](#): 117–20). A further complication is raised by the fact that two other sources, Pausanias (1.8.5) and Valerius Maximus (2.10 ext. 1), attribute the restoration to an unspecified Antiochus and Seleucus, respectively. This raises the possibility that Alexander merely promised to return the statues, a promise that was not carried out until later ([Bosworth 1980](#): 317 and [Lehmann 2015](#): 57 n.55). There is also the possibility that one or more of the Seleucids subsequently claimed Alexander's original act as their doing (see [Gafforini 1989](#): 20–23). [Moggi 1973](#), followed by [Habicht 1989](#): 7–8 and 1997: 13, goes further still, suggesting that the initial theft by Xerxes was invented to justify the return of statues that were then fabricated for the occasion, but see [Rathmann 2010](#): 58–59 n.12 and [Azoulay 2017](#): 202 n.52 against this suggestion. For our present purposes it does not greatly matter if Xerxes did steal the statues or even who returned them (genuine or otherwise), only that Alexander publicized some such promise at this point ([Rathmann 2010](#): 58).

¹⁷⁰ It is possible that Sparta had already been defeated by this point (see [note 157](#)), but Alexander could not yet have known about it and so here acted to support the propaganda campaign designed to retain the loyalty of his Greek allies.

¹⁷¹ [Lane Fox 1973](#): 254, [Zahrnt 2006](#): 161, and [Kremmydas 2013](#): 206. A similar tone was struck by two stories that Plutarch associates with the capture of the Persian heartland: Alexander's reflections on a fallen statue of Xerxes (*Alex.* 37.5) and the comments of Demaratus the Corinthian (37.7; see p. 240)

¹⁷² For a discussion of the sources, see [Brunt 1976b](#): 514–17 and [Lehmann 2015](#): 58–66; for the archaeological evidence, see [Hammond 1992](#), [Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993](#), and [Lehmann 2015](#): 66–67.

¹⁷³ The young king had, in fact, shown himself conspicuously respectful of local customs and obliging to conquered foes (see [Bosworth 1988](#): 229–41).

¹⁷⁴ [Badian 1967](#) and [1994b](#) argues that Alexander was here motivated by a desire to secure Greek loyalty in the face of Agis's revolt (see also [Bosworth 1988](#): 92–94, [Hammond 1992](#): 362, 1993: 74, and 1997: 115, [Flower 1999](#): 421, and [Worthington 2014](#): 206), but his is certainly not the only explanation; see [Bloedow 1995b](#): 29–37 for an extensive discussion of earlier solutions and 1995b: 40 for his own; see also [Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993](#): 185, [Fredricksmeyer 2000](#): 148–50, [Brosius 2003](#): 183–84, [Nawotka 2003b](#), and [Faraguna 2003](#): 115.

¹⁷⁵ For the unanimity of our sources, see [Borza 1972](#): 244, [Bellen 1974](#): 60–63, [Goukowsky 1976](#): 223, [Bosworth 1980](#): 331, [Hammond 1993](#): 74, [Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993](#): 179, [Atkinson 1994](#): 124, [Flower 2000a](#): 115, [Fredricksmeyer 2000](#): 148, [Morrison 2001](#): 32, [Faraguna 2003](#): 115, [Nawotka 2003b](#): 70, [Bridges 2015](#): 120, and [Rung 2016](#): 167. [Bloedow 1995b](#): 35 categorically rejects the notion that Persian-War propaganda played any role in the decision to burn Persepolis, but he severely underestimates the importance of this propaganda to Alexander generally. It should also be noted that the buildings that bore the brunt of the fire were indeed associated with Xerxes ([Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1993](#): 182, [Morrison 2001](#): 42, and [Lehmann 2015](#): 67), which would lend credence to the possibility that the Macedonians were motivated by considerations of vengeance whether acting from premeditation or otherwise.

¹⁷⁶ Strabo too suggests that Alexander burned Persepolis as a calculated act of vengeance (15.3.6).

¹⁷⁷ [Rung 2016](#): 166–67.

¹⁷⁸ There is good reason to doubt the historicity of the episode (see [Balcer 1978](#): 120–21, [Hammond 1992](#): 361, [Worthington 2014](#): 206, and [Lehmann 2015](#): 68), and even those who accept it, generally combine it with Arrian and conclude that Alexander had already planned to destroy the palace or at the very least had seriously considered the matter in advance ([Badian 1967](#): 187, [Borza 1972](#): 233–35, [Bellen 1974](#): 61–63, [Bosworth 1988](#): 93, [Atkinson 1994](#): 121–22, [Fredricksmeyer 2000](#): 149–50, [Morrison 2001](#): 42–44, and [Nawotka 2003b](#): 72–73); see, however, J. [Hamilton 1969](#): 101 and 1973: 88–89, [Lane Fox 1973](#): 261–64, and [Bloedow 1995b](#) for casual vandalism as the principal motive.

¹⁷⁹ [Bellen 1974](#): 61. Curtius records that Alexander explained to his officers that “no city was more mischievous to the Greeks than the seat of the ancient kings of Persia; it was from there that those huge armies had been poured into their country, from there first Darius, then Xerxes, had made godless war upon Europe; by its destruction they ought to offer sacrifice to the spirits of their forefathers” (5.6.1, tr. Rolfe; [Lehmann 2015](#): 60). Diodorus assigns a similar attitude to Alexander who “felt bitter enmity to the inhabitants” (17.71.3) and describes the city to his Macedonian soldiers as “the most hateful of the cities of Asia” (17.70.1, tr. Welles). In all of these cases, Alexander has the city of Persepolis, rather than the palace complex, in mind, but if these accounts accurately reflect Alexander's public

statements at the time, it is easy to see how his drinking companions would have come upon the arguments to persuade the king.

¹⁸⁰ Diodorus (17.72.6) and Curtius (5.7.8–9) also refer to the Persian War when they summarize the fate of the city in their authorial voices.

¹⁸¹ For the date of Agis's defeat at Megalopolis, see [note 157](#). Consensus opinion holds that the palace was burned toward the end of Alexander's four-month stay ([Badian 1967](#): 186–89 and 1994b: 281–85, [J. Hamilton 1969](#): 99, [Fredricksmeier 2000](#): 148, [Nawotka 2003b](#): 68, and [Worthington 2014](#): 205), but see [Wirth 1971](#): 621 against such a long stay and [Hammond 1992](#) for the possibility that the palace was destroyed almost immediately. [Bloedow and Loube 1997](#), however, offer a rebuttal of the latter. For the uncertain variables that are used to calculate the likely speed of communication between Europe and Alexander, see [Badian 1967](#): 187–90 and 1994a: 285–89, [Wirth 1971](#): 630–31 and 1993: 217–22, [Borza 1972](#): 238–42, and [Morrison 2001](#): 34–37.

¹⁸² That Alexander may have had his own troops principally in mind here, see [Morrison 2001](#).

¹⁸³ *Contra* [Bloedow 1995b](#): 34; see pp. 245–46 for the reaction of Thespieae.

¹⁸⁴ [Wilcken 1967](#): 144–45, [Bellen 1974](#): 63, [Dobesch 1975](#): 110–11, [Flower 2000a](#): 113–14, [Brosius 2003](#): 184–85, [Faraguna 2003](#): 115, [Squillace 2004a](#): 230, and [Heckel 2009](#): 40; Diodorus reflects on this very point (17.72.6).

¹⁸⁵ Plutarch brings out this negative reading of the same anecdote more forcefully in his *Agesilaus* (15.2–3; see also [J. Hamilton 1969](#): 99).

¹⁸⁶ Callisthenes's denial or perhaps omission of the Peace of Callias, which (genuine or not) was by now certainly part of the Athenian tradition, may have been intended to have much the same effect ([Eddy 1970](#): 12 and [Bosworth 1990](#)); see also [Zaccarini 2017b](#): 304–306 for a broader parallel between Cimon and Alexander in Callisthenes.

¹⁸⁷ Lycurgus also implies that the Macedonians were on the verge of re-enacting the impieties of Xerxes after Chaeronea (8), and [Mari 2003](#): 83 has rightly noted that such an implication would align the Macedonians, now leading the fight to avenge those earlier impieties, with the Persians of old.

¹⁸⁸ See [Chapter 4](#), pp. 163–64.

¹⁸⁹ For more on the presentation of Alexander I generally, see [Chapter 2](#), pp. 93–97 and [Chapter 3](#), pp. 110–13.

¹⁹⁰ [Mitchel 1965](#): 199 concludes that it “reads like a sermon on patriotism” (see also [Hintzen-Bohlen 1996](#): 100, [Mari 2003](#): 83, [Lambert 2010](#): 225–26, and [Kremmydas 2013](#): 209).

¹⁹¹ See Demosthenes (18.204–205, 208; and 50.10–11), Aeschines (see pp. 246–47), Hyperides (see pp. 243–44), and even Dinarchus (1.37) with [Kremmydas 2013](#): 209–11; see also [Mari 2003](#) for the imputation of barbaric impiety to the Macedonians and their supporters in the works of Demosthenes, Hyperides, and Lycurgus generally.

¹⁹² For the justification of the Lamian War as a fight for freedom, see [Ashton 1984](#): 154, [Lehmann 1988](#), [Dmitriev 2011](#): 107, and [Wallace 2014](#): 605.

¹⁹³ [Flower 2000a](#): 130. The idea of Greece as a common homeland was not, however, new to Athens. Isocrates had imputed the same notion to the Athenians and Spartans of old in his *Panegyricus* (4.81) and had more recently urged Philip to act on this assumption as well (5.127).

¹⁹⁴ For more on the uses to which this declaration was put by Diodorus's source, Hieronymus of Cardia, see [Lehmann 1988](#): 133–34.

¹⁹⁵ See [Lehmann 1988](#): 131 n.22 for the connection between this emphasis on Athenian naval achievements in the Persian War and current preparations for the Lamian War.

196 Green 1996b: 26.

197 See Chapter 5, pp. 177–80.

198 Green 1996b: 26; for more on Greek attitudes toward Macedonian ethnicity, see also Badian 1982, Mari 2003, and Hunt 2010: 80–84. This was hardly the first time that Athenians had intimated that the Macedonian threat was akin to the Persian one of old. Demosthenes certainly makes the connection when he compares the fate of those accepting money from Persia then and Macedonia now (9.36–39). For more on the uses Athens made of the Persian War in the earlier fight with Philip, see M. Austin 1993: 201 with earlier bibliography; for a possible connection between these lines of attack and Macedonia's Medism, see Chapter 3, p. 112 n.68.

199 Worthington 2000: 95 and Herrman 2009: 23.

200 Hyperides is here following a time-honored tradition at Athens (see, for example, Lys. 2.30–32 and Isoc. 4.92). Herrman 2009: 84, pointing to Lycurg. 108, suggests rather a reference to Marathon, but the location of the present battle would have almost certainly prompted thoughts of Thermopylae as well.

201 See also Herrman 2009: 104.

202 For more on the conventions of the Athenian funerary oration, see Chapter 2, p. 92 n.148.

203 Green 2003: 2.

204 See Chapter 3, pp. 128–29 n.148 for a discussion of this holiday and its possible connection to the anniversary of the battle of Salamis.

205 As Boedeker 2007 has shown, Eleusinian Demeter was associated with a number of the Greek victories over Persia, but the coincidence that this was Salamis Day suggests that Plutarch's Athenians had that battle foremost in mind.

206 Simpson 1959: 387–88, Ryder 1965: 109, and Dixon 2007: 156.

207 It is difficult to know what Alexander himself ultimately thought of the efficacy of his earlier propaganda campaign, but if the Exiles' decree is any indication, he too may have begun to have misgivings. For more on the Exiles' decree and its implications for the member states of the Hellenic League, see Bosworth 1988: 220–28.

208 See pp. 224–25.

209 Here too it is likely that Macedonian patronage had contributed to the resurgence of the town after years of Theban domination, but the details are less clear than in the case of Plataea (see Snodgrass 2016).

210 Bellen 1974: 62 and Flower 2000a: 115. Nawotka 2003b: 71 doubts a reference to Persepolis is intended, but that is frankly difficult to accept given the notoriety of that event.

211 Lane Fox 1973: 93.

212 The conflation of past and present Persian kings, which Aeschines uses here to link the two wars, was itself not a product of Macedonian propaganda, however, and can be found in other surviving speeches (see Llewellyn-Jones 2012: 323–24 and Bridges 2015: 100–112).

213 For more on these epigrams, see Chapter 1, p. 51 n.93.

214 For more on the Stoa Poikile, see Chapter 3, pp. 126–27.

215 Demosthenes's treacherous acceptance of Persian money appears prominently elsewhere in the speech (3.156, 3.173, and 3.238–40).

216 We might, of course, suppose that reference to “those who died . . . at Plataea” implies a larger, panhellenic dimension, but the immediate context makes it almost certain that Aeschines is here thinking only of the Athenian dead.

217 See Brunt 1965: 206 for a similar observation.

218 For indications of transcendent panhellenism before Philip and Alexander, see Chapter 2.

219 See note 124.

After Alexander

Introduction

Within two years of Alexander's death, the elaborate Persian-War tradition invented by his father at Corinth lay in ruins. But that tradition and the transcendent panhellenism that stood behind it lived on and would soon reshape the way the Persian War was recalled throughout the Greek world. The driving force behind this long-term success was the new regime of power relationships that Philip and Alexander's victories had ushered into existence. The battle of Chaeronea had not simply marked the defeat of this or that polis. Rather, the battle had dealt a devastating, ultimately fatal blow to the city-state as a consequential player on the international stage. Alexander's subsequent conquests had materially altered the balance of power. Across the old Persian Empire, Alexander's generals carved out massive kingdoms, many now vying with Macedonia for influence over mainland Greece and the Aegean. Within Greece, new political organizations, like the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, rose to power. The old states of Greece survived, but they would never again wield the kind of power they had commanded before Chaeronea. A panhellenic memory of the Persian War that transcended those states better suited the new realities of this much broader, hellenistic world.

The rich history of the Persian-War tradition in this period could easily justify a full length chapter, but the focus of this book is the classical period to the end of the Lamian War. Consequently, I provide here only a brief look ahead, to survey the long-term impact of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition as it was variously adopted and adapted down to the beginning of the second century bce, when the arrival of the Romans introduced yet another significant change to the tradition. I limit myself here to nine examples. Since I am attempting to show the broad impact of the new panhellenic tradition, and not its evolution over time, I have organized these commemorations by dedicating party, not chronologically. I begin with the successor kings,

then turn to the states and leagues with little or no historical connection to the Persian War, and finally end with those states that had a strong preexisting social memory of the war.

The Successor Kings

Despite the failure of Alexander's Persian-War propaganda, the new tradition still presented distinct advantages to his would-be successors, who were themselves eager to exploit the storied conflict in pursuit of their own ambitions. It is easy to see why. At the most basic level, the new tradition afforded access to a group of political newcomers who otherwise had no preexisting Persian-War tradition to call upon. This was, in essence, to use Philip and Alexander's invented tradition exactly as they had. But for the successor kings, the new tradition offered additional advantages. By imitating Philip and Alexander's commemorations, they could additionally draw a direct connection to the Macedonian monarchs whose achievements had brought their dynasties to power.¹ Three Persian-War recollections bring out this trend: the insertion of Antigonos I and his son Demetrius I into two Athenian monuments at Delphi; the speech of Lyciscus at Sparta on behalf of Philip V; and finally, the erection of a statue group by Attalus I on the Athenian Acropolis. In each case, not only was the Persian War itself recalled, but so too were Philip and Alexander's Persian-War commemorations.

Antigonos I and his son Demetrius I devoted significant energies to securing their influence over mainland Greece in the decades after Alexander's death. These efforts culminated in the restoration of the Hellenic League at Corinth in 302, an act that was surely intended to recall the original Hellenic League against Xerxes, as well as Philip and Alexander's more recent restoration.² While this commemoration fits the pattern I hope to sketch for the successor kings in the following, I focus here on a connection forged between the Antigonids and the Athenian tradition of the Persian War a few years before. After liberating Athens from Cassander in 307/6, Antigonos and Demetrius were given a unique honor by the Athenian demos. Two new tribes were created within the Athenian state and were named after the dynasts. The Athenians also undertook the additional expense of inserting statues of them into two monuments at Delphi that featured the ten original eponymous tribal heroes—a statue group attached to the Athenian treasury and another located near the entrance of the sanctuary.³ On the surface, these changes were intended to commemorate the honors voted to the Antigonids, but both monuments were themselves commemorations of the Athenian

victory at Marathon.⁴ The group located near the entrance even boasted a statue of Miltiades. The effect was striking and, given the Antigonids' later attempt to associate themselves with the Persian War at Corinth, surely no accident.⁵ At Delphi, Antigonos and Demetrios now stood shoulder-to-shoulder with Miltiades and the other Athenian heroes who had (metaphorically) defended Greece from foreign invasion. Antigonid power was here literally inserted into Athens's Persian-War past, which in turn served to thrust both monuments into the contemporary *milieu de mémoire*.⁶ The free use made of the Athenian tradition on behalf of the Antigonids can at first glance seem quite unexceptional. Indeed, the centrality of Athens within the overall Persian-War tradition is often assumed.⁷ But it is important to remember that it was Philip and Alexander who had first popularized the use of that tradition outside of Athens and had further put it at the disposal of non-Athenians.⁸

Almost a hundred years later, Philip V, the king of Macedonia and a descendant of Antigonos, seems to have had the outline of his namesake's planned ethnic war against the barbarians very much in mind when he sought to use the Persian War as a call to arms against Rome during the First Macedonian War.⁹ A speech in Polybios captures the tone.¹⁰ In 210 Lyciscus the Acarnanian arrived in Sparta to convince the erstwhile superpower to join Macedonia against the Aetolians and their Roman allies. He begins by recounting Macedonia's long-standing defense of Greece against the barbarians (9.33–35).¹¹ Alexander's war of revenge against Persia is cited prominently, which is very much in line with earlier Macedonian propaganda: "he inflicted punishments on the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks" (9.34.2, tr. Paton). Lyciscus then comes to the crux of his argument. The present war was no longer a war between Greeks. Rome, a barbarian outsider, was now attempting to take advantage (9.37).¹² The Persian War is evoked to drive the point home to the Spartans:

All Greeks, therefore, should foresee the approaching storm and especially the Spartans. For why do you think it was, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, at the time when Xerxes sent you an envoy demanding water and earth, thrust the stranger into the well and heaped earth upon him, and bade him announce to Xerxes that he had received what was demanded, water and earth? Or why did Leonidas and his men march forth of their own will to meet certain death? Surely it was to show that they were risking their lives not for their own freedom alone, but for that of the other Greeks. (Polyb. 9.38.1–4, tr. Paton modified)

The murder of Xerxes's messengers and the heroic stand of Leonidas at Thermopylae are cited specifically to remind the Spartans of their duty in the face of foreign invasion. They also serve to bring the Romans into parallel with the Persians.¹³ For Polybios's Lyciscus,

likely reflecting the larger propaganda of Philip V,¹⁴ the Persian War of old is to be reified as a new ethnic war between Greeks and barbarians.¹⁵

This rendition of the Persian War has a Spartan ring, but Lyciscus is not interested in Sparta's parochial tradition of the war. He immediately follows his laudation of Sparta's past by concluding, tongue-in-cheek,

It very well becomes you, the descendants of such men, to make an alliance now with barbarians, to take the field with them and make war on the Epirots, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, and Thessalians, in fact with almost all the Greeks except the Aetolians. (Polyb. 9.38.5, tr. Paton)

The appeal to panhellenism is obvious, but ironically almost none of the other Greeks here listed actually fought with the Spartans against Persia. That inconvenient fact presents no problem for Lyciscus, who goes on to erase Medism from the Persian War entirely. He remarks that a Roman alliance would be a shame for a people who

decreed that when you had conquered the barbarians, the Thebans were to pay a tithe to the gods for having decided under compulsion, but alone among the Greeks, to remain neutral during the Persian invasion. (9.39.5, tr. Paton)

The received tradition undergoes significant revision here.¹⁶ It remained open for debate if Thebes had in fact been compelled to defect.¹⁷ In any event, they were certainly not the only ones to do so. Lyciscus even attempts to exculpate this one wayward Greek state of any active collusion with the barbarians by characterizing their Medism as neutrality. This was not the Spartan memory of the war, nor does it reflect the state-centered panhellenism of the Serpent Column or Isocrates. The Persian War and Sparta's particular role within it have here been recast as an ethnic war that places (almost) all Greeks on the right side of history, much as Philip and Alexander had done in the lead-up to their invasion of Persia.

About a decade later, one of Philip V's opponents in the First Macedonian War, Attalus I of Pergamum, chose to celebrate his rising influence by connecting his own achievements to the glories of the Persian War. He erected four bronze statue groups on the Acropolis in Athens (Paus. 1.25.2).¹⁸ The groups were modeled in part on the Stoa Poikile.¹⁹ The Stoa contained four paintings that represented the historical Athenian battles of Marathon and Oenoe, along with the mythological sack of Troy and the Amazonomachy.²⁰ Attalus's monument also contained four scenes, two historical and two mythological. Marathon and the Amazonomachy were retained. Instead of the sack of Troy, the Gigantomachy was figured.²¹ More notable for our purposes, the enigmatic battle of Oenoe was replaced

by Attalus's own victory over the Gauls at the Caicus River in ca. 237. That victory had the distinct advantage of presenting Attalus as a defender of hellenism against barbarism and thus was very much in the spirit of Athens's classical tradition.²² But the substitution of the Caicus scene served to reframe that struggle significantly. In the Stoa Poikile, Marathon had been placed among three other Athenian victories; now it was paired with a foreign one.²³ Athens's glorious past is here nationalized by being rendered a Greek victory over barbarism, rather than an Athenian one.²⁴ The technique of approaching the glories of the Persian War through Athens was frequently used by Philip and Alexander,²⁵ but it is tempting to see an even more explicit reference in this case. By placing his monument on the Acropolis, Attalus may have intended to evoke (and outdo) the panoplies dedicated by Alexander after his victory over the barbarians at the Granicus.²⁶ Indeed, if anything of the Granicus dedication remained on the Acropolis to this time, Attalus may have erected his monument in sight of it.²⁷

The tradition invented by Philip and Alexander had opened the Persian War to a wider audience by selectively exploiting elements of the old parochial narratives within a panhellenic paradigm that expressly transcended the horizons of the city-states. It had also closely associated that war with their own more recent achievements. Both proved advantageous to the hellenistic kings, and in the preceding examples we see them commemorating the Persian War in ways that recalled their great predecessors. The insertion of Antigonus and Demetrius into the Athenian tradition (as well as their decision to restore the Hellenic League at Corinth) evoked earlier Persian-War commemorations by both Philip and Alexander. So too did Lyciscus's attempts to make the Persian War a precedent for an ethnic war by papering over the divisive nature of the earlier conflict with the rhetoric of transcendent panhellenism. Attalus may have had Alexander's Granicus monument specifically in mind when, like Antigonus, he coupled his victory to the Athenian tradition. It would seem that the heirs to Philip and Alexander's empire also saw themselves as the heirs to their Persian-War tradition.

The New Powers of Old Greece

Our second group of commemorating parties are the new powers of the mainland and the Aegean basin, specifically the Aetolian League, the Achaean League, and Rhodes. Strictly speaking, none of these political entities existed in anything like their hellenistic form at the time of the Persian War. So, like the successor kings, they had no

obvious claim on the memory of that war. They were, however, much less likely to look to the legacy of Alexander the Great as an additional source of legitimacy. That fact did not stop them from exploiting the transcendent panhellenism that stood behind his invented tradition, to cast themselves as the metaphorical inheritors of that great “Greek” victory as well. In the following I consider three commemorations that took advantage of this broader understanding of the Persian War: the golden shields dedicated at Delphi by the Aetolians; the theatrical arrival of Philopoemen at the Nemean Games; and finally, a recollection of the Peace of Callias by the Rhodians.

When in 278 the Aetolians wished to associate their victory over the Gauls at Delphi with the earlier defeat of the Persians, they felt no need to brandish their own Persian-War tradition (which they did not have), nor did they show any particular regard for Alexander’s invented tradition. At Delphi the Aetolians dedicated a set of golden shields and attached them to the southern and western metopes of the temple of Apollo (Paus. 10.19.4).²⁸ A reference to the golden shields dedicated by the Athenians and mounted on the eastern and northern metopes of the same temple in honor of their victory over Persia would have been hard to miss.²⁹ The connection was further reinforced by the style of shields represented in the Aetolian dedication. Pausanias feels it necessary to clarify that, although the shields dedicated by the Aetolians were actually Gallic (Γαλατῶν δὴ ὄπλα), their appearance was much closer to the Persian wicker shields (σχήμα δὲ αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐγγυτάτω τῶν Περσικῶν γέρρων). The message was clear. The Aetolians were continuing the work begun by the Athenians.³⁰ The commemoration had the desired effect. Even so hostile a source as Polybius could not help but mention the Aetolian defense of Delphi in the same breath with the Persian War (2.35.7).³¹ The freedom the Aetolians felt to co-opt the Persian-War past to ennoble their recent achievements indicates how far the tradition had slipped from the proprietary control of those states that had fought the war.

At the end of the third century the Achaean general Philopoemen felt similarly free to appropriate the Persian War for his own purposes. A year after defeating the Spartan tyrant Machanidas at Mantinea in 206, Philopoemen arrived in Argos to much fanfare.³² He had come to celebrate the Nemean Games and, of course, to advertise the Achaean League’s new ascendancy in Peloponnesian affairs.³³ Philopoemen, accompanied by the flower of his hoplite elite, entered the theater just as a performance of Timotheus’s laudatory poem about the victory at Salamis began: “Fashioning for Greece the great and glorious ornament of freedom” (tr. Campbell).³⁴ Philopoemen’s arrival at this precise moment was hardly the accident Plutarch himself claims

(κατὰ τύχην: *Phil.* 11.2); this was high political theater.³⁵ Plutarch goes on to describe the scene. The crowd immediately turned its eyes to the general.³⁶ A cheer broke out, and “in their hopes the Greeks were recovering their ancient dignity, and in their courage they were making the nearest approach to their former spirit” (*Phil.* 11.3, tr. Perrin modified). Philopoemen was not claiming any personal or political connection to the events of Salamis, save that it was a famous Greek victory.³⁷ The Achaean League’s fifth-century antecedent remained neutral during the Persian War, and Philopoemen’s Megalopolis did not even exist at the time. The audience shared Philopoemen’s disinterest in such parochial details. According to Plutarch, their thoughts fly to a restoration of Greece’s former reputation. It is easy to miss the logical leap whereby people whose ancestors or states did not actually fight in a war can take up again (ἀναλαμβάνοντων) the courage and glory it represented. Indeed, it is a singular irony that the setting for these reflections was Nemea, the one crown sanctuary that could boast no known Persian-War monuments, likely because of the conspicuous neutrality (some would have said Medism) of Argos.³⁸ Moreover, neither the commemorative act nor even Plutarch’s much later treatment of it acknowledges the additional irony that Philopoemen is here prompted to take up the mantle of the Persian War by the defeat of Sparta, the hegemon of the actual fight against Xerxes. As with the Aetolians, this was a recollection of the war that was Greek first and Athenian or Spartan a very distant second.³⁹

Almost ten years after Philopoemen’s theatrical entry into the Nemean Games, the Rhodians were compelled to address the westward expansion of Antiochus III and did so by citing the Persian-War tradition. Rhodes did not exist as a single political entity at the time of the Persian War. Nevertheless, one of its constituent towns, Lindus, did have a Persian-War tradition of its own, a story of divine aid in the heroic defense of the town beset by superior Persian forces.⁴⁰ But the Rhodians did not turn to local traditions in their present situation. Rather, Livy tells us that they cited the Peace of Callias that had brought the Delian-League campaign against Persia to an end, warning Antiochus “not to pass beyond Chelidoniae.”⁴¹ He then adds parenthetically that Chelidoniae was “a promontory in Cilicia famous for the treaty concluded in days of old between Athens and the kings of Persia” (33.20.2, tr. Yardley). This is an authorial insertion, but the link between that location and the treaty was long-standing in Athenian tradition and surely was not lost on the Rhodian ambassadors.⁴² The recollection is not, however, evocative of Philip and Alexander. Despite their extensive use of Athenian local tradition, the Peace of Callias played no role in their propaganda, and

understandably so. The Peace had allegedly ended the war with Persia, and the Macedonian dynasts were eager to present the Persian War as unfinished business.⁴³ For the Rhodians, however, this piece of Persian-War memory was perfectly suited to their present needs. It turned a static matter of geography into a powerful comment on Antiochus's westward expansion.⁴⁴ The Rhodians claimed that they were acting on behalf of the Roman liberation of Greece (33.20.3).⁴⁵ By calling on Antiochus to recognize a boundary once imposed on the Persians, the Rhodians were casting him as a potential threat to Greek freedom—indeed as its arch-enemy.⁴⁶ In so doing, the Rhodians, like the Aetolians and Achaeans before them, deployed the Persian War as a part of Greek history that any Greek could use.

In each of the three preceding examples, the commemorating party recalled the Persian War neither on the strength of their own local traditions nor by evoking the specific acts of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition. Nevertheless, the influence of that tradition is manifest. At the core of these commemorations stands the transcendent panhellenism that the Macedonians had used to reorganize the Persian War into an event that was Greek first and only incidentally parochial. The ease with which these parties took advantage of the broader lines of what had begun as a piece of Macedonian propaganda should come as no surprise, however.⁴⁷ In contrast to the many local traditions of the classical period, Philip and Alexander presupposed (or rather invented) a Persian War that belonged neither to Macedonia nor to its ruling dynasty. They had opened the Persian War to a much larger audience that no longer needed to justify its use with details or bona fides. Simply being Greek was now enough to imagine oneself (or one's political community) as the lineal descendent of the "Greeks" who fought the Persians. The Aetolians, Achaeans, and Rhodians took full advantage as they used the Persian-War tradition to position their newfound power and influence within the much older political and commemorative landscape of Greece.

The Participating States

To this point our survey has focused on states, leagues, and kingdoms that had no direct or easy access to the Persian-War past. It was natural that there, if anywhere, the tradition invented by Philip and Alexander would have a discernable impact, as it opened this valuable piece of commemorative property to the Greeks generally. But the impact of their invented tradition was also felt among the states that actually had fought against the Persians so long ago. As we saw in

[Chapter 6](#), the initial reaction of these states had been broadly hostile. Their local traditions continued to be circulated throughout the hellenistic period and beyond. But these traditions did not survive in a commemorative vacuum. In the following I consider three roughly contemporary recollections of the Persian War, all likely connected to the efforts of Ptolemy II to assert his influence over the Aegean basin in the mid-third century. I begin with the so-called Themistocles decree from Troezen, then the Chremonides decree from Athens, and finally return to the Plataean rituals examined earlier in connection with Alexander the Great. These three examples show the range of possible reactions and interactions between the preexisting parochial traditions and the commemorative innovations that had been introduced after Chaeronea and then repurposed by the leading powers of the hellenistic period.

If we look at the text of the Themistocles decree, which was inscribed at the order of the Troezenians in the mid-third century (ML 23),^{[48](#)} we see the familiar lines of the state-centered paradigm of the classical period reproduced here in the hellenistic. This decree purports to be a copy of the motion proposed by Themistocles and passed by the Athenians in preparation for Xerxes's invasion (ln. 1–3). The decree calls for a series of measures, the most important of which for our purposes is an order for the evacuation of Attica: women and children to Troezen, the elderly and movable property to Salamis (ln. 6–11). The authenticity of the inscription has caused much debate, but for our present purposes the question is irrelevant.^{[49](#)} What matters here is that the Troezenians opted to commemorate it over two hundred years later. The original provenance of the decree is unknown, but it was likely associated with a Persian-War monument noted by Pausanias in the agora of Troezen:^{[50](#)}

Under a portico in the marketplace are set up women; both they and their children are of stone. They are the women and children whom the Athenians gave to the Troezenians to be kept safe when they had resolved to evacuate Athens and not to await the attack of the Persians by land. (2.31.7, tr. Jones)

The focus of the monument and indeed the inscription it likely housed is centered on the participating states. It recalls a specific benefaction undertaken by the Troezenians on behalf of the Athenians. Details—the statues and the decree—are supplied to advance the claim. In addition to naming Troezen, the decree also singles out the Spartans, Corinthians, and perhaps the Aeginetans for special credit, along with the Athenians (ln. 16–17). The Greeks generally are mentioned only once as the party whose freedom the Athenians and the other allies hope to defend (ln. 14–16).^{[51](#)} The decree's adherence to the norms of the classical tradition is in fact so thoroughgoing that it has long been

thought a genuine decree of the Persian-War era or at least a product of the mid-fourth century.⁵² We might, of course, point to the decree's focus on Athens as an indication of its hellenistic origin, but in this case that focus fits fully within Troezen's parochial claim to have benefited that state during the war. The monument must have served a contemporary function, and Noel Robertson has argued that much here is intended to imply a flattering comparison between the earlier fight against Persia and Ptolemy II's present fight against Antigonid Macedonia.⁵³ However that may be, the means the Troezenians used to advance their present needs was very much a throwback to the classical period.

Our second example comes from nearby Athens. In the 260s the Athenian Chremonides moved a resolution confirming a perpetual alliance with Sparta in support of Ptolemy II against Macedonia.⁵⁴ The resulting war would bear his name, the Chremonidean War. The decree begins with a sizable recapitulation of the events of the Persian War:

Previously the Athenians, Spartans, and allies of each concluded a common friendship and alliance, competed in many glorious contests with one another against those attempting to enslave their cities, and from this acquired honor for themselves and provided freedom to the other Greeks. (*IG II² 686/7.7–13 = Syll³ 434/5: 7–13*)

At the most basic level, these prefatory comments align the current fight against Macedonia with the earlier fight against Xerxes.⁵⁵ As in the case of the Themistocles decree, much here is evocative of the classical tradition. The home state of Athens still plays a prominent role, and the unit of conceptual measure remains the polis. But now Athens shares center stage with Sparta and the other allied states. This large collective makes common cause against the enemy and thus gains glory for itself and provides freedom to the rest of the Greeks. The role conceded to the Spartans and the other allies is immediately striking. While the credit goes to those who specifically fought against the Persians (not the Greeks generally), this is not the kind of Persian War that appears in the Athenian monuments of the fifth century or in the various orations of the fourth. Athenocentrism is significantly moderated—and that in an Athenian decree. True, the purpose of this decree is to confirm a foreign alliance, and in that circumstance a broader view of the Persian War is appropriate, but we should keep in mind that Isocrates had much the same purpose when writing his *Panegyricus* and that did not stop him from producing a patently Athenocentric account.⁵⁶ More to our present point, Diodorus records a similar decree moved on the eve of the Lamian War, and there too Athenocentrism prevails.⁵⁷ This is not to imply that purely parochial

traditions were not still maintained at Athens—far from it. Indeed, their influence is manifestly visible here. But the mere fact that an Athenian decree mentions Persian-War allies at all, let alone gives them an equal share of the credit, suggests that by the mid-third century Alexander's emphasis on larger frames of recollection was becoming a force even in this bastion of the old tradition.

Our final example, the Glaucon decree, comes from Plataea and will already be familiar from our examination of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition.⁵⁸ The decree was passed after the defeat of Ptolemy's anti-Macedonian alliance in the Chremonidean War.⁵⁹ It honors Glaucon the Athenian, the brother of the previously mentioned Chremonides and a past benefactor of the Persian-War rituals that occurred at Plataea. A direct connection between Glaucon's benefactions and Ptolemy's anti-Macedonian alliance is almost certain.⁶⁰ In [Chapter 6](#), we used this decree to extrapolate the likely state of those rituals some sixty years before. Now I consider briefly its implications for our understanding of Plataean local tradition in the hellenistic period. Of course, the decree itself is not particularly telling in this regard since it was passed by an international body, not the Plataeans (ln. 30–31). But the rituals mentioned in it did take place at Plataea, and it is difficult to imagine that they could have been maintained without the acquiescence, indeed the active support, of the Plataeans themselves.⁶¹ To recapitulate briefly, these rituals were panhellenic in composition and outlook. The games and cults emphasized the broad themes of unity and freedom. Individual participants and their respective merits were largely ignored.⁶² Rather, the war remembered there was fought by the Greeks generally, as the (later?) inscription on the altar of Zeus Eleutherios would proclaim. Even the management of the festivities was yielded to an international body. As I concluded earlier, the new rituals recorded in the Glaucon decree (and elsewhere) are so evocative of Philip and Alexander's invented tradition that they were likely initiated under their influence. If so, then the Plataeans would appear to have maintained those rituals, even as Macedonian interest in and control over the site waned.⁶³ We should not, however, assume that the Plataeans recalled their older, classical rituals as distinct from their present ones, which were likely introduced as a restoration of long-standing practice.⁶⁴ When they later placed these same rituals in the service of Ptolemy's anti-Macedonian league, they would have seen them as Plataean, not Macedonian, and so would have missed the irony of using Macedonian propaganda against its inventors.⁶⁵ Contemporary Plataean perceptions notwithstanding, the Persian War recalled in hellenistic Plataea owed much more to Philip and Alexander than to the state-centered traditions of the classical

period.⁶⁶

It is clear from our three examples that the tradition invented by Philip and Alexander did have an impact on those states with preexisting social memories of the war. That said, it did not replace those memories. At Troezen, Athens, and likely elsewhere, the Greeks whose states had fought the Persians continued to remember the war from a parochial perspective. This is hardly surprising. As we saw in [Chapter 5](#), preexisting social memories have a significant impact on the ways in which the past is likely to be recalled. But there was more going on here than the conservative tendencies of collective memory. New commemorations of the Persian War continued to be made. Such recollections had an internal audience surely, but as each of the preceding examples demonstrate, they were also used to forge international connections within the wider hellenistic world. Nor was Ptolemy II the only interested party. Others, like Antigonus, Demetrius, and Attalus, were eager to sharpen their own adaptations of the Persian War with specific references to the glorious past. In such an environment, there were distinct advantages to meeting that demand.⁶⁷ Parochial traditions remained valuable and could be used to advance the present needs of those who could call upon them. Nevertheless, we should not imagine that the participating states became *lieux de mémoire*, museums of parochial tradition effectively isolated from evolving networks of power in mainland Greece and beyond. Rather, our examples show that they adapted, they evolved.⁶⁸ The parochial survived, but as part of a vibrant *milieu de mémoire* dominated now by the transcendent panhellenism that stood behind Philip and Alexander's invented tradition.

Conclusion

By the end of the third century, a new power was emerging onto the political and commemorative landscape of mainland Greece. The efforts of the Roman Republic, its generals, and supporters to adapt the Persian War to suit their own ends represented another paradigm shift in the Persian-War tradition that was easily the equal of that introduced by Philip and Alexander almost a century and a half before. The Macedonian dynasts had intended to broaden to all ethnic Greeks (themselves included) a memory previously “owned” by those who could claim to have fought the Persians. Their success in this regard far exceeded the political aims that their propaganda had been originally designed to advance. The Temenid dynasty had collapsed and Alexander's empire along with it, but the Persian War they invented continued to influence commemoration, even in those states

that had long cherished their own parochial narratives of the war. The entry of Rome into mainland Greece and their decision to align themselves with the grand Persian-War tradition required yet another expansion of the community of those who could properly “remember” the war. Once the property of those who fought the war, then of ethnic Greeks, the Persian War was soon to become a prized “memory” of the West against the East, the effects of which still remain with us today. It is worth noting, however, that the Roman general Flamininus (like others before him) chose Isthmia as the stage for his own piece of Persian-War propaganda, in large part because of Philip’s decision to restore the Hellenic League at nearby Corinth.⁶⁹ The Persian-War tradition that emerges from our Roman sources is quite different from the one we have examined in the preceding and would continue to evolve through the centuries, but its initial formulation in the early second century still owed much to the inventions of Philip and Alexander.

All of this is to move beyond the limited aim of the present chapter, which is to demonstrate the impact of Philip and Alexander on the commemoration of the Persian War before the arrival of the Romans. Our survey has been brief. The nine examples considered in this chapter represent only a small portion of the surviving Persian-War commemorations from that period, and each could bear more extensive analysis than appears here. But I hope that some overall trends have nonetheless become clear. The successor kings had every reason to recall the Persian War in much the same way as Philip and Alexander had done in their propaganda, and our examples suggest that they did. The new powers of mainland Greece, eager to align themselves with the glories of the Persian War, took full advantage of the transcendent panhellenism inherent in Philip’s invented tradition to do so. The reaction of those states with their own preexisting social memories of the Persian War was more complex. New ideas about the Persian-War past had an impact, but parochial commemorations remained quite strong.

The overall state of the Persian-War tradition in the early hellenistic period is therefore quite similar to that posited by Jung for the early classical. He argues for two planes of memory in the years after the Persian War, a local one centered on the city-states and another devoted to a panhellenism that transcended those states.⁷⁰ I have argued that the political realities of the classical period militated against any such panhellenic plane, but those realities were overturned at the battle of Chaeronea. Macedonia and then the kings and leagues of the hellenistic period supplied the critical mass needed to support a new, broader community of memory that exceeded the grasp of the old city-states, and it is that community, beginning with

Philip in 337, that sustained a truly panhellenic paradigm for recalling the Persian War. The relationship between this paradigm and the older state-centered one was contentious during the reign of Alexander, but appears significantly less so in the hellenistic period. The city-states of old Greece no longer had the kind of power to insist on a recollection of the Persian War that excluded all outsiders in the classical sense.⁷¹ There was also a profitable market for select elements of the old parochial traditions that Athens and others were happy to supply. Our few examples point to two paradigms that interacted and evolved together throughout the early hellenistic period, but it seems clear that the dominant narrative was now thoroughly panhellenic.

Finally, we should note the increasing influence of the Athenian tradition. Antigonos, Demetrius, Ptolemy, and Attalus sought an explicit connection. The Aetolians and the Rhodian ambassadors added (by accident or design) a markedly Athenians flavor to their own co-optations.⁷² Even at Troezen, Athens looms large, though here for reasons that have more to do with Troezen than Athens. This kind of influence is often assumed in the classical period, but as we have seen, the Athenian tradition, however well attested in our surviving evidence, was at that time restricted to Athens. There were exceptions, of course, but by and large our evidence confirms the impression we gain from Herodotus, that outside of Athens, Athenian claims (and the memories that supported them) were viewed with suspicion.⁷³ This suspicion did not end with Philip and Alexander. Despite their extensive use of Athenian social memories, they and their contemporaries could still recall those same memories with marked incredulity.⁷⁴ To the extent that these memories were understood as Athenian and so part of an alien tradition, such doubts represented nothing new in the memory of the Persian War.⁷⁵ But it seems clear from this chapter and the previous one that the Athenian tradition was increasingly being viewed as synonymous with the Persian-War tradition generally. To this extent, these doubts may have begun to create in the minds of those who harbored them a sufficient sense of incredulity toward what was now part of their shared Persian-War legacy that we may very well be able to speak of true *lieux de mémoire*.⁷⁶

¹ Dixon 2007: 154; for the continued popularity of Philip and Alexander among the successors and the Macedonian rank-and-file in the years after Alexander's death, see Meeus 2009.

² For more on the propaganda surrounding Demetrius's restoration of the Hellenic League, see Ferguson 1948: 112, Simpson 1959: 396–97, Billows 1990: 172–73, Dixon 2007: 175–77, and Dmitriev 2011: 132–33.

³ For more on these monuments in the classical period, see Chapter 3, pp. 120–24.

The details and date of the alterations are difficult to recover. The statue group near the entrance is almost completely lost. Pausanias suggests that the Athenians were compelled to erect the statues (10.10.2), but since this is almost certainly a conjecture based on the later hostility between the Athenians and Antigonids, it tells us nothing about the date. The remains of the base of the statue group attached to the Athenian treasury survives and so its changes can be traced archaeologically. The addition of Antigonos and Demetrius falls between 290 and 245, with most suggesting a date of 246 to coincide with successes against the Gauls ([Jacquemin 1999](#): 229–30 and [Neer 2004](#): 66 n.11), but a closer connection with the interests of the Antigonids—Demetrius I in the earliest years of this range or Antigonos II after the recapture of the city in the wake of the Chremonidean War—seems preferable. Demetrius's treaty with the Aetolians concerning access to the sanctuary in 289 is particularly tempting (for the treaty, see [Lefèvre 1998](#)). It must remain an open question whether the changes to the other statue group occurred at the same time or (as is often assumed) at the time the honors were granted ([Bommelaer 1991](#): 111, [Hintzen-Bohlen 1992](#): 209, [Krumeich 1997](#): 101, and [Brogan 2003](#): 197).

⁴ See [Chapter 3](#), p. 121.

⁵ [Hintzen-Bohlen 1992](#): 45 and [Brogan 2003](#): 197.

⁶ For *milieu de mémoire* and its relationship to *lieu de mémoire* see [Introduction](#), pp. 18–19.

⁷ See the [Introduction](#), p. 5.

⁸ *Contra* [Jung 2006](#): 203–204, who argues that the Marathon tradition remained a local Athenian phenomenon throughout the hellenistic period. He concedes that parties outside Athens knew its importance within Athens, but only Attalus I (2006: 171–72) and possibly Antigonos II (2006: 173 n.11) are cited as having made any attempt to co-opt the victory for their own purposes. For the limited uses made of the Athenian tradition outside of Athens in the classical period, see [Chapter 6](#), p. 212 n.51.

⁹ For more on the connection that Philip V hoped to forge between himself and Philip II, see [Walbank 1942](#), [1943](#), and [1944](#); see especially 1943: 9–10 n.9 regarding the invasion of Persia.

¹⁰ For the basic historicity of the speech, see [Walbank 1967a](#): 88 n.1 and 1967b: 163, [Wooten 1974](#): 240, and [Usher 2009](#): 495 n.10; *contra* [Schmitt 1957/58](#): 39–40.

¹¹ [Champion 2000](#): 433–34, [Usher 2009](#): 498–99, and [Overtom 2013](#): 579.

¹² [Wooten 1974](#): 240, [Champion 2000](#): 434 and 2004: 55–56, [Usher 2009](#): 500, and [Dmitriev 2011](#): 327.

¹³ [Wooten 1974](#): 240 and [Derrow 2003](#): 55–56.

¹⁴ The continued equivalence between Rome and Persia in Macedonian propaganda is suggested by Plutarch. In the *Flamininus*, he claims that before the battle of Cynoscephalae the Macedonian rank and file hoped to prove Philip V a better general than Alexander the Great by defeating the Romans, whom they considered a worthier foe than the Persians of old (7.3).

¹⁵ [Wooten 1974](#): 250–51 points out several parallels between this speech and Demosthenes's *Third Philippic* within a larger argument for the influence of Demosthenes on hellenistic oratory, and while the influence of the Attic orators (Demosthenes in particular) on later oratory cannot be denied, the larger historical context suggests that this model has here been used to draw a parallel with Philip and Alexander's war against the Persians, not Demosthenes's war against the Macedonians. For the influence of Thucydides here as well, see [Usher 2009](#): 494–502.

¹⁶ [Walbank 1967b](#): 181–82; [Usher 2009](#): 501 adds that the title Lyciscus refers to here was never collected.

¹⁷ See [Chapter 6](#), pp. 230–32 for the Theban appraisal.

¹⁸ For more on their precise location, see [Stewart 2004](#): 181–98. The date of this monument is uncertain since Pausanias does not specify which Attalus dedicated the statues, Attalus I (241–197) or Attalus II (158–138). The balance of evidence favors the later years of Attalus I's reign, specifically 200–197 ([Stewart 2004](#): 218–20 and 222–23), but see [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 234–44 in favor of Attalus II. For the extensive bibliography on the question, see also [Bringmann et al. 1995](#): 66–68.

¹⁹ E. [Hansen 1971](#): 312, [Stewart 2004](#): 200, and [Papini 2016](#): 43.

²⁰ For more on the Stoa Poikile, see [Chapter 3](#), pp. 126–27.

²¹ The Gigantomachy was a natural choice. It appeared on the nearby Parthenon where it had long been used to prefigure the Athenian victory over the Persians (see [Chapter 5](#), p. 177). For more on the connection between the Attalid statue groups and the iconography of the Parthenon, see [Pollitt 1986](#): 93, [Bringmann et al. 1995](#): 68, [Hurwit 1999](#): 271, [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 129–30, [Stewart 2004](#): 200, and [Papini 2016](#): 43.

²² For this connection to the Athenian tradition, see E. [Hansen 1971](#): 59 and 312, [Stewart 1979](#): 20–21, [Pollitt 1986](#): 93–95, [Habicht 1990](#): 576, [Bringmann et al. 1995](#): 68, [Hurwit 1999](#): 271, [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 239–41, [Gehrke 2003](#): 25 (= 2007: 103), [S. Mitchell 2003](#): 287, [Whitaker 2005](#): 165, [Jung 2006](#): 171–73, and [Priestley 2014](#): 159–60. [Stewart 2004](#): 223–26 argues that the Caicus scene (along with the others) was intended to prefigure Philip V, whose cruelty during the war had done much to undercut his earlier attempts to position himself as a defender of Greece against the barbarous Romans (see also [Queyrel 1989](#): 281–82).

²³ Of course, neither the sack of Troy pictured in the Stoa Poikile nor the Gigantomachy featured by Attalus were, strictly speaking, Athenian victories, but see [Chapter 5](#), p. 177 for their close association with the Persian War at Athens.

²⁴ [Stewart 2004](#): 200. For the use of the word “nationalize” in this context, see [Chapter 6](#), p. 213 n.54.

²⁵ For the possibility that Attalus had the earlier Antigonid monuments in mind here, see [Brogan 2003](#): 203. Even in that case, however, it would be hard to conclude that he was not also looking past the Antigonids to Philip and Alexander, especially given the antipathy of the Athenians toward the Antigonids at this time ([Habicht 1997](#): 197).

²⁶ [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 232, [Rathmann 2010](#): 78, and [Papini 2016](#): 42–43.

²⁷ It has been suggested that some of the shields from this dedication were attached to the eastern architraves of the Parthenon and so immediately below the metopes depicting the Gigantomachy ([Hurwit 1999](#): 254 and [Rathmann 2010](#): 57), which, given the prominence of the Gigantomachy in Attalus's dedication, would have reinforced the connection between the monuments, but this all remains highly speculative ([Bringmann et al. 1995](#): 18, [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 89–90, and [Hoff 2003](#): 173–74; see also [Chapter 6](#), p. 218 n.77).

²⁸ See also [Syll.³ 398.9–10](#) and [Callim. Hymn 4.171–87](#); [Bommelaer 1991](#): 180.

²⁹ [Nachtergaele 1977](#): 197, [Amandry 1978](#): 580, [Jacquemin 1985](#): 29, [Schalles 1985](#): 107, [Hintzen-Bohlen 1992](#): 63, [Grainger 1999](#): 104, [Schmidt-Dounas 2000](#): 189, [S. Mitchell 2003](#): 282, [Bayliss 2011](#): 196, and [Priestley 2014](#): 159. Of course, we immediately think of Aeschines's spirited defense of these shields in 339 (3.116), but when Pausanias mentions these shields, he associates them with the battle of Marathon (10.19.4). He may have been mistaken, but it is also possible that the shields were rededicated at some point. For more on the afterlife of these shields, see [Parke 1939](#), [Gauer 1968](#): 26–27, [Bommelaer and Bommelaer 1983](#): 30 n.23, [Hintzen-Bohlen 1992](#): 52 and 63 n.442, [Habicht 1997](#): 93, [Dreyer 1999](#): 129–30, [Jacquemin 1999](#): 58 n.159, [Kuhn 2006](#): 278, and [Mari 2013](#): 129 n.22. If shields from Alexander's Granicus dedication had indeed been attached to the Parthenon (see [note 27](#)), then we might posit a more direct connection with Alexander's

invented tradition in this case, but given the conjectural nature of that proposition, it is a difficult point to press.

³⁰ Bayliss 2011: 198 goes further and suggests that the shields may have also been intended to outdo the Athenians, whose leadership against the Gauls at Thermopylae had ended in defeat.

³¹ Champion 1996. It should be noted that although Polybius here mentions the defeat of the Gauls and clearly has the Aetolian victory in mind, he does not expressly mention the Aetolians (Champion 1996: 328 and 2007: 360).

³² For a discussion of the date, see Errington: 1969: 250 and Schrott 2014: 368.

³³ For the contemporary political context, see Walbank 1943: 9 and Errington 1969: 76. For more on Plutarch's presentation of Philopoemen's arrival at the Nemean Games and its narrative connection to Flamininus's famous proclamation of freedom for the Greeks at the Isthmian Games, see Swain 1988: 336 and 342, J. J. Walsh 1992: 212–18, and Pelling 2002: 243–47.

³⁴ For more on the fragment and its immediate context within the poem, see Hordern 2002: 127–29; for more on the poem in its original political context (that of the late fifth century), see van Minnen 1997. I would, however, caution against van Minnen's conclusion that "Timotheus deliberately spoke of 'Greeks' in their struggle against the Persians, not of the Athenians as the representatives of an individual city state" (1997: 257; see also Bridges 2015: 42–43). While it is true that the surviving portions of the poem do not mention an individual city-state, too much of the work has been lost to press that point with confidence (Hordern 2002: 15–17; see also Garland 2017: 121–22). We should note that the initial line requires a singular subject to do the fashioning (τεύχων). Hordern 2002: 128 suggests the Athenian demos. This is only an educated guess, but it amply demonstrates the dangers of extrapolation from what little survives.

³⁵ Pausanias also suggests that Philopoemen's presence at this moment was an accident (8.50.3), but his version is so close to Plutarch's that he is likely using the same source, who may have tried to avoid portraying Philopoemen as a crass opportunist.

³⁶ Plutarch claims that something quite similar happened to Themistocles when he arrived at the Olympic Games after Salamis (*Them.* 17.2). The similarity was certainly not lost on Pausanias (8.50.3)—or his source?—who explicitly compares the two incidents.

³⁷ Schrott 2014: 371–72 reads the recollection of the Persian War here in much the same way, except that he follows Plutarch and assumes that Philopoemen's arrival at that moment was indeed a coincidence.

³⁸ For Nemea's failure to receive a dedication from the Hellenic League, see Nielsen 2007; for the rumors surrounding Argive neutrality during the Persian War, see Chapter 3, pp. 125–26.

³⁹ The connection drawn between the Persian War and the defeat of Sparta in this case raises the possibility that the posthumous monument erected at Delphi to honor Philopoemen was intended to draw added meaning from the nearby Marathon statue group (not to mention the Aegospotami monument and that of the Arcadian League as well). For this final possibility, see Jacquemin 1999: 259. If so, then we could conclude that the power of this site of memory at Delphi continued to attract commemorations well into the hellenistic period (see Chapter 3, pp. 119–33). Unfortunately, nothing except the placement of the monument commends this possibility, and so it must remain a conjecture. For more on the monument, see Pouilloux and Roux 1963: 37–40, Daux 1966, Roux 1969: 29–36, Bommelear 1991: 106, Hintzen-Bohlen 1992: 164–65, and Jacquemin, Mulliez, and Rougemont 2012: 274–75.

⁴⁰ For more on this episode, see Higbie 2003: 42–47 and 141–47.

⁴¹ The historicity of the Peace of Callias has been variously debated (see, for example, [Meiggs 1972](#): 487–95, [Walsh 1981](#), and [Badian 1993](#): 1–72). For our present purposes, however, it only matters that by this point it had long been recalled as the treaty that brought the Athenian war against Persia to a successful conclusion ([W. Thompson 1981](#)).

⁴² It is, of course, possible that the Rhodians had maintained a parochial memory of the treaty, to which Lindus and the other towns of Rhodes had been party as members of the Delian League. But if the Rhodian ambassadors made such a connection, Livy retains no indication of it. Indeed, his thoughts fly to Athens, and the same is likely true of his source, Polybius, who here seems to depend ultimately on a Rhodian source ([Briscoe 1973](#): 286 and [Mastrocinque 1977/78](#): 12).

⁴³ See also [Chapter 6](#), p. 240 n.186.

⁴⁴ It is important to note that the choice of Chelidoniae was not imposed by present circumstances. Livy tells us that the messengers reached Antiochus while he was besieging Coracesium (33.20.4) which is over 140 kilometers from Chelidoniae, located on the other side of the Pamphylian Sea. If the envoys had simply wanted to halt Antiochus's progress, this was an odd demand to make. For a discussion of the interplay between such geographic points and memory, see [Said 2000](#): 180.

⁴⁵ [Gruen 1984](#): 539–40.

⁴⁶ [Mastrocinque 1977/78](#): 12 and 1983: 123–24 and [Russo 2014](#): 318. The Romans would eagerly take up this piece of propaganda when they confronted Antiochus in the following years (see [Russo 2013](#) and [2014](#) with earlier bibliography).

⁴⁷ For a parallel, see [Chapter 6](#), p. 226 n.116.

⁴⁸ For the date and location of the inscription, see [Dow 1962](#); see also [Robertson 1982](#): 12 and [Johansson 2001](#): 69–70.

⁴⁹ See, for example, [Jameson 1960](#), [Chambers 1962](#) and [1967](#), [Hignett 1963](#): 458–68, [Fornara 1967b](#), [Meiggs and Lewis 1969](#): 48–52, [Mattingly 1981](#), and [Johansson 2001](#).

⁵⁰ For more on the provenance of the decree, see [Robertson 1982](#): 12–13.

⁵¹ The phrase in question reads: ἀμύ/νεσ[θαί] τ[ὸ]μ βάρβαρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε ἑαυ/τῶν [καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων]. It should be noted that the word “Greeks” appears in a bracket, but the conjecture is a strong one nonetheless.

⁵² See [note 49](#) for more on this possibility.

⁵³ [Robertson 1982](#) (see also [Mattingly 1981](#): 84–86 and [Wallace 2011](#): 171 n.82); for a brief critique of Robertson, see [Johansson 2001](#): 69 n.6.

⁵⁴ The exact date of the decree is debated (see [Dreyer 1999](#): 286–341 and [O’Neil 2008](#): 68–71 with earlier bibliography).

⁵⁵ [Heinen 1972](#): 118, [Habicht 1992](#): 72 and 1997: 144, [Jung 2006](#): 312–14, [O’Neil 2008](#): 66, and [Bayliss 2011](#): 109–10. [Heinen 1972](#): 138 and [Erskine 1990](#): 91 underestimate the continued importance of such Persian-War references at this time.

⁵⁶ See [Chapter 2](#), pp. 88–92.

⁵⁷ See [Chapter 6](#), pp. 242–43. [Dreyer 1999](#): 249 rightly notes that Athens was much weaker at the outbreak of the Chremonidean War than it had been during the Lamian War, a fact that doubtless commended a more panhellenic view of the Persian War to the Athenians in this case.

⁵⁸ See [Chapter 6](#), pp. 224–27.

⁵⁹ For a discussion of the likely date and circumstances under which the decree was passed, see [Jung 2006](#): 302–306 with earlier bibliography.

⁶⁰ [Étienne and Piérart 1975](#): 68–71, [Habicht 1997](#): 156, [Dreyer 1999](#): 249–50, [Jung 2006](#): 311–15, [Marquaille 2008](#): 57, and [Wallace 2011](#): 161.

⁶¹ [Schachter 1994](#): 132 concludes that despite the obvious authority of the

“common council of the Greeks” in the administration of the festivities noted in the Glaucon decree, the day-to-day operation likely remained under the managements of the Plataeans (see also [Nafissi 1995](#): 129–30; *contra* [Jung 2006](#): 308–309).

⁶² It is certainly possible that by the time of the Chremonidean War, Sparta and Athens featured prominently within the festivities and commemorations ([Wallace 2011](#): 162–63; see [Jung 2006](#): 338–39 for Athens alone), but the evidence for this is not particularly strong. The Chremonides decree does emphasize the contribution of those states to the Persian-War generally (see p. 262), but it is notable that the Glaucon decree does not. A ritualized debate between the two states, the *dialogos*, was associated with the Freedom Games, but it seems to have developed in the second century bce ([Robertson 1986](#); see also [Schachter 1994](#): 137 and [Jung 2006](#): 351–60). Pausanias saw separate tombs for the Athenians and Spartans at the battle site, but we cannot be sure that they were recognized as such at the time since the site was certainly reorganized at some point after the classical period and may have continued to evolve over the centuries between the restoration of the town by Philip and Pausanias’s day (see [Chapter 2](#), p. 79). We might say the same of the role Aristeides plays in the institution of the rituals in Plutarch’s biography (see [Chapter 6](#), p. 227 n.121). It does, of course, stand to reason that Sparta and Athens would emerge within the collective remembrance of the battle, but the balance of our evidence for the mid-third century suggests that their exploits were framed within a thoroughly panhellenic paradigm.

⁶³ [Wallace 2011](#): 160–64.

⁶⁴ That, at least, is the implication of the later tradition in Plutarch’s *Aristeides* (21.1) and would, moreover, be characteristic of invented traditions, ancient and modern (see [Chapter 6](#), pp. 204–205).

⁶⁵ [Wallace 2011](#): 163 leaves open the question of whether the “re-appropriation” of the pro-Macedonian inventions at Plataea during the Chremonidean War was “conscious or not.”

⁶⁶ This is all to assume that these rituals were indeed invented at the time of Philip and Alexander, but even if we opted for a later date, as Jung and others have argued (see [Chapter 6](#), p. 224 n.108), we would still have to conclude that the rituals subsequently emerging at Plataea were strongly influenced by Philip and Alexander’s invented tradition.

⁶⁷ As [Hölscher 2010](#): 130 underscores in the case of Athens.

⁶⁸ For the dynamic adaptation of invented traditions by those upon whom they are imposed, see Ranger [1993](#) and [1999](#), who explores the question in the context of post-colonial Africa.

⁶⁹ See [Dmitriev 2011](#): 180, [Gebhard 2011](#): 62–63, and [Pettegrew 2016](#): 96 along with [Chapter 6](#), pp. 209–210 where the novelty of Philip’s decision to emphasize Corinth and the Hellenic League is discussed.

⁷⁰ For more on Jung’s argument, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 6–7.

⁷¹ [Mari 2003](#): 92 makes a similar observation about the fourth-century practice of accusing Macedonians and pro-Macedonians of impiety. As relations with the various Macedonian successor kingdoms became more complex, the Athenians had to draw subtler distinctions between pious and impious Macedonians.

⁷² Philopoemen may have had Athens in mind when he positioned himself and the Achaean League generally as the heir of Salamis, but this cannot be pressed since the battle was not universally recognized as an Athenian achievement (see [Chapter 6](#), p. 218 n.76).

⁷³ *Contra* [Starr 1962](#): 330–32 who sees the victory of the Athenian version won already in the fourth century.

⁷⁴ See, for example, [Chapter 6](#), p. 240; we might also consider Theopompus here, who devoted significant attention to the Athenians’ inflated claims about their own

past in Book 25 of his *Philippica* (Connor 1968: 77–98, Shrimpton 1991: 79–82, and Flower 1994: 160; see also Squillace 2004b: 38–42 and 2010: 73, Marincola 2007: 109–110, and Jung 2013: 255).

⁷⁵ See Powell and Meidani 2016 for broader hostility toward the Athenians and their traditions generally.

⁷⁶ Stewart 2004: 232 suggests that Athens did indeed become a proper *lieu de mémoire* by the second century bce, but that moves beyond the chronological purview of the present study.

Conclusion

The Persian War from Polis to Panhellenism

In 340/39 the Athenian orator Aeschines, then serving as a delegate to the Delphic Amphictyony, defended the propriety of a Persian-War monument that the Athenians had recently dedicated at Delphi. The charge was brought by the Amphissians, but Aeschines saw clearly enough that the Thebans were lurking behind the accusation. The monument, a set of golden shields installed on the temple of Apollo, proclaimed that the Athenians had defeated the Persians and the Thebans when they had fought against the Greeks at Plataea. The Thebans were gravely offended and, acting through their Amphissian allies, took action to remove the monument and punish the Athenians. Aeschines responded by accusing the Amphissians of impiety and actually turned the Amphictyony against them. The spiraling consequences of the debate soon brought about a new Sacred War. This war gave Philip of Macedonia the excuse he needed to enter central Greece and deal Athens and its allies a crushing defeat that would forever change the balance of power in the Greek world.¹ In retrospect, Demosthenes would accuse his longtime rival of engineering the entire incident on Philip's behalf, but it is frankly hard to imagine that Aeschines could have foreseen the broader ramifications of his own counter accusations.² If anything, the monuments and memories that crowded the site of Delphi would have assured him that the golden shields and even the accusations hurled against them were nothing new, but rather were part of a time-honored tradition dating back to the Persian War itself. These divided memories and the contestations that resulted had long reinforced the preeminence of the polis as an institution, but no longer. Within three years of Aeschines's spirited defense of the golden shields, Philip was sketching the lines of a new way of remembering the Persian War that transcended the interests of the city-states that had actually fought it and for a time monopolized its memory. We should not, of course, overstate the historical importance of the dispute that set all this in motion. If it had never taken place, Philip would have surely found some other excuse to justify his entry into central Greece. Indeed, only

Aeschines preserves a record of the altercation at all; Demosthenes did not deign to mention it explicitly (18.150). Even the fate of the shields themselves is uncertain.³ But for our purposes, the shields, the resulting dispute, and its accidental consequences have served as ideal touchstones for the present study because they exemplify the three propositions I set out to prove in this monograph: that the Greeks of the classical period recalled the Persian War as members of their respective states, not collectively as Greeks, that the resulting differences were extensive and fiercely contested, and finally, that a mutually accepted master narrative of the war did not emerge until Philip imposed one after shattering the conceptual dominance of the polis at the battle of Chaeronea.

That the Greeks tended to recall the Persian War in terms of their own home states has long been recognized, but it has often been argued that this parochial focus was balanced by the pull of cultural and political panhellenism. The Greeks had, after all, fought the war in a relatively large alliance of states, and the surviving commemorations frequently refer to the panhellenic scale of the conflict. But there is little evidence that the Greeks of the classical period recalled the war as Greeks. The larger collective was rather remembered as a coalition of separate states or more often as a mere backdrop for the heroics of the home state. This should hardly surprise. Before the Persian War, the Greeks were politically divided. Afterward, those who had banded together to defeat the Persians returned home to parochial prejudices and animosities that easily came to define and differentiate their shared experience by state. These centrifugal tendencies are particularly visible in light of the outsized ambitions of those who had led the Greeks to victory. Pausanias and Themistocles saw in the panhellenic scope of the war a chance to break the civic constraints imposed upon them by their fellow citizens. Their efforts left a mark on the tradition, but never constituted a serious alternative to a commemoration of the war as the victory of the polis. There was no Greek nation. The Hellenic League was a loose, ad hoc organization built on Spartan hegemony. When Pausanias claimed a personal leadership position within Greece, his fellow citizens rejected the claim outright. Themistocles fared no better among his countrymen. From the end of the war to the moment Aeschines rose to defend the golden shields, there was no sustained interest anywhere in Greece to recall the Persian War from a perspective other than the parochial.

The consequences of state domination within the Persian-War tradition were manifold. Debates over who could and could not claim what credit for the victory were incessant. Indeed, such questions stand at the heart of the altercation over the golden shields.

Nevertheless, the extent and intensity of these debates can easily be missed. Throughout the classical period, enormous sums of money were spent publicizing conflicting claims to the glories of the Persian War. These investments were not made in vain. The Persian War, suitably recalled, proved a valuable asset in interstate diplomacy. Hegemonies could be supported or undercut; savage punishments could be justified or averted—or so it was hoped. The differences between these contrary claims to the Persian War were not limited to the celebrated questions of primacy or participation, however. Rather, each locality developed its own distinct master narrative of the war as a whole that served both to frame and advance their individual claims. The polis was not a monolithic memorial community, but the Greeks very much tended to recall the common events of the Persian War through the lens of their separate states, which had the effect of refracting those events in idiosyncratic ways. As a result, when Aeschines defended the golden shields at Delphi, he would have encountered in the minds of his fellow delegates, not one Persian War, but several.

The intense parochialism at play in the controversy over the golden shields remained a force in the recollection of the Persian War for centuries to come, but the rise of Philip changed its relative importance within the overall tradition. After his victory at Chaeronea, he too turned to the Persian War to justify his ambitions. But as we have seen, the war he commemorated was quite different from the one recalled by the golden shields and countless earlier commemorations. The significance of this change for the subsequent commemoration of the Persian War has been overlooked in the past, but it was only at this point that transcendent panhellenism, which had remained latent within the Persian-War tradition throughout the classical period, was given sustained expression. At first, this invented tradition met with mixed success. Philip and Alexander were, of course, extraordinarily powerful, but they could not simply substitute their new tradition for those held throughout Greece. Not only did the divisive parochialism of the preexisting Persian-War tradition remain, but on three separate occasions it was marshalled to counter Macedonian propaganda. Despite its initial failure, the tradition invented by Philip and Alexander was later repurposed not only by the so-called successor kings, but also by the Greeks of the mainland. In time, the transcendent panhellenism that stood behind it came to dominate the memory of the Persian War, displacing the state-centered paradigm that had defined it in the classical period. The participating states continued to commemorate their parochial traditions, but now within a much changed political and commemorative environment. Select elements of the Athenian

tradition achieved heights of international recognition that had before been the stuff of jingoistic fantasy, but it was a victory won ironically only after the imperial ambition that had originally fired the likes of Cimon and Isocrates was itself a thing of the past. Even at Athens, concessions were made to the growing influence of the new tradition invented by Philip and Alexander.

Our examination of Persian-War memory has some important implications beyond the commemoration of that war. The Persian War was arguably the most remembered event in Greek history. Its commemoration offers important insights into the dynamics that underlay collective memory in the classical period generally. In his influential application of memory theory to the ancient world, Jan Assmann points to “fluidity,” “controversy,” and “a variety of traditions” as defining aspects of Greek cultural memory,⁴ and this is very much the impression we gain from the commemorations of the Persian War. At Delphi, on embassies, and in numerous other ways, the Greeks communicated the dominant narratives of their local memorial communities with those who did not share them and often bristled at their implications. There were certainly memories so distant and benign that others could accept them without objection, as Gehrke has shown in the case of hellenistic Magnesia.⁵ But the Persian-War tradition reminds us that the Greek commemorative landscape was also populated by divisive memories that were more likely to provoke contestation than acceptance. We might imagine even greater fragmentation when the members of Greece’s numerous state memorial communities recalled those events that were purely parochial or in which their interlocutors were not allies, but enemies. This is not to say that the Greeks failed to coalesce into a loose memorial community, nor to deny that they shared a cultural memory, but that memory would have been defined as much by dissension as consensus and so could hardly have constituted a “space of past time that was common to all,” as Gehrke suggests.⁶

Such a divisive memorial culture has additional implications for the reality and impact of panhellenism in the classical period. The Persian War did indeed prompt individuals and communities across the Greek world to think in larger terms, to recognize (or invent) similarities between themselves in contrast to perceived differences with the invader. But these ideas of cultural unity and political cooperation provoked an equal and opposite reaction in the commemoration of the war that fostered them. Parochialism and local chauvinism were cherished facts of life.⁷ Despite the manifest fact that Xerxes had been defeated by a relatively large Greek coalition (or rather because of it), the Persian War was almost exclusively recalled as a victory won by the polis, either acting alone or in concert with other independent

poleis. The larger Greek collective continued to play a role, but as the passive recipient of benefactions bestowed by the polis. Yet memory is never wholly at the disposal of those who attempt to control it. By casting Greece and the Greeks as a constant backdrop for the heroic actions of the polis, state-centered commemorations served to reify the very feelings of common identity they were intended to overwhelm. These feelings remained latent within the tradition for most of the classical period, but were then given powerful voice by Philip at Corinth and later by Alexander and others. Commemorations have unintended consequences.

We should not, however, assume that the latent panhellenism of our classical commemorations was a single concept shared throughout the Greek world. There was no interstate notion of panhellenism emanating out from some panhellenic center that was then accepted by the individual members of this massive imagined community. Rather, each locality projected an image of this larger community in the light of its own local traditions, experiences, and interests. The panhellenism of Athenian hegemony looked very different from the panhellenism for which the Plataeans pled in Thucydides. Mytilenean or Syracusan travelers to Delphi would have been hard pressed to accept the distinctly limited panhellenism of the Serpent Column's list. The Corinthians saw themselves united with their fellow Greeks as the beneficiaries of female sexuality; the Athenians believed that they and their fellow Greeks had fought against its pernicious influence. Each of these groups was, of course, imagining the same community. Naturally, similar projections arose that were later exploited by Philip and Alexander, but in the classical period (and beyond) this larger community of Greeks could look very different depending on the state memorial community to which the individual invoking it belonged. Just as there were multiple Persian Wars recalled by our surviving narratives and monuments, so too were there multiple panhellenisms. Such a conclusion lends additional support to Mitchell's view that panhellenism "was not generated by a single centre at a single time. . . . Rather, there were a number of 'moments' among the poleis when individual communities created and defined the symbolic community."⁸

The Persian-War tradition we have outlined here was complex, differentiated, and dynamic. It did not emerge as a static or inevitable result of a simpler, ancient collective memory such as Nora, Hobsbawm, and others often imply of pre-modern commemoration generally.⁹ When our sources are interpreted in their proper spatial and chronological context, they point rather to a tradition that was just as contested and historically contingent as are modern and postmodern memories. As we have seen in the preceding, the

parochial dominated the recollection of the Persian War for so long as the Greek world was dominated by the city-state. Indeed, despite significant differences in commemorative and master narratives, the Greek memory of the Persian War was largely shaped by the shared cultural paradigm of the polis. When the regime of competing city-states was overthrown, however, a very different paradigm for recalling the war emerged and in time prevailed. The shift was not total. The Persian-War memories monumentalized and narrated after that point continued to celebrate many of the same events and often recycled narrative frames and emplotments that had been popularized in the classical period. Indeed, many looked back to classical sources like Simonides, Herodotus, and Isocrates explicitly. But the assumptions that underlay their reconstructions were now quite different. The Persian War had become the moment when panhellenic sentiments had for a brief time transcended endemic (and deleterious) parochialism; when being Greek had counted for more than being Athenian, Megarian, or Tegean. This was a far cry from the classical tradition, which reveled in its parochialism. The new tradition may have reflected the historical reality of the Persian War more accurately (as many moderns assume), but for our purposes that hardly matters. The Greeks came to think of the war in this way, not because it had been so in reality, but rather because it had come to be commemorated and remembered as such later. We run the risk of homogenizing dynamic collective memories of the past (and so justifying the casual assumption of modern theorists) if we fail to contextualize and historicize the sources of those memories adequately.

Our examination of Persian-War memory and its implications for Greek memorial culture raise inevitable questions about our capacity to reconstruct the past that our surviving commemorations recall. As noted in the Introduction, our sources for the recollection of the Persian War are our sources for the war itself.¹⁰ The situation is hardly different for almost any event in the ancient world. Despite the inevitable exaggerations, dramatizations, biases, and outright fabrications that accompanied the process of public memory-making, the details of the Persian War can be reconstructed with some confidence. The study of collective memory does not (in my opinion at least) present us with an epistemological crisis. It does, however, suggest that greater caution is needed when we attempt to organize these events into modern historical narratives. Too often scholars have accepted narrative frames and emplotments popular in one part of Greece (usually Athens) as reflecting a true and accurate account of the war without due consideration for their origin as self-interested and parochial collective memories. Problems are compounded when

these parochial narratives, now taken for historical reality, are thought to motivate the decisions of our historical actors.¹¹ We cannot and should not assume that the Greeks collectively or individually understood the past either as we do or as their contemporaries did. Rather, the lessons they learned from the Persian War would have been as different as the master narratives upon which such things depend.

Finally, the likely state of the Persian-War tradition in the classical period sheds new light on our principal source for the war, Herodotus. When he set about to record the noteworthy deeds of the Greeks and barbarians and particularly how they came to fight each other, he would have been greeted by a mass of overlapping but distinct narratives of what had occurred, when, and where. Each of his narrative decisions—to begin the war with Croesus, to exclude the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily, or to end his account after Sestos—involved selecting one parochial variant over another. It is the singular genius of Herodotus to show his readers this process and the contestations that lay behind it. Earlier beginnings for the war and the Sicilian version of it are noted, but rejected. In other cases, Herodotus leaves the decision to us. Indeed, much of what can be said about the divided nature of Persian-War memory is owed to the fact that Herodotus includes so many different contemporary opinions about the war. But the extent of those differences simply could not be contained in a single narrative account. There were too many variations touching on too many core facets of the war. Herodotus's synthesis of those variations is admirably sensitive, but remains synthetic. It provides a valuable impression of the polyphony that would have defined the overall Persian-War tradition in the classical period, but does not restore to those voices the cohesiveness, dynamism, and independence that would have characterized them within the memorial communities that sustained them.

The Persian-War tradition evoked by the golden shields at Delphi was a shifting tangle of parochial recollections. There was no larger consensus, no dominant narrative in comparison to which the justice of Athenian claims could be tested. From the Athenian point of view, probably from Aeschines's as well, the inscription related a simple truth about the Persian War. For the other Greeks whose substantial efforts against Xerxes were elided, however, the dedication's single-minded focus on Athens must have seemed at best a half-truth. For the Thebans, whose support of the Greek cause prior to Thermopylae and dedication to Greek freedom afterward were forgotten in favor of their much-regretted brush with Medism, the inscription was an impermissible prevarication. Philip likely received word of this burgeoning dispute with great interest. For the sake of the Persian-

War past, now almost a century and a half old, Athens and Thebes were giving him the excuse he sought to enter central Greece. It is impossible to know, but tempting to speculate, that the circumstances that led to Chaeronea underscored in his mind the need to invent a new Persian-War tradition.

¹ For more on Aeschines's defense of the golden shields, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 1–3.

² It was Demosthenes's opinion that Aeschines had been bribed by Philip to act as he did with the specific intention of giving the Macedonian king an excuse to move against Athens (18.143–59); against Demosthenes's interpretation, see [Londey 1990](#).

³ See [Chapter 7](#), p. 257 n.29 for the afterlife of these shields.

⁴ [J. Assmann 1992](#): 271 (= 2011: 246).

⁵ [Gehrke 2001](#); see also [Chapter 3](#), p. 134.

⁶ [Gehrke 2001](#): 297.

⁷ See [Beck and Smith 2018](#) for more on the role of parochialism in Greek thought through a case study of Megara.

⁸ [L. Mitchell 2007](#), esp. 64–65.

⁹ For the assumption that pre-modern memory was somehow a simpler affair, see the [Introduction](#), pp. 17–19 and [Chapter 6](#), p. 204 n.10; see [Innes 2000](#): 8 and [Gallia 2012](#): 4 for earlier critiques of such assumptions about memory and commemoration in the pre-modern period.

¹⁰ See the [Introduction](#), pp. 26–27.

¹¹ The point is brought out by Cubitt, who notes that “what each successive wave of social actors relates to, whether positively or negatively, is of course not so much the reality of past experiences, as the ways in which the past has been imagined, evoked and represented by previous generations of social actors” (2007: 202).

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